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## **Poland's Integration with the European Union as Cultural Universe**

### **Introductory remarks**

At the end of the last decade of the twentieth Century cultural factor has grown in importance within the process of Poland's integration with the European Union. Several factors can be mentioned as reasons for that change, including, in particular, the following ones:

Firstly: the Union itself has appreciated the growing role of cultural factor in the processes of integration; the fact highlighted by the reform of the EU's cultural programmes. A single integrated programme "Culture 2000" has been established instead of several hitherto-existing ones. Additionally, a large growth of resources allocated for implementation of the new programme is expected. There is a belief firmly expressed on the establishment of the new programme, that culture should gain a new place, closer to the very centre of the process of European integration.

Secondly, as negotiation on accession comes nearer, controversy as to possible effects of integration for Poland has become more heated. This has been caused by a number of reasons, among which a fear of Poland losing its cultural sovereignty is certainly not the least important one. Apart from political and economic issues, culture is going to become an arena of controversy too, thus gaining a status of an essential political matter. Indeed, a dispute on the shape of culture of Polish people has focused on nothing less than the perspective of development of Poland in terms of civilisation.

Thirdly: a big deal of anxiety and incertitude have been related to globalisation, whose effects have been mistakenly interpreted as results of Poland's opening towards Western Europe. Furthermore, another kind of misunderstanding

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can be observed: the country's relationship with the Union has been blamed for any negative aspects of globalisation and for the results it has brought.

Fourthly: there have been some complex processes taking place in Poland, the responsibility for which has been attributed to our tendency to integrate with the European Union, while in fact what we have dealt with is a number of deep transformation processes implied by the evolution of Polish nation and influenced by democracy, by the opening of the country to the world and by the process of establishing market economy. New, previously unknown divisions and lines of cultural differentiation occur within the society. Some of the processes of establishing political nation based upon relationships of citizens have indeed been painful; nevertheless, they have taken place and gradually dominated over the weakening forces maintaining ethnical nation. The process has to be seen as advantageous from the point of view of Polish participation in the presently dominating current of global civilisation, however, one has to expect a number of further tensions in this respect. Accordingly, it is especially important to take account of this transformation in the educational process in Poland.

### **Anti-European scarecrows**

There is a number of sensitive matters related to Poland's accession to the Union, ones that provoke emotions in wide circles of Polish society. Beside economic issues such as threats to Polish agriculture, there is also some controversy growing around aspects which can be described as historical-psychological-cultural. The whole body of neurosis under discussion, taken together, may influence attitude of Polish people to the Union – and it actually does.

There is a growing pressure towards carrying out a referendum on whether Polish society really wishes accession. Irrespective of when such a referendum would take place, a debate on values, tradition and related matters is going to play a more and more important role in positions of different parties and – eventually – it will influence results of potential referendum. The presently observed trend is not advantageous for accession: the number of opponents has been growing. The level of support for Poland's accession to the Union is no longer secure and the tendency to decline in terms of support is indisputable. It should be remembered that several years ago, when first international survey in this field was carried out (by Eurobarometer) the support in Poland amounted to 80 per cent and ranked first in the Central Europe (except Albania). This was later confirmed by a survey carried out by CBOS in May 1996, when a level of support also reaching 80 per cent was noted. In April 1997 it fell to 72 per cent and in April 1998 it only amounted to 62 per cent. A similar decline was

observed in surveys made by the Institute of Public Affairs in 1999: while in February the support was at 62 per cent, by April of the same year it fell to just 58 per cent. In October 1999 the support ratio, as documented by surveys carried out by the Institute, fell below 50 per cent (reaching the level of 46 per cent).

Reservations regarding European integration concern three main areas: sovereignty, values and economic interests. Most integration advocates is found among inhabitants of big cities, among young people as well as among well-educated and high-income groups. Gradually, as our knowledge on the Union grows, including that on benefits but also on costs of accession thereto, the support decreases and slowly comes near to levels observed in Western-European countries. The more knowledge, the more sober and reserved our attitude. Perhaps we are just growing normal?

A generation factor seems to advocate accession (with support for Poland's integration with the European Union among the 18-24 age group being a dozen or more per cent higher than the average). Subsequent age groups of young people who reach adult age identify their life aspirations with Poland's full European and global opening; integration with the European Union moves their imagination in a positive way. This may bring broader social support for the integration in a few years, however, in the case of young people, this only means paper support. Polish youth's knowledge about the Union is still inadequate, which may become a source of a number of disappointments. Moreover, taking a low level of political participation of youth into account, which translates into a weak presence of that group during elections, their support will most likely occur one of little importance. Whilst there have been efforts made to mobilise young people around the aim of Poland's integration with the European Union, which is of great political importance, it also proves very difficult due to the present trends in culture of the young generation.

We have faced negative consequences of the fact that there was no debate on the balance of costs and benefits of our accession taking place during the last couple of years. Nobody made an effort to try to persuade to people that the country would have to bear costs this way or another, irrespective of whether Poland becomes a EU Member State or not (the costs in question can be seen as a price for opening of the country) while benefits are not guaranteed unless we integrate. Polish government has been inactive in this respect (and what we have experienced during the last year can even be called anti-propaganda of the Union, since that was the feeling provoked by competency disputes); support given by non-governmental organisations was inadequate, which can be explained, to a certain degree, by weakness of the third sector in Poland – or, in fact, weakness of citizenship society. Public media (radio and TV) have not been active enough, while among the non-public media there has been a clear division drawn, according to political tendencies, and they fail to provide

reliable information on the problems behind integration, confining themselves to either encourage or discourage to the Union using just casual opinions.

Accordingly, the pro-Union lobby has not become stronger, whilst there has been some sort of consolidation taking place among forces which have accused the Union for virtually every bad thing: from a financial crisis in the country to property sell-out, to destroying genuine Polish tradition by an invasion of mass culture and so on. Such an attitude has been expressed in a most spectacular way by „Radio Maryja”, by press and editing houses related thereto as well as by a large section of the remaining nationalist right wing. It should be stressed that a number of youth movements have been active within that right wing. One could regard the whole thing as one having only a minor importance – a manifestation of pluralism which is normal in an open society, save for the methods used to make the European Union odious to people. This makes other groups in Polish church weaker – namely those which present a realistic attitude towards integration, perhaps void of enthusiasm and full of reservations, but far from scaring people with a perspective of independent existence of Poland as a country being threatened. Even the Pope’s John Paul II support for our relationship with the EU, expressed during his last pilgrimage to Poland, has not ensued any growth in pro-Unionist attitudes.

The above-mentioned forces call upon a number of “scarecrows” at a time in order to truly influence opinion of considerable circles of people, including as follows:

- Perspective of a loss of national identity, dissolution of Poles in an “environment of foreign tribes”, including erosion of the Catholic faith,
- Perspective of a loss of the State sovereignty or even disintegration of the State. In this respect Article 90 of Polish Constitution in particular is quoted and interpreted, which stipulates for potential cession of some competencies of Polish State to supra-national institutions. Before the administration reform has been carried out in Poland, attempts were very common to provoke a phobia in society based on an argument that partition of Poland was taking place in order to divide it into separate “lands” and that such lands would fall apart due to a tendency of external gravitation,
- Perspective of imposition upon Poland of will by the Western European left wing and liberals who tend for erosion of nations and for them being dominated by great corporations,
- A German phobia – perspective of “buying-out” of Poland by Germans, of an uncertain legal position of Polish inhabitants in far Western and Northern parts of the country, of taking over Polish press by strong German companies and of a possible domination of the Western belt

of Poland by the Berlin metropolis being the most dynamic one in Europe at present,

- A phobia of getting possession of Polish economy by foreign actors and bringing Poles to a role of a hired workforce.

Of course, this propaganda and anti-Unionist indoctrination is evidently one-sided and fails to attract a great number of people in Poland, including those having only a middle level of education but capable of thinking reasonable way. On the other hand, one must not forget that – speaking in moderate terms – Polish people do not belong to the best-educated nations compared to societies of other European countries and, furthermore, their participation in inter-cultural communication as well as the level of their knowledge *by encounter* on the world is poor: only one in eight or nine adult people in Poland have ever visited any of the Western European countries. As a result, most people have to base their opinion upon *knowledge by reporting* which means second-hand information and experience, mainly filtered through the media. The fact in itself could be no dangerous at all if only people had their own and independent system of value, making it possible for them to evaluate facts and phenomena taking place in Europe. That way, they could filter any contents that reaches them independently. However, this is not, unfortunately, the case and to make things even worse, such contents is, more often than not, programmed to affect other-than cognitive elements in human nature: namely, it consists of “psycho-dynamic” and behavioural manipulation (attempts to exploit human fear, prejudice and complex).

One has to evaluate this trend of indoctrination as dangerous since while it is based upon ignorance, it reaches mainly those already declared as it is addressed to conservative people who tend to oppose any changes and stay in the “trenches” of Polish character and tradition. On the other hand, there are other trends in the anti-Unionist propaganda as well, which adduce to actual processes taking place both within Polish society and in the whole European environment. In fact, such processes have been far from unequivocal just as anything in a vivid social tissue and, accordingly, some well-reasoned arguments are needed in this respect to control such one-sided and narrow interpretations.

### **Culture and challenges of integration**

The cultural character of Poland will be, in a couple of decades to come, a resultant of the three most important elements: trends, internal transformational processes and integration with the European Union.

Culture has to be regarded as a parameter which is hard to measure and whose visibility is small. Nevertheless, it is going to be very important for Poland. How can one rate cultural consequences of the country's integration with the

Union? There is a potential for several different scenarios to come real. A statement can be put forth that these are not going to be shock effects for that area, since Polish culture, unlike the areas of politics or economy, was relatively open from as long as the middle of the fifties, long time before any further relationships with the Member States of the Union were established. Therefore, no cultural shock is expected, yet some kind of collision of values is going to happen. We have to deal, in different groups of society, with various types of reaction to collisions, on the part of receiving cultures. In the case under consideration, this may mean: (1) full acceptance of what Europe brings with itself or a one-side adaptation, (2) total rejection, (3) selective adaptation, (4) mutual adaptation.<sup>1</sup>

There seems to be much evidence encouraging us to assume that the two former scenarios (namely, full acceptance and total rejection) are rather unlikely. Rather than that, some kind of selective attitude towards Europe will probably be taken. Poland, along with other countries of the Central Europe, will bring its own genuine values which will inevitably result in some changes to the Union: the question is how far it will change. Whether such a change will be a far-reaching one, it depends on a strength and vitality of our values, their usefulness for the integration and for Western societies. Anyway, it is not going to look like Poland is the only one to transform; the Union will undergo changes as well. At some point where Polish and European vectors cross each other, a new identity of Poles will evolve in the next generation. Let us leave any megalomania aside: the meeting is not going to happen halfway; Poland's path to such a crossing point will be much longer than that of the Union.

There may be no hiatus between what is common and shared and what is genuine and national in Europe at the age of integration. A challenge arises to millions of Poles and other „Central Europeans” to redefine relationships between the former and the latter. Again, there is a potential for a couple of scenarios to happen: full **European status** (*i.e.* belonging or the feeling of partnership with the Western Europe), **sub-European status** (one of a back-door land; dependable and influenced development), **half-European status** (some groups identify with Europe, others mentally reject it), **non-European status** (voluntarily keeping distance to it – “*President Łukaszenko's choice in other words*”).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> K.Krzysztofek, *Zderzenia kulturowe w Polsce lat 90. Tendencje procesu kulturowego po zmianie ustroju (Cultural collisina in Poland of the nineties. Tendencies in cultural process following the systemic transformation)*, „*Transformacje*”, March 1996.

<sup>2</sup> More on the same subject see also: K.Krzysztofek, *Nowe problemy kulturowe Europy po 1989 r.* in: *Integracja Europy. Elementy historii, problemy, przyszłość (Europe's new cultural problems after 1989)*, ed. L.W.Zacher, P.Matusak, Warsaw 1996.

In attempts to exert mass influences the use of “icons” of Europe is an essential tool. A whole area of European symbols addressing emotional sphere is very important. According to Johann Galtung, Norwegian political philosopher<sup>3</sup>, the problem of seeking identification with the European character mainly concerns Central, Eastern and Northern Europeans (Scandinavians), since the „*holy centres of Europe are remote places for them, situated in the West and South of the continent rather than on their territories*” – we should add: in the form of ancient, historic metropolis such as Athens, Rome, Aachen (Charlemagne’s tomb), Santiago de Compostella (the Apostle Saint James’s tomb) as well as in great capitals of Western European countries: London and Paris and in the centres-symbols of new Europeism: Brussels, Strasbourg, Maastricht and in Amsterdam which has been a symbol in both historic and modern terms. When the Pope John Paul II rendered the Saints Cyryl and Metody the status of patrons of Europe, the gesture was meant to extend this sphere of European symbols – holy sites and patrons, to the East.

Nations having such “Europe’s holy sites” in their heritage face no problems regarding their identity: there is no dispute on what cultural relationship should look like between their European and national elements in French, English, German, Dutch or Italian societies. Such a debate has taken place in the countries where holy sites are scarce or lacking at all. The discussion goes on, gaining new momentum in different periods (especially at the turning points in particular country’s history) or within strong intellectual movements as history is judged and evaluated. We do not know, due to the lack of historic sources, what kind of debate took place in the times of Mieszko the First, when Polish Sclavinia was at the beginning of its first round of accession to Europe – namely – Christianisation. There was no such dispute during the Middle Ages or the Renaissance since the notion of a national State did not exist at the time and the consciousness of a genuine cultural identity was only beginning to form („*Poles no geese...*”). Such a consciousness was evident in the seventeenth Century, in the times of Counter-Reformation and Sarmatia, when cultural conflict between the West (full of „Calvinist miasma”) and homeliness of Catholic people having brave and warrior-minded yet other-than European ancestors first came into plain view.

Since that time polemics between what is European and what is a nation’s own and homely was constantly present in minds of the intellectual elite. It was very strong at the time of Romanticism and Positivism, among Poles in the country and in emigration alike. However, it never came close to be a threat of causing a mental or moral split of the nation similar to that which resulted

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<sup>3</sup> See: J.Galtung, paper presented on the International Conference: „Integration Cultural Shock of Small and Medium Size Countries upon Joining the EU”, Bratislava, Sept. 10-11.

from disputes between Russian „Nationals” and „Westernians” or between Turkish modernists (Kemal Pasha) and Islamists. Nevertheless, the debate on sources and essence of Polish culture is still very heated – the fact that should be rated positive since it has a revitalising effect upon culture. Generally speaking, it was (and still is) a dispute between proponents of the opinion that Polish culture wholly derives itself from the Mediterranean one and those pointing out that it has been formed by a number of influences coming from a lot of sources and that it has always evolved as a multi-facial pattern (Poland as “cultural vestibule” living in a „blow of winds of history”). Polish Christianity, Latin alphabet, a large percentage of words of Greek, Latin and neo-Latin (French) origin in Polish lexical resources originate from the Mediterranean source. Furthermore, we also had an immense civilisation-forming influence of German culture in our history (in culture in general and in language as well). Nobody dares to question the fact that Kraków, along with other historic cities in Poland, forms an essential element of our heritage and one should not forget that Kraków was founded basing on the Magdeburg law. Similarly, why should “founding” Poland again basing on the law of the Union be seen as a threat to its national substance?

Such a dispute on the place of Poland in Europe would be both needed and valuable as one fostering intellectual tensions, save for the lack of any axiological foundation in it in the form of an indispensable common basis for values. Instead, there is an acute contra-position of options, in other words a right of a strongly polarised magnet applies: the stronger the poles, the weaker the gravitation in the centre of the field. Both extremes are hard to accept: uncritical enthusiasm towards Europe and a thorough defence of „genuine homeliness” alike. None of them leads to creative adaptation.

- The above holds true in relation to the former option since it would confine us to a role of a nation programmed by other nations and only expected to adapt to and follow the standards established by others and possibly get rid of its fears and troubles rather than to come out with its genuine, independent ideas. Such an option is an excessively defensive one, giving an evidence of a pessimist belief that we are incapable of offering to the European Union anything fresh, enlivening, seminal from our catalogue of values since somebody else had already created and developed everything before we had our opportunity. To make things even worse, we seem to give up to such a conviction at the time when voices are increasingly heard throughout Europe, expressing a need to create programmes around the notion of a “creative nation”.
- The opposite tendency is excessively ethnocentric and even megalomaniac at times as it rejects “returning to Europe” in favour of a desire to “convert” it to the proper faith, basing on a belief that we are the only

ones to have preserved it and to be able to point the right way to heal the “sick spirit of Europe”. There is an opinion shared by a significant group in our society that we are in possession of values Europe needs, so it should adopt them in its own interest. However, an intellectual effort made to reconcile this identity orientation with demands of modernisation is scarce and it is quite clear that modernisation, due of its very nature, has to be imitative to a certain degree, since nobody attained any significant development success in modern times without emulating some best practices or solutions and showing an open attitude towards cultural diffusion.

One can ask the question whether it is the old and well-known Polish stirring between “peacock’s loftiness” and “parrot’s imitation” that manifests itself in the two above-mentioned tendencies. Is it not the old Polish inability to find a compromise between an ethnocentric and imitative culture that we see? Jacek Stróżyński, a Christian philosopher, points out some phenomenon<sup>4</sup> having as much a cultural as psychological nature: namely that of the presence, within the Polish way of thinking, of two forms of provincial character in relation to Europe. The first bases upon a belief that Poland is underdeveloped, backward and anachronistic in every respect compared to Western Europe, including the area of culture, a belief that we are burdened with a negative „mental luggage” (traditional Catholicism, a strong element of peasant culture) which forms a negative pre-condition for our integration with the West. Such a burden should simply be got rid of. Another aspect of the above-mentioned provincial attitude consists in regarding the same features of Polish character as essential values which should be protected from being “destroyed by Brussels” in order to avoid gaining a status of a pariah deprived of his genuine strength taken from his own culture and identity.

Such a debate is not exclusive to Poland: similar opinions have been heard in a Europe-wide dispute between conservatism and liberalism (as evidenced by the results of the recent elections in Austria and the phenomenon of Haider). In Poland, however, they are additionally burdened by the past, by judgements on history, by plunging in it in order to try to investigate once more, after a thousand times, what led us to the present moment. This makes any discussion on the future very difficult. This is very unfortunate because people in Poland at present need such a discussion just as they need healthy food or clean air, since that would be a debate on a consistent re-orientation of the country towards the West. This geo-political and geo-cultural choice can be compared, as to its importance, to just a few turning points in the history of the nation, such as the introduction of Latin Christianity to Poland, the Union with Lithuania and the

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<sup>4</sup> J.Stróżyński, *Wielka rafa europejska (A Great European Reef)*, „Nasz Głos”, no. 3/25/1999.

orientation to the East, chosen by kings of the Jagiellonian dynasty, disappearance of the State from maps of Europe, regaining independence, and moving Polish borders to the West. Admittedly, the latter fact has been strictly related to reorientation taking place at present.

It seems important to give an answer to the question which values present in the Polish catalogue are necessary for spiritual survival, while being, at the same time, functional for preservation of our ability to co-operate with the Western Europe and to pursue the development path on which such an ability can be reached, and, secondly, which values should be given up – even if through a painful process – due to the consciousness that they have to be regarded as the “adaptation losses” and accordingly written off. Putting the same thing in other words, the question is: should we undergo a stress of “pursuing Europe” in order to live a better life in some time perspective, probably rather nearer than more remote, however, at the price of certain values and some of our cultural tradition, or to preserve such values, which, on the one hand, probably have to be regarded as non-compatible with the civilisation currents dominating in the Western Europe, but, on the other hand, provide people with the feeling of a firm foundation, of surety in stressful times, orientation as to axiological poles. Of course, there are good and bad things, virtues and vices in any culture. The question is what should be done with those values and patterns which prove non-functional for our integration with Europe while forming, at the same time, a core of our identity? Theodor Adorno, an outstanding German philosopher, cautioned<sup>5</sup> that while adapting a nation’s own values to the needs of evolution of the modern world, a very careful attitude is needed to avoid “fouling” a whole cultural heritage.

To be sure, there are such values in Polish catalogue. For example, how to reconcile an emotional attitude of a Polish peasant to the land with the right of purchase and sale of land in the European Union which is unified in the area of law. “*Have your money back, stranger, since one who sells land betrays Polish faith*” or “*You don’t sell land as you don’t sell sky or sun*” – we learnt from *Placówka*, a novel by Bolesław Prus. What’s at stake is a sale of the land where ashes of our fathers rest – warnings like that can quite often be heard. In short, the question is: how can Polish tradition with its strong element of peasant culture fit into a cultural corset of the Union? Furthermore, this is not the only kind of the elements of culture that matters. The heritage of Polish culture throughout the two past Centuries mainly consisted of struggle and fight for national independence, which quite naturally resulted in domination of community and freedom values. Accordingly, values which are in high esteem in the life of Western Europe – individualistic and pragmatic ones – were mainly out of

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<sup>5</sup> See: Th. Adorno, *Minima Moralia*, Frankfurt/Main 1953.

interest in Poland, while today it is them that European integration is primarily based upon.<sup>6</sup>

For the four past decades European integration had at its core mainly urban middle class cultures, founded on citizen's ties and deriving their values from a modern, republican catalogue. During the process of modernisation, manifested by farmer revolution following American patterns old-fashioned, genuine peasant cultures eroded and almost ceased to exist in the European Union at present – except for a couple of areas at the outskirts (such as Italian Mezzogiorno or rural Greece).<sup>7</sup> Is the culture of Polish countryside with its neighbourhood and relative ties going to be just a burden? And if so, should we agree with the fact and sacrifice the living culture, dooming our rural areas to culture shock, in the hope that after that a next generation will create a new culture of adaptation which will prove functional for Europe? Or perhaps should we expect that cultural pluralism of the European Union will be receptive enough to contain peasant culture, which already became exotic for Europe? To be sure, what looks like one in the very centre of the civilised Europe, is in fact just a “rite and colourful folk events” which – such as Bavarian *Oktoberfest* famous for huge amounts of beer being drunk – have a role of attractions protecting from everyday dullness.

### **Identity of culture and the interest of State and nation**

The argument that a nation situated in the centre of Europe, at the end of the millennium, must not be closed, should be beyond any doubt. Therefore, as all respected intellectuals and scholars studying the area of culture agree, reaching reconciliation of a nation's own canon of culture with European and global cultural universe has been the basic challenge for any European nation. Only those societies who wish to communicate with the world on a scale as large as possible have a chance to succeed in this respect. Small European nations belonging to European Union have proven that opening makes culture more resistant, deepens the consciousness of the nation's own values, compels to ask questions on a sense of the nation's own culture, a sense of experiencing it deeply, verifies the value of work and intellectual effort. The nations

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<sup>6</sup> W.Morawski, *Kultura jako czynnik ciągłości i zmiany transformacji gospodarczej (Culture as continuity factor and changes in economic transformation)*, paper presented during the conference: „Nowoczesność Polaków” (“Modernity of Polish People”), Warsaw 1991.

<sup>7</sup> M.Wieruszewska, *Kultury chłopskie a szanse społeczeństwa obywatelskiego w perspektywie integracji Europy Środkowej z Unią Europejską (Peasant Cultures and Opportunities for the Citizenship Society in Perspective of the Central Europe's Integration with the European Union)*, paper presented during the international conference: „Między <uniwersalizmem> Zachodu a <partykularyzmem> Wschodu” (“In Between Western <Universalism> and Eastern <Particularism>”), Warsaw, 08-10.05.1997.

of European Union have lived for almost two generations in conditions of developing integration so they managed to accumulate a considerable deal of experience and already know how to defend their cultures, under such circumstances, against factors threatening their identity. It is clear that our opportunity to use this experience will be much better once we access to the Union than if we stay aside. Additionally, only as a Member State of the EU can Poland be included in its development programmes in the area of culture, since such programmes will not be accessible to countries beyond the Union.

Professor Janusz Tazbir was right to argue that while becoming member of the Union, we are far from being conquered by any empire<sup>8</sup>. Moreover, it cannot be said that history testifies against us. Late in the 16<sup>th</sup> Century Piotr Skarga expressed his warnings on Poland being threatened by Turkish influence. Similar voices of caution against French influences could also be heard quite often: *“you won't believe any casual news of the world unless you read it in a French newspaper”*. Following the third partition of Poland new warnings were expressed, predicting that the nation would fall just as the State which no longer existed. Fears of German and Russian influences were most common. However culture proved its strength, survived Wilhelmian efforts towards Germanization (in the form of radical German Society for the Eastern Borders called Hakata or of *Kulturkampf*) growing even more resistant. Polish culture was becoming a genuine national institution – while undergoing consolidation, at the same time it turned towards itself. As rightfully written by Bronisław Łagowski,<sup>9</sup> the need to protect a nation's identity is only raised and pronounced at a time *„when there is a threat of falling into dependence on foreign laws, institutions or custom. In such a situation protection of identity is synonymous with defence of freedom or sovereign existence”*.

At such times a sociological rule always applies which orders to close the ranks, to consolidate in dangerous times. Fight for identity and freedom of a nation has always become patriotic command. For the same reason our culture was hard to understand to foreigners – since it focused upon dilemmas and “pains of existence” that were genuinely Polish rather than universal. It may seem paradoxical that culture grew stronger at times when it was most threatened, when Polish people had no State of their own or when it lacked independence. That was the situation that prevailed for lifetimes of ten generations of Poles with just a single episode between the first and the second World Wars. This example illustrates than as the nation felt relatively secure in its own country, judgements on history ceased, the national issue no longer dominated over any other and energy was directed to civilisation development (could anyone dare to

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<sup>8</sup> J.Tazbir, *Nie wchodzimy do żadnego imperium* (“We Access No Empire”), „Europa”, no. 1/98.

<sup>9</sup> B.Łagowski, *Przejmujemy dobre i złe* (*We Are Going to Take Over Good and Bad*), „Europa”, no. 1/98.

think about inventing new, more hygienic wooden toilets for farmers at a time when all men were expected to fight for freedom?).

There is an obvious necessity to trace and study cultural process and to stay responsive through implementation of a well-balanced and reasonable cultural and educational policies. An inflow of foreign culture may be a threat only for a dull society who – due to that dullness – would only be capable of thoughtless imitation instead of creative adaptation and general creativity in every area of modern life. Such a consciousness is more and more evident among all circles, including those assuming sceptical attitude towards further chances for Polish identity. In this respect a reasonable point can be quoted, put forth by a representative of Catholic circles which seem to be afraid of the future fate and condition of our nation following the integration: it is not the European Union that would be guilty of erosion of Polish identity – there is no one capable of depriving us of our identity unless we renounce it ourselves. And the other way round: unless national culture independently defends itself under conditions of opening and confrontation of values, no man-made defence instrument is going to help it survive.<sup>10</sup>

Cultural processes can hardly be foreseen. The above quoted Łagowski is right while he says that *„the nation may undergo far-reaching transformation and, in spite of that, not to experience its identity being in threat. It can be the case when changes have a spontaneous character, are sought after and welcome, ensuing from an authentic, genuine need”*. Paradoxically, the country undergoes „westernisation” under the banners saying *„let Poland be Poland”*: *„Western standards seem to be dearer to large numbers of Poles, especially to young people, than the old-fashioned homeliness”*.<sup>11</sup> The factor of generations is very important indeed in this respect. Taking the educational and general intellectual level of Polish society into consideration, it can be foreseen with certainty – what finds an additional confirmation in general opinion – that young people, having a natural tendency to imitate, will be more eager to emulate what is “Western”, and not necessarily what is at its peak, rather what proves most efficient, pragmatic and oriented towards end results.

Young people in Poland are keen on emulating this dual culture. What’s more, there is a large group of youth in the present generation – in this one in particular – able to compete with Europe in a number of areas. This ability results in part from the freshness of the new system in Poland, from the fact that people had no time to grow tired with it yet; perhaps in time, while already being “in Europe”, they are going to experience some fatigue. On the other hand, the

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<sup>10</sup> See an opinion of Priest S.Tkocz, *„Tygodnik Powszechny”*, 19.02.1998.

<sup>11</sup> B.Łagowski, op.cit.

fact that bad patterns have also been emulated has to be seen and reckoned with as well.

It can be said that perhaps a full circle has to be drawn: people have to dip in freedom, tolerance, relativism first, and only at a later time they would realise that nobody is satisfied with such a cultural hybrid and that's when a problem will arise anew of the return "to the roots" and the issue of identity will re-emerge, though already on a different level. As German Europeans say, one can hardly think of anything better to happen to German people than the fact that they will dissolve in Europe at last, only in order to turn up again as Schwabs, Saxons, Prussians and so on.<sup>12</sup>

There is a number of complex processes taking place in contemporary culture in which also many negative phenomena can be pointed out and which require adaptation on the part of all societies, including the best developed ones. Debates also go on in the EU Member States, focusing on the status of nations under conditions of integration and on the role of culture in that process. A belief seems to dominate that Europe should reject any extremes: on the one hand it neither may be a "besieged fortress", a cultural "Schengen area", nor a colony („coca-colony") of global industries of mass culture; while on the other hand it may not be a group of tribes, broken up and plunged in mutual conflicts, since it has already taken such an unfortunate course back in its history. Instead, it should form a community of nations peacefully living together and sharing their values with each other. Of course, every nation has been a creation of history in which it developed, in particular of European history, and it undergoes transformations, however, as noted by Jerzy Szacki,<sup>13</sup> „*European societies are extremely attached to the idea of nation and hardly anybody can be pointed out who dreams of existence in a cosmopolitan vacuum. (...) Therefore, unified Europe will be, without any doubt, the <Europe of Homelands>*". Giving up even a small part of either political or cultural sovereignty is a difficult decision, in particular for the countries who have only enjoyed those values for a short time. Certainly, some common denominator of what is European will be needed, understood as a means of communication making it possible to maintain community. Such a denominator could consist of two layers of culture: the first one, in which all European would participate and another "dear" one – each nation's own and genuine.<sup>14</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> Ibidem.

<sup>13</sup> J.Szacki, *Tożsamość narodowa w obliczu otwartej przestrzeni europejskiej (National Identity and Regional Movement in Poland)* in: *Tożsamość narodowa a ruch regionalny w Polsce*, ed. A.Kociszewski, A.J.Omelaniuk, K.Orzechowski, Ciechanów 1998, pp.62-64.

<sup>14</sup> *In from the Margins. A Contribution to the Debate on Culture and Development in Europe*, Strasbourg 1996.

Leading politicians of the Union admit that no proper use was made of culture in the past, no efforts were undertaken to have the Union develop rules of co-existence and community life in the area of culture beside rules of efficient co-operation in such fields as coal mining, steel or textiles – and, furthermore, to ensure that the integration has a soul of its own thanks to that culture.<sup>15</sup> This was fully realised by one of the main architects of the integration Jean Monnet, who, dissatisfied with progress in European integration, was reported to say soon before he died that “*should he had an opportunity to do the thing once more from the outset, he would start with culture*”. It would not be reasonable to think that the task focused around culture would have been completed sooner; sure enough, culture is important in the processes of integration, however not as a building block, rather – depending on its either functional or disfunctional role – as a catalyst or a moderator. In the early post-war Europe it would have rather occurred the latter: as prejudices, lack of confidence or even hostility were still very strong at that time. It should be remembered how much time and effort as well as cultural actions were needed in order to reach full German-French reconciliation.

A modern State needs national identity, hence the important question: is it endangered? In order to give an answer, one should start with the statement, that, according to a belief shared by a dominating group of Polish people, in relations between State and nation it is the latter one that is more important of the two elements. Poles are an ethnic, “tribal” nation in their self-consciousness and self-knowledge, rather than political, based upon citizen’s ties. Moreover, this is a norm in this part of Europe. The point in question was proven by the dispute around constitution. As shown in social surveys, a large number of Poles prefer to call themselves just nation instead of citizens’ society. Their own State, unlike Anglo-American *nation-state* or French *l'état-nation*, has not been regarded as one of essential elements of their identity.

Culture conceived as a kind of national institution, in particular literary culture which filled the role of a replacement of the non-existent State for a number of generation in partitioned Poland and contesting it at a time of authoritarianism, has been an essential element of that identity. Fight for a freedom of national community, for national emancipation was ranked much higher during the last two hundred years than fight for citizens’ freedoms (in other words, for values that were *par excellence* republican, individual, liberal) („*Nie damy ziemi skąd nasz ród, nie damy pogrześć mowy...*”) (“*We shall not give up the land we come from/nor shall we let our mother tongue be lost*”). All this survived in collective memory, just one example for that being the Polish pantheon of national heroes.

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<sup>15</sup> P.Gahrton, *Does EU threaten national cultural identities?*, Paper presented on the International Conference: „Integration Cultural Shock of Small and Medium Size Countries upon Joining the EU”, op.cit.

The lack of a State which would transform community into a citizens' nation had to be substituted by some other binder, namely by culture providing people with a code of communication. Interestingly, the higher the degree of uncertainty experienced by an ethnic community as to its fate the more needed and more protected is such a code. When a number of Western European societies formed into modern citizen's nations, the territory of Poland saw culture advancing to a role of a rightful substitute of the State, through peasant Catholicism (an association a Pole = a Catholic), language, custom, „*raising peasant culture to civilisation*” as encouraged by Polish poet C.K.Norwid, which means introduction of genuine peasant culture to national canon in a belief that it is the only type of culture capable of preserving tradition not distorted by foreign trends and fashions. Additionally, fluidity of Polish borders in the 20<sup>th</sup> Century did not enhance identification of the nation with the State at all.

Such Polish perplexities taking place at the background of the rest of Europe occur at a time when a status of the State is put to probation in Western Europe as well. This happens due to a present tendency which can be observed in liberal cultures, related to post-modernist current, which undermines a practice of enforcing one and the same national identity by institutions of the State, questions any “great narrations” including an official national historiography, regarding them oppressive and seeking more adequate solution in “small narrations” – stories of individual persons, families, houses, local communities or regions.

Another reason is that integration processes tend to develop a single economic and cultural area, and in a long-term perspective also a single political area. What is going to be a distinctive feature or sign, for example for the Austrian nation, what will protect it from dissolution in German cultural universe as borders and national currency disappear? As State borders go down, together with national passports, and the common currency is established throughout the Union in the form of Euro, languages and cultures will remain most important distinctive features – physiognomies of communities, while cultural borders, not necessarily between nations, rather between regions having strong cultural personalities, will remain as the only well-marked and visible borders. That's why it is so important to express their identity and distinctiveness for German-speaking Austrians – for those living in Tirol, Steyer or Kaernten. One could agree, perhaps, that – in a paradoxical way – Polish people, with their attachment to culture and distance in relation to their own State, are going to find it easier to adapt to Europe in which individual cultures will be more important than national States as well.

However, this is not so simple. Processes taking place in modern Europe imply different kinds of consequences. National borders being cultural borders at the same time is far from the norm in Europe since ethnic heritages have been fragmented as a result of frequent changes of sovereigns, abound with heroes

who were born outside present State borders and, additionally, in spite of a constant tendency in Europe to develop ethnically uniform nations, existence of minorities still remains a phenomenon which is very common. In Europe where State borders – undergoing as many changes in history as they did in a large part of the continent – would become secondary to cultural borders, cultural areas would move, according to the right of diffusion, to their original historic places.<sup>16</sup>

In the case of Poland this means that German cultural universe is going to gravitate eastbound. However, the opportunity for Polish universe to similarly move eastbound will be much more restricted since the areas it used to cover still have participated in European processes to a very limited degree. Not to make it sound in a too imperialistic way, one should say at once that it was not meant to suggest any kind historic re-vindication, rather just studying processes of cultural diffusion. Historical cultural influences should be seen as an asset on our way to the Union rather than as any sort of burden. Experience of the Jagiellonian dynasty, as sore a subject as it may be to our neighbours, shows clearly that Poles were able to live in a multicultural environment for centuries. Of course, the integration that is taking place in modern Europe is very different, but it requires reconciliation of a nation's own identity with demands of a multicultural community as well.

We have to be conscious that the entry of Poland into the European civilisation circulation will expose its different cultural aspects, among other things the fact that several million Poles have lived upon territories which do not belong to ethnic Polish land although they are integrated with it. A myth of regaining of historic land of the Piast dynasty is going to be severely reviewed and perhaps ultimately rejected. Searching for origins encourages councils of towns and communities in Northern and Western Poland to trace back and try to reconstitute their German heritage, even if it has already been lost in real terms. Accent will be put – and in fact it already is – upon traditions of mutual osmosis rather than on the past two hundred years of conflict. The Polish legend of Eastern borderland has grown very deep in our culture (mass frequency in cinemas as the film “Pan Tadeusz”, based upon the most eminent national poem, was shown, is a good example of just how deep); borderland gave the country its most outstanding persons who were later on included in the national pantheon. On the other hand, we don't have anything comparable in relation to our Western borderland.

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<sup>16</sup> J.Damrosz, *Trwale i zmienne cechy obszarów etnokulturowych w Europie Środkowoschodniej (Constant and Changing Features of Ethno-Cultural Area in Central and Eastern Europe)*, paper presented during the international conference: „Między <uniwersalizmem> Zachodu a <partykularyzmem> Wschodu” (“In Between Western <Universalism> and Eastern <Particularism>”), Warsaw, 08-10.05.1997.

The saying that any culture has a well-established identity when it has both territorial character, present in a physical space, and temporal or smoothly handed down by one generation to another, belongs to most basic anthropologic rules. In the case under consideration, upon one third of the area of the country such a communication between generations took place because it was inhabited by Polish people, however, Polish culture has a territorial character in the large part of that area only for two recent generations. Poland's „holy sites” are situated on territories having well-established territorial culture – in historic capitals of the country such as Gniezno, Kraków, Warsaw or in the sanctuary at Jasna Góra (in Częstochowa), however, two national necropolises are beyond the borders now: that of Łyczaków in Lwów and Rossa in Vilna. In the country where easily a half of the people have not lived in the land where their grandfathers had been born it is still more difficult for them to identify with their region, especially in Western and Northern parts of the country, than it is elsewhere. It is here that Polish identity had been preserved in the old houses of people from Polesie (the former Eastern borderland of Poland, now beyond the State borders) held dearly in the memory of people who settled down in formerly German houses.

An active cultural policy, carried out by regional and local communities rather than by central government, filling that empty space with genuine Polish culture, is of utmost importance on a level as high as Polish reasons of State. Seen within a context of economic gravitation of the whole Western belt of Poland to Germany – and in particular to the expansive economic space of Berlin metropolis – the problem of rooting cultural territoriality of Poland is highly important from a political point of view. What is in stake is providing people with the feeling of cultural security, the feeling that there were some roots they have grown from. It is essential to convince them about their role of landholders, also in the Western and Northern lands, so that they no longer feel guests at there. Additionally, Poles also need to feel, for their comfort, that there has been Polish heritage in the present territories of Lithuania, Ukraine and Belarus as well – the heritage which is not contested or refused. They need it in order to feel protected from possible accusations thrown in their faces that they are polonised Lithuanians or Ukrainians rather than Poles. True, genuine history has been easier to find in the Western borderland as this is the area where new standards of co-existence with ethno-cultural minorities already started to prevail, ones that are undistorted and free from deceit. In the East, quite contrarily, one still has to wait for such a situation to develop; history is still a factor that tears apart instead of binding together, the example of which can be found in conflicts between Poland and Ukraine around monuments of the recent history. However, new times will bring new history. Is it going to prove fully satisfying for all those involved? Anyway, one thing is certain: disappearance

of political divisions in Europe, a change in the role of national State and, most of all, weakening of dividing lines resulting from the State borders, reconstitutes to a large degree the vivid and positive character of the old cultural areas.

We have to be conscious of it all: of cultural expressiveness of lands situated between Bug and Odra rivers. We really need such a consciousness in new Europe, if only in order to get rid of our complexes. Nations troubled by cultural complexes are, quite naturally, unwelcome in the Union. In order to heal all the wounds it is necessary to avoid both one-sided and imitative fascination and manifested prejudice. And, above all the rest, it is an imperative to be expressive in order to protect culture from taking on a hybrid character, in which both Polish element that we want to give to the common heritage and European element that we need to permanently refresh our values, would be lost.

What we face here is an important issue of ways of communication or perhaps transmission of the national canon of culture. An opinion can be heard quite often, according to which it is a number one challenge for Polish men and women to get education. Well, it certainly is a precondition for Poland in order not to become a resource of cheap and low-skilled labour force. Education is necessary to prepare efficient executors, producers, but in itself is far from enough for a creative nation to evolve. Unless a nation's own culture is in place, it is only possible to produce and not to create. Accordingly, what is needed is not just a programme of education conceived as teaching, rather that of upbringing, providing good breeding, making Polish people conscious of why they are Poles and why they want – if they do – to be Poles in Europe of Homelands and in Homeland-Europe. Transmission of cultural canon from one generation to another, in the meaning of handing down the code which enables communication and maintains community and, in result, persistence and evolution of culture, is an indispensable but not sufficient condition, or, in other words, a promise which, however, does not provide any guarantee of success. No culture may exist where no communication works and no community may exist with no culture – if it does, it is only a sum of dispersed multitudes.<sup>17</sup>

In consequence of the recent historic processes Poland found itself under a huge pressure exerted upon its cultural canon, understood as historically structured scenarios of behaviours, creating ties among people, and a sum of cultural texts: from *Pan Tadeusz* by Mickiewicz to *Homage of Prussia* by Matejko to national necropolises – composing such a national code. Our knowledge is still quite inconsiderable on how systems of inter-generation transmission of culture (through education, public media and other factors) in different countries manage to solve a problem of adaptation of an open and

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<sup>17</sup> K.Krzysztofek, *Ekspansja kultury mediów a międzypokoleniowy przekaz kultury (Expansion of Media Culture and Handing Culture Down Among Generations)* in: *Kultura polska w nowej sytuacji historycznej (Polish Culture in New Historic Situation)*, ed. J.Damrosz, Warsaw 1998.

pluralist society, which is an addressee of an enormous cultural offer from world-wide. The Polish system of handing culture down to young generation has been developed in another historic period and has remained practically unchanged for the last fifty years. Modifications done recently were chaotic and limited to replacement of some heroes in the national pantheon with other ones and to review of a list of obligatory literature to be read in schools, while in fact it is necessary to know what should be changed in order to preserve as much good values as possible while doing away, at the same time, with anachronistic elements. Additionally, a role of the State in the undertaking has to be clearly drawn.

The inter-generation transmission of the canon of culture is the issue essential for the identity of each community, related to what can be called "cultural self-presentation" of society in order for it not to be doomed only to consume "somebody else's mental pabulum", to an invasion of ready patterns and values in which it fails to find its own spirit, its own experience and problems through a means of its own creativity and its institutions. One could ask the question: is Polish society losing its ability to portrait itself through its own culture?

The problem under consideration is of utmost importance for what's at stake is a key question in perspective of the forthcoming new millennium: whether Poles are capable of making use of their values to wake up creative forces of their nation. Are they going to be smart enough to give up those elements of their tradition which cannot be reconciled with requirements of evolution? In fact, this is the question on our chances for development, the question whether Poles, in the process of modernisation, will just be a nation programmed by others or can they assimilate, in a creative way, what is necessary for them and defend, in their catalogue of values, anything what is indispensable to preserve their identity and to reach ability to actively adapt to changes. In short, the question is whether they can find an optimum balance between imitation and binding up in themselves and in their national canon.

### **Final remarks**

Just as in any area, also in culture it is necessary to carry out a cost and benefit balance. It is our belief that there will be more of the latter for culture, resulting from the integration. Accordingly, one hardly can agree with an opinion that culture is exposed mainly to losses. Such a statement cannot be maintained using rational arguments. The truth is that the integration is not going to bring with itself qualitatively new processes which could negatively change the situation of culture. Most important challenges which transform conditions in which culture exists and evolves and in which indeed some threats

are contained, have arisen as early as at the beginning of nineteen-nineties when Poland was becoming an open society and market transformation in economy also affected the area of culture. Those were the pains of transformation felt in culture in a most acute way. Poland, following its accession to the European Union will not become an object of any more intense inflow of mass culture from world-wide than it has already been the case for several years. Summing it up – the Union is not going to undermine our feeling of national identity. Barbara Skarga is right to say that „*to be sure: nobody is going to homogenise our Christmas tradition. No one will take it away from us or try to deprive it of its character*”.<sup>18</sup>

The European Union, while levelling psychological barriers between nations, does not attempt to diminish their peculiarities and distinctive features. To the contrary, it provides opportunities for their presence, encourages to think in national categories, although in a different way. Which way? The answer is: the Portuguese, Greeks, Spaniards have only recently become truly proud of their nationalities.

On the other hand, there may be no doubt as to the fact that an era is close to an end in Europe when intellectual elites have shaped cultural processes through their own purposeful cultural policies or media strategies, presenting their own offers, competitive in relation to global “technopolis” of culture. At present such an offer has only remained a smaller or larger top of an iceberg while a huge underwater part of it is the culture of media and industries. The period is at its end when creativity and popularisation of culture were an area of national sovereignty. Today, in a manner parallel to that observed in the area of manufacturing, an area of production in culture begins to gain an independent status in a framework of international corporations, depriving national States of their principal asset – sovereignty. Recently, cultural policy of a State has been more and more limited to clever management or, in other words, to a skill of an efficient play among market actors of the game, instead of any kinds of direct intervention or even establishing quotas and limits restricting import of foreign cultural products. And this is a serious challenge for any society.

Poland has a very important asset in the form of its active involvement in regional co-operation – an area ranked especially high by the European Union (also, but not only following the Balkan tragedy). Poland has not only been situated where the West and the East meet – in cultural categories – but also on a seam between two great European regions: the Nordic and Central-European ones. These have formed the geo-cultural spaces nearest to us. They have been

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<sup>18</sup> B.Skarga, *Nie mam złości do losu (I Do Not Accuse My Fate)*, „Gazeta Wyborcza” 23-24.10.1999.

anchored in European culture, however, each of them has its particular features related to the difficult but, at the same time, rich history of mutual relations.

It should be regarded as a lucky or even beneficial opportunity for Poland and its society, in the present situation in terms of civilisation, that they have a strategic aim to access to the European integrational structure as well as to the Atlantic structures of international security. Such a clean-cut aim is of great importance the significance of which may be, in some respects, larger than the issue of material resources. Every possible effort should be made to unify as large a group of society as possible around the pivotal national interest, to release positive energy and a healthy desire to compete with other countries. The consciousness of such an aim as well as of requirements, whose fulfilment is necessary to attain it, provides us with a kind of a compass enabling us to judge what we should develop and what to avoid, what brings us closer to the chosen aim and what keeps as remote from it; in short, what should be sought after and what is undesirable.

The meaning of this issue for all the functions of the State, both external and internal, cannot be overrated: it effectively protects us from being tempted to rely on an authoritarian system and from such economic, political or legal steps which may seem attractive from a short-term perspective as they make it easier to rule, however, on a long-term scale, would render it more difficult for us to fulfil conditions of the EU membership. This can be seen as a kind of pressure exerted by Europe, a very successful one, as evidenced by the fact that subsequent governments, having different political backgrounds, in fact implement the same strategy of transformation.

Under conditions present in a closed State its external function is almost identical to foreign policy carried out by a single centre. Through an opening of a country to the world the situation evolves considerably: a role of the external function becomes incomparably larger and, at the same time, it undergoes decentralisation. This is an advantageous phenomenon since a group of actors taking part in an international exchange and co-operation grows, although, at the same time, it may occur more difficult to reach a consensus even in some fundamental issues.

In conditions of opening a weakening of differences between internal and external matters can be observed; the State policies in various areas grow more consistent, gradually tending for a *continuum*. For example, the State administration reform, that has been implemented in Poland since early 1999, has been of great importance for our European policy. The reform in itself can be seen as an act having international significance for our part of Europe, since there will be changes to the status of territorial units, including, in particular, those adjacent to the State borders, so that they may become directly involved in international co-operation. The Act of 18 July 1998 on a province territorial

government<sup>19</sup> empowers authorities of that level to resolve on „*priorities of international co-operation of a province*”. As evidenced in experience of many countries, great regions, those visible in a map of Europe, have tended for as high a degree of independence and autonomy in pursuing their interests as possible. Independence, if properly understood, may provide an enormous support in our adaptation to the Union as it transmits a considerable portion of the adaptation effort to the level of regions. On the other hand, it may occur very negative as well. While political centre of the State has certainly got some legal measures of enforcement of such regional policies as are adequate to general aims of the State's foreign policy, much will also depend on political instinct of those responsible for management of new regions.

European Union, while attaching particular importance to the introduction of uniform standards in different areas of life, is, at the same time, far from imposing uniform solutions in the scope of the status of regions, their role in the system of a State authority and their relationships with environment. Those issues have been largely solved through tradition and particular contemporary situation in individual countries. There are a couple of models, adopted depending on a scope of competence of regions (varying from sovereign German lands to French *grandes regions*, given less independence). Finding an optimum balance within policies of the State and of regions, between a degree to which the State consistence should be maintained under new conditions and to what a degree regions may and should participate in trans-national structures, is going to become a challenge of utmost importance. This is one of the essential challenges for Poland and, at the same time, one of key issues for Polish foreign policy.

The Western Europe has got a long record of both decentralisation and deregulation processes. This process, however, while taking place in the frames of particular States, was of great importance for Europe as a whole, since it lowered a level at which integration was implemented, a level at which economic, social and cultural ties developed. Poland joins this evolution and starts to take part in these ties lately, nevertheless it faces at present a historical opportunity to successfully become their member.

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<sup>19</sup> “*Dziennik Ustaw*” (“*The Polish Journal of Statutory Law*”), item.91, articles 75, 76 and 77.