

*Dariusz Milczarek\**

## **What Foreign and Security Policy for the Enlarged European Union?**

The enlarged European Union, including Poland and nine other new Member States, faces important challenges in many areas: politics, economy, social affairs, culture. One of the most important challenge regards development of consistent and efficient EU foreign and security policy.

Some politicians, scholars or public opinion representatives in the EU Member States underrate the importance of this issue as they tend to focus upon various aspects of home situation in their countries or in the EU as the whole. Such an attitude – present also in Poland – is certainly wrong. The area of the EU's broad relationships with the outer world has become more and more important. This is reflected in a number of dimensions, mainly in the growing role of economic and trade exchange in overseas relations which determines development of Member States economies to a significant degree – but not only. Issues concerning foreign and security policy have also gained importance, reflecting significance of the former problem. This can be seen clearly in the obvious weaknesses of the EU which, in many cases, proves to have neither political nor military measures to influence matters of greatest international importance (as in the Iraqi case). Nor it seems to be prepared to face symptoms of war against international terrorism that become more frequent and severe, already affecting Europe directly (as it happened in Madrid).

In general terms, the problem is about the need to make a fundamental strategic choice: should the European Union develop its foreign dimension at all in order to gain position it deserves on the global arena? In other words: should it restrict itself to European dimension only or should it assume the global one? As argued further on, it takes an answer to another strategic choice to deal with

---

\* Prof. **Dariusz Milczarek** – Deputy Director of the Warsaw University Centre for Europe and Editor-in-Chief of the quarterly “*Studia Europejskie*” (“European Studies”).

the first one: namely that, whether united Europe should rely to a greater degree upon solutions of a federal or rather confederal model? The question is implied by the basic fact that adoption of either the two models largely determines the former choice, that between options of the European Union as a sort of power of global influence or as an international actor having just local or, at best, regional importance.

The following considerations seek to analyse the issue of a strategic choice regarding the EU's future foreign and security policy. It takes into account a specific nature of the EU as an actor in international relations, peculiarities of its foreign policy, potential for such policy development and, finally, conditions that should be met in order for the EU to gain position it deserves in an international arena.

### **1. The European Union as an international actor**

Inquiring what kind of an actor the European Union has been in international relations, firstly, an immense complexity and uniqueness of the very EU phenomenon has to be underlined. The Union, taking advantage of an overwhelming historical heritage of European cultural orbit that has emanated world-wide, constitutes the one and only instance, in the history of human race, of such highly integrated international community. It has been based upon ideas and political assumptions suitable thereto and referred to, more or less aptly, as European values. While some characteristic features of the European Union are neither unique nor particular to it, their combined presence in the same time and place makes up (as through a sort of synergy) a new quality. Seen this way, the EU has been a unique entity, with no equivalent to match over the whole history of international relations. This is illustrated, among other things, in a specific, unique status within such relations, a status that neither responds to that of a State nor to that of a classic international organisation. That makes the European Union (that features, at present, no status of an international legal personality)<sup>1</sup> a structure which is based upon assumptions of two basic models: that of federalism (also called the Community method) and that of confederalism (an intergovernmental method).<sup>2</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup> Views on this issue differ considerably, yet most experts accord with the belief that at present the EU has no an international legal personality status (see: D.Milczarek, *Status Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych (The European Union status in international relations)*, "Stosunki Międzynarodowe", No. 3-4/2001). It has been given legal status only as late as in the Constitutional Treaty. See: K.Myszona, *Projekt Traktatu ustanawiającego Konstytucję dla Europy (The Draft Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe)*, "Zeszyty OIDE", Warsaw 2003.

<sup>2</sup> In a simplified way it can be explained that federalism treats the processes of European integration as supranational (assuming establishment of institutions empowered with competences

The European Union's international position, defined by fundamental geopolitical determinants, in particular economic ones, may be described as one of the world's leading. (This is justified, among other things, by such data as its first place in global export or its GDP similar to that of the USA.) And its distinguishing features do not end here since the EU's uniqueness also concerns depth and scale of integration. It should be emphasised that there is no other international community to have developed integration processes taking place therein to such a high degree. This regards both depth of solutions adopted (as evidenced, among other things, by exclusivity of the Community powers in certain areas) and a scale of activities undertaken for integration. Expanding gradually, such activities have ended up covering practically all areas of life, if to different degrees. They have been evident in economy, politics, defence, social and cultural matters, scientific studies and research, environment protection, etc. The same can be said about the way the EU has been organised or institutional and legal solutions applied. No other integration group in the world, even if numbering more Member States and including highly developed ones among them, managed to achieve such a high degree of consistence and, at the same time, efficiency of actions of its institutions.<sup>3</sup>

The above peculiarities taken into account, one comes at comprehensive conclusions about the international position and role of the European Union.<sup>4</sup> It occurs that the effects of depth and scale of integration, cumulated in a synergetic way with other characteristics, bring interesting results. Namely, the EU stands out among other integrating communities, but even more importantly, it is in position to gain peculiar advantages over them. This may be illustrated with an example of achievements of the EU economy. Bringing economic efforts of its Member States together – thanks to mechanisms of the Single Market and the Economic and Monetary Union – it ranks at leading positions world-wide, being actively involved, at the same time, in processes of globalisation, as proven by basic macro-economic ratios. Interestingly, such ratios have been

---

of authority in relation to individual States), while confederalism basically restricts integration to intergovernmental co-operation in which individual States are involved preserving their sovereign rights and competences. While both concepts seem to have quite opposite assumptions and goals, in fact they are complementary making a genuine "mix" reflected practically in the way the European Communities/European Union operate. More on the same subject – see: M.Burgess, *Federalism and European Union: the Building of Europe, 1950-2000*, London-New York 2000.

<sup>3</sup> A separate issue is that to which degree differences in range and scale of integration processes result from conscious choices regarding particular models of integration. The following models are distinguished in literature: European (based upon EC/EU pattern) and American one, the latter assuming much looser integration bounds, predominantly basing on the free trade doctrine.

<sup>4</sup> See: D.Milczarek, *Pozycja i rola Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych. Wybrane aspekty teoretyczne (Position and role of the European Union in international relations. Selected theoretical aspects)*, Warsaw 2003.

much better than one might presume from potential of the EU Member States resulting from their area, demography, raw materials, etc.

A huge, perhaps the most important attainment of the European Communities is that they have managed, throughout the post-war period, to ensure peaceful development not just to their members whose number gradually increased, but in fact to the whole continent. This was achieved with appropriate structures of security as well as political, economic and military co-operation established (with support from the American ally) On the one hand they provided conditions to prevent conflicts among Member States, while, on the other, they discouraged potential external enemies (for quite a long time identified with the Communist block countries).<sup>5</sup>

At the same time the European Union has played a number of international roles. Among them typical EU's roles related to provision of comprehensive aid to third countries come to the forefront, as well as to promotion of specific system of European values. Apart from consolidation of democracy, rule of law or protection of human rights, such values also include a particular model of social development. (A peculiar nature of the EU in this respect is evidenced as we compare it to the system of values and foreign policy of the United States, its principal ally but at the same time its competitor in international relations, as argued in more detail further on.)

Considering the EU's position and role world-wide in general terms one observes a clear dichotomy: on the one hand, in line with the above remarks, the European Union has all the potential to act as the leading player on the global scene, but, on the other hand, it seems unable to take proper advantage of its potential and powers. This mainly results from quite an obvious unevenness in development of the two principal components in the area of the EU's relationships with the world: namely, foreign economic relations on the one hand and foreign and security policy on the other. (In addition, a lack of proper co-ordination between the way two components work should be stressed.)

Foreign economic relations, almost entirely subject to competence of the Community bodies (and as such fitting in the logic of a federal model) have been well-developed since long ago. Moreover, they have everything it takes for further dynamic progress (especially after the launch of Euro and the EU Eastward enlargement) and to strengthen its international position and role, mostly on economic map of the world. Whilst nothing happens automatically in that area and one has to actively strive for maintaining such positive trends in a well-balanced way (which the EU does in fact), there is no reason for any major concern for further development of the economic component.

---

<sup>5</sup> In fact the post-war Europe has experienced some armed conflicts, but only on a local scale, so this doesn't really change that positive opinion.

What is striking, instead, is a presence of undeniable deficiencies in the way the political-and-military component operates. The so-called EU second pillar, *i.e.* Common Foreign and Security Policy and Common European Security and Defence Policy that originates therefrom, have still relied upon intergovernmental co-operation, so it is based, in fact, on principles of confederal model. This is so in spite of an important community-wise evolution. As a result, the European Union's system of developing and, in particular, implementing its foreign policy remains imperfect. It seems even far-fetched to call it a truly common policy and the same relates, to even a higher degree, to the EU security policy which, in fact, remains at a very early stage so far. This means that, compared to economic integration, this component is relatively underdeveloped.

This leads to general conclusion which, put in metaphor, goes like this: despite an enormous growth of its importance world-wide over the past fifty years, the European Union in international relations has been an economic giant and at the same time a political-and-military dwarf. In other words, compared to other actors of international relations, the EU has neither developed nor applied in a fully effective way a comprehensive set of instruments it could take advantage of in the area of foreign relationships. This way, it hasn't used all of its actual or potential assets and as such is unable to secure protection of all its international interests. This mainly relates to its military potential, which, while already significant and showing promising signs for further growth, is nevertheless only at a very initial phase of development.

Taken together this goes to show that on an international arena the EU has been an actor to which a concept of the so-called civilian power fits. The core of that concept may be summed up as follows: "*a civilian power has been an entity which influences the international system using mainly economic, financial and political measures rather than military power*".<sup>6</sup> Characteristics of such an entity include, among other things, precedence of diplomatic actions in solving global problems and using mechanisms and structures of international organisations to this end.

## **2. Specific features of the EU's foreign and security policy**

Therefore, the European Union has been a specific sort of power having a global range in economic terms while in other dimensions – political and military one in particular – it remains restricted to just regional scale. It should be emphasised at the same time that it is a very specific power also when

---

<sup>6</sup> S.Stavridis, *Why the 'Militarising' of the European Union is Strengthening the Concept of a Civilian Power Europe*, EUI Working Papers no. 2001/17, San Domenico 2001, p.3-4.

compared to other ones. As mentioned above, special about it is that it has played a number of international roles among which those of conciliator, of promoter of democratic values or of proponent of peaceful solutions for international problems (in line with the concept of civilian power) seem most significant.

These roles deserve particular attention as they have much in common with the already mentioned peculiar philosophy which underlies the whole EU's international activity and which may be roughly defined as supremacy of European values. Without involving in controversy over their precise definition, it is sufficient to observe here that those values clearly privilege dialogue, co-operation and development of comprehensive bounds, while retortion or repression measures of whatever kind are regarded less desirable or effective.<sup>7</sup>

In such an attitude, even as the so-called principle of conditionality is applied – as increasingly is the case – *i.e.* one that makes provision of aid by the EU to third countries dependant upon meeting of certain political conditions, the idea behind it is to achieve positive goals in the form of consolidation of democracy and protection of human rights. This should be made quite clear: isolating of recipient countries from assistance they usually need badly is not an aim behind such tactics at all. As aptly put by K.E.Smith: “*Integration, dialogue and trade should be used to root democracy, economic reforms and <good-mannered behaviour>*”, while sanctions only bring harm to people and generate politically unstable situations. Moreover, they make it more difficult or even impossible for the European Union to influence an inner situation or foreign policy of a given country.<sup>8</sup>

The real nature of such an attitude can be well illustrated as particular case studies are considered. Reaction to announcement of Marshall Law in Poland in 1981 is an example. Unlike the United States (that applied relatively strict economic and political sanctions both against Poland and the Soviet Union), response of the European Communities was more temperate consisting only in imposing – admittedly, under pressure from the USA – limited sanctions only against the USSR. This was justified by an urge to maintain, with neighbouring countries from the Central and Eastern Europe, good economic and political relations, better suited to the goal of maintaining détente and peace on the continent. In a similar way in 1995 the European Union at first reached for the principle of conditionality in order to exert pressure upon the Russian Federation (suspending, among other things, conclusion of a trade agreement) to contain it

---

<sup>7</sup> More on the same subject see: L.Stainier, *Common Interests, Values and Criteria for Action in: Towards a Common Defence Policy*, eds. L.Martin, J.Roper, Paris 1995.

<sup>8</sup> K.E.Smith, *Paradoxes of European Foreign Policy. The Instruments of European Union Foreign Policy*, EUI Working Papers no. 97/68, San Domenico 1997, p.15.

from repressive actions in Chechnya, but soon a policy of encouragement prevailed and the agreement was signed. Arguments given to justify that change in attitude mentioned the need to involve Russia in structures of European cooperation. Furthermore, contrary to the position of the United States that maintained an embargo on trade with Iran and Cuba, the EU carried on the so-called critical dialogue with Teheran and extended its economic bounds with Fidel Castro's regime.

### 2.1. European Union *versus* United States

As seen in the above examples, an argument about specific features of the EU foreign policy is easier justified by comparisons with foreign policy of another global actor dominant in international relations, *i.e.* that of the United States. There is a fundamental difference not only between style but between the very nature of both policies. One should point out that while the EU actions – with any potential critical remarks regarding their inconsistency, ineffectiveness and so on – basically fit into the canon of international political correctness, the same can hardly be said about their American equivalent. While steering clear of coarse anti-Americanism, it should nevertheless be observed that, according to Americans themselves (as R.Kagan), the Washington diplomats “*divide the world into good and evil; into foe and friend, while the picture Europeans see is more sophisticated. Confronting their enemy Americans prefer coercion to persuasion, give priority to policy of sanctions rather than encouraging others to behave in a right way, of punishment rather than reward*”.<sup>9</sup> Europeans, on the other hand, “*attempt to influence others in a more indirect way, using more subtle methods (...) usually choosing peaceful solutions and preferring negotiation, diplomacy and persuasion to coercion*”.<sup>9</sup> Certainly, such evaluations border at *cliché*, however they seem to hit the point.

Anyway, two very different political philosophies are evident: a “harsher” American one and “milder” European one. The distinction went as far as to gain its name in literature: the U.S. policy was defined, with reference to the famous Cold-War doctrine, as “economic containment”, while the EC attitude as “interdependence”.<sup>10</sup> Alternatively, terms as “asphyxiation” and “oxygen” are used.<sup>11</sup> This is related with the distinction into categories of “hard power”

---

<sup>9</sup> R.Kagan, *Kowboje i barmani (Cowboys and Bartenders)*, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 17-18.08.2002.

<sup>10</sup> Terms introduced by J.Zielonka, *Introduction: Eastern Europe in Transition* in: *After the Revolution. East-West Trade and Technology Transfer in the 1990s*, eds. G.K.Bertsch, H.Vogel, J.Zielonka, Boulder 1991, p.2-4.

<sup>11</sup> See: F.L.Lavin, *Asphyxiation or Oxygen? The Sanctions Dilemma*, “Foreign Policy”, Fall 1996.

(a policy that exerts different sorts of pressures including the use of armed force) and “soft power”, basing on application of conciliatory and peaceful measures.

Looking from perspective of past fifty years controversies in transatlantic relations are nothing new since views and positions of both parties in various areas of politics, economy or defence systems have always differed from each other and they still do.<sup>12</sup> It seems, however, that the situation we have to deal with at present is different in qualitative terms. Notably, fundamental differences have developed and become evident between the European Union and the United States over doctrine and practice, regarding both understanding and implementation of foreign and security policy.<sup>13</sup> Specifically, this involves – among other things – a different attitude towards problems of modern world. To sum it up in a short and simplified way, Americans (in line with the above-mentioned Kagan’s observations) tend to divide the world into good and evil the Manichaean way, clearly prefer resolute actions consisting in pressing and forcing their way through rather than in persuasion and don’t hesitate to make use of arms (as they have shown many times – lately in Iraq).

Moreover, U.S. foreign policy begins to reveal, to a growing degree, unilateral attitude which can be observed not only in political practice but also reflected in official strategic concepts. The so-called Bush’s doctrine, announced in the autumn of 2002, has been just one example of such a one-sided attitude, resulting from eagerness to protect American interests and security.<sup>14</sup> According to it, the United States afford themselves the right to evaluate the way global situation evolves independently (*i.e.* even in opposition to the UN or to their allies) and to take any measures they deem appropriate, including the use of military power against so-called rogue countries. What’s even more important, such actions may be of preventive nature, so they hardly fit in the logic of modern international law whose rules provide for sanctions for breaking it *ex post* rather than *ex ante*. The best example one can think of is starting armed intervention in Iraq in March 2003.

All of this is contrary to the attitude represented by the European Union. The EU politicians see international problems in more nuance and certainly prefer persuasion and peaceful solutions using political and economic instruments. Also, they are clearly in favour of comprehensive, multi-faceted actions,

---

<sup>12</sup> See synthetic evaluations in: A.Krzemiński, *Burza nad Atlantykiem (Storm over Atlantic)*, “Polityka”, 12.10.2002 and an interview made by P.Hassner, *Ta stara, dobra Europa (Good old Europe)*, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 15-16.02.2003.

<sup>13</sup> One should not forget the difference between possibilities of carrying on an effective foreign policy by such a power as the United States and by the European Union which groups sovereign States and struggles to develop its foreign policy that rarely exceeds the level of just a compromise between the Community interest and interests of its Member States.

<sup>14</sup> See: “Financial Times”, 21.09.2002.



preferably with official support from the United Nations or at least such as undergo consultation and agreements on a broader arena, for instance within NATO.

An appropriate example of those differences is found in a clearly different attitude towards one of the most important problems to have reached the global range recently, namely that of international terrorism. Leaving aside the fact that firm response of the United States following 11<sup>th</sup> of September 2001 was caused by a direct strike against their territory, it can clearly be seen that transatlantic allies have differing visions on how to solve the problem. Americans, as illustrated by their intervention in Afghanistan and then in Iraq, first of all reach for military measures using political ones to much smaller degree. Most EU Member States led by Germany and France, on the contrary, would undisputedly prefer an opposite sequence of actions, that is to use all political possibilities in the first place, especially within the United Nations, and to reach for military power only as a last resort. It seems that in fact this rather stems from a different political philosophy, as outlined above, subscribed to by European politicians, than from the fact that military potential of the EU Member States is vastly weaker than American one so that the Europeans' scope of possible action is simply quite restricted.

From the other hand, it must be underlined that some Member States faithfully support American policy. It concerns such important countries like the United Kingdom, Italy and Spain, as well as a couple of other countries, such as Poland. One should point out that transatlantic controversies have already influence Polish foreign and security policy and probably will increasingly do in the future.<sup>15</sup>

Such differences in terms of attitude towards fundamental international problems seem to reach further than suggested by a superficial glance reducing them down to a "family quarrel" within the Western world. While it is not our intent to utter bleak prophecies, one nevertheless should see a threat that over time such dissimilitude may undermine the transatlantic alliance.<sup>16</sup> Both the USA and the EU Member States have already begun pointing fingers at one another with serious accusations: Americans blaming it with passive or even cowardly attitude in the face of global threats, while reproaches cast the opposite

---

<sup>15</sup> See: D.Milczarek, *Ewolucja instytucjonalnych aspektów bezpieczeństwa w związku z integracją Polski z Unią Europejską (Evolution of institutional aspects of security in the context of Poland's integration with the European Union)* in: *Polska w Unii Europejskiej. Początkowe problemy i kryzysy? (Poland in the European Union. Initial problems and crises?)*, eds. U.Kurczewska, M.Kwiatkowska, K.Sochacka, PISM, Warsaw 2002.

<sup>16</sup> This has found a spectacular manifestation in NATO around granting, in February 2003, preventive aid to Turkey as part of American preparation to war against Iraq – see: "Financial Times", 10.02.2003.

way concern political and military irresponsibility and an urge to play a role of “global gendarme”.<sup>17</sup> Both protagonists are right to some degree, although it seems that it is the American policy that raises more question marks and anxiety. Additionally, it is not irrelevant that in terms of culture and civilisation the United States have gradually become more and more remote from their European roots, reinforcing their liaisons with regions which feed them with principal streams of immigration: *i.e.* Latin America and South-Eastern Asia. Consequently, it is quite likely that America is going to lose its interest in Europe.

In spite of presence of the above-outlined controversy or dissimilar political philosophies it should be emphasised that, so far, foreign policy of the European Union as the whole hasn't become anti-American in any respect (neither in economic foreign relations nor in foreign and security policy). What's more, as follows from an analysis of the CFSP, it remains based upon the transatlantic alliance. Nevertheless, the EU politicians repeatedly stress the need to preserve their autonomy in relationship with the mighty partner. For example, Swedish Prime Minister G.Persson had argued before the Iraqi war began that “*the EU has been the only institution allowing us to counter-balance American dominance in the global arena*”.<sup>18</sup> Also H.Védrine, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, the country that has traditionally revealed its lack of confidence regarding hegemonic aspirations of the USA, described the United States as a “hyper-power” “*whose strength entails a risk of its monopolistic domination as long as a counterbalance is found thereto*”. The European Union is the only entity able to provide such counterbalance. To do so, it has to “*gradually come to regard itself a power*”.<sup>19</sup>

### 3. European Union – what kind of international actor?

Therefore a question arises whether there is a potential or chances to implement such an ambitious plan or, more broadly, what sort of an international actor the EU may become in the future?

It should be pointed out right at the beginning that any such forecasts are tricky. It isn't easy to describe the future shape of the EU's relations with the outer world, as general course along which the whole Union is going to proceed

---

<sup>17</sup> According to already quoted R.Kagan, Americans have globally played the role of sheriffs who actively fight bandits, while European not only restrict themselves to a role of passive watchers, but sometimes seem to be more afraid of rash sheriffs than of bandits.

<sup>18</sup> “International Herald Tribune”, 24.01.2003.

<sup>19</sup> Quoted from: M.Walker, *Europe: Superstate or Superpower?*, “World Policy Journal”, Winter 2000/2001, p.5. See also his opinions (together with Z.Brzeziński) in: “Le Nouvel Observateur”, 30.01.2003.

remains unclear. Then, prognoses regarding the EU foreign and security policy should be drawn with particular caution since this is an area abound with factors unknown and scanty in reliable and well-grounded studies.<sup>20</sup>

This doesn't mean, however, that experts or politicians give up such an exercise altogether. Different variants are prepared describing how the situation is likely to unfold either in global or regional dimension. It should be firmly underlined that in many cases such attempts seem excessively abstract or theory-laden.<sup>21</sup> Only studies prepared by serious scholars and institutions, featuring high methodological level and sensibly focused upon their subject-matter, can have real value. They are usually useful in that they reliably gather together, put in order and provide interpretation to data which, as such, were meant to build different types of scenarios or action plans (according to the formula: problem identification – proposals for solutions) rather than to draw forecasts.<sup>22</sup>

Then, evaluations regarding the future global importance of the EU differ considerably ranging from bleak scenarios prophesying collapse of the European Union sooner or later to enthusiastic visions of potential replacement of the United States by the European Union in the role of global leader.<sup>23</sup> The latter prognoses rely – denying any prompt objections about their utopian nature –

---

<sup>20</sup> See: *Europe in the Perspective of Global Change*, eds. A.Kukliński, B.Skuza, Warsaw 2003. See also: G.Andréani, *L'Europe de la défense: progrès récents et problèmes non résolus*, "Stosunki Międzynarodowe", special issue, June 2002.

<sup>21</sup> An example is found in the following study: M.G.Roskin, *The Emerging Europe: Power Configuration for the Next Century* (<http://carlisle-www.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/99winter/roskin.htm>). The Author, an expert from US Army War College, prepared a number of scenarios, each including several variables, for instance Europe: united or divided; Germany: weak or additionally strengthened; Russia: hostile towards the West or co-operating, and so on. A number of possible combinations of the variables reaches eight, some of them being quite unlikely (such as that in which all potential actors are hostile to each other) while some other ones are abstractive and useless.

<sup>22</sup> Such an in-deep analysis with several variants has been presented by A.Z.Nowak, *Integracja europejska. Szansa dla Polski? (European Integration: an Opportunity for Poland?)*, Warsaw 2002. See also reports: one prepared by the Bertelsmann Foundation: *Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor*, Bertelsmann Foundation, Gütersloh 2000, another one being a periodic report by the European Commission experts: G.Bertrand, A.Michalski, L.R.Pench, *Scenarios Europe 2010, Five Possible Futures for Europe*, Forward Studies Unit, European Commission, Working Paper, July 1999.

<sup>23</sup> From very abundant literature on that subject, see: *Actors and models. Assessing the European Union's External Capability and Influence*, eds. P.Willa, N.Levrat, "Europa études" 11-2001, Genève 2001; *Europe in the New Century. Visions of an Emerging Power*, ed. R.J.Guttman, Boulder 2001; H.Sjursen, *The Common Foreign and Security Policy: an Emerging New Voice in International Politics*, ARENA Working Papers 99/34.

upon rational, scientific premises. Specifically, they are justified, among other things, by a concept of the so-called power transition.<sup>24</sup>

It is possible to prove that in the history of international relations so far we had to deal with alternate emergence and decline of subsequent powers which played, for some time, the leading role in either global or regional (mainly European) scale. During the last three hundred years more than a dozen of such powers may be identified, starting with Turkey and ending with the present superpower the United States. Each developed along several stages: initiating (an original, more or less prompt growth of power), transitional (dynamic consolidation of power) and full growth, when some symptoms of weakening of its power status already begin to appear. An exchange (transition) in the position of the leading power also comes in stages – first a challenger to play the leading role steps up, then he questions the present hegemony's status in order to take on the top position as a result of decomposition of the old power structure.

According to a number of scholars, some symptoms that indicate a fall or rather beginning of the end of the USA power in the global power balance have already begun to appear.<sup>25</sup> Even if facts seem to deny that at the present moment, then there's no reasonable grounds to negate the above, empirically demonstrable regularities. What they reveal are certain historical necessities rather than mechanical determinism of historic processes. Eventually, it is quite hard to imagine the power of the USA, unlike any other in the past, will remain dominant in the world forever! Sure enough, time-scale of a new transition remains an open issue, probably ranging over several dozens of years.

There is no doubt that there have been different scenarios for further development of global power arrangement. For example, a unipolar pattern may give way for emergence of bipolar one. However, as one admits the assumption – which seem rational in the light of historic experience so far – that next transition is inevitable, then one consequently proceeds to attempt to identify those players of contemporary international relations who could lay a claim to take the power position over from the United States. They are not many, as, realistically, a group of either actual or potential candidates to the superpower status has been limited to just a couple of countries (notably China, possibly Russia, Brazil or India) and to one peculiar new-type of participant of international relations in the person of the European Union. Leaving aside an important question to which degree it can act as a uniform, single global actor,

---

<sup>24</sup> More on the same subject see: T.Łoś-Nowak, *Stosunki międzynarodowe. Teorie – systemy – uczestnicy (International Relations. Theories – systems – participants)*, Wrocław 2000, p.149-159.

<sup>25</sup> Such a view is presented, among others, by a French historian E.Todd – see his study: *Après l'empire. Essai sur la décomposition du système américain*, Paris 2001 and an interview with him in: "Le Figaro", 05.04.2003.

one should seriously consider its strengths in this respect.<sup>26</sup> Both a very strong international position of the EU (especially in global economy) and relatively abundant catalogue of various important international roles it plays taken into account, one can argue that the European Union is at a very good starting point to achieve the status of the world's leading power in the future.<sup>27</sup> Whether such a scenario comes true, this depends, naturally, on whether a number of factors pop up or not and on certain conditions being met.

Looking at the EU potential (broadly understood as the whole set of measures rendering it in position to operate on an international scale) it is evident that, as far as some elements constituting the status of power are concerned, the European Union has already got them. This mainly relates, of course, to the enormous economic potential (comparable, taken together, to the American one) as well as capabilities of exerting political influence, especially by playing a role of a civilian power that promotes European values: democracy, rule of law, protection of human rights. Additionally, immense potential of Europe can be mentioned in the area of influences regarding culture or suggesting proven social solutions. These factors, however, do not suffice for the EU to become global superpower as it seems that in order to achieve that goal, another basic conditions needs to be met.

Undeniably, to gain a status of power, the European Union has to have a complete set of instruments, including a relevant military potential. Unless this condition is met, the EU can be an important player in international relations, but with no ability to take real advantage of its significant position and international role. In other words, it is not going to be a full, consummate power.

The EU top decision-makers have been well aware of the above requirement despite notorious controversy among Member States regarding development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy. As put by the French President J.Chirac: "*The European Union cannot exist to the full unless it enjoys autonomous possibilities of action in the area of defence*".<sup>28</sup> Lord G.Robertson, the former General Secretary of NATO, backed him with an apt metaphor: "*without military potential Europe is going to be but a paper-made tiger*".<sup>29</sup> Not dissimilar are positions assumed by the Community institutions. The European Commission was it very clear about it in one of its official documents as early as in mid-Nineties: "*The EU foreign policy suffers from its inability to use reliable*

---

<sup>26</sup> It should also be remembered that strongest EU Member States (such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and Italy) rank at high positions in various global rankings independently.

<sup>27</sup> As viewed by a commentator: "*Europe is going to become the principal competitor of America and there's no turning back on that road*" (Ch.A.Kupchan, *Koniec Zachodu (The End of the West)*, "Forum", 24.02.2003.).

<sup>28</sup> Quoted from: M.Walker, op.cit.

<sup>29</sup> See: an interview in: "Le Monde", 04.10.1999.

military force”.<sup>30</sup> The Commission endeavoured, also at a later time, to unfold “debates regarding European security and defence policy, which is of crucial importance for political position of the Union”.<sup>31</sup>

It is on such occasions, however, that clashes of opinion or at least different accentuation regarding the way the goal is to be achieved become evident. Should this happen through reinforcement of Community scope of competence or through intergovernmental co-operation? So, for instance, British Prime Minister T.Blair stated in his address held in Warsaw in October 2000 that he sees united Europe as “super-power rather than a super-State”.<sup>32</sup> This way he referred to debate on presence of elements of federalism and confederalism in processes of European integration, in which Britons have traditionally supported confederal solutions.

There have been different proposals emerging within that debate in which both politicians and scholars are involved. Among the most interesting is the idea of military criteria of convergence, patterned on the already-known criteria used in relation to the Economic and Monetary Union.<sup>33</sup> Development and implementation of such criteria would complement and at the same time foster implementation of the idea of Common European Security and Defence Policy, first creating a set of conditions whose fulfilment would be necessary and then developing a clear scenario of military development of the European Union. Among proposals put forth in this respect a catalogue of criteria prepared by A.Missiroli seems most interesting.<sup>34</sup>

The catalogue in question provides for introduction of two categories of criteria: economic-and-quantity-based as well as military-and-functional. The first includes, above all, the requirement that European States belonging to both NATO and the EU have to bear expenses for military spending in the amount of at least 2% of their GDP. While this has been, on the average, met by a group of the EU Member States belonging to NATO, not each of them fills that condition (Germany being particularly evident exception). Other requirements would regard inadmissibility of further cuts in *per capita* investment ratio (which have

---

<sup>30</sup> Reinforcing Political Union and Preparing for Enlargement, (COM/96/90 final), 28.02.1996, p.13.

<sup>31</sup> Adapting the Institutions to make a success of enlargement: a Commission contribution to the preparations for the Inter-Governmental Conference on institutional issues, 10 November 1999 (IP/99/826).

<sup>32</sup> See: “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 08.10.2000.

<sup>33</sup> Such criteria would have been used, among other things, to form a so-called Diplomatic and Military Union (DMU). This was postulated in 1999 by Commissioner E.Bonino.

<sup>34</sup> A.Missiroli, *European Security and Defence: The Case for Setting ‘Convergence Criteria’*, “European Foreign Affairs Review”, No. 4/1999. See also: K.Schake, A.Bloch-Lainé, C.Grant, *Building European defence capability*, “Survival”, No. 1/1999 and F.Heisbourg, *L’Europe de la défense dans l’Alliance atlantique*, “Politique étrangère”, février 1999.

been very different), making the army totally or at least partially professional as well as creation of an efficient pan-European military industry fostering further standardisation of military equipment. (The latter postulate has been largely included in provisions of the Constitutional Treaty.)

Another category of military-and-functional criteria would include a fundamental requirement regarding integration of military forces of individual States reaching much further and, above all, being much more effective. This concerns both functional aspect (creation of common units or groups, preferably specialised, e.g. in landing operations) and regional one (organisation of forces directed to, for instance, Mediterranean or Central-European area of operation).<sup>35</sup> Anyway, provision of a special institutional and legal infrastructure would be required to that end, an embryo of which was established in 1999 during the EU summit in Helsinki, in the form of plans to create European rapid deployment forces.

Such conditions met, it would be possible to implement subsequent stages of the Common European Security and Defence Policy. According to postulates of the Bertelsmann Foundation report, following the first, already initiated stage of that policy, “*its second stage would consist in transition from focusing only on provision of common security and ability to use military force to create a collective and wholly common defence system*”.<sup>36</sup> At the same time this would mean fulfilment of Maastricht and Amsterdam Treaties provisions, which provided for establishment of “common defence” for the European Union, whose assumptions – which needs pointing out – would rely, in line with those postulates, on markedly federal principles.<sup>37</sup>

Therefore, deeply rooted disputes among Member States have not so much been about a goal to make a full-size power out of the European Union and consolidation of its position and role in international relations, as about ways to achieve that goal. The essence of the controversy seems to consist in a need to make a choice between an urge to gain a military power status and that to maintain a non-military power status. In spite of a relatively strong opposition from some scholar circles, public opinion and governments of some countries, the former option seems to take momentum and prevail. Gradually more and more experts and politicians subscribe to it and its justification can be found in an apt statement: “*If the EU intends to take its own aspirations seriously, namely*

---

<sup>35</sup> Missiroli includes a list of more than forty common military units of different types, formed by different European States (op.cit., p.494-495).

<sup>36</sup> *Enhancing the European Union as an International Security Actor*, op.cit., p.73.

<sup>37</sup> According to a report of the Bertelsmann Foundation “*during the 2<sup>nd</sup> stage (to take place in the years 2015-2030) gradual transfer of national competence in the area of decision-making, command and control is foreseen towards a common structure, in which some sort of voting by qualified majority of votes would be adopted, on the basis of jointly agreed legal rules*” (p.74).

*those stipulated for in the EU Treaty and regarding playing an important role on the international arena, rendering it in position to undertake preventive actions and other specific activities, then (...) the only way for it is to equip itself in its own European defence system”.*<sup>38</sup>

However, one should also remember about limitations and threats in that area. M.Keens-Soper warns that “*Europe must not prepare to the future seen according to just one scenario since developing a reliable list of potential scenarios of global future, if only the most ponderous ones, is simply impracticable*”. Consequently, “*it would be more reasonable (if more troublesome as well) to consider as many possible situations as workable*”.<sup>39</sup> Moreover, one should take into account that results of actions undertaken in the area of foreign policy are, in fact, unforeseeable. As justly observed by C.D.Walton, “*no matter how laudable are intentions of those who promote common European foreign policy, potential emergence of Europe as superpower may affect global order in a way wholly contrary to that intended*”.<sup>40</sup> This, would undermine the balance in the global balance of power in the first place. A situation in which the European Union would become a very serious or even the only true competitor of the U.S. power could (or already has, according to some experts!) prompt the United States to undertake measures in response, putting general stability of the international system at threat.<sup>41</sup> This could, for instance, take form of trade wars intended to weaken European economic strength.

In order to mitigate such a bleak vision one should point out that concepts regarding traditionally conceived international balance of power seem to give

---

<sup>38</sup> B.Ch.Ryba, *La Politique Etrangère et de Sécurité Commune (PESC). Mode d'emploi et bilan d'une année d'application (fin 1993/1994)*, “Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne”, janvier 1995, p.31. Such opinions are closely echoed by Polish authors, such as M.Sulek, according to whom “*a decisive growth of the EU's political importance is not going to be possible without a serious increase in armaments and tightening military bounds*” (M.Sulek, *Wielkie jednostki polityczne w świetle syntetycznych miar potęgi (Great political units in the light of synthetic measures of power)* in: *Współczesne problemy globalne a bezpieczeństwo europejskie (Modern global problems and European security)*, Toruń 2001, p.140).

<sup>39</sup> M.Keens-Soper, op.cit., p.75-76.

<sup>40</sup> C.D.Walton, *Europa United: The Rise of a Second Superpower and its Effect on World Order*, “European Security”, Winter 1997, p.51.

<sup>41</sup> As described by one of experts: “*As one observes political construction of global society, emergence of another superpower taking a crucial position and controlling resources sufficient to compete with the United States may give rise to serious problems*” (H.H.Nolte, *The European Union within the Modern World-System* in: *The European Union in the World System Perspective*, ed. R.Stemplowski, Warsaw 2002, p.38). According to another commentator, rivalry between the USA and the EU may give rise to a threat that “*the next clash of civilisations will not be that between the West and the rest but between conflicted parts of the same old West*” (Ch.A.Kupchan, *Koniec Zachodu (The End of the West)*, op.cit.).



way, at present, by to a more modern attitude. The latter one is based on an observation on gradual decay of reasons that have caused perpetual clashes among influences and interests of big powers. As expressed by H.H.Nolte, “*if we assume that the EU doesn’t intend to compete with the U.S. hegemony, this suggests that rivalry among countries in the area of playing a role of leading power within the global system came to an end (provided, however, that China or Japan do not enter the game)*”.<sup>42</sup> Even if we regard that belief too idealistic, it nevertheless deserves attention, at least because it emphasises an important traits of the EU foreign policy, already pointed out above: the fact that it shares with the United States – all disagreement and controversy aside – a catalogue of values and principles common for the whole Western world.

#### **4. Conclusions**

There’s no doubt that at present the European Union does not play the role of a full-size global power. (The most one can admit thereto is a regional power status.) This is inadequate both to its true potential and to the aspirations it claims, expressed in treaties and repeatedly announced by the EU authorities. First of all, however, this situation does not ensure – as mentioned above – relevant protection of its international interests. The basic reason for that is not as much a lack of means as that of political will strong enough, mainly on the part of Member States, to develop the military component of European integration. (Although one should emphasise, at the same time, considerable progress made in this area in the Nineties, when some turning points in that development have begun to appear.) Such lack of political will results, in turn, not only from an irritating nature of the matter, namely Member States’ indisposition to give up their sovereign rights in the area of foreign and defence policy.

To a certain degree this is also related to reception of some theoretic concepts that negate the necessity to use military measures in the EU foreign policy, such as the above-mentioned concept of civilian power. While not overestimating influence of such theories upon political practice, one should add, however, that they have brought a certain climate that favours a kind of “pacifism” in the EU foreign policy. This finds additional support in policy of certain Member States (neutral countries in particular) which haven’t been enthusiastic about reinforcing the EU’s foreign and security policy.

Despite such trends, the postulate of growth of the European Union importance in an international arena has been mentioned more and more frequently by both scholars and politicians. There’s no agreement among them,

---

<sup>42</sup> H.H.Nolte, *op.cit.*, p.38.

however, as to which measures should be used in order to achieve such growth.<sup>43</sup> It seems that the concept of a civilian power – with all its correctness and political attractiveness in the context of promoting European values – cannot consist an adequate solution, mainly due to pragmatic reasons. Examples of Japan (as the country that has been an economic power without political-and-military influence) and Russia (which has been, contrarily, military power with no sufficient economic fundament) make it clear that it is most appropriate for such power as the EU to have a complete set of foreign policy instruments: economic, political and military ones. (Such as in the case of the United States that have been a universal power.) Only having full set of instruments renders one in position to response in a flexible way, relevant to a given situation and provides an adequate space to undertake efficient actions in an international arena. As expressed by High Representative for the CFSP J.Solana, “*The EU has already got very important instruments for carrying on legitimate foreign policy in areas of economy and trade. At present it intends to develop such tools as – if need be – enable it to exercise power to protect its vital interests*”.<sup>44</sup>

All this means that the European Union should tend towards further consolidation of its international dimension, which means – the first fundamental strategic choice outlined at the beginning of this text taken into account – that the EU should become a power on the global scale. It should be emphasised on that occasion once more that this is dictated by the necessity to protect its various interests of political, economic, military or social-and-cultural nature, rather than just by an urge to satisfy its political ambitions and the need of prestige.

This assumption made, we are led to another conclusion: from the point of view of interests of the European Union as the whole, it would be desirable to control as far as possible or even eliminate disproportion in development of both basic components in the area of its relations with the abroad, namely foreign economic relations and foreign and security policy.

The basic justification for that postulate is that only its fulfilment can put the European Union in position to gain an even higher position it deserves and playing an even more significant role globally, to which it has all the assets it takes: both in objective (economic power) and potential (abilities in political and military area) terms. The lack of an adequate co-ordination among components of the EU foreign policy, evident at present, and, most of all, deficiency of underdeveloped political and military tools, seriously undermine the EU’s abilities to act effectively in the international arena. More precisely, it can be

---

<sup>43</sup> The debate on that subject is presented more extensively in: K.E.Jørgensen, *Three Doctrines on European Foreign Policy*, “WeltTrends”, No. 42/2004.

<sup>44</sup> “International Herald Tribune”, 26.01.2000.

said that unless it has a well-balanced and co-ordinated economic, political and military potential at the same time, the European Union is going to be limited, at best, to a role of a regional power (that it undisputedly plays at present). On the contrary, fulfilment of that postulate would open up its way to gain in the future a global power status, comparable to the role and position enjoyed today by the United States. This way – in line with the essence of the strategic choice defined above – it would be able to secure its vivid interests.

In order to meet this postulate in practice it would take to seriously reinforce a political-and-military component and this, in turn, would result in limitation or even elimination of the most important barriers (political, institutional, legal and so on) in its development. There have naturally been a number of reasons for such deficiencies, however it seems that the Common Foreign and Security Policy having an insufficient Community-wise nature has been the most important single barrier. In other words, this means a lack of a single effective decision-making centre. Such a centre should initiate, co-ordinate, implement and supervise actions undertaken in the area of foreign and security policy or – still better – in the whole area of relations with the outer world. This lack of proper co-ordination within that policy has become a deficit more and more painfully experienced by politicians and the EU institutions. In this context proposals appear to increase a level of consistence of the EU's foreign policy, among other things through merging positions of the High Representative for the CFSP and the commissioner for external relations. Such proposals have been put forth, among others, by the European Commission as well as a number of European politicians<sup>45</sup> and they found implementation in the provision of the Constitutional Treaty establishing the position of the EU Foreign Affairs Minister. Additionally, such a single decision-making centre should have actual, adequate competence of authority in relation to Member States and to Community bodies.<sup>46</sup> Anyway, the barrier in question is going to last as long as the EU Member States, afraid of losing their sovereign competence in so sensitive areas, remain unwilling to give up at least a part of it to supra-national Community-level bodies.

---

<sup>45</sup> See: *Communication from the Commission. A Project for the European Union*, Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 22.05.2002, COM (2002) 247 final. It is argued in that document that the EU's "policy has to become more consistent", and "an individual representation of collective interests is of key importance" (p.12, 14). Similar postulates were submitted in 2003 by the French President Chirac, German Chancellor Schröder and Danish Prime minister Rasmussen – see: "International Herald Tribune", 03.03.2003.

<sup>46</sup> As put by the former Commissioner H.van den Broek, "the voice of Europe over global matters is going to be audible only provided this will be one, common voice" (H.van den Broek, *CFSP: The View of the Commission in: The European Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. The Challenges of the Future*, eds. S.A.Pappas, S.Vanhoonacker, Maastricht 1996, p.23).

This way we come at dissolution of the second fundamental strategic choice: that of establishment of decision-making centre in the area of the EU foreign policy, meeting the above-mentioned conditions, would only be possible provided acceptance of federal solutions. Admittedly, it is evident that the mixed model that has been in place so far, doesn't work properly and going any further in confederal solutions basing upon intergovernmental co-operation would aggravate the present unsatisfactory situation even more.

One should add in this context that proposing such a postulate is only meant here as a politological diagnose taking only a criterion of effectiveness into account. (Of course, both different analytical attitudes, advocating development of confederal model<sup>47</sup> and different political postulates favouring more prudent practical solutions are possible.)<sup>48</sup> Nor is the above postulate meant to suggest that it promotes any particular political/ideological option as direction of further EU development remains unclear after all.

Among a very large number of views on that subject there have also been those (expressed by prominent politicians)<sup>49</sup> that reject the strategic choice favouring development of the EU international dimension and call to abandon aspirations for the EU to play any major role in the world, let alone its ambitions to become power. Such voices call for limitation or giving up building the EU's autonomous military potential altogether. This, however, doesn't affect the fact that regarding as important an area as the European Union's relations with the outer world the federal model is more useful, while maintaining any sort of middle-course solutions or implementation of confederal vision would only preserve the present unsatisfactory situation.

All that issue has been closely related to an enormous challenge having crucial importance, regarding the future of all processes of European integration. No matter how differently this issue is presented, essentially the European Union has already faced the need to make a historic, strategic choice – either to develop

---

<sup>47</sup> Such an opinion is presented, among others, by R.Kuźniar, according to whom “*the most desirable for a meaningful international identity of the EU would be an intergovernmental model with a strong command. A community model, considering membership profile of the EU, would suffer from an insufficient political and social legitimacy for the EU to play a strong international role*” and “*would be of more advantage only from the point of view of inner integration of the EU*” (idem, *Międzynarodowa tożsamość Europy (UE) (An international identity of Europe (EU))* in: *Unia Europejska nowy typ wspólnoty międzynarodowej (The European Union – a new type of international community)*, eds. E.Haliżak, S.Parzymies, Warsaw 2002, p.29).

<sup>48</sup> The European Commission believes, in the above quoted statement, that “*evolving the EU foreign policy Community-wise using traditional Community procedures is out of the question*”, although, on the other hand, “*nor should we bend our foreign policy towards an intergovernmental model...*” (*Communication from the Commission...*, op.cit., p.12).

<sup>49</sup> See a debate in: *O przyszłości Europy. Głosy polityków (On future of Europe. Politicians opinions)*, Warsaw 2000.

its supranational structures further on and rebuild its Community-level competence in all areas, including foreign and defence policy (which implies adoption and implementation of federal model) or to preserve or possibly only improve the existing procedures of intergovernmental co-operation based upon a confederal model. What depends on making of that historic choice is not only the future of the European Union itself (including its international dimension) but the future of European integration as well and – therefore – of all our continent.

Of course it is a fundamental question also for new Member States, such as Poland. Polish vital national interest is to support federal-oriented development of the EU, including its international dimension, just because weak, divided Europe would not be able to help Poland in resolving its major political, economic and social problems.

The question becomes urgent, since there has been much evidence suggesting that the present formula of European integration taking advantage of elements of both models has ran out, especially in conditions of the EU Eastward enlargement. This enlargement of membership and potential of the EU, unprecedented in all respects, is not only going to provide immense opportunities for growth but also to become a serious trial for the EU institutional and legal structures and for political consistence of all members of that qualitatively new European Community.<sup>50</sup> Are they going to be able to cope with such a challenge and to clearly define the shape of the future united Europe? It's hard to tell yet. As pointed out before, any attempts at forecasts in this area may easily undergo sceptical judgement and experience from both the work of the European Convent and from the Constitutional Treaty developed thereby haven't managed to solve all problems and dilemmas.

Nevertheless it seems that no matter which further difficulties are encountered in this area, development of the European Union's foreign and security policy has been a long-lasting and well-rooted process. Furthermore, it fits well with the logic of integration processes that take place in the Old Continent.

---

<sup>50</sup> An early symptom of troubles that are quite likely to appear in this context can be seen in the above-mentioned controversies resulting from the fact that the EU Member States as well as countries-candidates to the accession had proven unable, early in 2003, to develop a uniform position regarding the American armed intervention in Iraq.