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From Yalta to Brussels. A Search for a New Model of European Security System from Polish/Central European Perspective

1. Introductory remarks

This study aims to answer the following question: which model of a new international security system should be developed in Europe at the beginning of the 21st century in order to ensure as comprehensive protection and fulfilment of fundamental interests of all the entities (states and organisations) involved in international relations on our continent, as possible? The analysis has been carried out mainly from Poland's perspective, but also from that of other Central Europe countries, which have been regarded as forming the region where some common interests have been shared.

The main assumption taken by the author of this study has been based upon the belief that the **key elements of the optimum European security system have been *de facto* already in place and either actually work or at least have potentially been capable of working**. Therefore, the security system in question is not a purely theoretical category, which is but mentioned in considerations of experts, but, conversely, has been, at least in part, a reality having political and military nature in the first rank (although it is of economic and social nature as well). Accordingly, an identification of the actually existing, main elements of the system is needed and it should be done along with an attempt to show their appropriateness or indispensability and to suggest, within the framework of a theoretic consideration, ways of their supplementation or modification.¹

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¹ As regards methodology used in research studies, there is a pivotal question – faced in any field of political sciences – in which areas and to what a degree various types of theoretical models are coherent to the complex circumstances of reality, or are useful to study it. The Author of the present study taken on a highly sceptical attitude towards the excessively theoretical

The basic thesis of the present study consists of the statement that **it is possible, under the present conditions, to create an optimum security system in Europe**, one that will conform to the above-mentioned objective of ensuring protection of interests of all the interested parties. In order to substantiate the above statement, a **genesis** of the present situation in the field of European security will be presented in short, followed by a concise description of its main **determinants and conditioning** (mainly those seen from the point of view of Central Europe) and, finally, with development and justification of a **research postulate**, containing also a **model** suggestion.

2. Genesis and conditioning of contemporary European security system

The collapse of the communist system in Europe at the turn of the nineteen eighties and nineties implied a parallel decline of the hitherto-existing “cold-war” arrangement of power, basing upon the East-West confrontation. Such an arrangement, basing on a “balance of fear”, was potentially dangerous, but, at the same time, relatively stable and, as it occurred, allowing – despite all the vices – to maintain peace in Europe for over half a century.

At present we have to deal with a transitional situation as the former security system no longer works while the new one has not been fully developed yet – it still under creation, *in statu nascendi*. It should be repeated, though, that its basic elements have already been in place and have been working, which means that we are not dealing with a politic and military vacuum in today’s Europe, since the Western democracies, true winners in such a competition between the two systems, have got an efficient and proven defence system, with NATO at the forefront. Nevertheless, this system had been developed under different conditions and for a different purpose, therefore it requires a far-reaching reform in order to adapt it to the needs of the present day.

The situation has been made even more complex due to the fact that the notion of “security” itself has been evolving during the last several dozens of years. Over that time it moved from its former understanding, mainly in military and political categories, to be enriched with the wider perspective, with other

approach to models of international relations, which in most cases have been wrong in stressing in an unreasonable way a single aspect of analysis. Rather than that, the Author prefers to look at things from a geopolitical perspective; an attitude, which has been ingeniously developed by Zbigniew Brzeziński. Besides, there is a separate issue of influence of theoretical models (or, speaking more broadly – findings of scholar research) upon political practice. This influence could be evaluated in different ways – one should not overestimate that factor, however, it should not be ignored, since there is a serious body of evidence proving that theoretical consideration (especially that practised by reputable scholars or practitioners) may influence not only particular political decisions but long-term processes as well.

areas taken into consideration, including those assuring a broadly understood development of individual countries and providing them with the opportunities to operate in the international scene, which can be regarded as favourable from both political and diplomatic point of view. Among such factors supplementing the notion of security, the economic ones should be mentioned (seen within the context of the so-called geo-economics by some authors),² along with science and technology, social issues (including protection of human rights), ideology, culture or ecology.³ Accordingly, five “security sectors” have been distinguished in the literature: military, political, economic, cultural and ecological ones.⁴

That seems to mean that the scope of the notion of security has been regarded at present as a much broader one than ever before; in fact, one is even tempted to say it became too broad.⁵ Moreover, the scope of that notion is not limited to the areas of interests of individual countries and to their protection, but also includes both regional and global arrangements of political, economic and military forces within the international arena. A trend towards creation of wider, global or regional, collective security systems (such as the European one, most interesting to us in the present study), including also other than military aspects of international co-operation, results from the wider and wider

² Such an attitude has been taken by, among others, E.Haliżak: *Ekonomiczne czynniki bezpieczeństwa (Economic Factors of Security)* in: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w Europie Środkowej po zimnej wojnie (International Security in Central Europe After the Cold War)*, Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW (Warsaw University Institute of International Relations), Warsaw 1994 and *Geoekonomika - nowy wymiar bezpieczeństwa narodowego Polski (Geo-economics – a new dimension of national security of Poland)* in: *Filozofia, polityka, stosunki międzynarodowe. Księga jubileuszowa na 70-lecie Profesora Leszka Kasprzyka (Philosophy, politics, international relations. 70th anniversary jubilee books of Prof. Leszek Kasprzyk)*, Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW (Warsaw University Institute of International Relations), Warsaw 1995, esp. p.61-63.

³ A broad understanding of the notion of European security has also been adopted by Polish scholars for a long time now – see M.Perczyński, *Globalne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa ekonomicznego (Global conditioning of economic security)*, Warsaw 1990 and J.Kukułka, *Ekologiczne czynniki bezpieczeństwa (Ecological factors of security)* and G.Michałowska, *Kulturowe czynniki bezpieczeństwa (Cultural factors of security)* in: *Bezpieczeństwo międzynarodowe w Europie Środkowej ... ((International Security in Central Europe ...)*, op.cit. More on the same issues, see: *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe u schyłku XX wieku (National and International Security in the Late XX Century)*, ed. D.B.Bobrow, E.Haliżak, R.Zięba, Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW (Warsaw University Institute of International Relations), Warsaw 1997.

⁴ See J.Czaputowicz, *Model bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku (Model of XXth Century Security)*, „*Studia i Materiały*” No. 97, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (Polish Institute of International Affairs), Warsaw, December 1995, p.7-8.

⁵ It seems that an excessive broadening of the scope of meaning of certain categories can make them too general or even “dissolved” in a way, which makes it impossible to use them in a precise way, thus making them unsuited to the needs of analyses of particular issues.

acceptance of the following three fundamental principles, upon which the modern concept of security has to be based:

- a) principles of indivisibility of security, which means that a close relation exists between security of each individual country and that of the other countries;
- b) principles of comprehensive security which encompass various above-mentioned aspects;
- c) principles of co-operative security, meaning that a multi-facial (sub-regional, regional and global) as well as multi-organisational structure of security needs to exist.⁶

2.1. The existing models of European security

The process of development of a new European security system consists of formulation of theoretical assumptions as well as practical implementation of particular political and military actions. The process in question has led to different theoretical and practical models being developed. It should be pointed out that there is no full agreement yet as to their precise nature, either among experts or among practitioners from the interested political and military circles.

The following three models, most fundamental and best-suited to requirements of reality, as it seems, were chosen for the needs of the present analysis:

1. the Euro-Atlantic model, based upon the reformed and enlarged NATO,
2. the European model, based upon the European Union and the Western European Union,
3. the model of collective security, based upon the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE).

While it is not my aim to analyse the three models right now, one should take into account that analysing their effectiveness or usefulness is not an easy task to perform. There are serious constraints due to their ambiguous nature (resulting – as mentioned above – from the combination of promoting theoretical concepts with actual functioning of the practically existing structures). Moreover, they have been related to each other with a complex pattern of mutual relations, some of them having just a supplementary nature, others being contradictory or even antagonistic in their nature. A relatively high complementarity of the Euro-Atlantic and the European models, dealt with below, on the one hand, and their contradictory character in relation to the model based upon the OSCE, are factors that adequately illustrate the scale of difficulty inherent in an attempt of their analysis.

⁶ The order of categories suggested by J.Czaputowicz, *op.cit.*, p.9.

3. Basic determinants and requirements of a security model from the perspective of Central Europe

One should start with a brief description of that region, since even its geographic area has been set out in different ways: sometimes – especially in German literature – territories of Germany or Austria have been included in that area; moreover, it has been regarded very often as constituting a common conglomerate with the Eastern Europe, called Central and Eastern Europe, which is an evident mistake (since it seems to suggest, for instance, that Poland belongs to the same area as Moldova does); finally, it happens that, looking from a far geographic and cultural perspective, a whole part of the European continent, to the East of the line drawn by the Elbe and Danube rivers, is regarded as one region, including even Balkan countries, as different in any respect as they are.

Therefore, we assume for the needs of the present analysis that the **Central Europe consists of the countries of the Vysehrad Group, i.e. Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia**. The region in question has a very important place on the map of Europe, as it is situated at the crossing of two fundamental strategic axes: East-West (which sets the tone for the relations between the Western Europe and Russia), and North-South (dividing the zone of Western-European culture from the Eastern civilisation).⁷

The position of Poland within that area is without a doubt a peculiar one since the country features the largest potential in it, in terms of demographic, economic, military and other factors, larger than the respective resources of the three other countries combined. On the other hand, Poland is still too weak at present to play a more important role on the scale of the whole Europe alone.⁸ Nevertheless, Poland is eager and capable of taking on a role of a local leader for the whole region and, to a certain degree, of the adjacent regions as well (such as the ex-Soviet Baltic Sea countries). Without any doubt, Poland has both ambitions and some serious assets and opportunities in order to – the most optimistic scenarios assumed – become such an actor in a foreseeable future.

⁷ More on the functioning of that model as well as on some general issues concerning security of the Central European countries see J.Stańczyk, *Uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa postsocjalistycznych państw Europy Środkowej (Security of the Post-Socialistic Countries of Central Europe)*, „*Studia Europejskie*”, no. 4/1998. See also: *Stability and integration. Security relations with Central and Eastern Europe*, Netherlands Atlantic Commission 1998.

⁸ Using a nomenclature developed by Zbigniew Brzeziński, Poland not only cannot be regarded as a „geostrategic player”, but even as a “geopolitical pivot”, which means that it should not be included among the countries whose „importance stems from their key geographic position and from results of their potential instability for the behaviours of geostrategic players rather than from their actual power or ambitions” [Z.Brzeziński, *Wielka szachownica. Główne cele polityki amerykańskiej, (The Grand Cheesboard. American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives)*, Warsaw 1998, s.49].

In an attempt to analyse the present situation in the Central Europe one is faced with several problems and complex issues making it much more difficult to come out with clear and unequivocal assessments. On the one hand, there is no dispute as to the fact that the region is separate and peculiar as one having its own features in historical, geopolitical, economic or cultural respects, although its political and cultural leaders, in their pursuit to integrate with the Western Europe, rather tend to underline historical foundations for firm links relating their countries to the West.⁹ On the other hand, individual countries of Central Europe differ between themselves, sometimes to a considerable degree and in a number of areas, such as a level of economic and social development, a degree of consciousness of national identity among people (and especially of their individual cultural character) a degree of advancement of the processes of systemic transformation, a scale of tendencies to integrate with Europe and so on.

Looking at a political situation in this part of Europe one is tempted to claim that there is no such powers in the Central European region, despite it forms quite objectively a kind of a separate entity, and not enough motivation to “speak univocally” and to play, as a whole, a sound, co-ordinated role in general European area, which potentially could be possible. This is particularly evident in the field of a quest to integrate with the Euro-Atlantic structures, as individual states of the Vysehrad Group have made different kinds of efforts to that end mainly alone and independently. Fortunately, at least a stage when neighbouring countries regarded one another not only as partners but also as competitors or even rivals on the way to NATO or the European Union membership, is finally over.

In the area of security, which is the most important one for us, the situation in the region underwent unprecedented changes over the last decade. First and foremost, there was a thorough transformation of both political and military status of the countries of Central Europe – once strategically important allies (and, at the same time, strictly controlled vassals) of Soviet Union, situated at its Western boundaries or, seen in a different way, in a “close abroad” area of the Soviet empire, these countries became fully-sovereign subjects of international relations. While the final decline of the Warsaw Pact in 1991 meant that Central European countries were set free from foreign domination, exerted upon them half a century earlier, it was far from solving, at the same time, all the problems concerning security of both individual countries themselves and the region as a whole.

Admittedly, during the nineteen-nineties Central Europe became a kind of a “grey zone” where in practice no political and military guarantees could be

⁹ See considerations in this respect in: J.Nowicki, *Rewindykacja europejskości – tożsamość Europy Centralnej (The European identity regained - Central European identity)*, „*Studia Europejskie*”, no. 3/1999.

trusted and where a risk was felt that it may be transformed into just a „buffer zone” or – another time in its history – into an influence area for the neighbouring powers. There was such a threat since the Western countries (which from the very beginning expressed their support for the process of both political and economic transformation and that towards development of democracy in the region) were not as prompt to acknowledge that it is both necessary and justified to enlarge their own security structures to include the Central Europe region.

There was a number of reasons for such an attitude, among other things there were fears of serious involvement in problems of a seemingly unstable region or (not as eagerly declared in public) unwillingness to antagonise Russia, the country which – in spite of the fall of the Soviet empire – kept maintaining its statements on its special interests in this part of the world. One should remember that the quest of the countries of the Vysehrad Group to acquire NATO membership found a favourable ground only at a later time. Initially, governments of several countries, such as France or other countries situated in NATO’s Southern flank, took a very reserved position towards the idea of enlargement,¹⁰ and in the opinion-giving circles of experts and politicians, explicitly negative opinions were heard quite often.¹¹ Moreover, at the time of taking up early activities in favour of the expectations of the Central Europe countries, such as the “Partnership for Peace” programme, initiated in 1994, fears were expressed that these were meant to be just a kind of substitute, provided instead of extension of true security guarantees for our region.

Several years of further intense diplomatic and political efforts were needed¹² in order to gain political support from establishments and in particular from societies of the Western countries, for the idea of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. (The change of attitude of the Washington administration in this respect, which took place in the mid-nineties, can be regarded as the turning point in that process.)¹³ Sure enough, it is not the matter

¹⁰ Even H.Kohl, the former Chancellor of Germany, otherwise a supporter of inviting the Central Europe countries to the integration structures, had initially taken a negative attitude – see: K.H.Kamp, *The Folly of Rapid NATO Expansion*, „*Foreign Policy*”, Spring 1995.

¹¹ Among a number of such opinions, uttered in either official or semi-official way by politicians, scholars or journalists in respected magazines, the following two may be mentioned: M.Brown, *The Flawed Logic of NATO Expansion*, „*Survival*”, Spring 1995 and D.J.Kramer, *No Need to Expand NATO*, „*Christian Science Monitor*”, 10-16.02.1996.

¹² The little known activities of Polish diplomacy and of different kinds of pressure groups (the society of Polish Americans in the USA in particular) exerting influences in favour of Poland’s membership in NATO is described more extensively in: B.Węglarczyk, *Przez pięć kęgów (Through five circles)*, „*Gazeta Wyborcza*”, 06-07.03.1999.

¹³ See A.Bailes, *Europe’s Defense Challenge. Reinventing Atlantic Alliance*, „*Foreign Affairs*”, January/February 1997.

of blaming anyone responsible for the situation, the more so that issues under debate regarded, in fact, mainly the basic question who should pay the cost of the enlargement and these were very sensitive issues from the point of view of tax-payers. However, it should be firmly stressed that – as it is shown below in more detail – extension of NATO's security guarantees to include most countries of the Central Europe, was not an expression of political altruism, but rather (which has often been overlooked in debates taking place in the Western countries) an increase of the security level of the whole organisation and its general reinforcement.

From the point of view of political and military interests of Central Europe, accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary to NATO in 1999 was an especially positive and important move towards ensuring security for the whole region, but definitely far from the last. It seems necessary to undertake further measures in this respect. Among other things, the process of enlargement of NATO should go on, to adopt, in the first rank, Slovakia (the last country of the region which remains outside Euro-Atlantic structures), and then other countries of Eastern Europe, including in particular the Baltic Sea countries and those of the Balkan region. Security of the countries of the Vysehrad Group depends – according to the principle of indivisibility of security over the whole continent, which was stressed at an earlier time – not only on obtaining either individual or collective guarantees, but on their extension as wide as possible to include the neighbouring countries as well.¹⁴

Since – as we try to prove below – NATO has not been the only structure capable of ensuring security in our part of the continent, it also seems necessary to enlarge European Union through the adoption of all the Central European countries (and, in a long-term perspective, of other countries as well). It is only through such an attitude that true premises for development of the optimum security system for Central Europe may be provided.

3.1. Geopolitical situation of Central Europe

Geopolitical situation of the Central European countries has been a factor influencing their attitudes towards the issues of security to a very high degree. As already mentioned, being situated in a strategically important place in the central part of the continent may be of serious advantage, in economic and trading terms in particular. On the other hand, it has to be remembered that such a special geopolitical situation may also generate a number of threats.

¹⁴ A deepened debate on the necessity to enlarge NATO to include those areas as well, see in: *Rozszerzanie NATO (NATO Enlargement)*, Stowarzyszenie Euro-Atlantyckie (Euro-Atlantic Association), Warsaw, March 2000; see also T.Kuzio, *NATO Enlargement: The View From the East*, „*European Security*”, Spring 1997.

The fact of existence of those threats seems to be overlooked by the adherents of the so-called “third solution” (who are present in Poland), who advocate adoption of an independent model of political, economic, social and military development, totally unrelated to the European integration. Whilst a more detailed discussion of this issue falls beyond the scope of the present study, it should be pointed out that adherents of such ideas not only tend to ignore the fact that Poland would only play a secondary role in the most important processes of development of modern world, but, more importantly, seem to disregard **objective premises** that make it necessary for us to be involved in the process of building of the unified Europe.

Geopolitical situation of Poland has been one of such fundamental premises, which practically leaves no choice since the country may under no circumstances remain a “no man’s land”. Both Poland and – to a certain degree – other countries of the region have been situated directly on a seam between Russia (which still retains its ambitions to be a global power) and the Euro-Atlantic system, represented by Germany which is another powerful neighbour, whose role in the European Union is more and more important. This means that Poland, whether we like it or not, has just got to choose since it cannot afford any kind of a suicidal „splendid isolation”.¹⁵

The issue of Russia

Poland’s relations with Russia have played an extremely important role in this respect as they have accounted for one of the keys to the region security and, to a considerable degree – to the security of Europe as a whole as well. First of all, it has to be remembered that historical tradition, reaching from the time of Peter the Great at least to that of the Soviet Union, seem to strengthen Russia’s conviction, arising out of its ambitions to be a world power, that Central Europe should be treated as its own influence zone.¹⁶ On the other hand, the same

¹⁵ It should be remembered that even Britons, who have been advocates of the principle of “splendid isolation” for several centuries, have fully integrated their country in Euro-Atlantic structures (despite being sceptical about extension of a scope of European integration having a supra-national nature); whilst Norwegians – often quoted by Polish opponents of integration as an example to be followed – while not wanting the UE membership (since their country is situated in an entirely different, incomparable less important geopolitical location, and, besides, they have appropriate economic conditions to stay aside), they have actually been members of NATO.

¹⁶ More on the subject, see S.Bieleń, *Ciągłość i zmiana ról międzynarodowych Rosji (Continuity and changes of Russia’s international roles)* in: *Nowe role mocarstw (New Roles of Superpowers)*, ed. B.Mrozek, S.Bieleń, Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW (Warsaw University Institute of International Relations), Warsaw 1996. See also an analysis by J.Staniszkis, *Russia: Empire or Metropoly w: Racja stanu w dobie transformacji ładu europejskiego. Implikacje dla Polski (State interests in the era of European order transformation. Implications*

historical experience clearly indicates that renewal of close connection with Russia would be an unacceptable solution for the countries of our regions (which, however, does not mean that no correct and mutually advantageous international bilateral and multilateral relations with Russia should be maintained!).

One should start with a factor which usually has been regarded as a subjective one, yet its influence upon the field of actual activities cannot be overestimated and therefore it gains the status of objectivity. The factor in question is that of strong anti-Russian attitudes that have been observed within societies of the Central European countries (although to different degrees). In Poland for example, where prejudice to Russia has been historically grounded to a highest degree, Russians have been regarded – together with Ukrainians and Belarussians who have quite often been included into one common category – as the most disliked nations.¹⁷ Even if such a situation does not preclude development of mutual relations between the countries, it makes them much more difficult to evolve.

Still more important is a fear that a relapse into the Russian domination would result in the Central European countries' regress in virtually every area and the total failure of all the efforts undertaken in order to regain independence, to develop democratic systems and to attain welfare. That fear has its roots mainly in the deep, overwhelming and long-lasting crisis experienced in Russia in virtually every area. Without any doubt, this is a country of a huge potential which seems to have all the assets needed to gain the status of a true power which is adequate to it. However, within a reasonable time perspective, it is not going to become an attractive or a sufficiently competitive partner for its former satellite countries of the Central Europe. At present, fears about the further progress of events in Russia are prevailing in these countries,¹⁸ therefore they attempt – whether we judge it right or wrong – to limit their ties with their former influence-wielder. Such a tendency has been evident in various areas,

for Poland), ed. J.Stefanowicz, I.Grabowska-Lipińska, Instytut Studiów Politycznych PAN, Warsaw 1995.

¹⁷ In 1977 the ratio of dislike was as follows: 53% towards Russians, 46% towards Belarussians and as much as 60% towards Ukrainians, placing these nations upon the places three to five in rating measuring prejudice on the side of Polish people. [*Stosunek naszego społeczeństwa do innych nacji. Komunikat z badań (Attitudes of our society toward other nations. Survey communication)*, CBOS, Warsaw, October 1997.] More recent surveys show deepening of those trends – at present Russians are the foreign nation least welcome in Poland (65% of negative opinions), along with Belarussians (62%) and Ukrainians (64%). See: „*Polityka*”, 20.05.2000.

¹⁸ As commented by P.Starzyński, „*The Poles are reluctant to attempt to foresee what may happen in Russia. They believe almost anything may happen there*” (*Public attitudes on security in Central Europe. Poland in: Perceptions of security. Public opinion and expert assessments in Europe's new democracies*, ed. R.Smoke, Manchester-New York 1996, p.58.).

including political relations, but is especially strong in the field of economic relations and trade exchange, as documented in the appropriate analyses and statistical data.¹⁹ They prove that even such an important event as the Russian financial crisis of 1998 did not imply any serious turbulence in Polish economy or in those of other Central European countries.

In the Western Europe either an inadequate knowledge or ignorance of the real and imminent threats resulting from a highly unstable situation in Russia are very often a case. One has to remember that Russia never had democracy in the Western style in place and that some catastrophic scenarios, such as attainment of power by nationalist and communist forces, have still been possible. Such a misunderstanding of the "Russian issue" has been best observed during the debate on the enlargement of NATO and is especially evident in the opinions of the opponents of the process who seem to be most numerous and most vocal in the United States – the country which is relatively remote from European problems.²⁰ (Although it has to be reminded once again that the controversy were mainly related to financial issues and that Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary ultimately became the members of NATO thanks to the US attitude in the first rank).

Sure enough, the countries of Central Europe are capable of playing a role of a kind of bridge in relation to Russia and should do that in order to support (in its own interest as well as in that of Russia and of the whole Europe) development of democracy and market economy in that country. This is explicitly expected from them by the Western European countries for whom new partners from Central Europe are going to be as valuable as they contribute to the attainment of stabilisation in the Eastern part of the continent. This is equally true in relation to their support for reforms in the former Soviet republics, in particular the Baltic countries and Ukraine, and for their aspirations for independence.

Another aspect of the problem is that Russia itself seems less interested in „beneficial services” offered to it by its Western neighbours and if it looks for

¹⁹ While in 1988 Soviet Union was Poland's main trade partner (its share in Polish export accounted for 24,5%, and in import 23,3%), in 1994 Russia dropped to the third place (respectively 5,4% and 6,8%). At a later time these ratios underwent only minor changes. See A.Z.Nowak, *Dylematy polskiej polityki gospodarczej wobec zmian na światowych rynkach finansowych i integracji z Unią Europejską - ujęcie jakościowe (Dilemmas of Poland's economy policy in view of changes on the world's financial markets and Poland's integration with EU - qualitative approach)*, "Studia Europejskie", no. 3/1999, p.53 etc.

²⁰ Among numerous examples two significant opinions of American experts may be quoted, those of A.Perlmutter and T.G.Carpenter, who called the NATO enlargement towards the East "a crazy step" and "dangerous bluff", mainly due to Russia's reservations and fears of retortions on its part (*NATO's Expensive Trip East. The Folly of Enlargement*, „Foreign Affairs”, January/February 1998).

contacts with the Western Europe at all, then it does it on its own.²¹ Moreover, Russia's geostrategic doctrine covers a horizon that is much wider than just the traditionally important relations with the Western Europe and the United States, and also includes those with China or (as one could notice recently) India as well. Consequently, irrespective of what citizens of the Central European countries may think of Russian foreign policy, this direction of international relations may in fact be not the one of utmost importance for Russia.²²

There is, however, another very important issue from the point of view of Central Europe: namely, how to prevent a "new Yalta" from occurring, *i.e.* how to avoid a new partitioning of Europe to the influence areas. This would be detrimental to all the interested countries, including Russia, in spite of the fact that some advocates of Russian interests in the Western Europe acknowledge Russia's rights of interference in the matters of its "near abroad" neighbours. They seem to forget that the *Mitteleuropa* region has also been, for several centuries, the zone of German influence, so one simply must not reopen the Central European "Pandora's box" of imperial ambitions of the neighbouring powers.

The issue of Germany

Among the issues of primary importance there is also that of international relations of the Central European countries with Germany. The positive aspect of those relations – consisting in the fact that both parties understand their respective national interests in a similar way for the first time since a couple of centuries, relating them to the necessity of enlargement and deepening of European integration – cannot be overestimated. Germans may regard enlargement of both the European Union and NATO as an opportunity for them to strengthen their economic, political and – last but not least – military position within the unified Europe, moving its centre of gravity towards the East. Accordingly, they have eagerly acted as advocates of the Central European countries.

Such a support from Germany is very important for the countries of the region in their efforts towards integration. That support gains additional importance due to the fact that other leading countries of European Union, especially France, do not seem – contrary to their officially expressed statements

²¹ S.Bieleń in the above-quoted study entitled *Ciągłość i zmiana ról międzynarodowych Rosji (Continuity and changes of Russia's international roles)* stresses the ambiguous character of Russia's strategic concepts: its Eurocentric and pro-Western trend on the one hand and the "neoeurasiatism" on the other.

²² A broader discussion of these issues: see: Z.Brzeziński in: *op.cit.*

– as interested in the enlargement of the EU towards the East.²³ This is caused by the reasons which are exactly converse than in the case of Germany, *i.e.* due to them having no vital interests in development of the European integration in this direction. Furthermore, it is quite obvious that European partners of German Republic, including in particular France, regard the perspective of an excessive growth of German power as a threat to them – a threat that a new hegemony may arise in the old continent. That would mean that valuable balance of power, which has developed over the several last decades within the European Communities, is in danger and may collapse.²⁴

Seen from the perspective of the Central European countries, the Federal Republic of Germany has already been their leading partner in economic co-operation and trade exchange. This position of Germany is well evidenced in economic analyses and data relating to Poland. They indicate that Germany plays an absolutely dominant role in Polish foreign trade, one that is incomparable to that of any other trade partner.²⁵ On the one hand, it provides an appropriate basis as well as favourable conditions for the mutually advantageous development of bilateral relations in different fields, including correctly evolving political contacts. On the other hand, such a considerable dependence on just a single partner may present some kinds of threats for Polish economy, which is much weaker.

Admittedly, there may exist a whole range of threats in this respect, therefore one should not be over-satisfied with the situation. Not every country of Central

²³ See A.Juppé, *Quel horizon pour la politique étrangère de la France*, „Politique étrangère”, no. 1/1998 and S.Parzymies, *Francja wobec rozszerzenia Unii Europejskiej (France and the European Union Enlargement)*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, no. 4-6/1998. The former President of France Valéry Giscard d’Estaing and the former West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt suggested a necessity of a serious prolongation of the period of Poland’s waiting for the EU membership, explaining that the EU structures were not prepared for enlargement [*Wysokie pokoje i przedsiönek (Halls and antichambres)*, „Gazeta Wyborcza”, 13-14.05.2000].

²⁴ There is a clear division into two “blocks” in European Union at present: that of the Southern or Mediterranean countries with France at the forefront and that of the Eastern and Northern countries, led by Germany. Since further development of the EU is only possible and will actually progress to the East, it may suggest that there will be further growth of power of Germany as a country having a dominant position in this area and, therefore, an accumulation of dissents or even conflicts of interests between these blocks may be expected. See: *Tamed power. Germany in Europe*, ed. P.J.Katzenstein, Ithaca (NY) 1997 and D.Schlachter, *Question d’Europe. Le débat économique et politique*, Paris 1998.

²⁵ Germany, starting from the position of Poland’s second most important trade partner late in the 1980’s, as soon as 1991 moved to the first place. (29,4% of export and 26,5% of import). During the later years these percentage ratios were still higher, reaching its peak in 1995: 35,7% of export and 27,4% of import. Comparably – Netherlands, which is Poland’s second largest export partner, accounted for 5,9% and Italy (respective position in import) – for 8,4%. See: A.Z.Nowak, *Dylematy polskiej polityki gospodarczej... (Dilemmas of Poland’s economy policy...)*, op.cit., p.53 et seq.

Europe has such well-established and fully correct bilateral relations with Germany. Poland has succeeded to shape them relatively well so it is even quoted as Polish-German reconciliation, comparable to that occurring between France and Germany soon after the Second World War. Apart from the above-mentioned development of economic and political relations, this is also evidenced in the outcomes of surveys regarding opinions of Polish people on their Western neighbours. Of special interest are changes occurring in this area over time, in particular if we compare data revealing long-term changes. They show that over a recent quarter century attitude towards Germans in Poland underwent a significant improvement. Moreover, as it seems, such a tendency is a long-lasting one.²⁶

However, in the case of other countries of the region, such as the Czech Republic, one can hardly speak about full normalisation of relations with Germany, as they have been disturbed by historical events, caused, in this case, by the problem of the Sudeten Germans. Furthermore, in spite of the above-mentioned, marked improvement in this respect, there still have been social resentments and a prejudice to the powerful neighbour visible in all the countries in question, resulting from historical experience. In Poland they have been expressed for example as fears of possibility that Germans may buy-out land. This kind of threat is especially true for Polish people living in rural areas who regard this problem as one of the arguments against Poland's integration with the European Union.²⁷

Such resentments should be viewed at the background of the already-mentioned fear of a possible further strengthening of position of Germany in Europe, up to a kind of hegemony – a kind of *Pax Germanica*. Observing the fears expressed in such powerful Germany's neighbours as France, one should not be surprised to see the same kind of anxiety in economically weak countries

²⁶ In 1975 in a Polish survey of public attitudes towards different nationalities Germans were 20th among 24 nationalities (being disliked by 60% of those surveyed and liked by only 8% of them). In a similar surveyed carried out in 1997 Germans had 11th place among 20 different nations (liked by 38% / disliked by 30% of those under survey). They got still better results in a surveyed performed in the year 2000 – as many as 51% regarded Germans' presence in Poland as advantageous (only Americans were rated better, at 60%). See: *Stosunek naszego społeczeństwa ... (Attitudes of our society ...)*, op.cit. and „*Polityka*”, 20.05.2000.

²⁷ See analysis in: E.Nalewajko, *Chłopi – rolnicy – farmerzy: polityka i interesy w kontekście integracji Polski z Unią Europejską (Peasants – agriculture workers – farmers: policy and interests in the context of integration with the European Union)*, „*Studia Europejskie*”, no. 2/1999. By the way, it seems that fears of Polish people that strangers may buy-out land in Poland have become one of the “hot topics” in Poland's negotiation on the EU membership, in parallel to fears appearing on the EU side (in Austria and Germany in particular) related to the issue of access of Polish workers to the EU labour market.

of the Central Europe.²⁸ Therefore, although only potential, but at the same time quite real possibility of Germany's domination over their Eastern neighbours should neither be entirely excluded nor underestimated. Such a threat could be most acute in the area of economy, but in the fields of foreign policy and defensive system as well.

Such fears or threats should be clearly distinguished from the naturally existing influences of a powerful country, felt in the neighbouring countries and, accordingly, such influences should not be mistakenly regarded as endangering vital national interests. In the present conditions of solidifying globalisation no country – neither Germany nor even more powerful United States – is free of a number of various external limitations, resulting in undermining or at least different attitude towards a traditionally conceived notion of sovereignty.²⁹ The fears in question also should not prompt anyone to express a vote of no confidence to German society of political circles or – even more broadly – to the well-established German democracy. On the other hand, one must not forget that over the post-war period that democracy hasn't got a single opportunity to test its strength at the moment of ordeal.

4. Strategic options for Central Europe

During the debate on the most favourable concepts of security to be adopted by the Central European countries, in which politicians and experts are involved, a range of different opinions and postulates are put forth.³⁰ In some of them it is

²⁸ More in: B.Kozel, *Mittleuropa rediviva? Europa Środkowo- i Południowo-Wschodnia w polityce zjednoczonych Niemiec (Mittleuropa rediviva? Central and South-Eastern Europe in the policy of united Germany)*, Instytut Zachodni (Western Institute), Poznań 1999.

²⁹ Out of rich English-language literature in this field, see for example: M.Keens-Soper, *Europe in the World. The Persistence of Power Politics*, London-New York 1999 (especially chapters: „Globalization” and „Powers of Decision”), and in Polish literature: *Państwo we współczesnych stosunkach międzynarodowych (State in contemporary international relations)*, ed. E.Haliżak, I.Popiuk-Rysińska, Instytut Stosunków Międzynarodowych UW (Warsaw University Institute of International Relations), Warsaw 1995 and *Suverenność i integracja europejska (Sovereignty and the European Integration)*, ed. W.Czapliński, I.Lipowicz, T.Skoczny, M.Wyrzykowski, Centrum Europejskie Uniwersytetu Warszawskiego (Warsaw University Centre for Europe), Warsaw 1999.

³⁰ Out of rich foreign literature in this field, see: O.Waever, *The European security triangle*, Centre for Peace and Conflict Research, Copenhagen 1994; J.Wright, *European Security – Post-Bosnia*, „European Security”, Summer 1997; M.Jopp, *The strategic implications of European integration*, Hessische Stiftung Friedens- und Konfliktforschung, Frankfurt/m. 1994, and in Polish literature: the above-quoted studies: *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe ... (National and International Security ...)* and J.Czaputowicz, *Model bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku (Model of XXth Century Security)*, as well as: A.Hajnicz, *Europejska architektura bezpieczeństwa z polskiej*

suggested, for instance, that a policy of neutrality would be the best solution for the countries of our region. Such a policy could be seen as an attractive one for the countries under the Soviet domination in the conditions of the “cold war”; moreover, it could be of use for some “buffer” countries such as Austria or Finland. At present, in a completely different geo-political situation, it seems inapplicable, at least taking into account that there is no chance to obtain guarantees of our neutrality from the big powers.³¹ Similarly, the idea of creation of either regional or sub-regional systems of security in Europe is not an effective solution for the countries situated in the Central Europe, since such systems would not be capable of full performance of their tasks due to the insufficient potential of their participants. (The above should not be understood as an understatement of the already existing sub-regional groups in this part of the continent.)³²

Taking these determinants into account, as well as those mentioned during the earlier considerations, and carrying out a sober analysis based upon them, one can conclude that the only reasonable solution in order to have security and further development of the Central Europe guaranteed, is its **integration with the West**.³³ This implies a postulate of **the most complete adoption, taking place as soon as possible, of Poland and all the countries of the region, to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration structures** (European Union, NATO, West-European Union, Council of Europe and others), covering – in line with the broadened concept of security – all the areas: politics, defence system, economy, social and cultural issues, etc.

To put things figuratively, Poland faces, in the long-term historical perspective, a choice: an alliance with the developing, democratic and wealthy

perspektywy (European security system from Polish perspective), „Polska w Europie”, no. 2/1995.

³¹ J.Stefanowicz stressed in his study on the subject, that: „for a country situated in such a geographic location as Poland, neutrality has become impractical or perhaps even dangerous” (*Expert assessments of security in Central Europe. Poland in: Perceptions of security...*, op.cit., p. 113).

³² More in: R.Zięba, *Rola ugrupowań subregionalnych w nowym systemie bezpieczeństwa europejskiego (The role of subregional organisation in the new European security system), „Studia Europejskie”, no. 1/2000.*

³³ This is clearly seen by Western experts; for example, Z.Brzeziński observes that: „... closer and closer relations with NATO and with the unifying Europe provide Poland with a degree of security which is unprecedented in the country’s history, limiting, at the same time, the scope of its possible strategic choice” [*Wielka szachownica ... (The Grand Cheesboard ...)*, op.cit., p.53]. See also: J.Czaputowicz, *Model bezpieczeństwa XXI wieku (Model of XXth Century Security)*, op.cit. and R.Kuźniar: *Geostrategiczne uwarunkowania bezpieczeństwa Polski (Geostrategic implications of Poland’s security)*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, No. 1/1993 i *Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa narodowego w polityce Polski (Issues of national security in Poland’s politics)* in: *Bezpieczeństwo narodowe i międzynarodowe ... (National and International security ...)*, op.cit.

countries of the Western Europe and the United States, or falling into another subordination to Russia (which is still politically unstable and experiences serious economic and social problems) and membership in the Russia-dominated Commonwealth of Independent States.

An adoption of the European or Euro-Atlantic option is going to be of advantage to Europe as a whole – the fact that should be firmly underlined – rather than only to the interested Central-European countries.³⁴

4.1. Benefits for Central Europe

From the point of view of the countries of our region, adoption of such a solution will bring a number of benefits; namely the following ones, to name just a few of them:

- Final elimination of grey economy occurring in the countries of the region in the past or at present as well as doing away, for the first time in history of the last several centuries, with the logic of being an influence zone of the two neighbouring powers: Russia and Germany. Related to it is a parallel liquidation of the age-long threat of “crushing” Central Europe by the two powers. There are, fortunately, a range of evidences which seem to indicate that, despite all appearances and opinions of critics, Russia, having no real opportunity to accomplish its imperial temptations, is going to be more inclined to follow a process of democratisation and to fill a role of the global power, which is appropriate to it, in a peaceful way (additionally, looking upon the positive example of post-communist transformation). At the same time, Germany, firmly bound to their Eastern neighbours by links within the structures such as EU and NATO, will neither be eager nor able to present a threat for them or for the whole continent.
- Getting an opportunity (the taking of which depends mainly on ourselves) to obtain long-lasting guarantees of political and military security as well as of economic and social development, making it possible for the country to carry on political and economic reforms within the whole process of transformation, to eliminate general backwardness in terms of civilisation, etc. This, in turn, is going to provide the Central European countries with better opportunities – although no automatic guarantees – to join the group of the most advanced and developed countries of the world. Such a „civilisation-creating” aspect of the integration sometimes tends to be disregarded during internal debate taking place within the countries of our

³⁴ More in: A.Inotai, *Political, economic and social arguments for and against EU enlargement. A survey of the influence pressure groups*, Institute for World Economics, Budapest 1999 and L.Friis, *An ever larger Union, EU enlargement and European integration. Anthology*, Danish Institute of International Affairs, Copenhagen 1999.

region. Nevertheless, developmental backwardness should certainly be eliminated this way or another and the process may proceed in a way that is much more smooth and efficient within the framework of the European integration structures.

- Attainment of (even if “imposed” by the very fact of participation in the same integration structures) stabilisation on a regional scale, making it easier, among other things, to develop natural mutual relations in a more harmonious way, and in particular dissolution of tensions and conflicts between individual Central European countries. This issue may seem less important (especially from Poland’s point of view), however it should be remembered that local tensions, sometimes very acute, occurring for example in relations between Hungary and Slovakia, exert a very negative influence upon the whole set of international relations in the region and thus deteriorate its image in the international arena, having a negative influence on the attitude of the European Union towards the candidate countries.³⁵ Moreover, broadening of regional co-operation and creation of a network of closer links in that area – which is underdeveloped, as mentioned above, in spite of the existence of the CEFTA and the Vysehrad Group – is not only desirable (*e.g.* facing the common challenge of obtaining the EU membership), but also necessary from the point of view of getting an opportunity to have political, military and economic interests of all the partners secured.

4.2. Benefits for the Western Europe

To begin with, it should be stressed once more that building of “Europe ranging from the Atlantic ocean to the Ural mountains” (as de Gaulle wanted it) or of a „common European home” (according to Gorbachov) **is not only in the interest of the Central European countries, but in that of Western Europe as well.** Full integration of Central Europe is indeed going to bring a number of benefits, including the following ones:

- An ultimate liquidation of the unnatural partition of the continent and the creation of a new organism, coherent in every respect, including a huge sales market for the EU goods and, on a long-term scale, considerable broadening of its economic potential. This aspect has often been underestimated or even ignored by the critics of enlargement of EU towards the East, who only tend to stress costs of the process, while leaving some explicit benefits for the

³⁵ It is little known that there is a requirement put forth in the so-called Copenhagen criteria of 1993 (stipulating for conditions of the EU membership for the candidate countries) that the candidates have to solve any disputable issues with their neighbours or with other third countries in order not to bring such problems into the European Union’s foreign policy.

present “Fifteen” aside. It is enough to mention that the adoption of the countries of our region would result in a growth of the territory and of demographic and economic potential (calculated in a growth of a buying power) of European Union by circa 20 per cent.

- Extension of defence structures and of the Eastern border of NATO as well as of the whole European security system to include new territories. This objectively improves security of Western Europe – which tends to be forgotten by the opponents of enlargement of NATO – and furthermore, it allows a greater freedom of operation for NATO. This is very important in the context of changes introduced to its strategy and methods of operation, featuring a move from the old strategy of defence against a “threat from the East” to the so-called Petersberg missions, aiming mainly at maintenance of peace and carrying out humanitarian operations.
- Extension of an area of democracy, welfare and stabilisation, which is in the interest of the whole Western world, especially in the situation where there are sources of tensions and conflicts in Europe itself (in the Balkan area for example) and in neighbouring areas (Maghreb, Near East). (According to the principle that it is better to invest in trade or even in foreign aid, than in armaments to defend against irresponsible neighbours.)

5. The postulated model of European security

Which model of security is best suited to the needs and interests of the Central European countries?

From the point of view of their interests as well as – as it seems – those of the whole Europe, **it would be best to adopt the variant of security based upon the combined European and Euro-Atlantic models** (which can be called a **European/Euro-Atlantic** one). Although it is evident in the debates that have taken place for a long time now and in political intents and actual activities, that the attainment of such a goal would be very difficult, it is not impossible.

In the first rank it is necessary that a new concept of the ultimate shape, role and tasks of the NATO in Europe be crystallised, one accepted by all the allies involved. This is the more important since there still exist some serious disagreements in this respect, between the United States whose role in NATO is a key one, and their European allies. Related to it is an extensive complex of issues – also a source of transatlantic disputes – concerning concept and scope of further development of the European components of NATO’s defence structures.³⁶ Such European components primarily include the Western

³⁶ These issues have been broadly described in literature – see for example: *America and Europe. A partnership for a new era*, ed. D.C.Gompert, F.S.Larrabee, Cambridge 1997; C.Jean, *Changing Interests and Inter-Institutional Relations in Europe and NATO w: CJTF - A Lifeline for*

European Union, which, following a several decades long period of inertia has – as stipulated for in the Maastricht Treaty and confirmed later in Amsterdam – to play a role of a “military component” of European Union and, at the same time, the „European pillar” of NATO. Leaving some contradiction inherent in such a wording aside (what about the EU Member States which do not belong to NATO?), there has been a scope of incertitude and disagreements as to range and scale of the „Europeisation” or „Euroatlantic character” of the Western European Union.³⁷

In this context an issue of functioning of the so-called second pillar of European Union has to appear, *i.e.* that of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).³⁸ Its further development will depend, among other factors, on dissolution of the above-mentioned dilemmas, as well as on the readiness and political intent of the EU Member States to speak in the international arena univocally and on acquiring of a larger political and military independence, also within the concept of the European Security and Defence Identity.³⁹ (France is a resolute adherent of development of that structure).⁴⁰ Existence of some positive tendencies in this direction was confirmed by some provisions of the Amsterdam Treaty, establishing, among other bodies, an institution of the High Representative for CFSP or providing for some procedural improvements. This was also evidenced by decisions made during the subsequent EU “summits”,

a European Defence Policy?, ed. E.Foster, G.Wilson, Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies, London 1997; J.H.Wyllie, *European Security in the New Political Environment*, London-New York 1997. See also: B.Vassort-Rousset, *Les Etats Unies face à la sécurité et de la défense européenne*, „Cahier de CEDSI”, no.20, septembre 1977 and D.Milczarek, *Zagadnienia bezpieczeństwa w stosunkach Unia Europejska - Stany Zjednoczone: partnerstwo czy rywalizacja? (The Issue of Security in Relations between the European Union and the United States: Partnership or Rivalry?)*, „Studia Europejskie”, no. 1/1999.

³⁷ On the evolution of WEU, see for example: M.-C.Plantin, *Le résistant approfondissement de l'UEO*, „Cahier de CEDSI”, no. 18, février 1977 and J.Gryz, *Unia Zachodnioeuropejska a NATO, (WUE and NATO)*, Toruń 1996.

³⁸ The issues concerning the CFSP have been broadly addressed in literature, therefore we only mention some studies as an example: *Foreign Policy of the European Union. From EPC to CFSP and Beyond*, ed. E.Regelsberger et al., London 1997 or a series of comprehensively prepared materials: *Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP)* ed. S.Duke, European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht, 7 February 2000, and, in Polish literature: S.Stebelski, *Wspólna Polityka Zagraniczna i Bezpieczeństwa UE (EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy)*, „Sprawy Międzynarodowe”, no. 3/1997.

³⁹ More on this subject – see: L.M.Puig, *The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO*, „NATO Review”, no. 2/1998 or *Europejska Tożsamość w Dziedzinie Bezpieczeństwa i Obrony (European Security and Defence Identity)*, ed. A.Skoczek, P.Włodarski, „Bezpieczeństwo Polski w zmieniającej się Europie”, no. 9/1999.

⁴⁰ See also a series of articles on the French position, published in the monthly „*Défense nationale*” in 1977: Ph.Moreau Defarges, *De la politique étrangère et de sécurité commune (mars)* and J.Dufourcq, *La puissance européenne, un enjeu de taille* (juin).

in particular that in Cologne in June 1999 r. and in Helsinki in December 1999. An intent of the Union to play, in the international arena, a role as appropriate to it, was confirmed and a number of important recommendations were presented (concerning, among other things, further, strict relation of potential of military industries of the Member States) as conditions for creation, in the future, of a new, fourth EU pillar.

Such a new pillar would certainly consist of the Common European Security and Defence Policy (CESDP), conceived as a supplement to the CFSP.⁴¹ Provision, during the summit in Helsinki, of an obligation of the Member States to provide, within the next three years, military forces numbering of 50-60 thousand, ready for implementation of the „Petersberg missions”, which means the establishment of a kind of “European army”, as well as to develop appropriate political and military structures, can be seen as one specific manifestation of determination in this area.⁴²

In relation to those issues one should question the opinions expressed in Western Europe, displaying fears that extension of the Euro-Atlantic integration structures towards the East involves a threat of them being paralysed. It is feared that there exists such a risk due to an excessive number of members (neither fully effective nor reliable) being adopted to those structures, as well as to clogging of decision-making procedures, financial problems or – also seen as an important issue – doubts as to actual efficiency of guarantees of security, extended to such new members.⁴³

In the light of the above-presented arguments (although only selected ones were mentioned) it is evident that such fears are unjustified. Any evidence indicates that new members would be able to bring a considerable contribution to both the reform of the enlarged NATO and to development of common foreign and defence policies.⁴⁴ Such a prognosis is the more justified that social consensus has been attained in the field of acceptance of political and defence

⁴¹ More on the concept of the fourth pillar – see: A.Missiroli, *CFSP, Defense and Flexibility*, “Chaillot Papers”, no. 38, Institute for Security Studies, WEU, Paris, February 2000.

⁴² See: *Wnioski Prezydencji Rady Europejskiej. Helsinki, 10-11 grudnia 1999 r. (European Council Presidency Conclusions. Helsinki, 10-11 December 1999)*, „*Studia Europejskie*”, no. 1/2000, s.120-121.

⁴³ See: *The ‘New NATO’ and the Enlargement Process*, „*European Security*”, Winter 1977.

⁴⁴ More on this subject in: S.Przymies, *Unia Europejska a Europa Środkowa. Polityczne aspekty współpracy (European Union and Central Europe. Political aspects of co-operation)*, Polska Fundacja Spraw Międzynarodowych (Polish Foundation of International Affairs), Warsaw 1997 nad J.Wijaszka, *Wspólna polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa UE. Współpraca polityczna z państwami stowarzyszonymi Europy Środkowej (EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Political co-operation with the associated countries of Central Europe)*, „*Studia i Materiały*”, no. 90, Polski Instytut Spraw Międzynarodowych (Polish Institute of International Affairs), Warsaw, May 1995.

aspects of NATO and EU membership in all the countries of our region, including the most positively declared one in Poland, the country having the largest importance in this respect.⁴⁵

It would be difficult at present to attempt to assess a final shape or specific functional and organisational solutions of such a new, postulated European/Euro-Atlantic security model. It depends on a large number of objective as well as subjective factors out of which only some can be foreseen. It seems that one has to confine himself to formulation of some „**border conditions**”, whose implementation could render creation and efficient working of such a model possible.

The first and most important of such conditions is fulfilment of the above-mentioned postulate of adoption of ultimate concepts or strategies behind the activities of the already existing structures (NATO, WEU, CFSP or CESDP), agreed upon and approved by all the parties concerned. This would be a condition which is necessary but not sufficient in itself, since such new strategies would have to assume either liquidation or at least bringing to a minimum of fundamental disagreements occurring between the United States and Europe on the one hand, and among the European allies themselves on the other hand, rather than be based upon any random premises. Unless this condition is met, it makes little sense to speak of development of principles of a security model – either common or at least one generally accepted by all the parties concerned. It is here that the main difficulty in development of such a model is faced, because it is not only the matter of **different positions or political ideas of particular countries** (although sometimes voiced in quite a spectacular way) but mainly of the more important and much deeper **differences in national interests of particular countries, or** – as in the case of the European Union as a whole – **international structures**.

It doesn't mean, however, that the difficulty cannot be overcome. While we appreciate the importance of the category of „national interest”, which, generally, plays a very important role in politics of particular countries, on the other hand it should not be overestimated.⁴⁶ As already mentioned, processes of globalisation taking place in the modern world account for a new situation in which a network of mutual relations and interdependencies, which grows more and more dense, prompts all the actors of international relations, even as

⁴⁵ In a survey carried out by OBOP agency in Poland in January 1997 90% (!) of Poles declared their support for acquiring NATO membership.

⁴⁶ Compared to nineteen fifties and sixties, when the category of „national interest” was firmly displayed in the ideas of the American school of “political realism” (whose main representative was H.Morgenthau), the understanding of that category underwent – just as the understanding of the category of security – a serious evolution, marked by a move away from treating national interest as a main and fundamental determinant for a foreign policy of any country.

powerful ones as the United States and the European Union, to look for **compromise** in virtually all the areas, including that of **interests in the field of security and foreign policy**. Additionally, one should take into account that – as evidenced by the results of a comparative analysis – a number of elements of the already existing political and defence structures of the NATO, WEU and EU is no longer common, co-operating, compatible or viable to be integrated in the future.

Taken together, this consideration seems an appropriate basis for a conclusion which confirms the statement, made at the beginning, that **it is possible to create, under the present conditions, an optimal system of security in Europe, basing upon transatlantic co-operation and ensuring interests of all the interested parties.**

The adoption of the European/Euro-Atlantic model means that a model of collective security assuming establishment of subsequent structures such as the OSCE should either be rejected at all or at least a very reserved attitude towards it should be taken. Although that organisation has played (and still keeps playing, which should be underlined) a very important and positive role in our continent, however, due to a number of reasons (including its limited powers and a threat of being dominated by Russia) it cannot fulfil a function of an effectively working security system for the whole continent.⁴⁷

The European/Euro-Atlantic model is not only the most effective one, proven over the last 50 years, but it is also capable of meeting, in a most successful way, challenges and demands of the 21 century. Certainly, its adoption may not mean that any new “walls” would be built in Europe. This should be prevented by geographic extension of the European integration structures – a solution which has been supported by the Central European countries. Such a system, built to meet the needs of the next century, should take interests and aspirations of all the European countries (including those of Central Europe) into consideration, in order to effectively fill its role. Under conditions of contemporary world, where mutual and multilateral relations of all kinds become more and more dense and firm, European security becomes – as stressed in the introductory remarks to this study – an indivisible category which should cover the whole continent and not be limited only to its Western part.

In this context a maxim of ancient Romans may be quoted, one that is often underrated by politicians: *historia vitae magistra est* – as one can see, a need to take past experience into account in present activities was appreciated in the ancient Rome. It should be reminded to the opponents of enlargement of European integration structures, who still have been many in the West, that their

⁴⁷ This issue has been analysed by R.Zięba, *Funkcjonowanie paneuropejskiego systemu bezpieczeństwa KBWE/OBWE (The Functioning of the pan-European security system of CSCE/OSCE)*, „*Studia Europejskie*”, no. 3/1998.

compatriots who refused to die for Polish Gdańsk the day before the Second World War began, soon had to die for French Dunkerque or for British Coventry.

Of course no historical events release the Central European countries from their part of responsibility. They still have, on their part, to undertake continuous efforts aiming both at carrying on political and economic transformation and at reaching in all the areas and as soon as possible, full adaptation to standards of the unified Europe. There is no doubt, however, that this has to take place within the framework of a new security system, one that will be stable, effective and advantageous to all the parties involved. The former "Yalta order" has to be replaced with a new "Brussels system", which fully meets the needs and demands of modern world and is adopted through a democratic and free choice.