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The Common Migration Policy and Debates about the Future of the European Union

Abstract: The article analyses the need to build the Common EU Migration Policy in the context of a general debate about the future of the Union. The debate is intended to provide a communicative link between the governing and those who are governed and legitimise the decisions of the former. Therefore, it is essential to define the following notions: the aging of the European societies, immigrants, ‘the aliens’, integrative migration policy, and the role of the public authorities in the integration of immigrants. Moreover, the adequate informative, promoting and educational activities need to be undertaken to further legitimise the decisions of policy-makers. Consequently, the adoption of solutions common to the Member States and acknowledging the importance of democratic processes as well as the humanitarian and fundamental rights and national and societal interest, will finally allow for their acceptance at national level and in the mentality of societies. Since the changes in the societal awareness and the openness towards ‘the alien’ can guarantee the stability of solutions adopted at the EU level only. Against this background, the present text discusses such phenomena as migration and immigration, migration in the context of mobility, and finally, it considers the EU Migration Policy in view of the recent increase of the international terrorism.

Migration is phenomenon as old as humanity itself. Linguistically, migration (from Latin migratio) means wayfaring, permanent or temporary movements of people. There have been a number of typologies of migratory movements. Most often divisions are made with respect to:

- range: inner or outer migration – movements of people either within or beyond a single administrative or political unit,
- a migrant’s will to take part: voluntary or forced,
- reason: economic, political, religious,

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duration: transitional, including seasonal and either backward and forward or one-way,

• form: emigration – moving away from a country, immigration – moving into a country, re-emigration – return from temporary emigration, refugeeism – escape, evacuation – organised by the State in order to avoid an expected threat, repatriation – return of citizens from foreign territory organised by their own State, displacement (transfer) – moving of citizens of a given State within its borders or beyond, deportation – coercive transfer of a given person or group of persons either to peripheries of a given State or beyond its borders.¹

Such a division makes it possible to appreciate the phenomenon in all its complexity and the whole scope of its social consequences. According to contemporary estimates, circa 100 million people, including roughly 50 million in Europe, lost their dwelling places as a result of forced migration in the 20th Century.²

Migration policy, either of a national State or a federation, constitutes a collection of legal norms and rules of procedure applied with respect to persons moving across its borders with an intent to remain in its territory on either short- or long-term basis. It has been relatively new phenomenon for integrating European Union to regard migration policy as the Community problem. In fact, for many years it remained within the scope of competence of inter-governmental decisions entrusted to sovereign States and subordinated to their national interests. It has begun to assume the Community nature only after signing, in 1985, of the Schengen agreement, which provided for abolition of control on the inner borders of the States of Benelux, as well as Germany and France, coupled with sharpening of control on their outer borders. The agreement was subsequently joined by one EEC country after another.³

What is worth to mention in this context is an original attempt at such a policy, made in 1974, when a proposal to form a passport union was put forth, during a summit in Paris, by the Communities’ Member States.

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³ States that joined the Schengen zone in 1995 were: Austria, Denmark, Finland, Greece, Spain, Portugal, Sweden and Italy.
A document that became important for building of a common migration policy was the Treaty of Amsterdam (TA) of 1999, where that policy was included into a larger project, namely to create an area of freedom, security and justice. The Treaty also incorporated the arrangements made in Schengen to the *acquis communautaire*. The Treaty of Nice contributed no expected modifications in that field and the Treaty establishing the Constitution for Europe was actually the only attempt to put in better order what had already been provided for in the primary legislation.

An important role is played by the legislation and practice of the Community institutions, including, in particular, the European Commission, where decisions made sometimes precede treaty arrangements. Perhaps an open coordination method is also going to prove helpful in this respect, consisting in adopting, at the Community level, of guidelines and timelines for the achievement of specified objectives, as well as indicators, both qualitative and quantitative, intended to achieve greater consistency among national policies when the use of other methods seems ineffective. On the other hand, the possible barriers include particular regional interests and divergences in the way the situation is evaluated by individual Member States.

The Treaty of Amsterdam, having crucial importance for the migration policy, provided for transferring onto the level of Community decisions concerning entry and stay of third countries’ citizens on territories of Member States as well as visa-related procedures regarding long-term visas and stay permits, including activities aiming at joining families together. Transitional period for those provisions was five years. Matters concerning illegal migration, illegal stay and deportation were entrusted to immediate Community decision-making forthwith.

In the wake of the TA the summit of the European Council in Tampere was held (15-16 October 1999). The meeting was dedicated in the whole to the problems related to administration of justice and home affairs. Principal focus at that opportunity was at such issues as building partnership with immigrants’ countries of origin, where initiatives should be undertaken to fight poverty, improve living conditions and work opportunities, prevent conflicts and consolidate democracy. Moreover, conclusions of the Tampere meeting emphasised that the EU Member States should have ensured fair treatment of third country citizens staying legally in the EU territory and offer to them, within their integration policies, rights and obligations comparable to

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those applied to the EU citizens.\textsuperscript{5} The necessity to steer movements of migration at all stages and the need to provide reliable information by any Member State on true potential of legal migration and preventive measures aiming at counteracting trafficking and smuggling of people were other issues mentioned at that occasion. The summit also underlined the importance of cooperation with countries of origin and transit of immigrants in the area of voluntary returns of migrants. Despite repeated denials on the part of the EU politicians regarding their purported intent to create ‘fortress Europe’, it was not really hard to observe that actions undertaken were mostly aimed at keeping immigrants at a distance from territory of the Community and improving its own inner safety, while the humanitarian aspect was only talked about.

The Tampere programme had two principal stages. The earlier one was passive, expectant, lasting until the attacks of 11 September 2001, while the later one followed those events and the Madrid attack in March 2004. First reactions following the attacks seemed to foretell intensified common actions to ensure a higher level of inner security of the Communities (European Arrest Warrant, European list of terrorist organisations, the appointment of Eurojust and Frontex - a European agency of border protection). Later on, as the memories of tragic events became more remote, national interests gradually prevailed.

After 5 years from entry of the TA into force time was ripe to reassess the situation and address issues that had previously escaped Community regulation. This task was entrusted to the Hague Programme, developed during lengthy inter-governmental debate and adopted on 11 November 2004. While at first it seemed to be a true opportunity to bring favourable changes, it ultimately turned to be compromised, cautious and conservative event. Independent police or intelligence structures, once planned, were not mentioned any more while the document mainly focused upon better cooperation and information exchange between Member States. The Community institutions were brought down therein to mere coordinators involved in inter-governmental collaboration. There was no mention about independent decisions or taking over, by the Community of scopes of competence of police or prosecuting bodies in the sovereign States. One of the few points that deserves some recognition was the fact that the problem of migration was noticed and considered with broad background of reasons of that phenomenon taken into

\footnote{http://www.ukie.gov.pl/HLP/mointntgr.nsf/0/4B14EBAFF4B0DC80C1256E75005617A8/ \$file/ME5326A.pdf}
account and with the emphasis on the importance of integration of legal immigrants and repatriation policy (as well as collaboration with third countries, necessary in this respect). A step onto a subsequent level of moving migration policy into the Community scope of competence was mentioned in the context of bearing common responsibility and financial burdens as well as Member States’ greater solidarity in the face of problems emerging. Finally, the document included reassuring declarations that definition of specific numbers of immigrants adopted was going to remain within individual Member States’ responsibilities.

An analysis of consecutive documents adopted by the Community concerning migration policy reveals how difficult the area of cooperation really is. It has featured a considerable divergence of Member States’ national interests, traditions and needs. Massive enlargement of the EU in 2004 and another accession, that of Bulgaria and Romania in January 2007, altered the borderline of integrating Europe twice again. New groups of immigrants appear one after another and problems of those who have already lived on territories of Member States, either legally or otherwise, have not – admittedly – been really solved.

Sharpening of control on the Community outer borders, application of more and more effective methods of identity verification, improvement of information and personal data exchange procedures indeed became the necessity of the day. However, there have also been other problems awaiting solution, such as adoption of uniform rules for migrating workers from the EU new Member States, fighting poverty, lack of new methods of integration within the society and a phenomenon of pushing ‘old’ immigrants living in Member States to marginal position. Postponing difficult issues is not going to eliminate them. Migration policy as a subject awaiting sound common decisions is going to re-emerge again and again.

1. Migration policy: at the Community or national level?

The question to which an answer should form the starting point for further action in creation of the area of freedom, security and justice is as follows: is it possible to build common migration policy? Or, alternatively: is it, perhaps, only possible to build national migration policies?

The process of the European integration, which started with the signing of the Treaties of Rome, has been characterised by an evident growth of a number of areas entrusted, one after another, to common scope of responsibilities.

\footnote{7 As the Treaty of Amsterdam puts it.}
According to functionalist model of integration and the spill over theory, what we have been witnessing is gradual harmonisation of economic, legal and political orders on territories of integrating States.

Since mid-1990s an obvious increase of interest in the problem of foreigners staying in the territory of the European Union is observed. Finally the Schengen agreement became operational, signed after all as long ago as 1985 and incorporated, by the virtue of the Treaty of Amsterdam, together with all the legal output of cooperation of the Schengen area countries, to the EU *acquis communautaire*. Long period that passed from its signing to its entry into force, as well as later, extremely cautious actions undertaken in the area of bringing migration policy into the common scope of competence, are often used as arguments to describe all the process as hopelessly slow and lagging. It should be taken into account, however, how many decades it took to achieve harmonization in other areas and that the dynamics of creation of laws concerning migrants in the EU territory should only be judged from that perspective.

The abolition of internal borders in the EU area in fact enables a third country citizen who once crossed such an outer border of the Communities to freely move throughout its area, with practical no control. Terrorist attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London drove Europeans to a verge of panic and provoked a desire to get rid of ‘the alien’ from their territories, whatever the word would really signify.

Another problem, by now experienced in almost all the countries of integrating Europe is that of their societies getting old. The notion of the Old Continent becomes quite pertinent not only in historical and cultural terms. As estimated by a number of demographers, including Jean-Claude Chesnais, selective immigration is the only chance Europe has. The French demographer and economist indicates the phenomenon of ‘demographic transformation’ that has begun in the early 18th Century, when traditional demographic system, featuring high indexes of births and deaths, gave way to the modern one in which mortality and fertility rates are low. Demographers prepare their forecasts based on the age pyramid that reveals considerable transformations – numbers of elderly people grows up, a number of births – and hence, also that of future parents – fall down. Until 2050 the global population is going to increase by half, however, over the same period the number of old people will

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triple. After 1965 we have witnessed emergence of consecutive generations of children of prosperity – well fed, coddled, accustomed to live in leisurely and ill-disposed to raise children. That’s when the index of fertility fell down to 1.4, while generations renewal threshold is 2.1.

The phenomenon of shrinking families is a consequence of a number of factors: popularisation and full availability of contraceptives, unprecedented dynamics of women’s entry into labour market, which implies postponing decisions on having and raising children, infertility happening much more often than in the past and, finally, changes in the living models, favouring 2+1 or even single options.

This process has an obvious consequence of an inevitable deficit of labour force as Europe grows old. It seems that under such circumstances it would be a desired model solution to open up immigration channels, of course under adequate control in terms of age, culture and occupational profiles. Immigration, therefore, already is and is going to remain a common problem of countries of integrating European Union for many years to come.

It can be argued that in fact there have been no formal obstacles for developing common migration policy. The real barrier is the need to protect sovereignty and national interest, deeply rooted since hundreds of years. Each Member State used to either open or close its borders to the migrants throughout history. The ‘old’ EU Member States’ migration policy has been a specific consequence of inflow of cheap foreign labour force, which in Sixties and Seventies enabled those countries to record significant economic growth. That immigration was by no means uniform with respect to origin, culture or religion, but it nevertheless met economic needs of that period. In the case of United Kingdom it mainly consisted of immigrants from the former British colonies (India, Pakistan), in France from North Africa, mainly Algeria, in Italy from Morocco and in Germany - the gastarbeiter from Turkey. An inflow of foreigners in those countries was much faster than thinking about finding an adequate place for them in their new societies. Actions undertaken were mainly transitional, aimed at prompt and provisional solutions of problems experienced. At the same time tensions and conflicts kept growing, accumulating and once in a while exploding in an uncontrolled manner, in such forms as setting Turkish or Moroccan workers’ houses on fire. Regional conflicts (in Africa, Balkan, Afghanistan and Chechnya) added their yield of refugees and asylum-seekers to the already massive kettle.

\[11\] J-C. Chesnais observes that it happens for the first time in the world history that there is less people in the age under 15 than those over 65: for example, in Italy 14% vs. 19%, in Germany 15% vs. 18%, with a trend for that advantage to grow up even further, see: ibidem.
Along with legal immigrants the illegal also appeared, coming after better wages or higher living standard.

Several EU countries resolved to take action and solve the problem of foreigners staying in their territories illicitly. France, Italy, Greece, Portugal and most of all Spain prepared their legalisation programmes for hundreds of thousand such persons.\(^\text{12}\) This sort of attitude has often been criticised by other Member States, since – in their opinion – it in fact encourages subsequent waves of people to try and get onto the EU territory with the expectations that over time their stay is going to be legalised, too. Spain rejected such arguments explaining that the European Union has no common migration policy and that Spanish government is more interested in dealing with legal and controlled immigration than in having to cope with economic underground.\(^\text{13}\) The other EU countries, situated farther from the Mediterranean, where rafts full of refugees from Africa land, experience no burdens resulting from the need to provide aid thereto. Such countries as the United Kingdom or Ireland that opened their labour markets up for citizens of the EU new Member States and put the labour force that comes to good use according to their needs (those highly-skilled being most wanted) refer with much scepticism to potential adoption of a programme managing the inflow of unskilled immigrants from Africa, Turkey or Ukraine. Witnessing all that, it is obvious that the efforts to create a common migration policy are certainly going to take a number of years more, but from the point of view of the European Union as the whole ‘doing that homework’ such scenario seems inevitable anyway. Foreigners, either welcome or not, appear on the common territory with no inner borders, so in fact they come ‘here to us’, no matter how far any given Member State is situated from the particular place where they crossed the border. The sooner the EU decision-makers and the EU societies become fully aware of this, all the better. Any decisions made under pressure or an aggravating problem are, by definition, just provisional and little apt.


2. Two-speed Migration Policy

A meeting that took place on 27 May 2005 might herald a new, unfavourable stage on the way to bring migration policy from national to the Community level. In German town Prüm (Rheinland-Pfalz) seven EU Member States (Austria, Belgium, France, Spain, Netherlands, Luxembourg and Germany) signed an agreement on establishing closer cooperation in fighting terrorism and organised crime.\textsuperscript{14} The signatory States obliged to render available data on genetic codes and fingerprints of potential suspects. Moreover, it was agreed for each country to make access to information on persons suspected of membership in terrorist organisations easier for other signatories, as well as to participate in joint actions against illegal immigrants. The agreement was signed 20 years after signing of the Schengen agreement\textsuperscript{15} and was given an unofficial name of ‘Schengen III’.\textsuperscript{16} It has all characteristics of a procedure of strengthened cooperation, the principles of which were defined by the Treaty on the European Union: it has been based upon the \textit{acquis communautaire}, it has been open to other Member States, it provides for informing both the EU Council and the European Commission on progress achieved in such cooperation on a current basis.\textsuperscript{17} The point is, however, that according to the Treaty regulations, such type of cooperation should only be undertaken in the case when it proves impossible to achieve the common objectives ‘over a reasonable timeline’ by all the States, whilst the preamble to the Prüm agreement mentions the pioneering role thereof. Do we, then, have to deal with ‘two-speed Europe’ in this area? Did unfruitful meetings and debates on the forum of the European Parliament or the Council provide a sufficient and justified basis for undertaking such a forward-moved cooperation? What may sound reassuring is declaration, on the part of States-signatories, that they will take measures aiming at incorporation of arrangements agreed in Prüm to the \textit{acquis communautaire}. The Prüm Agreement certainly sets new standards of cooperation and ensuring of security to citizens in the face of the threat of terrorism and illegal immigration. What is disquieting from the point of view of the EU as

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{14} http://euro.pap.com.pl/cgi-bin/raporty.pl?rap=15&dep=67183&lista=1
  \item \textsuperscript{15} The Schengen I Convention – the agreement of 14 June 1985; see: http://www.refugeeawreader.org/396/Schengen_Agreement.pdf
  \item \textsuperscript{16} The Schengen II Convention was a convention concluded in Schengen, signed in 1990.
  \item \textsuperscript{17} See: A.Gruszczak, F.Jasiński. \textit{Układ z Prüm: czy nowe porozumienie o współpracy w zwalczaniu zagrożeń dla porządku i bezpieczeństwa publicznego to właściwy kierunek współpracy w Europie? (The Prüm Agreement: is new agreement on cooperation in fighting threats for public order and security going to mark an appropriate direction for cooperation in Europe?)}, The EU Justice and Home Affairs Pillar Forum, 31.07.2005.
\end{itemize}
integrating area is the fact that the discussion over the agreement took place outside the EU structures and the other Member States\textsuperscript{18} were not consulted.

It is all but easy to evaluate the Prüm agreement. On the one hand, a group of countries went ahead in the field of their home affairs and administration of justice, which should be seen as positive aspect. On the other hand, however, it was an act of breaking away from the team, of creating an inner circle of collaboration, an evidence of the lack of intent to build the common policy in that area and the lack of a common standard enabling Member States to consolidate their common policy. In situations of danger (such as terrorist attack in Madrid) it is important to act promptly and jointly. Where no will of such action exists, it is natural that most active group of countries mobilises and takes a step forward which for the rest means being left behind.

Between 14-16 January 2007 an informal meeting of the EU Council was held in Dresden, on the level of ministers of home affairs and those of justice. The aim was to define a common action plan in those areas. As regards matters of migration, the ministers, basing on a working document prepared by the United Kingdom, decided it was necessary to reinforce control over migration movements and to define objectives, principles and priorities of common immigration policy.\textsuperscript{19} At this opportunity attention was paid to the issue of reinforcement of the Frontex Agency, improvement of information exchange between structures of Member States and better consular collaboration. Other points emphasised during the occasion included the importance of cooperation with third countries, introduction of quota limits for immigrants, provision of legal seasonal migration opportunities, but at the same time, assistance in reintegration of migrants returning to their countries of origin to social and economic life therein.

The fact of undertaking of such subjects reveals both the awareness and the need to discuss those topical problems. However, the fact that actual decisions mainly concern closing the Europe to the alien elements, sharpening of controls and getting rid of immigrants from Europe is also quite meaningful.

3. Emigration and immigration

It should be observed, as one analyses the European Union’s documents concerning migration policy, that they in fact only relate to one side of such policy – an attitude taken towards immigrants coming to the EU territory. However, there is another side to migration policy, as well – namely,

\textsuperscript{18} ibidem.
\textsuperscript{19} http://www.esa.int/SPECIALS/Ministerial_Council/SEME6Y6UWJF_1.html
emigration. The opposite direction that, at present, seems to have fallen into oblivion, but only until one looks into migration statistics of at least some Member States. That’s when some alarming phenomena may be observed. Specifically, in 2005 as many as 144,815 German citizens left their country in search for better life of wages.\(^{20}\) British statistics are hardly better: only in 2004 120,000 persons left the UK territory (compared to 17,000 in 1994). Whilst the migration balance has still been positive, this mainly results from an inflow of citizens from the EU new Member States following 1 May 2004 (14,000 in 2003, increasing to 74,000 in 2004).\(^{21}\) Situation in the new Member States is also worth of a closer glance. Poland, for example, has to deal with an abrupt outflow of highly-skilled workforce to the United Kingdom and Ireland. The Irish Ministry of Social and Family Affairs which attributes numbers of Irish social insurance (PPS) announced that in 2006 such numbers were given to almost 90 thousand of Poles. That was 25 thousands more than in 2005.\(^{22}\) There were nearly 11,000 doctors and nurses among those leaving Poland. Polish construction industry, by the way, is another sector to have recorded significant human capital flight. Waiting time for building services extended, prices increased considerably. This way, the phenomenon of brain drain has no longer been limited to countries formerly known as the third world. Instead, it becomes serious problem within the EU, as well.

Following Poland’s accession to the European Union economic emigration among Poles exceeded expectations. However, the phenomenon raises greater anxiety on the part of Polish authorities than on that of adopting countries. It is estimated that as many as between 1.5 and 2 million Poles went abroad, looking for jobs in the British Isles, in Spain, Germany, Italy, Netherlands and France.\(^{23}\) Most of them are seasonal employees, but several hundred thousands decided to stay for good. They have been employed in agriculture, manufacturing industry, construction, in bars and restaurants, cafés, pubs and hotels. Large numbers of women are given jobs of babysitter, caretakers for elderly people or housemaids.

Almost 60% of emigrants are not older than 35. Poles going abroad are in fact getting younger but at the same better educated. Percentage of those having at least high school education has already reached 60% of today’s emigration from Poland.\(^{24}\) There were 205 thousands legally working Poles in the United Kingdom in late 2006, along with 80 thousands in Ireland. In


\(^{22}\) “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 04.01.2007, http://serwisy.gazeta.pl/swiat/1,34218,38271.html

\(^{23}\) http://www.informacje.int.pl/Fachowcy-odplywaja-art1023.html

France there are *circa* 250 thousands jobs in construction, catering and hotel industry awaiting Polish employees, while respective numbers in Italy exceeds 170 thousands. The Regional Medical Chamber in Warsaw announced that \( \frac{3}{4} \) of doctors leaving Poland are persons between 36 and 49 years of age, which is at the summit of their careers.\(^{25}\) As a consequence of the EU directive, limiting working time of medical personnel to 48 hours per week, combined with facts that European society grows old and that demand for medical services among people after 60 years of age increase four times, in years to come Western Europe is going to see a serious growth of demand for doctors - by 60-100 thousands.

An average *per capita* gross domestic product in the Western part of the continent is higher almost by half than in the Eastern one. It is thus quite clear that even assuming dynamic economic growth in new Member States, no complete change in this area can be expected over the nearest dozen or so years. The problem of depopulation has been experienced in other countries, apart from Poland, too. For example, over 50 thousands people left Latvia, the population of which totals only 2 million. It is also in this context that it seems justified to come back to the question about possibilities to develop the EU’s common migration policy, if needs of individual countries seem so divergent. Needs that in the case of Western countries may possibly largely be met by movements of people within the European Union, in that of new Member States may require reaching for a labour force from third countries. Accordingly, levels of interest in the creation of common solutions in this respect may well vary.

The phenomenon of economic emigration attracts all sorts of opinions. Some people see it in terms of money sent back to families waiting in migrants’ countries of origin or, later, their potential return with capital, expertise and businesslike attitudes. Others perceive the same as drainage of the best people, full of initiative, courage and entrepreneurship. Social philosophers ask the question whether emigration is a way for one to take control over one’s life or rather an evidence of losing it and just drifting with the current. An attempt to give valid answer would require studies to be carried out over different groups of migrants, in different periods of their lives. At a first glance it seems that the former option is right. An outflow of people from a given country, be it Poland or be it Somalia, really means drainage of the best men, at least in long-term, since those mediocre are not going to make it abroad just as they failed to make it in their home countries.

One thing in this discussion seems indisputable: Poland begins to feel deficit of labour force. This poses enormous task before the government and

\(^{25}\) Ibidem, p.103.
labour offices – to direct as many jobless people as possible to labour market. Such people, however, have to be appropriately prepared. That is why training programmes, implemented after all with public funds, have to be as effective as possible, that is to give people true skills rather than just proverbial and enigmatic ‘PC skills’. Money is spent for training anyway, so at least that should be done more effectively. Certainly, this requires close cooperation of labour offices with employers in order to prepare people to work in most needed professions. This is very closely related with necessary changes in the system of education. It is only now evident how short-sighted it was to close down, on a massive scale, technical secondary schools in the Nineties. The same can be said about secondary schools and post-secondary medical schools.

Along with the reactivation of schools for young people, a system of continuing education for adults has to be developed. Poland recently joined the countries in which the phenomenon of changing from one profession to another is on the increase: few people assume now they would work in the same profession or, less still, the same company, until retirement.

Education in deficit professions seems one of possible solutions in order to prevent lack of workers. Another solution is to provide motivation to stay in the country for those professional groups for which the State is employer – including increased wages, improved career prospects and opportunities and better social services. A thoughtful, carefully channelled opening up to foreigners would be still another possibility. In this respect it is important to publish lists of highly-skilled professionals, whose applications for the right of stay and employment would be considered in the first rank or adoption of students to some specific faculties and motivating graduates to stay in Poland.

First step in that direction was made by Czechs who launched, in 2003, a five-year ‘Pilot project of active recruitment of skilled foreign labour force’, which is specifically aimed at obtaining permanent stay permissions for those citizens of third countries who meet criteria specified by Czech authorities. Moreover, such measures favour elimination of illegal immigration as well as contribute to enriching the State budget with income from taxes paid by legally working employees. Considering aging societies and decreasing social insurance systems incomes, such budgetary receipts may contribute quite significant sums.

4. Migrations or mobility?

Experts studying movements of people for decades use such notions as: ‘emigrant’, ‘immigrant’, ‘migration movements’. It is an important issue, however, to check whether these notions have the same meaning now as they had in the past.
It has been quite a universal belief that contemporary migration movements have been one of important effects of globalisation. The point seems worth of closer consideration. Daniel Cohen, French Professor of economy, observed in his renowned book *Globalization and Its Enemies* that at present immigrants have accounted for just 3% of the world, while in 1913 the same index equalled 10%. And this happens at times we call an era of all-embracing globalisation which pervades into modern life in virtually all its aspects. Does it, then, really imply mass migration? Or perhaps we have to deal with a certain mistaken connotation: globalisation – all-embracing movement – easiness to move from one place to another – mass transfer – easy migration? D. Cohen goes as far as say: ‘Today’s globalisation is immobile’ and illustrates this statement with the fact that goods are manufactured and marketed on the scale of the whole planet, but great many inhabitants of wealthy countries know other societies only from TV screen or from holiday spent in a country they find exotic. Whilst emigration from the above-mentioned South, from poor African countries lost in local armed conflicts and from the ever-inflammable Middle East is in fact indisputable, this is not really the case in much of Europe. In order to work in Brussels one no longer has to emigrate there with the family and settle there down; instead, it is perfectly possible now to fly over there from Warsaw (or Paris, Stockholm or Berlin for that case) on Monday and come back home on Friday. Similarly, to provide IT servicing for an American insurance company one is not required to move from his native Delhi – it shall suffice to be an exquisite computer expert and smoothly use a common language in employer-employee relations. These remarks result in a situation where a seemingly simple relation between the two phenomena: globalisation and increasing migration become much more complex.

This, in turn, provokes another question, about whether it would not be apt to seek for a new language to describe the phenomena of contemporary world in terms of movements of people? Do migrations and mobility constitute identical, similar, or perhaps quite different processes? If we reach for such examples as that of employees of international institutions and organisations, hundreds of thousands people living far from their homelands, paying no taxes, no health insurance or pension premiums therein, moving with unbelievable easiness from one end of the globe to another (costs usually playing no major role in that context), living within their own perfectly operating worlds – then should we call them emigrants?! It seems quite obvious that this expression, present for many decades in our awareness, can

hardly be applied to those groups of people, to name just one example. A review of all sorts of activities carried out in today’s world would probably enable to distinguish and name many similar groups. The answer to the question whether there are such notions as national idea, feeling of reins tying them to their countries of origin, their tradition, culture or identity present in conscience of such people, is difficult and requires detailed studies. However, considering the scale of the phenomenon it cannot be left apart as we attempt to assess the situation and find proper notions to analyse it.27

5. Relativity of demographic forecasts

Forecasts prepared by demographists for Europe reveal how inevitably it is bound towards decline due to the aging of its societies. It is estimated that until 2020 the demand for immigrant labour force is going to amount to 500 thousands per year, with a trend to further growth over subsequent years.28 The process is believed to be unavoidable. Is it so in fact? One should remember that it is past and present perspectives that are used as starting point for such forecasts. Is vast development of information and communication technologies, observed over recent years, not capable of altering a logical run of history?

Already in these days whole manufacturing sectors are planted outside Europe. Many global corporations build their branches in China or in India, where costs of manufacturing goods are incomparably lower due to cheap labour force. It is not impossible, therefore, that future generations of aging Europe will begin to make up for deficits in labour force in the continent in a similar way. If they do, then today’s forecasts prepared by demographists may have to be revised. What will remain open anyway is the question about who is going to work in jobs regarded socially inferior, yet necessary in any community. This is an area that usually caters for immigrant labour force.

6. Terrorism: brought from beyond or born inside the EU?

Some slogans, when cast on a fertile ground, turn into ideologies. This is the case, for example, with the fight against terrorism, declared following the attacks in New York, Washington, Madrid and London. It is in fact right-wing

and nationalist groups in particular that tend to regard these events as favourable starting point for their critical views about ‘the aliens’ in their respective countries.

A fear of attacks on the part of Muslim fundamentalists paralysed traffic in airports, railway stations, in the underground, etc. Actions undertaken by armed anti-terrorist troops were intended to restore the feeling of security to those living in big cities, as well of stability of the world they lived in. It might have seemed that authorities (national as well as international) played the role of watchmen and guarantors of such security: it shall suffice to strengthen border control and ‘close the door to the alien’. However, that’s when a question arises: is terrorism for which Muslims reached really brought from abroad? Theo van Gogh, Dutch film director was murdered on a street in Amsterdam by a 26-years old Dutchman of Moroccan origin. Attacks against the World Trade Center in New York were prepared by young men of Islamic origin, but living in Germany and studying in Hamburg academies. What’s also peculiar, there were over 500 people with Arab names, but living in Berlin, Hamburg, Bremen, Stuttgart and Tübingen, among those receiving an e-mail service of radical islamists.

Reflection and conclusions provoked by cars in flames in suburbs of French cities or by attacks in German schools are likewise. Nicolas Sarkozy, formerly the French minister of home affairs, reacted with statements that one had to end with ‘social scum’ and ‘clean the suburbs with a hose full of water’.

Hundreds, maybe thousands of cars burning down, several hundreds of people arrested every night – these are alarming, paralysing facts that left French society shocked and stunned. France, the country of slogans of liberty, equality and fraternity proudly written on its colours was sent to a corner by second and third generation of immigrants from Algeria, former French North Africa, French Equator Africa and other overseas territories. Their fathers and grand-fathers, who contributed to build the power of French industry, live today together with their children and grand-children in gigantic settlements of blocks far in the suburbs, farther still from ‘old, noble France’.

This is where it seems worthwhile to turn back to the past for a while. At times foreign labour force played an important role in economies of Western European countries. Masses of immigrants, attracted at that time, came to Western Europe to meet the demand of the moment, quite unaware of the lack

of comprehensive integration solutions in the adopting countries. Foreigners were treated as workers – as temporary guests\textsuperscript{32} who were later expected to come back where they came from in the first place. This, however, did not happen. Those who came then wanted to bring their families along and to settle down for good. The original scenario, according to which they were just meant to play their role and go back, proved wrong. They transferred money they earned back to their families, they actually thought about return. However, the awareness of an extent of difficulty related with moving back persuaded them not to, so finally they preferred to extend their stays, bring their families, identify more with an adopting country. Even if what they regarded identification was quite peculiar – with building of their on closed social circles, own local institutions, associations, shops and small worlds.

In many countries an inflow of foreigners was much faster than thinking about finding a place for them in their new societies. Actions undertaken were mostly just temporary, aiming at finding provisional solutions to problems experienced. At the same time tensions and conflicts kept growing, accumulating and once in a while exploding in an uncontrolled manner, in such forms as setting Turkish or Moroccan workers’ houses on fire. There was an obvious lack of thinking, on the part of governments, about the principal element of migration policy, \textit{i.e.} integration of immigrants with adopting societies and, quite importantly, conducting such policy in both directions. Such a bilateral attitude assumes that integration not only concerns immigrants but it does adopting societies as well. This is, admittedly, not about a unilateral process of adapting ‘the alien’, but about achieving their harmonisation with those communities, about building and maintaining mutual relations, about rights, but also obligations, acceptance going both ways. This, in turn, requires carefully devised actions, undertaken by States in relation to both interested parties, requires teaching of mutual respect and tolerance, developing proper attitudes. It seems particularly desirable for the Communities to work out a general model of integration. In 2003 the European Economic and Social Committee (EESC) suggested that the EU prepare a Community programme for integration and attributed an appropriate budget thereto. It should be noted with satisfaction that in the EU financial perspective for the years 2007-2013 for the first time considerable budgetary funds were foreseen for financing European immigration policy, including the

\textsuperscript{32} K.Iglicka, \textit{Dylematy europejskiej polityki migracyjnej} (Dilemmas of European migration policy), op.cit.
European Integration Fund which is intended to contribute to the implementation of the programme.33

Moreover, the EESC regards active involvement of social partners and other citizen society organisations as a crucial element in promoting the success of integration policy. Integration is a process running in two directions, based on rights and duties, binding both immigrants and the adopting society. In another opinion the EESC defined integration as a gradual equalisation of migrants’ rights and duties with the rights of the rest of population, both in purely legal aspect and in regards to access to goods, services and possibility to participate in citizens life on conditions of equal opportunities and uniform treatment.

The adoption of certain general solutions for the EU Member States in the area of migration policy, including, in particular, its integration dimension and taking humanitarian values, human rights and best-conceived human solidarity into proper account, should enable any country to adapt adequate solutions to its own specific needs as well as social and cultural conditions. At the same time, this will generate a feeling of common awareness of the problem and give an impulse for joint efforts to solve it in a valid manner. This, after all, constitutes the very fundament of the Community Europe has built for 50 years now.

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