TABLE OF CONTENTS

Editorial Foreword......................................................... 5

ARTICLES

Bogdan Góralczyk
Return of History or Anti-liberal Revolution ................. 11

Tomasz Grzegorz Grosse, Joanna Hetnarowicz
The Discourse of Solidarity and the European Migrant Crisis ........ 35

Agata Dziewulska, Anna M. Ostrowska
The Crooked Logic of Migration Policies and Their Malthusian Roots ................. 63

Małgorzta Pacek
European Europe – The Migration Crisis of European Integration ....... 83

Marta Pachocka
Understanding the Visegrad Group States’ Response to the Migrant and Refugee Crises 2014+ in the European Union .... 101

Viktor Glied, Norbert Pap
The ‘Christian Fortress of Hungary’ – The Anatomy of the Migration Crisis in Hungary............... 133

Adam A. Ambroziak, Michał Schwabe
Factors Influencing Immigration to Poland As an EU Member State ................. 151
Artur Adamczyk, Goran Ilik
Greek-Turkish Relations, UE and Migration Problem ........ 187

Ludmila Golovataia
European Union Migration Policies and Their Influence on Migration Flows from the Republic of Moldova During Contemporary Times .................... 211

Tomasz Stępniewski
Ukraine Crisis: Political Transformation vs. Security and Migration .................... 237

Mustafa Switat
Arabic Community in Poland – Facts and Myths. Research Report .................... 249

Karina Paulina Marczuk
Australia’s History and Background of Migration and Refugee Policies – Lessons for the EU and Its Member States? ........ 261

BOOK REVIEWS


The European Union and Poland – Problems and Achievements, eds. Artur Adamczyk, Przemysław Dubel (rev. Adam A. Ambroziak) .................... 285

ACTIVITIES OF THE CENTRE FOR EUROPE

Publications of the Centre for Europe Publishing Programme. .... 297
Editorial Foreword

Dear Readers,

The year 2016 has proved to be a fateful one for Europe and the European integration process. After several decades of ever stronger and deeper cooperation, the British referendum of June 23rd this year, for the first time on this unique road, has replaced integration by the specter of disintegration. Instead of constant movement towards ever-deeper and ever-larger integration, Brexit has opened a new dynamics, while a procedure of exit of a member state from the European Union (EU) has formally begun. Of course, we don't know yet, if by that some kind of a new Pandora’s Box has been opened, but it is more than obvious that we have a lot of new troubles and challenges within the EU. What is more, the deep conviction that the integration process is irreversible has proved to be an illusion, while the fundamental principle of ‘ever closer Union’ has been, at least partially, undermined.

Instead of fruitful effects of ever-stronger cooperation, we have more and more division lines, both on the Continent, and also on the domestics scene of almost all member states of the EU. Populism, nationalism, public discontent of right and left origin are on top of the agenda, becoming a standard-bearers of a popular revolt against the political establishment. Extremism of far right and far left and Euroskeptic forces are on the rise, while political center has visibly lost its power and control. Both the market and globalization, praised until then, now became the objects of hostility and concern. We have to deal now with economic and democratic dysfunction of the process, combined after 2014 – since forceful annexation of Crimea and Donbas crisis in Ukraine and the appearance of ISIS – Daesh simultaneously – with external (migrants and refugees) and internal (danger of terrorist attacks) plethora of challenges, dangers and threats. First economy, next liberal democracy values, and now even our security concepts are badly bruised.
In those circumstances the previous idea of the European Institutions, starting from Council and Commission, that our proper choice for the future is muddling through is not an viable option anymore. Creative and strategic hard thinking is necessary. Isolationism, pure return to the nation state, shutting the border lines and building the walls or barbed wires is not a long-term solution, only a kind of ad hoc response to public expectations. In this new political and strategic landscape we need to come back to the roots – the center must hold again, if we want to save the biggest and unquestionable achievements of integration that is several decades of peace on the continent and its peaceful development, as we were successful of making continent peaceful, whole and free, as for now, what is especially necessary to be reminded to the public now in front of so many new challenges.

This special edition of our Yearbook is concentrated on one crucial aspect of the new European agenda, that is the migration and refugee (those are not the same categories of people) crisis in the EU and territories around it. In 2015 we saw more and more people crossing our borders. Since then we have thousands of asylum seekers, including many vulnerable people in abysmal conditions. The political and moral choice is not easy, how to deal with this new category of challenge, while, as for now, it is visible the EU member states failed to take a collective action to share responsibility to create the situation of asylum seekers safe and legal. How to enforce some common standards on reception conditions and asylum procedures are still the conditions to be worked out. Simultaneously we have to deal with many new migrants arriving almost day by day. How to combat smuggling the people and how effectively respond to the crisis of so magnificent proportions?

The proper answer to this plethora of challenges, it seems, is almost impossible without an effective combination of keeping the open borders, mixed with a redefinition migration issues. What seems to be necessary is a kind of a rebalance of power among the European institutions and their connections with the national capitals. Only after elections in many important EU countries (including France and Germany) in 2017 we can probably move forward, but the direction of this eventual movement is still unknown. New blueprints and scenarios are necessary if we want to keep the EU further as a viable center of economic growth, stability and values. Europe’s future is at stake. The EU divided, with some further ‘exits’ on the horizon, would stay weaker and distracted. In response to so many new challenges, as its seems, only a new vision of re-unification can keep Europe as an important center on the global scene.

That is, more or less, a final conclusion of the first article in this special volume of our ‘Yearbook’, by B. Góralczyk, who in his well-researched
Editorial Foreword

study is defining new division lines on the continent, mixed with several ‘crisis management’ situations on it. According to him, we have not only an economic, political, and security issues on top of the agenda, but also axiological crises (understood as the creation of ‘illiberal democracy’) and ‘democratic deficit’ (permanent gap between the establishment and societies) as almost existential issues to be resolved as soon as possible. Góralczyk also adds that due to economic crisis of 2008 a new division line has appeared on South–North axis (Grexit, PIGS), while the security crisis of 2014 (forceful annexation of Crimea and conflict in Donbas, mixed with the appearance of ISIS – Daesh) followed by huge migrant wave next year is leading towards the re-creation of former ominous East–West division. He also does not exclude a new ‘multi-speed integration’ scenarios, but is opposing any ‘concentric circles’ ideas, dividing the EU into hard core, periphery and semi-periphery.

After this substantial introduction we have a whole bloc of materials dealing with the crucial and front-page issue of this volume of our ‘Yearbook’, that is the migrants and refugee crises in the EU and its external relations. All major issues, like humanitarian aspects, resettlement schemes, asylum procedures, migrant and refugee smuggling operations and European counter operations, among others, are dealt here by many authors of different background and specialization, giving us – hopefully – not only in-depths analysis on this complicated subject, but also widespread explanation of the migrant challenge in front of the EU institutions and national capitals now.

T.G. Grosse and J. Hetnarowicz are trying to assess to impact of migrant crisis on the European system of values (‘Copenhagen criteria’), and especially the notion of solidarity, definitely under pressure in those new circumstances on the continent. However, their analysis is deeper and focused on academic debate on the subject. Even deeper in its theoretical background is the next study of A. Dziewulska and A. Ostrowska. They argue here that the way the EU perceives and deals with the recent flow of migrants (refugees and others) is based on an outdated perception and present a possible new way forward by discussing the EU’s migration policy and border management, as linked to the EU security and defense policy. According to them, there is no chance to resolve the migrant challenge and dilemma if not starting from the redefinition and rethinking of the security policy of the EU (mostly missing).

From theoretical layer we are moving forward towards more practical issues of policy choices under the migration pressure, which is the essence of study of M. Pacek, while M. Pachocka is dealing with, much discussed recently, ambivalent and questionable approach of the Visegrad Group
countries towards the migrant crisis, with special emphasis put on re-location and resettlement schemes, provided by the European Commission and other institutions. We have also two case studies of two Visegrad countries, Hungary and Poland, first written by V. Glied and N. Pap, and the second by A.A. Ambroziak and M. Schwabe. The first one is more or less an analysis of the Islam factor on Hungarian domestic – academic and especially political – scene, while the second focuses on potential immigration to Poland, a country on the outskirts of the EU, with a special pressure from the Ukraine (as available data shows). Their conclusion is more than obvious, but worth to be recalled: ‘The immigration crisis and the immigrants distribution issues revealed problems resulting from differences between the Member States in quality of living, including differences in wages and social benefits.’

Why Ukraine? The answer is in the study provided in the volume by T. Stepniewski, who provided a study of conflict in Ukraine, and especially Donbas region, trying to evaluate the complicated security situation there and its impact on the migrant issue. The Author is not over-optimistic and concludes: ‘Ukraine will not be able to manage the situation on its own without external financial aid’. Thus, we have another important topic on the current European agenda.

Finally, we have another important aspect of the current refugee – migrant crisis in the EU presented by A. Adamczyk and G. Illik, who are presenting a ‘demographic weapon’ in the Greek–Turkish and Turkey–EU relations, becoming so important after 2015 when so-called the Balkan Road has been opened.

The volume concludes by two detailed studies on interesting, but mostly unknown by the outside world, subjects: on the impact of migration flows on the Republic of Moldova by L. Golovataia and of the Arabic society – or small minority rather – in Poland by M. Switat.

We hope that this topic oriented volume of our Yearbook, reflecting on so many aspects of so important subject of refugee and migrant crises in the EU will allow the Reader to has its own opinion on this complicated set of issues and also contribute to the ongoing debate on the subject.

Editors
ARTICLES
Bogdan Góralczyk*

Return of History or Anti-liberal Revolution1

Abstract: The European Union, a unique entity on the global scene, is at a crossroads. The original blueprint to create a supranational entity is broken, under the pressure of the constitutional crisis (2005) and later the economic and financial one (the spectre of Grexit). The process sped up in 2014, when external security appeared on the agenda, followed by an unprecedented migrant wave coming to the EU in 2015. As a result, former Euroenthusiasm has been replaced by Euroskeptic forces, mostly of populist or nationalist nature, which was strongly confirmed by the British Brexit vote in June 2016. Those accumulated crises brought about many new division lines within the EU, well defined in this study – of political, economic, social, and even religious or cultural nature. The liberal mainstream, which has been dominant until recently, is retreating, while ‘illiberal democracy’, however it is understood, or even authoritarian solutions, are starting to flourish. This is an extraordinary era when the entire project of European integration is at stake. Time to react and sacrifice a lot to save it, if we do not want to retreat under the new challenges surrounding us. According to the author, the EU can be saved, even if it will be different than before.

Keywords: the EU, European integration, populism, nationalism, liberalism, migrants, social security, external security

* Prof. Bogdan Góralczyk, Ph. D. – Director of the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw. This is an altered and expanded version of an article published in Polish in “Studia Europejskie” quarterly No. 1/2017, bringing some new questions to the fore. Contact at: b.goralczyk@uw.edu.pl.

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Introduction

After more than two decades of huge optimism regarding the European integration project, which had been synonymous with the European Union since the Treaty of Maastricht of 1992, in the mid-2010s the project found itself at a crossroads. Indeed, there is general consensus that the EU is currently facing a multidimensional crisis. Both the European Parliament elections and the polls conducted in the EU Member States confirm it: Euroenthusiasm is falling, Euroskepticism is on the rise.

According to the results of a survey conducted by the well-known American research agency Pew, in 2012–2015 the support for the EU’s activities in Greece fell from 37 to 27 per cent, in France from 58 to 38 per cent, in Italy from 58 to 48 per cent, and in the UK from 54 to 44%. According to the same study, the highest support for the EU among the ten countries covered by the survey was recorded in Poland (72% of positive and 22% of negative opinions, while in Hungary it was 61% and 37%, respectively), while in Greece, or even France, an exactly opposite trend was recorded (with 27% and 38% positive and as much as 71% and 61% negative opinions, respectively). These figures lead to the conclusion that it is untrue that the current problems stem from the fifth and subsequent EU enlargements, in which much poorer post-communist countries of the former Eastern bloc were admitted to the EU. The reasons for the growing Euroskepticism and its sources are definitely much deeper and concern the entire continent.

There is already a noticeable and growing dispute concerning the number and order of importance of these crises – both in the EU and throughout the West. While the opinions of those who go as far as to talk about the ‘Decline of the West’, thereby referring to the once famous work by Oswald Spengler, are perhaps too far-reaching, the theses that ‘liberalism found itself in a deep crisis’ are most probably not exaggerated at


all. Even according to serious analysts and experts, the current crisis, or rather crises, strike at the very heart and core of the West,\textsuperscript{6} which makes this issue worth pondering on.

It seems that the phenomenon is even wider, since we are dealing with this situation both in Europe as a whole and, for example, in Hungary and Poland, where – according to the Pew survey – the societies still show positive attitudes to the EU, while policy-makers are strongly Euroskeptic. However, we are observing similar disappointment with liberal solutions also outside the EU, as evidenced by such diverse personalities as Donald Trump in the United States, Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines or Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in Turkey. All these cases confirm the outcome of the analysis conducted by Thomas Piketty and then Branko Milanovic: the key reason is the domination of markets in our lives and the resulting unequal distribution of goods and excessive concentration of wealth in the hands of the existing elites.\textsuperscript{7}

On the one hand, there is a wave of variously defined nationalism and populism, on a scale unprecedented in the recent decades, while on the other hand, we are observing the emergence of equally unprecedented anti-democratic tendencies and authoritarian aspirations. Instead of the previous wave of liberalism, we have an anti-liberal wave as well as an ideological ‘counter-revolution’ directed against liberal democracy, defined by Pankaj Mishra in the influential magazine ‘Foreign Affairs’ as ‘the globalization of rage’. According to this author, the situation is dire: ‘The world seems beset by pervasive panic, which doesn’t quite resemble the centralized fear that emanates from despotic power. Rather, people everywhere find themselves in thrall to the sentiment – generated by the news media and amplified by social media – that anything can happen, anywhere, to anybody, at any time’.\textsuperscript{8}

Furthermore, the politicians who reach into the deep layers of human dissatisfaction, who are known by name and some of whom have been listed above, look for simple black and white patterns, adhering to a very Manichean worldview: populist politicians divide the


society into the unblemished ‘ordinary people’ and the corrupt and self-indulgent elite. They eagerly present foreign capital and therefore also other European governments and the EU institutions as a new form of colonialism. The specifically understood ‘familiarity’ is contrasted with globalism, transnationality and supranationality pursued by the EU. As rightly pointed out by Milanovic: ‘Populism has thus entered fully into political life and has gradually moved toward displacing the mainstream – or rather, is becoming mainstream itself’.10

The Euroskepticism shown in a plethora of studies has not only merged with demagogy and populism but also brought to the foreground national slogans and national sovereignty, which is being praised in all possible ways. Populists, however understood and defined, have one thing in common: they want to destroy the existing system from within, either by means of direct democracy, namely referendums, or – which is even more dangerous – advocating more or less authoritarian solutions, invoking the will of the disgruntled or frustrated society. The new populist groups are building on the strong contrast to create a different, fresh division: into those who enjoy privileges and those who are deprived of them.11 This forms a basis for various significantly increasing divisions between EU nationals, while it is more than obvious that the more of these divisions, the weaker the Union’s position in the global arena.12

In this article, I will attempt to answer the question: What has happened that there are so many political parties and groupings in the EU that openly draw on the dissatisfaction of the society and easily use negative stereotypes or prejudices against others for their own benefit? This will be followed by an attempt to define the most important crisis developments in the EU and in the international arena today, which requires taking a multidimensional and multidisciplinary approach (political science, economics, sociology, history, and even social psychology) and a preliminary suggestion of what should be done to address this difficult situation. It is more than certain that it is easier to define and describe the current state of integration – and often even disintegration (although there are fierce ideological and programme-related disputes on this particular point) – than to propose measures and ways out of this vicious circle. It is easier to diagnose than forecast. So far, however, there has been no solid diagnosis either; there have only been some partial attempts at explication, if any.

11 Demokracja w obliczu populizmu..., op.cit., p. 42.
1. The UE as a child of the ‘end of history’ era

Being the result of an already nearly 40-year long process of integration, the EU emerged in the global arena as an actor that had not been fully defined\(^\text{13}\) and at a moment when after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the collapse of the bipolar system the United States dominated practically everywhere, imposing its will and vision on the entire world, even in the ideological and philosophical dimensions, as evidenced by the spectacular success at that time of Francis Fukuyama’s thesis that the collapse of communism was nothing else than the ‘end of history’, in the sense that there was no longer any ideological alternative to the domination of the market and liberal democracy.\(^\text{14}\) The EU was therefore, in a way, a child of the era of triumphing political liberalism and market dominance. As such, it quickly emerged as an important economic and normative power as well as a soft or civilian power,\(^\text{15}\) without military elements or the classic attributes of power as defined by the realist school, which include maintaining, consolidating and demonstrating power.\(^\text{16}\) Another drawback that has been clear from the beginning of the process of European integration is that verbal and normative assurances often have not found confirmation in facts and reality. Rules and regulations said one thing, and life went a slightly different way. In this context, the spectre of alienation and estrangement has appeared.\(^\text{17}\)

The EU is a political as well as an economic project (as a matter of fact, it is usually perceived first as an economic project and only second as a political one because integration began with a free trade zone). Therefore, apart from the political situation in this grouping, we should just as much take into consideration economic issues and processes. In this particular sphere, however, after the collapse of the Cold War order, there was, on the one hand, a triumph – in the world markets as well as in the EU – of ‘market fundamentalism’, as referred to by scholars such as the

\(^{13}\) Some even called it an ‘intellectual puzzle’ or an ‘unidentified political object’. What everyone agrees on is that it has always been in statu nascendi – in the nascent state. D. Milczarek, *Unia Europejska we współczesnym świecie (The European Union in the Contemporary World)*, Warszawa 2005, p. 10.


\(^{15}\) D. Milczarek, *Pozycja i rola Unii Europejskiej w stosunkach międzynarodowych (The Position and Role of the European Union in International Relations)*, Warszawa 2003, p. 184.


Nobel Prize winner Joseph Stiglitz\textsuperscript{18} (who was not alone in this view); and on the other hand, conditions were dictated by the insatiable and selfish American ‘Global Minotaur’,\textsuperscript{19} searching for new markets and resources to use. It was an era of absolute domination of orthodox neo-liberal markets and the so-called Washington consensus.\textsuperscript{20} What is worse, the distinct ‘dictatorship of money’, also known as excessive commercialisation and even ‘financialization’ of the lives of societies and states, seems to confirm what Oswald Spengler discovered long ago is indeed true: ‘through money democracy destroys itself, after money has destroyed the spirit’.\textsuperscript{21}

The EU, being the child of this age, proved to be a well-functioning commercial area and customs union, but it fell into trouble when – in accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Maastricht – it started to implement the not yet fully prepared monetary union, in which fiscal policy and budgets remained at Member State level, with the banking union still in the nascent state. The paradox was that monetary centralisation met fiscal decentralisation, or even fragmentation, which eventually turned out to be a structural barrier to the entire integration process.\textsuperscript{22} Implemented for political and ideological reasons rather than economic ones, the mechanism began to fail after the Constitutional Treaty\textsuperscript{23} had been rejected and when it turned out that harmonization of individual policies was impossible, as clearly shown by the great global crisis of 2008, which affected primarily Western markets.

In the political, ideological and institutional dimension, in turn, the Global Minotaur, that is the United States as the dominant power at that


\textsuperscript{19} Y. Varoufakis, \textit{The Global Minotaur: America, the True Origins of the Financial Crisis and the Future of the World Economy}, London 2013. According to the author, as a result of this mechanism we entered a state of aporia, i.e. of intense puzzlement caused by confused concepts and seeing the existing order crumble down, p. 3.


\textsuperscript{21} O. Spengler, op.cit., p. 582.

\textsuperscript{22} J. Stiglitz, op.cit., p. 5.

\textsuperscript{23} Which, as explained by the ‘father’ of this Treaty, V. Giscard d’Estaing, was supposed to answer the key question of why Europe meddles in everything, while frequently remaining ineffective. \textit{Nowa Unia na półmetku (The New Union Crossing the Halfway Mark)}, “Gazeta Wyborcza”, 23.01.2003.
time, imposed its own checks-and-balances system, ensuring balance and mutual control of the main powers in the governance system. Post-communist countries surrendered to this dictate, with the Russian Federation at the forefront and China being the only significant exception.\footnote{As R. Kagan aptly put it: ‘most Americans and Europeans believed China and Russia were on a path toward liberalism’. R. Kagan, \textit{The Return of History and the End of Dream}, New York 2008, p. 5. In both cases this turned out to be a huge illusion and mistake: China has never adopted the neo-liberal Washington Consensus orthodoxy, while Russia rejected it after Vladimir Putin had risen to power.} Initially, the nascent EU also followed this liberal free-market orthodoxy, as evidenced by the Copenhagen criteria adopted in June 1993 and from then on imposed on all the candidate countries as a \textit{sine qua non} for future membership.\footnote{A. Menon, \textit{Europa: stan unii (Europe: State of the Union)}, Warszawa 2013, p. 65.} This condition was in fact formulated because of the prospects of admitting post-communist countries, with their different historical baggage and very different political and economic experience.\footnote{In most general terms, they include the requirements of adopting democracy, rule of law, market economy and the EU acquis: http://www.neww.org.pl/slownik/opis/159,159.html (last visited 23.12.2016).}

It was an era of great triumph and optimism of the West, victorious after the Cold War, so it should come as no surprise that all the countries of the former Eastern Bloc, almost without exception, wanted to ‘go to Europe’, to join the ranks of the grouping that in the material sense (for instance, in terms of total GDP\footnote{In 2014, the EU was responsible for 23.8% of global GDP while the US for 22.2% and China for 13.4\%. \textit{The EU in the world. 2016 edition}, Eurostat, Brussels 2016, p. 79. Other available data are slightly different but still unequivocally confirm the role of the EU as one of the key poles of the world economy. See the useful comparison of World Bank, CIA and IMF data at: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal) (last visited 27.12.2016).}) was emerging as an important power centre on the global stage, in particular as regards economic and soft power. One argument in support of this thesis is that for a long time there was a parliamentary consensus in Poland on the pro-European direction after the fall of real socialism; this direction was first challenged only before the referendum on EU accession by the then extra-parliamentary, populist and demagogic Samoobrona (Self-defence) party, which tried to scare its compatriots by raising the spectre of Poland being dominated by German and Western capital.\footnote{For the full position of this party on the EU at that time see http://samoobrona.org.pl/zzr/pages/04.Stanowiska/index.php?document=998.html (last visited 28.12.2016).} At the time, nobody considered an anti-Union posture as a serious possibility, neither in Poland nor in other countries of the region. Everyone, including the largest mainstream political parties,
regardless of their ideological views, as well as the majority of the population, was in favour of Europe (meaning, of course, the EU).

2. Why is Europe today not the same Europe that we have joined

The EU is a very special entity: neither a state nor a federation (not yet), nor a classic international organisation. It is a *sui generis* entity, or rather a process, which has developed for many years and decades of integration according to a characteristic pattern: ‘from crisis to crisis’, which means that breakthroughs happened only when barriers or obstacles appeared on the way. In addition, this special entity suffered from a kind of ‘cardinal sin’, as a product of the elite, which – just like the Global Minotaur in the world markets – dictated its own conditions and imposed its will on subordinate societies.

This ‘sin’ has revealed itself in all its glory when countries were asked not about their decision to access the EU but about the functioning of the Union: in spring 2005, the citizens of first France and then of the Netherlands rejected the draft of the joint Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. Thus, the Union fell into the first major crisis bearing the hallmarks of a structural, long-term crisis, which can be called a constitutional crisis. This time, not only the ‘from crisis to crisis’ formula broke down but the fundamental integration project was undermined as well as so far it had been based on neo-functional principles, under which the ultimate solution, the *finalité politique* of the entire process, would be a supranational federal structure.\(^29\) From then on, European federalists have been in retreat,\(^30\) and at the time when this text is being written, towards the end of 2016, probably only some European liberals, with their expressive leader, former Belgian Prime Minister Guy Verhofstadt, are still making such plans.\(^31\)

Due to the failed constitutional referendums in France and the Netherlands in spring 2005, the path of integration, so far not without obstacles and problems but consistently going towards a single goal, apparently lost its direction. This led to something that can be called the first national impulse, slowly undermining this essentially supranational project. In


the strong words of the well-known Irish businessman and politician influential in European institutions, Peter D. Sutherland: ‘Since the disastrous referendum in France on the European Union’s constitutional treaty, the EU has been directionless and politically damaged in a fundamental sense’.32

Once again, national policies and interests prevailed, and the Member States were not able to reach an agreement on the common vision of the future of their continent.33 Heated debates on the future of the Union started among the governments, but it is clear that the first serious impulse in this debate belonged to nationalists, advocating both strong leadership and the strong state, which means a return to sovereignty and in fact the confederate form of cooperation between the participants of the project – the Member States. However, this new approach created a stumbling block undermining the formula of an ever closer Union, so far repeated like a mantra, of a constantly deepening and expanding Union, that was nevertheless working in close cooperation and internally coherent.

In this already not particularly favourable context, a deep crisis in the markets emerged, starting with the United States as early as 2007 to later flare up in mid-September 2008, triggered by the collapse of the well-established institution of the local financial system, the Lehman Brothers. It reached the EU with a delay and initially showed its most intense face in Greece. On the one hand, it spurred the ideas of Grexit, meaning either a possible financial meltdown or leaving the euro area, established in 1999; on the other hand, it highlighted the problems of the PIIGS countries (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece and Spain, to which we could just as well add Cyprus, or even, as some argue, Finland). Thus the ongoing constitutional crisis was joined by a deep economic and financial crisis. The latter soon gave rise to serious social tensions and divisions, which according to some experts may not only lead to destabilisation and threats within the EU but can also affect the stability and balance of global markets.34 It also brought about the second national impulse, to use the same terminology as above, providing another propitious opportunity to those who oppose excessive integration.

In the most spectacular way the new threats were revealed in the PIGS countries (Ireland managed to leave the group rather quickly), especially Greece, which was a kind of litmus test for the strategy of dealing with

33 A. Menon, op.cit., p. 70.
the crisis. The European Commission, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the European Central Bank (ECB), known collectively in this context as the Troika, imposed a strict austerity and savings policy on Athens, which from the beginning was very poorly received by the Greek society. People in Greece were becoming ever angrier at Troika’s methods, which they strongly believed to be linked with underlying interests of the largest entity, namely Germany. It turned out that the first two tranches of assistance loans were in fact used to support and buy out bonds of German and French banks involved in the local market (it is estimated that some 90% of these funds were allocated to this purpose). Only after these banks were bailed out, after the deepest crisis, which in early 2015 raised to power the left-wing anti-establishment Syriza coalition, attacking Berlin and Brussels, a slightly larger part of the funds from the third tranche was allocated directly to Greece and for Greece, although still under strict requirements of austerity policy, which was strongly criticised by some, for example by Syriza’s former finance minister and eminent economist, Yanis Varoufakis.

The Eurozone crisis, in turn, fully revealed the structural shortcomings mentioned at the beginning of this text. It showed that the euro area was neither efficient nor effective, which led many authors, including such respected scholars or personalities as Josef Stiglitz or George Soros, to the conclusion that it might be a good solution to either dissolve or completely transform it. Meanwhile, two Polish financial and banking experts, Stefan Kawalec and Ernest Pytlarczyk, advocate a ‘controlled dissolution of the euro area,’ adding, or even cautioning that: ‘If the task of dissolving the euro areas not performed by pro-European and pro-market leaders of European Union countries, it is likely to be realised by their anti-European and anti-market successors. In the latter case, the European Union and the single market will also be destroyed’.

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3. The new dividing lines

The dictate of the Troika, Berlin and European institutions, which were not fully transparent (hence suggestions of another crisis, the so-called democratic deficit), unfortunately did not bring the expected results. On the contrary, if we take income levels in Greece in 2007, the last pre-crisis year, as 100%, then at the end of 2014 it was only 93%, and the country’s public debt rose from just over 120% of GDP in 2010 to as much as 178% in 2015; all this with an over 20% unemployment rate, exceeding the 50% threshold for young people, including those who graduated from schools and universities. No wonder that in the end this last group – young people finding it increasingly difficult to find a permanent job, start a family and settle down – was at the source of the protest referred to as the ‘precariat revolt’, which since then has been constantly expanding to other EU Member States.

The ‘Grexit’ threat and the crisis in many Member States, mainly in the Mediterranean Region, provided another strong impetus to nationalist forces as well as to the increasingly populist ones, invoking ‘injustice against the people’ exploited by the rich, enfranchised elites and foreign banks. Populist nationalism appeared, with extreme and extremist forces emerging in many countries, ranging from the almost purely fascist Golden Dawn party (Chrysi Avgi), openly calling for a rebellion against Greek elites, and even more against Berlin, despite the fact that, paradoxically, the party’s programme included explicit references to Nazi ideology. The party is not only deeply Euroskeptic but also nearly emblematic in terms of the demands put forward by similar groups. The Golden Dawn advocates leaving the euro area as well as the EU, but it is also strongly anti-Western (mainly against the US and Israel) and anti-capitalist. Its demands include, among others, nationalisation of banks and of some partially unspecified ‘national resources’, understood primarily as islands, ports and factories, topping it all up with their flagship slogan: ‘nationalism is not a crime’.

As we know, the Golden Dawn is unfortunately not an isolated case; it bears similarities to the Hungarian Jobbik and other nationalist groups throughout the EU with their populist slogans and programmes, which

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40 J. Stiglitz, op. cit., pp. 69, 75.
41 R. Woś, Dziecięca choroba liberalizmu (The Childhood Disease of Liberalism), Warszawa 2014, p. 126.
have clearly gained strength after 2010. This is happening not only on the periphery of the Union, but also in its very core, as evidenced by the activity of Marine Le Pen’s National Front in France, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP), or Geert Wilders’ Party of Freedom in the Netherlands. Also noteworthy is the rising popularity of the Alternative for Germany (created, which is important, only in 2013) and the Italian Five Star Movement (Movimento 5 Stelle), members of which have occupied increasingly important posts and positions in the state since 2013, and which after the fall of the cabinet of Prime Minister Matteo Renzi at the end of 2016 started to be considered as a serious candidate for the government, or at least for co-governing the entire country in a coalition.

The deep economic and financial crisis in the EU after 2010 led to the emergence or revival of essentially populist and usually right-wing nationalist parties and groups that decided to take advantage of favourable conditions to zealously promote their programmes. In addition, it created a deep and unsettling rift on the continent along the North–South axis. The North, starting with Germany, emerging after the crisis as the hegemon, is generally rich and more stable, while the South, including Greece, is poorer and confronted with more challenges. It was clear from the beginning that the rift was not a good development in the context of EU values and principles, such as solidarity, complementarity and subsidiarity. Once again the foundations of the previously applied concept of an ‘ever closer Union’ started crumble and have since then been constantly and consciously undermined.

As if this was not enough, new crises reached Europe in 2014–2015. Just like the one in 2008, they came from the outside. One of them is the security crisis (mainly concerning external security), revealed, on the one hand, in Ukraine, and on the other hand, by the formation of the so-called Islamic State (ISIS, ISIL, Daesh – the last being an acronym in Arabic). The other one, which is the main focus of this volume, is the refugee and migration crisis, often associated with the threat of terrorism. According to official data, in the crucial year 2015 alone it brought up to 1,322 million people into the EU, mostly from the Middle East but also from Africa and even Afghanistan, Pakistan and Sri

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45 The EU in the World..., op.cit., p. 31.
Both crises have highlighted the long identified main weakness of the EU: the lack of fundamental categories and institutions that are so important for a strong international actor, such as police, customs and border services, not to mention the armed forces and military power.46

Under pressure from an unprecedented (since the end of World War II) wave of migrants, the EU has clearly found itself on the defensive and on top of that once again strongly divided, this time not only along the North–South axis but also along the revived East–West axis, once so dangerous and still evoking bad memories. The migration and refugee threat triggered two emblematic responses: Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán, eagerly using a variety of nationalistic slogans and playing the ‘defend our sovereignty’ card, has built a barbed wire entanglement and fence on the border with Serbia and on minor sections of the border with Croatia;47 while German Chancellor Angela Merkel, in turn, proposed a Willkommen Politik, the policy of welcoming people coming from outside Europe. It soon turned out that the Chancellor’s liberal-spirited approach was a bit reckless and rather short-sighted, because nobody had realized how big the wave coming towards Europe would be. In September 2016 Chancellor Merkel herself admitted that her approach had been ‘wrong’.48 By contrast, the Hungarian Prime Minister not only was not ostracised in European high society and elites but even celebrated his triumph at home, proving that his principled anti-refugee position had been by all means appropriate. What is more, he found followers and supporters of this policy, within the Visegrad Group, for example.49

These events provided the third national impulse, so to call it, not only reinforcing nationalist trends and groups but also giving permission for openly xenophobic and often racist slogans. This time, a range of arguments referring to culture and civilization is being openly used, creating the image of the enemy as an outsider ready to waylay our prosperity and peace and on top of that, having not only a different skin and face but also professing another faith, especially Islam.

46 A. Menon, Europa..., op.cit., p. 213.
47 A subject for a broad range of academic works; for example, one interesting analysis can be found at: http://www.worldcrunch.com/opinion-analysis/how-orban-is-trying-to-take-europe-away-from-merkel (last visited 27.12.2016).
In this context, taking advantage of the uncertainty and even fear of citizens across the continent, an important debate has started probably across all EU Member States, albeit with varying intensity. It concerns European identity, the need to defend the values dear to our civilization, but also – perhaps for the first time on this scale in the history of integration – the need to seal our external borders and ensure external security. The nature of the political and public discourse has changed significantly. Instead of growth, markets and prosperity, we now talk more about security and the related threats, stemming from the conflicts in the Middle East (Syria, Iraq, Libya, Daesh), from the increasingly assertive behaviour of Russia in the international arena (in Ukraine and Donbas, also in Syria) as well as from the need to protect our own borders considering the relaxed internal controls inside the Schengen Area. In this context, some analysts go as far and deep as to quote Edward Gibbon and his classic work *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, in which he argues that one of the main reasons for the fall of the Roman Empire was simply the lack of proper border protection and underestimation of the dangers coming from the outside.\(^50\)

In this context, much attention has been devoted to the quite common awareness of risks to internal security. Thus emerges the **third dividing line** on the continent, having several aspects: reaching back to the theory of Immanuel Wallerstein and his division into the **centre, the periphery and the semi-periphery**,\(^51\) which in the EU currently takes the form of a division into **Germany and the rest**, and at the same time an urban–rural split between the capital, with other large cities, and the countryside,\(^52\) which was so well defined in the Brexit referendum but has been observed also outside the United Kingdom. Naturally, we could also easily include or exclude another, completely separate category of division – **into ‘Our Own’ and ‘Others’**, however the latter are defined (although Islam and Muslims are most often mentioned in this context).

We are therefore dealing with a completely new, unprecedented situation of a variety of overlapping distinct crises, to which the previous ‘from crisis to crisis’ strategy can no longer be applied as they are too many and too serious. This time we are dealing with something that can be called, without much

\(^{50}\) Gibbon wrote: ‘Dazzled with the extensive sway, the irresistible strength, and the real or affected moderation of the emperors, [the Romans] permitted themselves to despise, and sometimes to forget, the outlying countries which had been left in the enjoyment of a barbarous independence’. E. Gibbon, *The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire*, Vol. 1, 1776, p. 35.


exaggeration, an existential crisis. As rightly put by another Polish author, as a result of these accumulated crises the European Union is now blamed not only for its own imperfections, naivety and sins but also for the collapse of the world of rich, well-fed and stable societies – the beneficiaries of the international order of the last 200 years (Western Europe), 100 years (Scandinavia) or 25 years (Central Europe).53

4. Brexit and other challenges

The British referendum on leaving the EU54 should act as catharsis and a catalyst for a serious and profound debate on the state of integration, its current situation and, above all, on dealing with the challenges encountered in recent years by Brussels and EU institutions. Without this, one can hardly draw appropriate scenarios for the future, which are so difficult to outline right now and yet so necessary.

The key question: ‘Where are we now?’ can be answered in many ways but any consensus is unlikely because the discourse is inherently heavily biased by the moral judgement, the worldview and the position of each participant, regardless of who it is: a politician, a representative of the media or even an educated academic, who – after all – also has his or her own beliefs and values, even if he or she tries to be objective and impartial. With the deep polarisation that has emerged, the chances for a fully objective debate are slim.

After making these reservations, we should say that the first and basic reason for Brexit (as well as for the aforementioned third dividing line, i.e. between the centre and the periphery) is the increasingly apparent revolt against excessive commercialisation of life, domination of markets and emerging plutocracy, combining economic dominance with political power. This opposition stems directly from the earlier excessive optimism and belief in the ‘objective’ market forces. We are dealing both with the aforementioned ‘precariat revolt’ of the young generation with its high aspirations that it is unable to meet and with a rebellion against the noticeably growing inequalities that Joseph Stiglitz, referring to Abraham Lincoln’s famous idea of ‘government of the people, by the people, for the people’, defined as ‘the rule of the 1 per cent, by the 1 per cent, for the


privileged] 1 per cent’, which incidentally also provides a good explanation of the ‘Donald Trump phenomenon’ in the United States, which is not a subject of this study but is a closely related issue.

This revolt against the dictatorship of money and the market triggered a wave of social discontent that is so eagerly and diligently used by many politicians, starting with the British UKIP and Nigel Farage. It is well known and empirically proven that populism feeds on resentment and dissatisfaction of ‘the people’, and the parties and movements based on it claim to directly represent the will of the masses and shine up to this inherently broad electorate. Meanwhile, as the sociologist Jerzy Szacki proved rather well already years ago, just after the collapse of the previous system, liberalism in politics and neo-liberalism in the economy after the fall of communism was nothing else than ‘inverted Marxism’, an ‘anti-dictatorship’ or ‘communism à rebours’ and even became the ‘new faith’ in these areas. And because it was imposed by the then hegemonic United States and the US-dominated institutions of the Bretton Woods system – the World Bank and the IMF – it spread and prevailed throughout the globe (with some exceptions, like the PRC), and most certainly in the Western world, starting with the EU.

Populism stems from one other source as well: withdrawal from social obligations that the state has towards its citizens. Viktor Orbán was perhaps the first European leader to understand this, so when he returned to power in the spring of 2010, he not only proposed a new institutional, legal and constitutional model for his country, which he himself later defined as ‘illiberal democracy’, but also based this new model on a different set of

values than the previous one. He challenged the Copenhagen criteria applicable in the EU and heavily tilted the checks-and-balances system towards the dominance of the executive branch and himself as the charismatic prime minister. Thus he triggered a new, axiological crisis in the EU, and if not a crisis, then at least a major debate about the applicable values, especially since it turned out that Orbán has found many followers, of whom perhaps the most distinctive ones can be found in Poland after the October 2015 elections. What we are dealing with is therefore not an isolated case but a general trend that all the more requires careful attention, analysis and academic investigation. Quoting Mishra once again: ‘Demagogues are still emerging, in the West and outside it, as the promise of prosperity collides with massive disparities of wealth, power, education, and status. Militant secessions from a civilization premised on gradual progress… are once again brewing within the West and far beyond it: and as before, they are fuelled by a broad, deep, and volatile desire for destruction’.60

With these new developments, we now have a completely different set of values, under which the state once again replaces free market, the economy and governance are being centralised or even nationalised, elites are changed, and the concept of ‘nation’ replaces an idea of supranationality in the hierarchy of values. With this, there is a return to tradition, recent history is being redefined, there is a search for new points of reference and new heroes, and state authority is associated with faith and the Church. Family, children and social support for the poor are at the centre of interest of the state authorities. This whole ‘national’ programme is not only populist, as pointed out by its opponents, but also highly conservative and certainly Christian and nationalistic. ‘Christian values’, however understood, are in vogue, and the liberal code that has been binding so far (the Copenhagen criteria) is now in retreat, much criticised, attacked, and often outright persecuted.

The proponents of illiberal theories hold one more accusation against the elites that have ruled since the system change of 1989/90, which boils down to what has formally been called a ‘democratic deficit’ and in practice is yet another dimension of the accumulated split between the elites and the nation, or rather the society, because in Europe the population of one country can be made up of several nationalities. Another subject of serious – and largely justified – charges is the overly technocratic approach of Brussels and European institutions to the ongoing processes and developments, without proper social sensitivity and empathy for vulnerable social groups or classes. Similarly, yet another subject of serious criticism is the

60 P. Mishra, op.cit., p. 54.
non-transparent decision-making in EU institutions and the fact that many of their decisions are dependent on lobbyist pressure, which leads to the conclusion that ‘the legislative process escapes public scrutiny’.61

All this is part of yet another process, one that is potentially dangerous – the population ageing in Europe, well reflected in statistical figures. These concerns about the lack of a sufficient labour pool were also presumably (because it is not certain) at the source of Chancellor Merkel’s Willkommen Politik.

5. Scenarios for the future

The EU has been plunged into many crises and is on the defensive. Once again it turns out that fear sells better than hope, which is particularly noticeable in the context of the migration crisis in 2015. However, it should be strongly emphasised that although serious and requiring careful studies, the migration crisis is not the most sensitive and crucial one from the point of view of the EU’s future. Although it is a structural crisis and therefore inherently long-term and complex, it only contributes to the previously revealed fundamental problems of this structure, starting with the clear lack of vision after the collapse of neo-functional concepts and the lack of strong and effective leadership at the level of EU institutions.

The institutions and authorities in Brussels face a growing problem of how to address the nationalist and populist challenge, defined in the present study in many ways, often having deep roots, and offering ad-hoc justifications. At this major turning point in history, probably the most significant one since the fall of the Soviet Union and the Cold War order, we have to redefine many elementary issues and problems, such as sovereignty, the role of the state in the international arena, marketization and commercialization, attitude to one’s own and foreign values, and even matters as simple and basic as solidarity, empathy and the ability to cooperate with others.

A partial and most certainly belated answer (as usual, one would like to add) to the growing challenges was proposed on 1 March 2017 by Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker in his special White Paper on the Future of Europe. The document contains the following five scenarios of the future of the EU: 1. ‘Carrying on’ (or not to change anything); 2. Do ‘nothing but the Single Market’ (i.e. return to the roots of integration and the FTA structure); 3. ‘Those who want more do more’ (which means: a multi-speed EU); 4. ‘Doing less more efficiently’ (i.e. the return

to a hard core is probable) or 5. ‘Doing much more together’ (i.e. finalise the federation scenario).\textsuperscript{62}

Nobody, including the European Commission and the other institutions in Brussels, has any doubt that currently, towards the end of the second decade of the 21\textsuperscript{st} century, we are dealing with a serious disease in Europe, and especially within the EU. The question is whether recovery can be achieved just by assembling a new Consilium, say, a new Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), and if by chance this body does not turn into another entity whose members will fight for the legacy of the previous one, which would of course mean a revolutionary, or counterrevolutionary – according to some – change in the continent. At least until the outbreak of the migration crisis in 2015, Brussels and European institutions clearly pursued a kind of ‘ostrich policy’: sweeping problems under the carpet, waiting and abstaining from action. Now, however, this policy will achieve nothing; it is simply counterproductive. The risks are too big and too serious to bury one’s head in the sand.

On this wave of re-nationalisation, it is increasingly often said that we are ‘returning to intergovernmentalism’ based on national sovereignty,\textsuperscript{63} which is not and does not necessarily have to be a bad thing in itself, provided that it will not cause the EU to disintegrate into nation states and atomize into small entities. As the latter scenario would naturally push it back to the role of a minor actor on the global stage, one unable to stand up to such giants as the United States and China or even the assertive Russia and the increasingly dynamic ‘emerging markets’, such as India or Turkey, the latter being so crucial in the European migration crisis.

The unique process of European integration has brought about a period of peaceful coexistence, unprecedented in the history of the European continent, which is a great value in itself. Excluding the three brutal Balkan Wars after the breakup of Yugoslavia in the 1990s or the local shocks and breakthroughs in individual states, mostly in the former Eastern Bloc (e.g.: in 1956, 1968 or 1981), the rest of Europe – as the founding fathers of European integration had intended – has not experienced war for more than seven decades. This is definitely the greatest value of the integration process, in addition to great prosperity and normative achievements, which are the products of this peace. This value is clearly more important


than any other currently applicable code of values – whether liberal or Christian nationalist – which is what the parties to the conflict seem to keep forgetting, lost in their ideological struggles with each other.

This leads us to the ‘second mortal sin of neglect’, which is the lack of proper efforts and effective action to develop a common European identity, strongly exposed to great trials by the huge influx of migrants and refugees who have different experiences, beliefs and faith. Again, like in the Middle Ages, Europe and the European Union became fragmented, as the attempts to build shared values among its societies have failed, even though terms such as solidarity and equality have been at the core of the EU’s values.64

Let us keep in mind that, first, these values were not properly implemented in the EU Member States, and then, because they were not sufficiently embedded in the societies as well. Second, due to the activities of ever-growing populist and nationalist groups, those values were not applied - for obvious reasons - also to migrants and refugees. In result, while some, like UKIP politicians or Donald Trump in the United States, speak of economic and social factors as the basis of the threat to their identity, others, for example some groupings in the countries of the Visegrad Group, focus on religious and cultural factors. They are the ones who turned the mantra of ‘the economy above all’, commonly repeated in the past, into another: ‘security above all’.

This line of thinking can lead to completely opposite future scenarios. ‘You shall love your neighbour as yourself’ formula, as prescribed in the Gospels, seems to be at the moment less likely. It is rather on the contrary: ‘Give no quarter to the infidel’ prescription and the emergence of another Bulwark of Christianity (Antemurale Christianitatis), known in Central and Eastern Europe as an important political programme already back in the Renaissance in the context of the challenges originating from the Ottoman Empire that have quickly resurfaced.65 Unfortunately, much seems to indicate that in the current context the second, less optimistic scenario is more likely. Within it, once again Turkey could play the leading role, but this time as a potential source of migrants and refugees and at the same time a state that has clearly tilted towards Islamisation and autocracy since the failed military coup attempt in mid-July 2016.66

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64 Z. Czachór, op.cit., p. 367.
66 B. Góralczyk, Turcja Erdogana: islamizacja, autokracja i anty zachodni dryf (Erdogan’s Turkey: Islamisation, Autocracy and the Anti-Western Drift), Autumn 2016.
The debates initiated long ago and strengthened after the Brexit vote lead to different scenarios for the future. If nationalist forces win, the attempts to build a federation may be replaced by a loose confederation. It depends mainly on the most powerful EU member, Germany, whether or not its old idea of differentiated or gradual integration will return to the agenda, with Germany as the core country. It cannot be excluded that also the former French idea of variable geometry or concentric circles will be back on the agenda. In both cases, post-communist countries can easily fall out of the main group and fall to the second and even third league. It is worth taking this into consideration given that such scenarios and perhaps derivatives or variations thereof are more and more often seriously discussed among the European high society. A true battle for the future of the EU and thus the whole continent has begun.

Various options are being considered and different solutions are possible at this turning point for the EU. We can already see quite clearly that somewhat à rebours to Francis Fukuyama's optimistic predictions of the early 1990s and the moment of probably the greatest triumph of liberal democracy and the markets, the exact opposite has happened: history is back on the agenda – and let us hope it does not take too much of a toll on us.

Conclusions

The list of deficiencies, complaints or questions concerning the real existing EU is fairly long, and in the recent years, as a result of the challenges and crises described above, it has grown even longer, to an unprecedented scale. The original contested ideas have been joined by new threats and challenges. The claim that the EU was a project of the elites and that they have been attempting to build a supranational superstate, or a federation of sorts, with no clear social acceptance, is now accompanied by contestation of ultra-liberal values and free market economy as well as dissatisfaction with the tardiness and incompetence of the authorities in Brussels, with their technocratic governance and detachment from the society, called the ‘democratic deficit’. All this, at least since 2005, has served as a basis for nationalist and populist groups, on which they have built their – unfortunately constantly growing – capital, eagerly taking advantage of the broad arsenal of Manichean divisions into ‘Our Own’ and ‘Others’, offering simple black-and-white solutions to the frustrated and dissatisfied electorate.

According to the analysis presented in this text, after 2005, for many reasons, the EU and the entire European continent saw the emergence of

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serious cracks and divisions, both along the North–South axis (mainly in economic and social matters) and, more recently, again along the East–West axis (because of ‘dependent development’ as well as aversion to strangers, fuelled by unprecedented migrant wave and later by some politicians). Another dangerous split that is currently reappearing is the one between the European centre and the periphery, as evidenced by the scenarios drawn up after the British referendum on Brexit, which often involve either a return to the ‘hard core’, i.e. to the original six members that initiated the process of European integration in the mid-1950s or – more likely – the euro area. Should this happen, we would have hard evidence that the plans of the founding fathers of European integration have failed and that many serious mistakes have been made in the process, starting with too far-reaching attempts to privatisate economies and countries.

There is no doubt that the growth of populist movements was facilitated by the withdrawal of states from their social obligations to citizens. At first, therefore, the causes were internal, stemming either from the rejection of the proposal for a common Constitution or from excessive emphasis on market solutions, as highlighted by the crisis in the global markets, which, in turn, had come from the outside. Later, two other external challenges appeared: the security crisis and finally the migration crisis. Together, all these crises have led to an unprecedented amount of new challenges for the entire European integration project and generally put it into question, which is happening, in fact, for the first time since it was in fact initiated in the Treaties of Rome in March 1957. When this text is being written, the political climate is dominated by incertitude and lack of clarity and there is a real risk that the overlapping crises might develop a synergy, which would for the first time seriously shake the foundations of the integration process or even undermine it.

Thus, apart from the existing visions and strategies of further integration, for the first time we have to include the concepts and ideas of disintegration in our agenda (especially in the context of the ongoing Brexit procedure) and even take into consideration the risk of chaos. This is obviously not an optimistic scenario, but it is simply hard to present a different set of solutions given the present reality. What remains is to hope that all this together will not lead to a systemic and thus existential crisis. Whether it will be so or not, depends on the will, vision and strategy of

68 The notion of ‘dependent development’ is not examined and analysed in this article but is of great significance, especially for Central and Eastern Europe. An excellent analysis can be found in K. Jasiecki, Kapitalizm po polsku. Między modernizacją a peryferiami Unii Europejskiej (Polish Capitalism. Between Modernisation and the Periphery of the European Union), Warszawa 2013.
pro-European politicians, who unfortunately, in recent years, have found themselves on the defensive and in retreat. It should therefore not be surprising that this study ends with one big question mark: Will they be able to change this unfavourable trend?

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The Discourse of Solidarity and the European Migrant Crisis

Solidarity is the glue that keeps our Union together
J.-C. Juncker

Abstract: This study focuses on analysis of the discourse of solidarity during the current migrant crisis, with special attention paid to the second half of 2015 and the first months of 2016. We start by looking for the sources of the concept of solidarity in the writings of the founding fathers of the European Union and in the existing EU treaties. We then try to decide to what extent the political narratives of the crisis are based on these sources and in what ways they deviate from them or use them in a superficial way. Finally, we verify our research assumptions and offer an overview of the academic debate on the subject.

Keywords: solidarity, European Union, migrant crisis, founding fathers

Introduction

At the beginning of the European integration project, the idea of solidarity was treated as the cornerstone of the political project, which proposed the strengthening of cooperation between the countries and peoples of Europe. At that time, European solidarity was supposed to have two main goals: sharing the economic benefits and deepening the cooperation
on the political level. But careful observers of the integration process have noted that in recent years the idea of solidarity has become increasingly regarded as merely a rhetorical device, an issue often bandied about in the EU public discourse, and even as an element of the ‘political spectacle’, in which it can be used by a country to fight its opponents and to fulfil its agenda of particular interests.\(^1\) It seems that the tendency to use the term ‘solidarity’ disingenuously has deepened during the so-called European migrant crisis. This crisis started with the arrival of the first refugees from the war-torn countries of Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan and Eritrea, but it escalated as new waves of migrants from other countries (as well as stateless persons) joined the masses of war refugees. Many of the migrants do not have the legal status of refugees or asylum seekers, as their primary motivation is the desire for a better life and to improve their economic situation.\(^2\) In this article, the ‘migrant crisis’ is therefore defined as the significant influx of migrants into the EU territory, observable in recent years and which reached its apex in 2015, when it also became the source of multiple dysfunctions and problems for integrating Europe.

In our study we argue that the term ‘solidarity’ has been used as a part of many different rhetorical strategies, and is interpreted in diverse ways.\(^3\) The common feature of all usages of the term, however, has recently been the desire to gain the upper hand in the debates related to the crisis in the EU migration policy. In spite of the idealistic and lofty rhetoric, political deliberations on the issue of ‘solidarity’ have often been linked to hidden agendas of national interests, and thus selfishly exploited. If such is indeed the case, then it could lead to depreciation of the term itself, even though in theory ‘solidarity’ has no other goal but to serve the progress of European integration. Therefore we argue that while the term ‘solidarity’ was often heard during the peak of the crisis, its original meaning was increasingly forgotten or subverted. Such instrumental use of the term

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makes it devoid of meaning and substance. Its overuse may deprive the discourse of European integration of one of its core values, which has so far contributed to bringing the European nations together.

An additional problem lies in the fact that in recent years the EU has been experiencing a series of crises, and in each of these crises the idea of solidarity has become an important element of the political debate. One of the dominant features of the crisis of European identity can indeed be the devaluation of the fundamental European values, as well as the rampant hypocrisy of those stakeholders and parties who refer to these values in the public discourse. This leads to a very real loss of confidence on the part of the EU citizens, who tend to lose faith in the EU integration. It may also give rise to suspicions that the aim of European policies is to achieve particular interests, and not, as it has so often been claimed, to work for the public good. It is becoming more and more apparent that EU policies serve the interests of the most influential countries and shift the costs to those less politically influential and economically weaker. In our opinion, this may be the reason behind many countries’ reluctance to accept the obligations of solidarity and to cooperate to resolve the next crisis.

2. The concept of solidarity

The term ‘solidarity’ is derived from the Latin word soliditas (n. density, power; adj. solidus: dense, strong, durable). Its modern metaphorical meaning is also inspired by Roman law (Latin ‘in soldium’ meaning ‘in entirety’). The expression obligatio in soldium, which can be found in Roman codices, refers to the payment of financial obligations of the members of one’s family and to joint responsibility for the consequences of financial decisions made by family members.4 Later the legal meaning of the term was narrowed and came to be used to denote the rules on loan collateral (the warrantor would be responsible for the loan jointly with the debtor). In the process of development of the European legal systems, the notion evolved even further, and is now often used in the concept of the so-called joint and several liability. The civil codes of most European countries now differentiate between solidarity on the part of creditors (passive solidarity), and on the part of debtors (active solidarity).5

The word ‘solidarity’ began to be used outside its legal context and entered into general use at the turn of the eighteenth and nineteenth cen-

turies, in the era of fundamental economic transformations and ground-breaking political events, when new social movements and ideologies were being formed amid political and social turmoil. The German historian Karl Metz identifies three particularly important phenomena that shaped the idea of solidarity in Europe: 1) the French Revolution; 2) the rise of the market economy and the emphasis on self-help (of the poor) in the United Kingdom; and 3) the role of the state and the vision of social policy in Germany.6

As a result of the French Revolution, French society underwent a cataclysmic social and political transformation. One of the aspects of social life that underwent a complete change was helping the poor and needy. The unbridgeable vastness of the divide between the rich and the poor was, as is known, one of the causes of the revolution. As a consequence, after the overthrow of the ancient regime and in accordance with the revolutionary creed, the perception of the poor changed completely. Poverty ceased to be perceived as the fault of the poor and a consequence of idleness and improvidence, and began to be seen as bad luck, a result of circumstances that are beyond control of the afflicted individual. The new revolutionary leaders, true to their strongly secular and anti-Catholic agenda, dismantled the hitherto existing systems of assistance, inspired and organised by the Catholic church and based on the Christian ideal and practice of charity. Solidarity came to mean the recognition of the needs of others and the willingness to help them, not because of religious convictions, but because of caring for the individual in question. Metz concludes that the view of solidarity proposed after the French Revolution implies reciprocity, conscious participation, and voluntarism.7

In the United Kingdom, the idea of solidarity began to be invoked nearly fifty years later than in France. Its usage was at first popularised by the Chartists, a mass radical political movement whose aim was to introduce democratic change into the outdated electoral system and to improve the economic situation of the working class. In order to alleviate social tensions and prevent the very real threat of revolution, the British government decided to make a number of concessions in the field of labour law, and took on a number of obligations in the spheres of poverty relief and education.8 For this reason, the concept of solidarity which per-

7 Ibidem, pp. 191–197.
8 Ibidem, pp. 197–201.
meates British politics to this day is closely linked to the economy and rooted in a sense of public duty.

In turn, the characteristic feature of the German concept of solidarity is the underlying belief that society cannot govern itself. This notion inspired the so-called Sozialpolitik. A side effect of the industrialization in Germany was pointing out the existence of a connection between unemployment and poverty, and thus, the conviction that there is a need for legal provisions that would offer protection in cases of loss of employment. The German vision of solidarity is thus connected to the belief that the state is obligated to provide welfare to its citizens.

All these three visions of solidarity are rooted in its classic definition discussed above. Together they gave rise to the modern European meaning of the term, and have become the cornerstones of the concept of the welfare state in Western Europe.9 ‘Solidarity’ was understood primarily as the obligation to help the weakest members of a certain political community (at that time the term became popular, it referred primarily to national communities). Thus conceived, solidarity was connected predominantly with economic aid and social support, but its real purpose was stabilisation of the political order. The rich felt obligated to a measure of solidarity with the poor, but this was not a manifestation of their altruism. To the contrary, a measure of support for the poor was in the best interests of the rich, as it helped to protect the status quo and political stability. Support for the poor defused the possibility of radical outbreaks and prevented the emergence of anti-system or revolutionary movements and groups (or at least helped to minimise their support base). It was also in the interest of the state apparatus, for whom internal stability was a necessary condition for increasing a given country’s importance in international politics and for expanding its sphere of influence.

It is no wonder therefore that the above-mentioned understandings of the notion of solidarity was reflected in the assumptions that preceded the formation of the united Europe, and that many of the so-called founding fathers of united Europe repeatedly referred to this idea.10 The fullest expression of the will of European integration in which the integrative ambitions are based on the idea of solidarity can be found in the Schu-

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man Declaration. It was delivered by the French foreign minister Robert Schuman on 9 May 1950, almost exactly five years after the end of World War II (in fact, 8 May is celebrated in France as Victory Day). Thus, Schuman delivered his statement at a time when the memories of the war were still fresh, and its traumatic consequences were still experienced daily by many Europeans. The text of the Declaration outlines the proposed measures, aimed primarily at strengthening cooperation between France and Germany, which in the opinion of the Declaration’s author would remove the ‘age-old animosity’ between the two countries.

The Schuman Declaration is treated as the symbolic beginning of European integration. It gave impetus to the subsequent negotiations which resulted in the signing of the Treaty of Paris by France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Luxembourg, Italy, Belgium and the Netherlands. This Treaty established the European Coal and Steel Community, which was an important milestone in the progress towards European integration. The Schuman Declaration contained the following passages, directly invoking the idea of solidarity:

‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity’.11

‘The pooling of coal and steel production should immediately provide for the setting up of common foundations for economic development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they have been the most constant victims. The solidarity in production thus established will make it plain that any war between France and Germany becomes not merely unthinkable, but materially impossible’.12

Scholars of European integration highlight the fact that the Schuman Declaration is simultaneously an idealistic manifesto, a statement of an ambitious vision, and an expression of political pragmatism based on the knowledge of European society, history and international relations.13 The quotations cited above refer to the concept of solidarity stemming from specific activities and leading to organizational and institutional co-de-

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12 Ibidem.
pendence, which would become the foundation of a united Europe. The fact that the Schuman Declaration recognises the ‘the common good’ as the foundation of solidarity led to the gradual deepening of political integration, the ambitious end goal of which would be a European federation. ‘Solidarity’ in its French meaning must be founded on reciprocity and voluntarism, which should form the basis of shared responsibility. Schuman emphasised that the creation of a more closely connected Europe should be based on the cooperation of independent countries and peoples, which would create ‘collective sovereignty’.14

As the above overview shows, the idea of solidarity is multidimensional and complex. Its discussion should not be considered closed, as even the most comprehensive definition allows for a multitude of interpretations. For this reason, the context in which the term is used in this article should be specified very carefully. The above overview of the term ‘solidarity’ refers to an understanding of the term which was proposed by one of the founding fathers of today’s European Union. Schuman put great emphasis on the practical implementation of solidarity, mainly in the economic and social spheres, which harks back to the tradition of the welfare state that had been developing in Europe since the nineteenth century, and which was based on the idea of social solidarity. Schuman’s pragmatic approach also meant that, although his vision was primarily aimed at stimulating joint economic development, the next step would be building political unity in Europe. Striving for unity or fostering European integration in the political dimension could only be done under the aegis of a lofty ideal, a moral principle which would mobilise both politicians and societies and encourage them to work towards deepening cooperation. Political integration in Europe could not be achieved only through the workings of institutions or through legal regulations. It requires the will and efforts of individual people who share common, relevant values.15

3. The concept of solidarity in existing EU legislation

Before we begin to analyse the references to solidarity in the public discourse during the migrant crisis, we should first scrutinise the use of the term in EU legislation. Analysing the references to solidarity in EU

14 A. Marszałek, Suwerenność a integracja w perspektywie historycznej. Spór o istotę suwerenności i integracji (Sovereignty and integration in a historical perspective. The dispute about the essence of sovereignty and integration), Łódź 2000, p. 305.
legal documents aids us in looking for the definition of the term and its application in EU law, which will serve as a background for assessing the political discourse during the period of the migrant crisis.

The legal acts that form the foundations of all EU law are jointly called EU primary law. Its most important components are the Treaty on European Union (hereinafter: TEU) and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (hereinafter: TFEU). In the following section of this text we analyse these two documents with respect to their references to the concept of solidarity.

3.1. The notion of solidarity in the Treaty on European Union

The term ‘solidarity’ can be found in the preamble of the TEU. Already in its important opening section, the signatories to the treaty (the representatives of the member states) declare that the European Union is being established in accordance with the signatories’ wish to ‘to deepen the solidarity between their peoples while respecting their history, their culture and traditions’. Cooperation between European nations thus becomes the manifestation of the fundamental principle of solidarity, a solidarity which respects the unique character of individual nations’ history, culture and traditions.

In Article 3 of the TEU the term ‘solidarity’ is used with reference to economic, social and territorial cohesion, and thus it is applied to the Union’s obligation to support the economic development of weaker countries and regions by means of the cohesion policy. ‘The Union shall promote economic, social and territorial cohesion, and solidarity among Member States’. This short fragment is of the utmost importance for the understanding of solidarity in the EU discourse. It shows that Schuman’s vision of building a unified Europe still forms the basis of EU legislation. As we have argued above, Schuman was also the proponent of viewing economic solidarity as a means to an end, namely, to strengthening the solidarity between the peoples of the member states. The real purpose of the cooperation envisaged by Schuman was to be the establishment of a community of values that would be political in nature. The provision quoted above is an important indication of the will of the member states to cooperate. The goal of the proposed cooperation is first and foremost common economic and social growth.

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17 Ibidem.

ity’ in this context may be interpreted not only as a value, but also as one of the guiding principles of EU operations, regulating the relations between EU countries and their peoples.

An equally important passage can be found in Article 24 of the TEU relating to specific Provisions on the Common Foreign and Security Policy: ‘The Member States shall support the Union’s external and security policy actively and unreservedly in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity and shall comply with the Union’s action in this area. The Member States shall work together to enhance and develop their mutual political solidarity. They shall refrain from any action which is contrary to the interests of the Union or likely to impair its effectiveness as a cohesive force in international relations’.19 This provision further clarifies the meaning of solidarity, stating that the actions of individual countries must not be ‘contrary to the interests of the Union’. Furthermore, it states that the actions of member states should not indirectly contribute to escalating or exacerbating crises that would affect the Union or other member states.20 This obligation to ‘do no harm’ can be interpreted as the obligation of a minimum of solidarity between member states, i.e. to not engage in activities detrimental to the Union or to its interests.

Apart from the above-described obligation of solidarity between the member states, the TEU also contains two other references to the term in completely different contexts, namely with regard to gender equality (Article 2) and solidarity between generations (Article 3). These two applications of the term thus refer to social relations in the EU, firstly in the context of fundamental human rights and secondly in the context of combating social exclusion and promoting social justice, especially in economic terms.

The term ‘solidarity’ is thus invoked in important parts of the TEU, which leads to the conclusion that solidarity is indeed treated as the basis for cooperation and for the actions of EU member states. Two particularly important areas where the spirit of solidarity seems to be crucial are the cohesion policy and the common foreign and security policy. It seems startling therefore that the TEU does not contain a legal definition of the term ‘solidarity’ itself.

3.2. The concept of solidarity in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union

Similarly to the TEU, the TFEU also does not contain a legal definition of the term ‘solidarity.’ But as in the previous treaty, it appears in

19 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union..., op.cit.
20 Cf. P. Craig, G.de Búrca, op.cit., p. 347.
the TFEU in several crucial passages. Once again it can be found in the preamble. Representatives of the member states, in signing the treaty, declared that it was their intention ‘to confirm the solidarity which binds Europe and the overseas countries’ and that they desired ‘to ensure the development of their prosperity, in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations’.\(^{21}\) This passage is especially significant in the context of the migrant crisis, as it contains a clear expression of solidarity not only within the EU’s internal aspect (i.e. between member states), but also extending to third countries.

Furthermore, in Article 67 of Title V ‘Area of Freedom, Security and Justice’, we can read that: ‘The Union shall ensure the absence of internal border controls for persons and shall frame a common policy on asylum, immigration and external border control, based on solidarity between Member States, which is fair towards third-country nationals. For the purpose of this Title, stateless persons shall be treated as third-country nationals’.\(^{22}\) This passage very clearly states that matters related to asylum and immigration policy should be handled in the spirit of solidarity. In addition, at the conclusion of Chapter II, devoted to policies on border checks, asylum and immigration, in Article 80 we can find the following passage: ‘The policies of the Union set out in this Chapter and their implementation shall be governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States’.\(^{23}\) This short passage is by far the most relevant section of the whole treaty in terms of indicating how the EU member states should tackle the migrant crisis. In the light of these provisions, the idea of solidarity is expressed primarily in the implementation of joint endeavours, the joint implementation of the EU’s policy in this area, and in each state’s discharging of its obligations stemming from the legislation. Furthermore, solidarity is understood as the fair division of responsibility (including financial responsibility), which means that more burdens should be borne by the richer states than by the poorer ones.\(^{24}\) Pursuant to this interpretation, breaches of solidarity would involve firstly the failure to honour one’s commitments (e.g. non-compliance with the Dublin Regulation, which became part of EU law). The second type of breach of solidarity would involve individual countries’ actions targeted at avoiding the costs of crisis management measures, especially if such actions were taken by the relatively richer countries.

\(21\) Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union..., op.cit.

\(22\) Ibidem.

\(23\) Ibidem.

\(24\) P. Craig, G. de Búrca, op.cit., p. 974.
The concept of solidarity between member states reappears in other parts of the TFEU, for example in the provisions related to contingency measures that should be put in place 'in particular if severe difficulties arise in the supply of certain products, notably in the area of energy' (Art. 122), and in the passage describing the objectives of the EU energy policy, especially the EU's obligation 'a) to ensure the functioning of the energy market in the Union; (b) ensure security of energy supply in the Union; (c) promote energy efficiency and energy saving and the development of new and renewable forms of energy; and (d) promote the interconnection of energy networks' (Art. 194). Interestingly, the principle of solidarity was not included in the provisions of the TFEU that relate either to the redistributive policies of the EU (cohesion, agricultural policy, innovation policy) or to the creation of the multiannual financial framework of the EU budget. It is however proposed as a guiding principle in the situations where one member state becomes the object of a terrorist attack, or of a natural or man-made disaster (Art. 222). These provisions can be found under Title VII, explicitly entitled the 'Solidarity Clause.' The clause reads as follows: 'The Union and its Member States shall act jointly in a spirit of solidarity if a Member State is the object of a terrorist attack or the victim of a natural or man-made disaster. The Union shall mobilize all the instruments at its disposal, including the military resources made available by the Member States, to: (a) prevent the terrorist threat in the territory of the Member States; protect the democratic institutions and the civilian population from any terrorist attack; assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a terrorist attack; (b) assist a Member State in its territory, at the request of its political authorities, in the event of a natural or man-made disaster'.

Significantly, the provision does not specify the form of aid that should be offered. The decision is left to the countries in question. This means that the principle of solidarity is not enforced as a legal requirement and that no sanctions are provided for its breach. To the contrary, solidarity is voluntary, and the level of involvement should match the possibilities of the individual countries. So far, there have been no instances of a member state invoking this solidarity clause of the TFEU. Whereas shortly after the terrorist attack in Paris on 13 November 2015, the French government applied for EU cooperation, it invoked another treaty provision, namely Article 42 (7) of the TEU concerning the Common Security and Defence Policy, which provides legal grounds for joint military opera-

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25 Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union..., op.cit.
26 P. Craig, G. de Búrca, op.cit., p. 347.
tions outside the territory of a member state which becomes the victim of armed aggression.27 Representatives of all EU member states supported the French authorities, but the scale of concrete support differed from country to country, depending on the individual countries’ military capabilities and the provisions of their defence and security policies.

Thus, despite the fact that neither the TEU nor the TFEU contain a legal definition of of solidarity, both these documents specify situations and contexts where member states should act in the spirit of solidarity. One of them is the policy on asylum and immigration. European law can be viewed as a set of general guidelines on the ways in which the principle of solidarity should be interpreted in a given context or under given circumstances. We can identify at least three such contexts for the idea of solidarity, or rather for solidarity as the basic principle of operation within the EU. Firstly, the actions of member states should not harm the interests of the Union or operate to the detriment of other EU countries. This rule constitutes the minimum requirement of solidarity. Secondly, solidarity can be understood as the implementation of mutual arrangements, including common policies or European law. The third context for the idea of solidarity is the voluntary provision of aid, which takes into account the financial possibilities of a given country and assumes that the richer countries should contribute more generously than the poorer ones. This brings the principle of solidarity close to another EU guiding principle, namely that of ‘justice’. It should be noted however that the two principles do not overlap completely, and therefore cannot be understood as synonyms.28

4. The concept of solidarity in the discourse surrounding the migrant crisis

The idea of solidarity has been repeatedly invoked in the debates related to the recent migrant crisis. Does ‘solidarity’ still have the same meaning with which it was imbued by Schuman in his Declaration? This seems doubtful when one takes a closer look at the debates among politicians and in the media related to the migrant crisis, which reached their apex in 2015 (even though it is important to bear in mind that the influx of migrants into Europe actually started years earlier).

The term ‘solidarity’, ever-present in the discourse on the migration crisis, cannot be treated separately from another key concept, that of the

28 Cf. J. Habermas, op.cit., p. 22.
welfare state. The latter stands for redistribution of material goods by the state administration in such a way that adequate aid goes to those who find themselves in need.  

Many commentators on public life say the benefits of living in a welfare state, which in the case of the EU are also granted to migrants as well as to citizens, were the magnet for hundreds of thousands of migrants who arrived in Europe in 2015 and 2016. In particular, the policy of the German government during the migrant crisis came to be regarded as very divisive. German Chancellor Angela Merkel explicitly welcomed the migrants. The term Willkommenskultur (Ger. welcoming culture, also sometimes called ‘the open door policy’) was coined to succinctly express the government’s official positive attitude towards the migrants. But paradoxically, the German government’s attitude came increasingly to be seen as one of the sources of the crisis. Furthermore, Chancellor Merkel’s policy can also be seen as a breach of solidarity with other member states and with the European Union as a whole. As discussed above, the requirement of minimum solidarity obligates the member states to refrain from harming other countries and the Union itself and to avoid taking actions that would damage other countries. The German Chancellor’s unilateral declaration of opening the borders for refugees not only intensified the influx of refugees into Europe, but also encouraged large groups of would-be economic migrants – people from impoverished regions who were looking for opportunities to improve their economic status and living conditions. The scale of this phenomenon was massive: it is estimated that more than 1.2 million immigrants arrived in Europe in 2015 alone. According to the European Commission, over 60% were not refugees and were not eligible for asylum.

Of course Chancellor Merkel cannot be solely blamed for the migrant crisis, the original causes of which lie in the conflicts in the Middle East (which in large part can be traced back to the American involvement in the region, but in which many European countries, including Poland, also participated). The largest recent conflict in the region is the civil war in Syria, which broke out in 2011, fought with the participation of external forces (including Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Russia, the US and the EU member states; the latter’s involvement since 2016 also includes the

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29 D. Dobrzanski, op.cit., p. 39.
31 Cf. Most asylum seekers ineligible, EU commissioner says..., op.cit.
logistical support of the Polish army). Yet although the complex reasons behind the instability in the region were admittedly beyond the control of German politicians, Chancellor Merkel’s declaration played a very important role in increasing the influx of migrants into Europe. The migrants came not only to Germany itself, but spread throughout the continent, destabilising the political situation in the EU. According to some opinions, the mass influx of migrants may have jeopardised the whole process of European integration.\(^{32}\) The influx of migrants generated substantial costs for many member states. The situation became more and more dire because Germany, overwhelmed by the unexpected size of the influx, decided to seek solutions using the EU process, and specifically demanded that all member states should share the costs and burdens of the crisis.

The dispute over the distribution of the costs of the migrant crisis became one of the most important issues of political debate in 2015. The crisis became the subject of a heated ideological debate, in which the idea of European solidarity was repeatedly invoked. For all its fervour, the debate became protracted and muddled, in part because many opponents proposed disparate (and sometimes irreconcilable) interpretations of the term ‘solidarity’. Some usages of the term seemed to be employed in order to promote narrow national interests or to mask hidden agendas. Haranguing against one’s opponents’ lack of solidarity was also used as a strategy to undermine their credentials, accusing them of being anti-European and of demonstrating their lack of sympathy for the refugees (and for victims of war atrocities), as well as for the EU countries which were the most affected by the crisis.

During the crisis, there appeared four distinct types of political argumentation which made use of the concept solidarity.

1. As mentioned above, one of the political narratives claimed that it was the actions of Germany that pulled Europe into the crisis.\(^{33}\) Within this paradigm, Germany’s refugee-welcoming stance was interpreted as a breach of European solidarity. In addition, the European Commission (with the support of Berlin) proposed a plan to introduce a relocation system based on refugee quotas for individual countries. The proposal was criticised on the grounds that it would effectively shift the costs of the crisis to poorer EU countries. Furthermore, imposing fixed refugee quotas on the member countries would breach the principle of voluntary involvement in solidarity actions in the EU.

\(^{32}\) Migration crisis can destroy Europe, French Prime Minister Manuel Valls says, “The Independent”, 22.01.2016.

2. A different take on solidarity could be observed in the discourse related to the common asylum and migration policy, and especially to implementing EU law in this area.\textsuperscript{34} Many commentators, including German ones,\textsuperscript{35} pointed to violation of the so-called ‘first Dublin Regulation’ by Greece and Italy, and later by many other countries, which neither kept a record of incoming immigrants nor initiated an asylum procedure for the refugees. In general they did not comply with the existing EU legal provisions pertaining to the treatment of incoming refugees.

3. Moreover, in the political discourse the concept of solidarity became mixed with that of the fair sharing of responsibility for the refugees among member states, in accordance with the treaty provisions on border controls, asylum and immigration. The emphasis on joint responsibility was supposed to mobilise all member states to participate in the scheme of migrant relocation, both in terms of fixed refugee quotas and other redistributive mechanisms (including fines for non-compliance).

4. By the end of 2015, there appeared yet another political narrative. Some German politicians went on record forcefully demanding the solidarity of member states which they saw as reluctant, especially the new EU member states from Central Europe. They demanded compliance under the threat of decreasing EU financial aid to these countries, in particular limiting the cohesion policy funds. This pressure was yet another manifestation of the forcible imposition of ‘solidarity’ by the most influential member states (primarily by Germany). These actions were targeted at those member states who demonstrated reluctance toward Berlin’s proposals, and who were politically and economically weaker. The ultimate threat was that should the countries in question continue their recalcitrance, Germany would in turn cease to show solidarity with them and would refuse to participate in the EU redistributive policies, in retaliation for the fact that these countries now obstinately refuse to show solidarity with Germany during the migrant crisis.\textsuperscript{36}

The above-mentioned rhetorical tactics adopted by some German politicians contain many similarities to those used during the earlier eurozone crisis. The type of influence used to ensure fiscal compliance was also the same: i.e. Germany resorted to financial pressure, namely to the

\textsuperscript{34} Merkel and Hollande call for more solidarity to help refugees, “Euranet Plus News Agency”, 10.07.2015.
threat of suspension of EU aid programs. Germany’s call for European solidarity during the migrant crisis in fact proved to be little more than a form of political blackmail. It is important to highlight that German threats were directly related to a particular EU policy which is completely unconnected to the migrant crisis, both legally and substantively. It should be recalled that the cohesion policy was envisaged as a form of compensation for the less competitive and less developed countries and regions for opening up their economies and entering the internal market of the EU. It was not supposed to serve only as an expression of solidarity of the richer members of the EU with the poorer and less developed countries and regions. Its functioning is in fact based on the same compensation logic as the so-called Swiss Grants, Norway Grants, and other similar funds in the European Economic Area. All these funds and grants are set up by non-EU countries who have preferential access to the single EU market. In return for this, they are obligated to participate in financial aid for the most vulnerable EU countries. It should also be noted that in fact the cohesion policy brings many benefits to the richest countries, in part because European funds directly or indirectly go back to these countries as a result of trade and business investments.

There is a very clear-cut divide in the migrant dispute. On one side are the countries which welcome the largest numbers of refugees and migrants and which are pushing for an obligatory system of migrant allocation quotas throughout the EU; and on the other – the countries who oppose such a system. Both sides have been known to invoke the ideal of solidarity (although they mean different things by it). In fact, when the German government talked about ‘the need for solidarity’, the Polish government’s reaction was that the Germans ‘are trying to shift responsibility’. Rafał Trzaskowski, a prominent MP from the Civic Platform (PO) party, commented on the situation as follows: ‘We are ready to act in a spirit of solidarity, no one is trying to shirk from it. But that doesn’t mean we should automatically accept a system of fixed country

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38 For each euro transferred to Poland from German taxpayers under the cohesion policy, as much as 85 cents returns to Germany, cf. Ocena korzyści uzyskiwanych przez państwa UE-15 w wyniku realizacji polityki spójności w krajach Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Raport końcowy (Evaluation of benefits to the EU-15 as a result of the implementation of the Cohesion Policy in the Visegrad countries. Final report), Warsaw 2011.

quotas. This would mean losing control of the situation, and that’s something we cannot accept’. 40 Others argued that if the German ‘open door’ policy was a mistake, then agreeing to its continuation (in answer to the German calls for solidarity) would be a clear lapse of judgement. 41 It was also pointed out that in recent years, Poland had welcomed more than one million immigrants from Ukraine, a country which is currently engaged in a de facto war with Russia. The number of Ukrainian immigrants already accepted by Poland was not included in the relocation quotas proposed by the Commission. 42

In the heat of these debates, the term ‘solidarity’ became so ubiquitous that it began to gradually lose the meaning with which it was endowed by the founding fathers. As discussed above, ‘solidarity’ originally referred to the ideal that would inspire member states to cooperate for the sake of economic growth and political integration. Because the term was often used instrumentally in order to push a member state’s own political agenda, it increasingly lost its idealistic character and ceased to serve as an inducement for integration. To the contrary, it came to be increasingly denigrated and even ridiculed, especially when it turned out that it was used by some parties as a smoke screen, hiding their hypocrisy, double standards, or particular agendas.

It is worth recalling that originally, when the Italian government could not cope with the waves of illegal migrants arriving into the country from Africa and when it turned the European Union’s attention to the problem, making a case for a systemic solution, Berlin was adamantly against it. It was only when the tide of immigrants started pouring into Germany that the federal government made a complete about-face and began to demand solidarity from other member states. 43 There was one more action of Berlin that led to accusations of hypocrisy: in 2016 German diplomacy demanded that Greece should agree to take back asylum seekers who en-

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41 An opinion voiced during a seminar entitled “Crises in Europe: a disaster or a new chance for the Christian-democratic unification project?” organised by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, April 28, 2016, Warsaw.


tered the EU territory in Greece and then made it to Germany (arguing that according to EU law they should seek asylum in the first EU country that they enter). When Germany raised the issue, the European Commission was again delegated the task of sorting out this problem, even though earlier the EC provided only limited assistance to Greece, which was clearly overwhelmed and unable to provide adequate administrative and social services to the thousands of migrants. A considerable time earlier, some commentators were already saying that the growing problems were the result of Berlin’s reluctance to embrace the spirit of solidarity and stemmed from its insufficient support of Greece during the eurozone crisis. During that crisis, German diplomacy demanded from Athens the implementation of drastic austerity measures in return for financial aid. A clear effect of the ‘austerity policy’ forced on Greece (primarily by Germany) was the prolongation of the economic crisis, a significant rise in unemployment, and mounting public debt. Taking into account the dire condition of Greece, the EU’s support of the country during the migrant crisis can only be viewed as a token gesture. Likewise, the above-mentioned demands for the repatriation of refugees from Germany to Greece can hardly be regarded as a sign of solidarity.

Within the EU discourse on migrants, the concept of solidarity sometimes appears to lose its semantic meaning. Whereas the concept naturally presupposes giving support to those in need, it also involves voluntarism. Can systemic, institutionalized support, which is given under duress, still be called solidarity? In this context, one of the European Commission’s proposals is especially telling: the EC demanded that countries refusing to accept the refugee quota set by the EU should pay a fine in the amount of 250,000 euros per person. Previously, the Commission itself

46 EU Provides € 83 million to improve conditions for refugees in Greece, Press release, IP/16/1447, Brussels, 19 April 2016. To support the Greek Authorities as well as international organisations and NGOs operating in Greece in managing the refugee and humanitarian crisis, the Commission has awarded over € 181 million in emergency assistance since the beginning of 2015. The emergency funding comes on top of the € 509 million already allocated to Greece under the National Programmes for 2014–2020. This assistance should be compared with the aid for Turkey, which received for similar goals € 6 billion in 2016 deal with the EU.
estimated the annual costs of supporting one refugee in a given country as 6,000 euros (and such was the proposed level of EU support per person for the countries participating in the relocation scheme).

A particularly heated confrontation took place during the Council meeting when the richer and more politically influential states pushed their anti-crisis agenda, and their insistence clashed with the opposition of the smaller, politically weaker and poorer states, mainly from Central Europe.\textsuperscript{48} The demands of the richer countries not only negated the voluntary nature of solidarity in the EU, but also refuted another important aspect of this concept, namely the principle that solidarity actions should be undertaken by the richer states in order to help the poorer. Admittedly, the EU Council’s plan for refugee allocation sets the refugees quotas taking into account the country’s level of wealth (to be precise, the total GDP). In the calculation mechanism, a country’s GDP is granted a weight of 40%, but the second factor in the calculations is the country’s population (again, with a weight of 40%).\textsuperscript{49} It follows that as a result the more populous and yet relatively poorer countries might be forced to accept large numbers of refugees, and thus will have to carry a disproportionate burden. In addition, during the discussions over the shape of the proposed system, suggestions were made that the living conditions for refugees in different EU countries should be made equal, which would cause additional costs for the poorer countries with less developed social infrastructure and lower \textit{per capita} income. It should also be noted that the most divisive issue in the public debate was whether a permanent relocation mechanism should be put in place (if so, then the mechanism would probably retroactively apply to the migrants who flooded into Germany, the richest EU country).

The migrant crisis in Europe, and the attempts to solve it by the EU institutions brought about numerous disintegration tendencies in Europe. The most fundamental change is the growing animosity and dwindling trust between the member states. These feelings grew not only as

\textsuperscript{48} Council decision establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, 12098/15, Brussels 22.09.2015.

a result of the attempts to introduce the mandatory refugee relocation mechanism, but were also a reaction to the accompanying, highly emotional discussion about European solidarity. It can be exemplified by the words of the Austrian Foreign Minister, who said that the EU relocation mechanism was ‘wrong’ and ‘completely unrealistic’. Furthermore, he argued that it was in fact ‘dangerous, when some countries in the EU give the impression to be morally superior to other member states’. Another manifestation of disintegration tendencies was the non-compliance with European law on the part of the majority of member states, which involved not only non-compliance with the existing legal provisions on refugee relocation, but also breaking (or not implementing) a number of other regulations defining the principles of the EU migration policy and the functioning of the Schengen Area. Yet another clear sign of the disintegration tendencies is the result of the 2016 EU referendum in the UK. It is obvious that fears related to the migrant crisis played a role in the result, and significantly contributed to the decision of the majority of UK voters to cast their ballots in favour of leaving the EU.

All in all, the debate about solidarity during the migrant crisis has been far-removed from the lofty ideals of the founding fathers of the EU. The usage of the term ‘solidarity’ in the debate has not always been in accordance with the original meaning of the principle of solidarity in which the term appears in the treaties. It was only rarely that both sides of the debate found common ground in the interpretation of the term (or even agreed as to its semantic meaning). The idea of solidarity has become a weapon in the heated political debate currently taking place in Europe. It has been invoked by both sides, largely in order to exert political pressure on one’s opponents, which shows that even such a lofty ideal can be used instrumentally in the public discourse. The attempt to use the ‘obligation of European solidarity’ in order to blackmail reluctant member states was a clear travesty and imbued the term (and the whole concept of European integration) with new negative associations. It could even be said that the instrumental use of this term devalued its importance and devalued the ideal of integration. Up until now, European integration was a commonly shared vision that mobilised politicians and the public to work together for the common good. But the recent debate about European solidarity in the context of the migrant crisis has exacerbated the divisions and hostility between member states, which is a blatant misuse of the founding fathers’ vision.

The debate also indirectly strengthened Eurosceptic and populist forces in Europe, including in Central Europe.

5. The discussion

Before the outbreak of the eurozone crisis in 2010 the term ‘solidarity’ appeared quite rarely in the academic debates about European integration. Most of the scholars and commentators who referred to the concept of solidarity in their analyses of the crisis used this term in a way which harked back to the nineteenth-century discourse of solidarity, when it was connected with the emergence of the welfare states in Western Europe. Then the term ‘solidarity’ denoted mostly the financial redistribution from the richer members of a political community to the poorest ones, the goal of which was to help achieve political stability and stabilize the democratic order. In the context of the eurozone crisis, this meant that aid would be granted to those countries which were mired in economic problems in order to protect the single currency system. It was expected that solidarity with the crisis-stricken countries would be shown primarily by Germany, Finland, and the Netherlands, i.e. by the countries with the highest financial ratings. They were, however, reluctant to offer such support.\(^\text{51}\)

Scholars have noted\(^\text{52}\) that the crisis proved to be an unfavourable period for a show of solidarity, which was manifested by the growing reluctance of the richest EU societies, in particular Germany and France, to share their countries’ wealth (coming from the citizens’ taxes) with the inhabitants of the crisis-stricken countries. Bowing to the pressure from large groups of citizens, the politicians of the richer countries made their anti-aid stances more rigid, arguing against possible redistribution of financial resources to the crisis-stricken countries (whose economies were also the least competitive and the slowest-growing in the EU). In this context, it was impossible to implement the ideal of solidarity, understood as the pursuit of common growth, at a time when the crisis further deepened the differences in the pace of economic growth and employment.


\(^{52}\) N. Copsey, op.cit., p. 119; S. Börner, op.cit.
structures between the EMU countries. The voters’ reluctance to grant financial aid to other countries also led to the emergence of the political narratives which later reappeared in the context of the migrant crisis: the richer countries warned the crisis-stricken ones against the non-compliance with EU laws (especially the fiscal regulations), and threatened them by postulating that any financial aid would be conditioned upon full compliance.\textsuperscript{53} This type of reasoning was also reflected in the academic discourse. For example, the principle of solidarity in the euro area became increasingly interpreted as ‘solidarity in the discharge of obligations and commitments’ (in particular the fiscal criteria), and by extension it also came to mean solidarity in the joint pursuit of a common policy (and implementation of common European law, even if it was introduced in majority voting procedure).\textsuperscript{54}

Nevertheless, most scholars still talked about solidarity in the classic context of the financial assistance of the richer countries granted to the poorer and crisis-ridden ones. Some scholars argued however that such a show of solidarity, expressed by financial aid, should be conditioned upon the further deepening of political integration, and namely the gradual transformation of the EU into a democratic federation.\textsuperscript{55} They argued that only upon the establishment of such a federation would there be the possibility of making fiscal transfers to those members of the community who find themselves in difficulties. This scenario constitutes an important shift in the European solidarity discourse, and a marked departure from Schuman’s vision. Solidarity is no longer understood as the ideal leading towards greater political integration. It should be applied only after the full integration has taken place, and after the creation of a fully formed democratic European community. Among the proponents of this vision is Jürgen Habermas, who is in favour of fiscal solidarity, but at the same time argues for the creation of a political union in the eurozone and for the transfer of sovereignty (and taxes) from the national level to the European level.\textsuperscript{56}

It seems that the above was the key element in the analysis of the concept of solidarity during the common currency crisis. This dilemma (i.e. how close should the integration be?) has also proven important in the

\textsuperscript{55} K.R. McNamara, op.cit., pp. 28–29.
\textsuperscript{56} J. Habermas, op.cit., p. 19.
analysis of the migrant crisis. During this crisis it is again necessary to redistribute the fiscal resources from the EU to the most affected member states, primarily to Greece and Italy. The EU assistance is indispensable in order to develop the infrastructure that can deal with ‘processing’ the immigrants (their registration, humanitarian aid, and – at a later stage – social programmes that will help the refugees to integrate with their hosting communities and facilitate their assimilation into the new environment). Considerable financial resources are necessary to protect the EU’s external borders and to repatriate unwanted immigrants. One proposal that emerged during the debate was that of introducing a new funding mechanism in the form of common EU bonds in order to resolve the crisis. This same idea was floated earlier during the eurozone crisis, in order to save the common currency. In the opinion of Berlin, its implementation would first require deepening the political union in Europe. Increasing the political integration is also envisaged as a solution that would not only save the euro area, but also probably the Schengen Area.

Jürgen Habermas’s observation – that during the crisis solidarity becomes an important political category, but it should not be overused in the public discourse – is certainly cogent. In his opinion, it should not be associated with justice, and it specifically should not be equated with the discharge of a country’s commitments or obligations. Solidarity actions should be voluntary rather than mandatory, and by definition they should not be imposed upon others by use of pre-existing conditions or political blackmail. Similar caveats should also apply to the migrant crisis, especially in the situation where we are dealing with so many diverse, and sometimes conflicting, interpretations of the term ‘solidarity.’ The same sentiment was voiced by the head of the European Commission, who in his 2016 State of the Union speech said that ‘when it comes to managing the refugee crisis, [...] solidarity must be given voluntarily. It must come from the heart. It cannot be forced’.

Habermas also made another perceptive observation when he remarked that the erosion of solidarity in Europe results from the increasing distrust between member states. As mentioned above, the migrant crisis has been a time of deepening discord and division within the EU, which also stemmed from conflicting political narratives, and the result-

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58 J. Habermas, op.cit., pp. 22–23.
60 J. Habermas, op.cit., p. 24.
ing discussions have been highly emotional and often accusatory. In the discourse related to the migrant crisis, political opponents are vilified and the idea of European integration has become increasingly criticised, and even blamed for the crisis. In the second half of 2015, Central European countries often found themselves at the receiving end of the harangues of European politicians. They were repeatedly admonished for their lack of solidarity, compassion and European identity, and additionally chastised for their ingratitude (as they now refused to ‘pay forward’ the aid that they themselves received from the EU following accession). This sharp division between the East and West of the EU has, however, proved ephemeral, and even somewhat misleading. It was not the Central European countries who blocked the implementation of the European Commission’s (and Berlin’s) plan of fixed refugee quotas. It should be recalled that in the summer and autumn of 2015 there were two proposals for refugee relocation schemes (first for 40,000 refugees, then for 120,000). The proposals were supposed to pave the way for the establishment of a permanent mechanism for the distribution of asylum seekers among the EU countries. The Central European countries who opposed the schemes (specifically, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary and Romania) were outvoted and the implementation of the programme (including the prohibitively high fines for non-compliance) would probably have been legally enforced. However, in the aftermath of the Paris terrorist attacks of 13 November 2015, and due to the growing popularity of the anti-immigration National Front, the French Government felt the need take a step back and made its stance more rigid. In subsequent months, the relocation mechanism was practically universally disregarded: almost eighteen months after it came into effect, only approximately 3.5% of the total number of 160,000 refugees have been relocated in accordance with the scheme. Interestingly, Berlin was abandoned first by France, which is normally its closest ally and also one of the leaders of European decision-making and of the implementation of EU decisions. Subsequently, the German anti-crisis solution lost the support of most other member states, with the exception

61 At the annual conference on security policy in Munich, the French Prime Minister clearly stated that he is opposed to a fixed mechanism of refugee relocation in the EU and said that he is in favour of closing the EU’s external borders. Cf. «Nous ne pouvons accueillir plus de réfugiés», selon Manuel Valls, “Le Monde”, 13.02.2016, http://www.lemonde.fr/europe/article/2016/02/13/a-munich-l-europe-se-divise-sur-la-crise-des-refugies_4864911_3214.html (last visited 27.02.2016).
of Greece, Italy and Sweden (the countries most affected by the crisis). During this period, the solidarity rhetoric was significantly weakened, diminishing the use of solidarity to attack the Central European countries and to chastise them for their perceived lack of solidarity. The final blows to the German policy were the unilateral decisions made by some states (which, tellingly, were not the new EU members from Central Europe) which decided not to wait any longer for the EU response to the crisis and implemented their own measures, including internal refugee quotas. These countries were Denmark, Sweden and Austria.\textsuperscript{63}

**Conclusions**

In summarizing the above analysis, it should be stressed that solidarity was supposed to be one of the guiding principles of the united Europe. In the vision of the founding fathers, it was supposed to benefit all nations and bring about joint economic growth and the creation of a strong political community. This interpretation of solidarity should also be viewed against the background of the historical interpretations of the concept, which refer to aid granted by the rich to the poor, the aim of which was to stabilise the political order. During the eurozone crisis, opinions appeared that while the redistribution of funds in the spirit of solidarity would stabilise or even save the eurozone, it should be conditioned upon the establishment of a political union or a democratic community at the European level. The problem is that so far such a community simply does not exist, and national politicians are not very enthusiastic about creating one. In fact, the opposite is true: in the midst of the crisis, disintegration tendencies have gained increasing momentum. Eurosceptic movements in many European countries repeatedly remind voters about the importance of democratic national communities. This movement towards disintegration is becoming an ever larger obstacle to the practical implementation of the ideal of solidarity in the relations between the member states and nations of the EU.

Despite the above-mentioned dysfunctions, it is still possible to make some conclusions related to the future of European solidarity, which is after all rooted in the treaties. Firstly, on a very basic level solidarity can be understood as simply refraining from harming the interests of the EU, and indirectly also those of other member states. Secondly, solidarity

\textsuperscript{63} Austria introduced a ceiling of 80 people a day, and agreed to let another 3,200 a day to pass through its territory under the condition that they would go to another country. *Austria plans fresh curbs on borders with Italy and Slovenia*, “Financial Times”, 17.02.2016, p. 2.
should be voluntary, and therefore should not be imposed by political or legal pressure, especially if solidarity actions involve considerable financial or social costs. Thirdly, it should be deployed to a greater extent by the richer countries than the poorer ones. Unfortunately, as demonstrated above, the political deliberations during the migrant crisis and the tenor of the subsequent anti-crisis proposals often went against these assumptions. We witnessed rival political narratives that exploited the idea of solidarity in an instrumental way, most often for short-term gain or as a sort of blackmail levelled at political adversaries. Solidarity ceased to be treated as a noble ideal and was reduced to the role of a political weapon, or a veil masking particular interests and hidden agendas. In some cases the term ‘solidarity’ was completely misused and thus devalued. Instead of promoting the cooperation between European Union member states, building mutual trust and fostering a sense of political community, the political debate during the migrant crisis contributed to a sharp rise in divisions and hostility between European countries, to the detriment of further European integration.

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Agata Dziewulska*
Anna M. Ostrowska**

The Crooked Logic of Migration Policies and Their Malthusian Roots¹

Abstract: European perspectives on recent migration flows are heavily biased towards the Malthusian and evolutionist view of many classical western social thinkers. Although it may serve as a purely descriptive tool to outline the present relations between Europe and the outside world (specifically the Middle East and North Africa), it certainly does not provide any solid base for designing projects which might free human beings from further subjugation, poverty and entrenched inequality – precisely the reasons behind the recent migration crisis to the EU. We argue here that the way the EU perceives and deals with the recent flow of migrants (refugees and others) is based on an outdated perception that does not allow for providing valid solutions to real problems. Therefore we present the undercurrent logic behind the political designs, point out deficiencies, and illustrate a possible new approach by discussing the EU’s migration policy and border management, as linked to the EU security and defence policy. The current migration crisis would never have emerged if not for the lack of stability in the Middle East and North Africa, which neither the EU nor UN nor NATO was ready or able to remedy. The beginning of putting together a viable EU migration policy and border regime will depend on rethinking the security policy, decision-making and capacity, and abandoning the Malthusian perception of the world is a start.

Keywords: migration, policy, EU, Malthus, border security, global strategy

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*Agata Dziewulska, Ph.D – Assistant Professor at the Centre for Europe – University of Warsaw. Contact at: a.dziewulska@uw.edu.pl.
**Anna M. Ostrowska, Ph.D – Assistant Professor at the Centre for Europe – University of Warsaw. Contact at: amostrow@uw.edu.pl.
1. Work of Thomas Malthus and its heritage

The major work of Thomas Malthus, *An Essay on the Principle of Population*, has been widely acknowledged as the most influential work of its era. Since its publication late in the 18th century it assumed a key role in shaping scholarly and political views on demography, and it was assumed in the work that poverty, malnutrition, and disease could all be attributed to overpopulation. Due its highly influential nature, Malthus’s approach is regarded as pivotal in establishing the field of demography. Malthus claimed that if a population is left to grow unchecked, people will begin to starve and will fight over increasingly scarce resources. He warned that without any checks (e.g. deliberate population control or pandemics), the population would theoretically grow at a geometric rate, rapidly exceeding its ability to produce resources, which tend to grow arithmetically. However he argued that such rampant growth will self-correct itself through war, famine, and disease. Today, advocates of the Malthusian theory, as well as many others, argue that future pressures on food production, combined with threats such as global warming, make overpopulation a major threat in to our collective future.

In the times of Malthus in the England where he lived, the population was rapidly increasing but suitable agricultural land was limited. Moreover, Malthus did not believe in the notion that agricultural improvements could expand without limit. He claimed that if left unrestricted, the human population would continue to grow until it would become too large to be supported by the food grown on available agricultural land. The capacity of ecosystems or societies to support the local population would be outpaced by its volume. One of the proposed solutions to the problem was birth control, in the form of ‘moral restraint’, forced sterilization, or even criminal punishments for those who had more children than they could support. As controversial a solution as it was even in the times of Malthus, it proved to be very influential and has remained so even until today. For instance the Nobel prize-winning work of Gunnar and Alva Myrdal seems to be very much inspired by the ideas of Malthus. Over the two hundred years following Malthus’s projections, famine, poverty and conflicts of all sorts have overtaken numerous individual regions which did not have enough carrying capacity to support its population, and that seems to also be the key to the recent huge migration flows on a global scale.

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2. Reception and influence of the Essay

Many works today regarded as milestones of economic thought influenced the ideas of Thomas Malthus. He claimed in his Essay that the ‘other writers’ included Benjamin Franklin, Robert Wallace, Adam Smith, Richard Price, and David Hume. These authors were almost all contemporaries of Malthus and their views have shaped a plethora of dimensions of social theory (be it economics, demography, or political science) even until today.3

As much as Malthus was influenced by the then-contemporary scholarly works, he influenced even more other seminal thinkers and decision makers for decades to come. The references to Malthus’s book began almost immediately after its very appearance in 1798. Early after its release it was mentioned by Thomas Carlyle, the most influential English historian of 19th century. Its 6th edition (1826) was independently cited as a key influence by both Charles Darwin and Alfred Russell Wallace in their development of the theory of natural selection. Darwin referred to Malthus as ‘that great philosopher’ and it was his insight that led Darwin to the idea of natural selection and is a major underpinning of the ‘Origin of Species’.4 John Stuart Mill strongly defended the ideas of Malthus in his 1848 work, Principles of Political Economy. Mill considered the criticisms of Malthus that had been made up to that time to have been superficial. David Ricardo and Alfred Marshall also admired Malthus and came under his influence. Early converts to his population theory included William Paley. Despite Malthus’s opposition to contraception, his work exercised a strong influence on Francis Place (1771–1854), whose neo-Malthusian movement became the first to advocate contraception. Place published his ‘Illustrations and Proofs of the Principles of Population’ in 1822.5 Malthusian social theory influenced Herbert Spencer’s idea of the survival of the fittest, and the modern ecological-evolutionary social theory of Gerhard Lenski and Marvin Harris.6 Malthusian ideas have thus contributed to the canon of socioeconomic theory.


3. Malthus’s socioeconomic theory

Malthus offered an evolutionary social theory of population dynamics as it had developed steadily throughout all previous history. Seven major points regarding population dynamics appear in his 1798 Essay:

1. Subsistence severely limits the population-level; when the means of subsistence increases, the population increases.
2. Population pressures stimulate increases in productivity, and they thus stimulate further population growth.
3. When productivity increases, the potential rate of population growth cannot be maintained.
4. Individual cost/benefit decisions regarding sex, work, and children determine the expansion or contraction of populations and production.
5. The population requires strong checks to keep parity with the carrying-capacity.
6. Checks will come into operation as the population exceeds the subsistence-level.
7. The nature of these checks will have a significant effect on the larger socio-cultural system – Malthus points specifically to misery, vice, and poverty.

As will be demonstrated further, the link between overpopulation, poverty and vice was quite soon supplemented by another factor: namely political violence.

4. Malthus’ impact on economic and political thought and practice

It did not take too long to connect Malthus’s ideas to issues of migration, as one of the key factors triggering it was poverty and an inability to maintain a livelihood in one’s place of residence. However, Malthus himself was not keen on fostering migration as a solution to overpopulation. He believed that natural forces of reproduction would soon fill the demographic gap that would be created after migrants leave their homes. Today however, a causal chain of reasons pushing people out of their residences is motivated by factors unknown in the times of Malthus: more and more arable land is turning into desert; genetic modifications of edible plants may cause unwelcome effects on the food chain; and a massive increase in cultivating monocultures (e.g. for use as biomass) may work to the same effect. The industrial approach to ‘animal production’ caused the BSE crisis and put a limit (if not the end) to our belief that we can expand food production forever.
The major factor, however, that caused Malthusian ideas to penetrate, albeit saliently, into the present approaches to migration was their connection to demographic policies and in particular to political violence. One immediate impact of Malthus's book was that it triggered a debate about the size of the population in the Kingdom of Great Britain, which led to the passage of the Census Act of 1800. This Act enabled the holding of a national census in England, Wales and Scotland, starting in 1801 and continuing every ten years, up to the present day. The position held by Malthus as professor at the Haileybury training college, which he held to his death in 1834, gave his theories some influence over Britain's administration of India as well. Upon reading the work of Malthus, William Pitt the Younger (Prime Minister from 1783–1801 and again from 1804–1806) withdrew a Bill he had introduced that called for the extension of Poor Relief. Concerns raised by Malthus's theory also helped promote the above-mentioned national population census in the UK. Government official John Rickman became instrumental in the carrying out of the first modern British census in 1801, under Pitt's administration.

The first Director-General of UNESCO, Julian Huxley, wrote in his Evolutionary Humanism (1964) about 'the crowded world', calling for a world population policy. Huxley openly criticised communist and Roman Catholic attitudes toward birth control, population control, and overpopulation. The rapid increase in the global population of the past century exemplifies Malthus's predicted population patterns. It also led to the creation of neo-Malthusian modern mathematical models of long-term historical dynamics of population. Malthus made the specific prediction that world population would fall below a line going upward from its then current population of one billion, adding one billion every 25 years. This prediction is at the basis of the current UN data on the world population since 1800 and UN projections for future growth. To date, the world population has remained below Malthus's predicted line. However, the current rate of increase since 1955 is over two billion per 25 years, more than twice the Malthusian predicted maximum rate. At the same time, world hunger has been in decline. The highest UN projection has the population continuing at this rate and surpassing Malthus's predicted line. This high projection supposes today's growth rate will be sustainable to the year 2100 and beyond.

Malthusian ideas continue to have considerable influence. This is most prominently visible in the work of Paul R. Ehrlich. In the late 1960s Ehrlich predicted that hundreds of millions would die from an overpopulation-crisis in the 1970s. Other examples of applied Malthusianism include the 1972 book *The Limits to Growth* (published by the Club of Rome), and the Global 2000 report to the then-President of the United States Jimmy Carter.

More recently, a school of ‘neo-Malthusian’ scholars has begun to link population and economics to a third variable – political change and political violence – and to show how the variables interact. In the early 1980s Jack Goldstone linked population variables to the English Revolution of 1640–1660, and David Lempert devised a model of demographics, economics, and political change in the multi-ethnic country of Mauritius. Goldstone has since modelled other revolutions by looking at demographics and economics. Ted Robert Gurr has also modelled political violence, such as in the Palestinian territories and in Rwanda/Congo (two of the world’s regions with the most rapidly growing populations) using similar variables in several comparative cases. These approaches suggest that political ideology follows demographic forces.

5. An early case of the evolutionary Malthusian approach to migration

At the time of the Potato Famine in the West Highlands of Scotland in the late 1840s, the ideas of Robert Malthus loomed large among the politicians who governed the region. Promoting emigration seemed to be a response to the famine and a cure for most of the problems. Landlords and relief administrators were acutely conscious of the danger that the population would exceed the available means of subsistence. Malthus had been reluctant to advocate emigration because, he declared, a gap was created which the consequent reproduction soon would fill up. After the departure of migrants their land and houses would be taken over by the young, who would soon have even more children and thus increase the birth rate. He drew directly on the then-recent examples of Jura and Skye, where population grew rapidly despite vast emigration. Though these cases supported his theses, Malthus also said that

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9 Paul R. Ehrlich has written several books predicting famine as a result of population increases: *The Population Bomb* (1968); *Population, resources, environment: issues in human ecology* (1970, with Anne Ehrlich); *The end of affluence* (1974, with Anne Ehrlich); *The population explosion* (1990, with Anne Ehrlich).

10 *Malthus past and present…*, op.cit.
the effect could be delayed by the prevention of re-occupation and the destruction of cottages.

James Loch, commissioner to the famine stricken areas of Scotland, agreed with these views and advised offering assistance to those who were willing to emigrate. Landlords were increasingly keen to encourage emigration, which was regarded by the administration as beneficial to all the parties involved – the landlord in particular. A doctrine taken from Malthus was used to strengthen these arguments: emigration might have the desired effect of limiting population on the condition that the lands left behind by migrants should not be allowed to regenerate population growth. The key concern of decision makers was to prevent the further impoverishment of people and their increasing dependence on their landlords. It was postulated that policies should be designed to break the cycle, which was developed in a truly Malthusian manner. Some relief was to be determined by need, but it was to be combined with the encouragement to emigrate, which was believed to be a more permanent solution to the misery of the affected areas.

Also in a truly Malthusian manner, Loch claimed that the problem of overpopulation was increased by ‘the kindness with which the poverty stricken are treated.’ The relief provided to the starving should not encourage them to depend on the more affluent for their maintenance. In tune with the prevalent evolutionist and Malthusian sentiment, Loch advocated that food prices should not be subsidized because this would undoubtedly ‘paralyse the exertions of the industrious and encourage the less active’. These very words resound in the arguments of many present politician and some members of the media and help shape today’s attitudes toward managing migrants.

One may undoubtedly claim that a famine crisis, especially if coupled with other violent conflicts, loosens people’s ties with the land and thereby promotes migration. The Highland famine history is an early example of a significant acceleration of emigration and a rapid detachment of people from the land. It appeared to be a mechanical Malthusian evacuation, with people fleeing in the face of adversity and deciding that there was no decent future for them in their homeland. This is confirmed that by the fact that The Highland and Island Emigration Society had effectively made emigration to Australia virtually free and organised 5,000 passages to the region.

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12 Ibidem, p. 74.
shape our perspectives on migration flows and our attitudes toward migrants.

6. The EU approach to migration management

As Le Gloannec points out in her expert opinion for the European Union Institute for Security Studies, the EU built its migration policy by ‘outsourcing’ the responsibility of keeping the borders intact to a ring of ‘friendly’ surrounding states. The EU developed its neighbourhood and Mediterranean policies with the aim of transferring know-how and funds in order to stabilise the economies of the partner states and achieve a relative political stability. As a result, the EU was cooperating with both a number of states that enjoyed a degree of democracy, as well as with authoritarian regimes like that of Qaddafi. Even though the EU prizes itself for being a supporter of democratic values, working hand in hand with non-democracies might have been justifiable as ‘hard politics’ if the system of ‘outsourced migration management’ was effective. But the Arab Spring demonstrated that democracy or not, the political structures of states in all of North Africa and a large part of the Middle East are contested and political orders can be overturned. The EU, with its standardised approach of dealing with its neighbouring states through its policies and programmes such as the European Neighbourhood Policy, the Eastern Partnership, Association Agreements or Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Areas, had until that time paid no particular attention to development of a ‘Plan B’ in case its standardised approach began to fail. As Le Gloannec points out, the EU hence ignored power-politics and – with the Arab Spring sweeping away the governments of those ‘friendly states’, ISIS spreading havoc in the Middle East, and Russia attacking Ukraine – faced two problems at the same time: its broadly understood ‘neighbourhood’ was destabilised, and the EU remained without any effective border control in terms of managing (or filtering) the influx of migrants.

In putting the migration issue – perhaps unintentionally – in the broader perspective of not only developing border management and a migration policy, but also the security situation in the areas surrounding the EU, Le Gloannec hit the nail on the head. While most of the effort put into combating the wave of migration caused by the destabilisation of parts of Africa and Middle East is focused on rethinking the Schengen regime, border patrol programmes, and finding ways of keeping refugees and other migrants away from the EU borders (e.g. the agreements with

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Turkey and Serbia), the real problem lies in the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and especially in its Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP). Or, more precisely, in their lack of any effective means to prevent crises as extensive as the Arab Spring or the collapse of the balance of power in the Middle East. As a popular saying goes in the world of peace and conflict studies’ researchers (paraphrasing Benjamin Franklin): ‘an ounce of prevention is worth a ton of intervention’. The best possible way of dealing with an influx of massive migration is to prevent it from happening, i.e. in early warning and prevention measures within the scope of the EU’s CFSP and CSDP, which would have been the case had the CSDP been developed well enough and made ready for the challenges of preventing political destabilisation on a large scale in the vicinity of the EU. Dealing with migration in the face of ample economic discrepancies like those between the EU states and a large number of neighbouring areas, or trying to keep the border tight with no military force trained to do so, was like patching a net and could not be successful in the face of a deluge, as there were no exhaustive strategies nor designed and elaborated measures to provide the necessary patchwork. Only a comprehensive strategy could make both migration policy and border management effective and sufficiently strong. These two aspects alone, however, could hardly be expected to protect the EU from the influx of refugees and desperate economic migrants that have caused such a political crisis in the EU and challenged the integrity of the Schengen area and the model of the EU open society. The EU decision-makers seem to have been vaguely aware of this when designing policies of economic aid and transfer of political know-how, except that these measures cannot be adequate with no backup tools belonging to hard politics: military procedures and international political strength. The problem the EU faces does not derive from a total lack of tools with which to react, nor a total absence of strategies, but rather their inconsistencies and randomness.

7. Border management, migration policy and security strategy

There are several documents and programmes, as well as funds of the EU, its institutions and member states, which are relevant to the issue of regulating migration. Most of them can be classified into three categories: border management, migration policy, and security issues. Within the first category, the mainstays are composed of the Schengen Information System, the Visa Information System, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (previously Frontex). They aim to protect the area of free movement of people – one of the main aims of the European Communi-
ties’ founders – by establishing an effective border regime on the outside of the Schengen area and implementing systems of information-sharing in order to make the cooperation of national border agencies more effective and the pursuit of violators easier and faster. The most recent change regarding border protection is the reform of Frontex by making it part of the European Border and Coast Guard. This was an EU response to the recent waves of refugees and to the disputes over the coherence of the Schengen area. In the words of the president of the EU Donald Tusk: ‘To save Schengen, we must regain control of our external borders. A new European Border and Coast Guard Agency is being created’.14 The task of this newly created Agency is ‘to help provide integrated border management at the external borders. It will ensure the effective management of migration flows and provide a high level of security for the EU. At the same time it will help safeguard free movement within the EU and fully respect fundamental rights’.15 It will be composed of Frontex, armed with new competencies and transformed into the European Border and Coast Guard Agency, and national authorities responsible for border management. An operational border management strategy is, however, yet to come from these institutions.

Just as it did regarding border management, the EU intensified its efforts with respect to migration policy. Here, however, the greatest obstacle seems to have come from the reluctant attitudes of the governments of the member states of the EU. Voices can be heard in both the Commission and the European Parliament that the EU needs a comprehensive (and common) immigration policy, as ‘[i]t is clear that no EU country can or should be left alone to address huge migratory pressures’.16 In his address to the European Parliament in September 2016, Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission, stressed that: ‘When it comes to managing the refugee crisis, we have started to see solidarity. I am convinced much more solidarity is needed. But I also know that solidarity must be given voluntarily. It must come from the heart. It cannot be forced.’ In light of the lack of a common European policy on migration as yet, this call, addressed to the member states of the EU, is both a plea for cooperation as

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well as an admission that without the political will of the member states’ governments, the EU institutions alone can do but little.

In May 2015 the Commission introduced its Agenda on migration, with its priorities set out for the next two years. According to its provisions, in the short term both Frontex and relevant EU programmes and operations were assigned extra funds to deal with the immediate necessities arising from human tragedies on the outskirts of the EU. The middle and long-term measures concentrate on four priorities:

- Reducing the incentives for irregular migration (that is, taking actions addressing irregular migration in countries outside the EU as well as human trafficking networks and the development of return policies);
- Saving lives and securing the external borders (which is mainly concentrated on the strengthening of the external borders and encouraging member states to commit to the idea of solidarity);
- Strengthening the common asylum policy (with its pivotal point being the monitoring of member states to ensure they fully implement common rules in this area);
- Developing a new policy on legal migration (with its priority being attracting those qualified foreigners that the EU economies need).

The EU Agenda on migration, although focusing much attention to the crisis caused by the massive influx of migrants (and especially refugees) from war zones, takes an overall stance regarding all types of migration to the EU. While it is not a strategy which targets in much detail the issues of illegal migrants or the large-scale movements of persons endangered by activities of war, it nevertheless does vaguely refer to international politics: ‘Migration should be recognised as one of the primary areas where an active and engaged EU external policy is of direct importance to EU citizens. Civil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change all feed directly and immediately into migration, so the prevention and mitigation of these threats is of primary importance for the migration debate’. The Agenda is also linked to border management and states that: ‘The EU must continue engaging beyond its borders and strengthen cooperation with its global partners, address root causes, and promote modalities of

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18 Ibidem.
legal migration that foster circular growth and development in the countries of origin and destination. But it does not refer to a security strategy and places migration issues mainly in the context of border management, combined with the EU labour market (i.e. a plan for selecting migrants useful for the EU economy from those who do not meet the criteria set for the incomers). While it is understandable that the drafters of the EU agenda and EU policy-makers have to keep a broader picture in mind and prepare universal measures fit for a number of eventualities, both at present and in the future, and that hence the Agenda on migration has to be to general in some respects; it is nevertheless hard to comprehend why – for exactly the same reasons of far-sightedness – the Agenda is not rooted in measures of the CSDP.

In recent years the EU has faced a number of challenges related to the problem of instability of regions near its borders, and the large influx of migrants originated precisely as a result of this political instability, which in many cases renders neighbouring regions no longer able to provide for even basic security. European politicians have long been concerned with providing support to the ‘neighbourhood’ and passing on both financial resources and know-how in order to support political and economic balance and stability. Special attention has been paid to economic measures, as though economic assistance and other measures of a mercantile nature could settle the multi-dimensional cohesion problems in such large areas like North Africa and in the Middle East. Today, with the instability of Iraq and Syria and their own actual neighbourhoods turning to ashes, the EU is trying to come up with a way of dealing with the interrelated humanitarian disasters and the flow of refugees moving towards its centre. Thus in these recent years the EU has adopted a number of new documents that are aimed at providing a scaffolding for a firm EU approach. The 2016 new EU security strategy – the Global Strategy – made both internal security and the stability of regions key factors providing a focal point. Together with the announcement of the new strategy, the discussion intensified on the management of the EU’s policy towards its neighbourhood, the Schengen borders, and internal mechanisms of solidarity in case of emergencies. Thus the Global Strategy focuses on the analysis of the current challenges to the security of the EU and its member states. and recommends... well, what exactly does it recommend? The Strategy does not deliver concrete solutions, instead it just recommends that the EU be more active in anticipation of troubles, concentrate more on the stabilisation of fragile areas and ungoverned territories, and consolidates

19 Ibidem.
its efforts, which so far are scattered throughout a large number of programmes, projects, policies, and funds. Much of the discussion about the way to deal with large flows of migration – most recently from Syria and the Middle East, but on a number of earlier occasions concerning refugees from the Balkans (in early 1990s), or the crisis on the Italian island of Lampedusa – concentrates on the status of the migrants (refugee versus economic migrant), the necessity to initiate the EU mechanism of solidarity, and quotas on the number immigrants that particular member states agree (or are obliged) to take in. On the supra-regional level of EU actions, some improvements are being implemented by the adoption of more measures to secure the external borders and develop a common migration policy. Taken all together, however, these do not address the real problem and – perhaps more importantly – reveal the serious issue of the lack of teamwork among the EU member states, to the extent of turning a discussion about the ways to deal with the massive inflow of migrants into a serious political crisis. It is more and more often not just a pronouncement about the necessity to find an approach to protect the external borders and deal with refugees from conflict zones, but about truly fundamental issues, such as the integrity of the Schengen area.

All these discussions, which currently undermine and even endanger the achievements of the EU and its member states, could be avoided if a different perspective on the events is taken. Such a new perspective could make arguments about the Schengen area irrelevant and would make it possible to address the real problem with migration, rather than focus on patching leaks in a non-existent or ineffective (as it turns out) migration policy. Here we posit that the difficulties arise from the lack of coherent policies and good will on the part of member states, not from the absence of high-level strategies. We also point out that the approach of the political establishment of the EU is too narrow and the problem of massive immigration requires more than just a new security strategy – it requires new security measures. It requires more than migration and border policies – it requires stability through the Common Foreign and Security Policy. It requires more than the dispatching of economic and technical aid – it needs consistent and effective coordination of all available resources directed through and in accordance with concrete regional strategies.

8. The EU’s Global Strategy

The freshly adopted Global Strategy of the EU points out that the world in which we now live is much more disorganised than the one of 2003, when the previous EU security strategy was elaborated. This very
statement calls for a reflection on the strength of the EU measures: how much has the EU done to contribute to a more secure world? (which by the way was a leading theme of the 2003 security strategy, entitled ‘A secure Europe in a better world’). The new Global Strategy is divided into three parts, the first of which describes the contemporary world and characterises it as connected, contested, and complex. It reflects on the nature of contemporary international relations, declaring that their structure is variable and on the verge of a major remodelling, with the USA still being the strongest power but with other forces gaining increasing strength (like for instance China or India). The Global Strategy foresees the end of the era of a single dominant superpower. For the first time a finger is pointed so strongly at unstable states that a new term is coined to name them: ‘fragile states and ungoverned spaces,’ which means the places where conflicts have become endemic and cycles of violence and conflict are proving impossible to break. This in turn makes the nature of the threats that today accompany a military conflict (e.g. mass migration of refugees; creating hubs for terrorist activities and training; and development of armed forces capable to challenging any newly-formed authorities) a structural dilemma.

Two issues are key in relation to the problems the new strategy points out: one is that they are all interconnected and support each others’ growth in a vicious circle (i.e. conflicts cause migration, shortages of resources cause conflicts, and migration and climate change cause shortages of resources, which cause conflicts which cause migrations…, etc.). The second key issue is that troubles rooted in the instability of even remote regions influence the security of the states and societies of the EU because they spread to its borders – migration and terrorist activities being the prime examples.

The second part of the Strategy points out the challenges to the EU’s integrity arising from its inability to provide security to its society. The main focus is on the EU’s neighbourhood, where the greatest endeavours should be targeted at: assistance for the Western Balkans – still a key partner in the EU’s enlargement policy; close cooperation with Turkey; support for the consolidation of democracy in the countries east of the EU’s borders; and a dialogue with Russia in restructuring European security. North Africa and the Middle East should be offered solutions for constructive conflict resolution, alongside with the preparation of effective measures to control migration towards the EU. The EU is strongly recom-

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mended to deal with all these priority areas in cooperation with the USA, NATO and the United Nations.

The third part of the strategy concentrates on recommendations for the EU institutions and the governments of the EU states. While the contemporary world is complex, connected, contested, and increasingly destabilised, there are also opportunities – for those who can prioritise actions and focus on building up the proper instruments to achieve goals. Hence the EU decision-makers should focus their attention in the first instance to: directions of actions, flexibility, leverage, coordination, and capabilities. Although the CFSP is criticised in the Global Strategy as being incapable, in its current shape, of influencing international relations in a relevant way, the authors of the document place special attention on the need for an integrated approach to the activities of the EU. Thus idea of a ‘comprehensive approach’, or now an ‘integrated approach’, calls for all the programmes, funds, actions, and projects of the EU agencies and the institutions to be better coordinated and – if possible – consolidated in order to achieve a greater impact in terms of their deployment in selected areas.21 Although the Strategy does not offer precise details about such a reform, it can be understood that a document of an executive nature should follow.

The Global Strategy refers to migration several times in order to call attention to the global connectivity ‘with a surge in human mobility’.22 Like the strategy on migration, this key security document treats migration more broadly than just with reference to the recent migration crisis. Nevertheless, it points out the most frequent causes of large migration flows: ‘Migration […] is accelerating as a result of conflict, repression, economic disparity, demographic imbalances and climate change.’ The authors add: ‘Climate change and resource scarcity, coupled with demographic growth, contribute to international conflicts and are expected to do so even more in the future. Climate-induced floods, droughts, desertification and farmland destruction have triggered migration and conflict from Darfur to Mali,’ thus connecting elements of economic and political stability with the migration policy of the EU and its border


management. Further on the document explains that the strains related to migration, migration policy and border management are negatively influencing the political coherence of the EU and the solidarity of its societies. In order to prevent this, it is recommended that: ‘Our diplomatic, economic, migration, asylum and security policies need to account for the deep connections between Europe’s southern neighbours and their neighbours in the Gulf and sub-Saharan Africa in order to help put out the fires ravaging the region, from Libya to Syria, and Iraq to Yemen.’ Although the Global Strategy does not explicitly call for a remodelling of the EU policies towards greater connectivity, it does strongly suggest it. As the challenges associated with migration mount, the EU is instructed to assign additional resources to better manage threats, to integrate the internal and external dimensions of migration management, and to ‘tackle the root causes of the phenomenon in the long-term.’ It is true that no precise guidelines are attached, but the abovementioned concept of a ‘comprehensive approach’ is recalled and it is recommended that this outlook, which was set up within the EU’s CSDP ten years ago, should be now duplicated in all EU policies to create an EU model of responses to external challenges, making it possible to achieve synergy of both actions and their effects. This new EU way is called a ‘joined-up approach’ which means ‘establishing closer links between enlargement, neighbourhood, migration, energy, CT and security and defence policies.’ And so the Global Strategy enters into fields other than just its classic security domain and ventures to offer recommendations for the further development of the EU instruments, all with view toward strengthening its capacity to remain coherent internally while tackling external security challenges, including migration.

If the connection between border management, migration, and asylum policy and security issues is made, what then is the problem? The main trouble is that the provisions of Global Strategy are so far just wishful thinking (which is partly understandable since they were only published in mid-2016), while the challenges are real and pressing. Before a ‘joined-up approach’ is in operation, a vast amount of work is needed on a different level of decision-making.

As Global Strategy correctly states, the EU’s priority should be to address the root causes of the crises, hence migration policy itself, asylum policy and border management are but signs of the real problem. Although European politicians and civil servants talk about the need for change, few actions follow, so that even though the EU currently has a handful of instruments (e.g. humanitarian aid, development assistance, Neighbourhood Policy, policy of enlargement, and an outline
for a CSDP), there are several key problems with their operation. The first is the lack of coordination of these resources that the EU already uses, as many programmes and activities run parallel and mechanisms for funds’ and projects’ introduction and implementation are detached from the reality in which these resources operate, rendering them effective only to a limited extent. The second problem is the need for a better coordination of policies and strategies, so that a network of strategies make up a comprehensive framework for actions. The third problem is that all the fragmented policies and strategies should be rooted in broader objectives and goals. The Global Strategy is a good starting point, and its focus on security should be – as it is – a priority. Most of the current challenges that the EU is striving to overcome are connected with the lack of political and economic stability in key regions in the world. What is happening is that the dangers from outside result in internal threats such as terrorism or mass migration, affecting the societies of the EU states, while their governments debate the Schengen area and often choose isolationism, even despite the clear economic logic of coping with dangers together and hence joining forces and splitting the costs. Hence the striving for common planning and actions aimed at stabilising both the Middle East and Africa seems the right choice. Except that here a structural problem arises, this time concerning the CSDP. It is very weakly institutionalised and the most important decisions in the major domains it covers remain with the governments of the member states. Two of the most crucial ones regard the use of military forces, and financing stabilisation operations. While the Global Strategy accurately points out the roots of the problems that need to be addressed (with conflicts and political and economic instability having a prime place on the list), the question remains whether the EU is prepared to tackle them. While its capacities are large (to name just a few of the most obvious ones: considerable and well trained border guard forces, police forces, antiterrorist strategies and scenarios, military forces, and high overall expenditures on defence and security combined with ample opportunities created by the EU and the fact that member States work through its institutions), nevertheless its instruments to tackle them, they are fragmented and do not work together or deliver a comprehensive strategy. While there is a will to link sectoral strategies to the security area, the security policy is amongst the least developed of all the joint ventures of the member states, and at present is not ready to carry the burden it could be expected to bear.
9. Closure

Since 2015 over a million migrants and asylum-seekers have crossed European Union borders and the flow has shown no signs of diminishing. This unprecedented movement of people has attracted two main responses. A core issue for both is the Schengen principle of open borders, and public opinion is split between those who believe that the sheer weight of numbers of would-be migrants requires the reintroduction of strictly-controlled frontiers, and those who demand a prompt and sympathetic response to the plight of refugees from war-torn countries. For the latter, including some influential members of the European community, the belief that open borders should be retained whatever the cost is regarded as a matter of principle and an essential foundation of the EU project. For others, including many in Britain, Denmark and the Netherlands, the burdens associated with the unplanned arrival of substantial numbers of refugees – many needing housing, medical care, schools, and welfare benefits – weigh more heavily than the benefits coming from open borders.23

The complexity of this debate and its internal paradoxes throw light on some deeply ingrained ideas which can be traced back to the traditions derived from the evolutionist and Malthusian approaches of the 19th century. In many European countries net migration, which is running at well over hundreds of thousands a year, is simply not sustainable. In addition to that, there are also some additional, less immediately visible, concerns, growing in priority and significance. Among these is the risk that policies originally intended to reach out to help innocent people fleeing unendurable threats to their lives, families, and livelihoods, may also provide uncontrolled access to European countries for others with very different motives.

This is precisely the reason for the current heated debates. Although population growth in Europe is endangered by its decline in fertility and it may be offset by mass migration, unmanaged migration seems to be an even greater danger. We posit here that the roots of these negative feelings can be traced back to the 19th century, when population growth first came to be viewed as a threat to human continuity. The above-presented ideas of Malthus, reflected in influential works such as Paul Erlich's *The Population Bomb*, have been adamant in warning of a potential global catastrophe brought about by the sheer weight of human overload.

As Thomas Malthus noted two centuries ago, population size can be reduced as an unintended result of human actions. Malthus identified

three such unscheduled (and unwelcomed) developments: war, famine and disease. At the root of Malthus’ thesis was the principle that population and territory must be kept in balance, and that if a population exceeds the carrying capacity of its land and resources, nature will intervene to restore the balance. While the forms the threats take may have changed, the Malthusian diagnosis remains disturbingly convincing, for humans still face these most ancient of enemies: war in new and more destructive forms; famine in the shape of shortages of the basic foods needed to sustain life; and sickness and premature death, as overused antibiotics lose their effectiveness and acquire increased resistance to modern medical science. Malthus’s analysis reflected his time, but should not to be transferred so effortlessly into the modern world as it is visible in media news, with its gory visual evidence. Malthus did not write about migrants and did not connect poverty with violence. It was done by many later authors but it still continues to influence, albeit implicitly, our attitudes towards mass migration and the policies connected to these processes.

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European Commission, “Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and


Abstract: When joining the European integration project, countries declare that they accept the underlying common values and principles, including the principle of solidarity. The migration/refugee crisis has verified the attachment to these principles. As it had happened on many occasions throughout history, in times of crisis national tendencies and interests gain the upper hand and in some countries sensible public debate is replaced by calls for a fight for a European Europe. Poland is one of these countries.

Keywords: migration, refugees, solidarity, nation state, Visegrad Group, Polish migration policy

Introduction

‘If the EU did not exist, we would have to invent it today. Far from being a threat to national sovereignty at the beginning of the 21st century, the EU first makes it possible. In the world risk society, faced with the menacing aggregation of global problems that resist national solutions, nation states left to their own devices are powerless, incapable of exercising sovereignty. The pooled sovereignty of the EU provides the only hope
for every nation and every citizen to live in freedom and peace’. These are the words of the German sociologist Ulrich Beck,2 spoken in an interview for ‘The Guardian’ in 2009. But in the face of the migration/refugee crisis they seem as relevant as back then. The benefits from European integration to all Member States are so tangible and obvious that acting to the detriment of the European project by promoting nationalist sentiments in order to further one’s goals in the internal political arena can be dangerous and irreversible.

1. Nation, nation state

Europe is a continent composed of nation states or ethnically diverse states with a single, central authority. They differ considerably because of their location, history and tradition. The mobility of the inhabitants of Europe resulting from the abolishment of border controls between individual EU Member States, lower transportation prices as well as accessibility of information due to the widespread availability of Internet access has weakened local ties but at the same time contributed to the formation of new communities and caused changes to state structures. In this context, can modern European countries still invoke national identity, shared tradition and values?

What we refer to as a nation is an ethnic and cultural community existing in a specific territory, developed on the basis of history and tradition, aware of its own identity, and often also sharing the same language and having one dominant religion.3 According to this definition, national identity, the need to have a state, history and national culture are the most important nation-forming factors.

A nation is a community of ideas. The purpose of this ideology is to mobilise the largest possible part of the population, considered a nation, to defend its common interests. As the ideology spreads, national awareness starts to form, meaning a sense of belonging to a nation and feeling connected to it. Threats activate a mechanism of joint and involved action to defend it. The existence of such awareness results in the sense of national identity – the feeling of being different from other nations.

Most existing nations have formed independent states, mainly in the period of increasing nationalistic sentiments in the 18th and 19th centuries. A state should be considered a nation state when it is inhabited by the representatives of a single nation. Nowadays, however,

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it is hard to find a demographically homogeneous state. Globalisation and migration contributed considerably to diversification of the societies inhabiting individual countries. The model of a state developed in a given territory, subject to historical changes and exercising sovereign authority over the citizens, based on common language and tradition, is becoming a thing of the past. The increasing economic and political interdependencies, the formation of state unions, regional communities, federations and confederations, international organisations and corporations has limited the capability of states to exercise their sovereign powers as they have ceded some of their competences to other actors of international relations. The domestic and international realities are so strongly intertwined, the movement of goods, services and people is so intense that the borders that states used to guard are becoming blurred.

We are therefore starting to speak of the nation as a relic, an anachronistic form in international relations, which is sinking into oblivion by decision of contemporary societies. But perhaps we should pay more attention to historical phenomena, which have shown many times that the significance of the nation state grows considerably in crisis situations and in the face of armed conflicts. In these circumstances, uniform nation states, oriented inwards, have repeatedly proven stronger and have provided a greater feeling of stability.

The experience of World War II, with critical evaluation of nation states’ egoistic interests, pushed European countries towards integration in the 1950s. Already back then, politicians represented two different visions of European integration: federal and confederate. The former wanted a community equipped with supranational institutions, they were dreaming of a European government, of joint policies in various spheres, of transferring sovereign state competences to federal bodies (Paul-Henri Spaak, Konrad Adenauer, Alcide de Gasperi). The latter, in turn, spoke of a Europe of homelands, with common institutions limited to administrative and technical role, respecting the identity and sovereignty of the individual states and based on joint unanimous action of governments (Charles de Gaulle).

The debate on Europe of Homelands vs. Homeland Europe re-emerged at the turn of the millennia. In 2000, in his speech backed by Chancellor Gerhard Schröder, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joschka Fischer declared that the European Commission should become a strong government of Europe, the European Parliament should be dividing the EU budget and the EU Council of Ministers should become a ‘Chamber of the States’; Brussels would be making decisions on the military and
foreign policy of the Union. At the same time, French Prime Minister Lionel Jospin favoured a federation of nation states, the competences of the ‘European government’ being limited to decisions on the economic policy of the euro area, the European Commission having greater prerogatives but still within the traditional triangle: the Commission, the Council and the Parliament. Jospin advocated cooperation between the European Parliament and national parliaments, without excessively restricting their sovereignty. The media were emphasising at that time that Jospin had rejected Schröder’s plan to increase the power of European bodies at the expense of the individual states, because in the process of European integration France had always been stressing the role of nations. Additionally, Die Welt pointed out that it was not possible to build a federal structure with Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic or Slovenia because these countries had fought hard to regain sovereignty just a decade before and would not part with it now.5 Tony Blair, in turn, during his visit to Warsaw summed up the British position at the turn of the centuries as follows: ‘Europe is a Europe of free, independent sovereign nations who choose to pool that sovereignty in pursuit of their own interests and the common good, achieving more together than we can achieve alone. The EU will remain a unique combination of the intergovernmental and the supranational. Such a Europe can, in its economic and political strength, be a superpower; a superpower, but not a superstate’.6

In March 2000, when the EU’s Heads of State and Government met in Lisbon to discuss the strategy for the next 10 years, their main aim was to see European economy become the most competitive economy in the world, with constant growth due to the creation of more jobs and better use of the existing ones, increased social cohesion, growth of R&D investment, reduction of red tape and barriers to businesses.7 In order to fulfil this goal, we need manpower as much as funds, and given the ageing of Europe this means we need migrants as well.

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The members of the Communities had invited economic migrants much earlier – if not jointly then with the same intention. With the economic boom of the late 1950s and early 1960s, doors were opened to foreigners. As Max Frisch once very aptly said, ‘We asked for workers. We got people instead’. These people were coming from countries culturally and mentally much different from where they arrived. The plan was that they would come, fill the gap in the demand for workforce, and once they perform their tasks they would return to their countries of origin. The migration policy of the ‘old’ EU Member States is a consequence of the influx of cheap foreign labour force, which in the 1960s and 1970s fuelled their booming economic growth. The immigration was not homogeneous in terms of origin, culture or religion, but it met the economic demands of that time. In the United Kingdom, these were migrants from former British colonies (India, Pakistan), in France, they came from North Africa (mainly Algeria), in Italy – from Morocco, in Germany – from Turkey. The influx of foreigners to these countries was much ahead of any reflection on how to find a place for them in the society. Temporary measures were implemented to provide ad hoc solutions to the emerging problems. But tensions and conflicts were growing, accumulating, and from time to time they would flare up uncontrollably; for instance, there were cases of setting fire to the homes of Turkish or Moroccan workers, attacks on migrants in schools and on the streets.

The European Union expanded to include 28 Member States, but it has not become more cohesive and homogeneous. This was shown, for example, by the votes on the constitution for Europe (with referendums against in France and the Netherlands\(^8\)). After all, constitution is characteristic of a state, not of a European superstate. This and similar events have clearly shown the changing attitudes on the European political stage. The enlargement, as a result of which the countries of Central and Eastern Europe joined the Union, has also contributed to this situation by giving rise to intra-EU migrations. These, in turn, often met with a negative reaction of the societies in the ‘old’ Member States, which became much more sensitive to ‘others’, and the economic crisis further intensified this sentiment, as ‘others’ are perceived as a threat to local labour markets.

The deteriorating sentiments were also not much improved by Europe 2020, a strategy announced by President of the European Commission Jose Barroso in March 2010 with the aim of getting Europe out of

economic collapse. The strategy called for mobilisation and joint action to overcome the crisis. The economic development plan focused on innovation in research and promotion of environmentally friendly ‘green’ knowledge-based economy as well as on the development of human capital. This agenda should be implemented, again, jointly and for the common European good. Bureaucrats and officials in Brussels lost touch with the European reality and seem to have missed the signs that ‘Europe was no longer on the road to superpower status, but that it faced an existential crisis’.9

And where have we arrived at a couple years later? We have a European Union that is suffering from the effects of the financial and euro crisis and the migration/refugee crisis, a Union startled by the British decision on Brexit. And national ‘nightmares’ are resurfacing.

2. Migration in the EU before the crisis

According to Eurostat, on 1 January 2015, 34.3 million people born outside the EU-28 were living in the EU Member States. The highest numbers of foreigners were living in Germany (7.5 million), the United Kingdom (5.4 million), Italy (5.0 million), Spain (4.5 million) and France (4.4 million).10 Detailed information can be found in the table below.

It was therefore no longer a European Europe. What is more, the ‘nation-based’ societies of the Member States also form a very diverse melting pot, which has often been described as the source of the Community’s strength. Many citizens of the Member States move within the Union in search for better living conditions, contributing added value to the host societies, this added value being very positively evaluated by local and central authorities. The ‘national’ hysteria about the migration/refugee crisis seems therefore to have a second side to it – gathering votes, the electorate being fed fear of migrants, to win elections.

For many years Europe had been perceived as a place friendly and open to migrants. Each year some four million new immigrants arrived, including some two million from outside the EU territory.11 The Member States made numerous – albeit not very successful – attempts to develop a joint migration and asylum policy. In 1990, faced with a rising

11 *Kryzys i co dalej (The Crisis – And What Now?)*, “Biuletyn Migracyjny”, No. 53, December 2015.
Table 1. Foreigner population by nationality

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<tr>
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<th>Total (thousands)</th>
<th>(% of the population)</th>
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(*) The values for the different categories of citizenship may not sum to the totals due to rounding.

Source: Eurostat (migr_pop1ctz).
tide of migration, the ‘old’ Member States signed the Dublin Convention (it entered into force in 1997), concerning the processing of asylum applications by the EU Member States, replaced in 2003 by the Dublin II Regulation and in 2013 by Dublin III. The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, moved issues related to migration, asylum and visas from the third to the first pillar of integration, which meant that it was ‘Communitised’, that EU institutions would take responsibility for managing this sphere. It also incorporated the provisions of the Schengen Agreement into the EU acquis. These provisions were also confirmed by the Treaty of Lisbon. The sensitive nature of this issue, however, caused an unexpected regression of integration. In 2013, the ministers of foreign affairs of EU Member States approved a reform of the Schengen system, admitting temporary controls on the Union’s internal borders, as well as reforms of the European asylum policy. Border controls can be restored periodically in extraordinary circumstances (such as a threat to national security) for a period of no longer than 10 days and only upon consent of the European Commission. A considerable surge of migration was not deemed a threat to internal security. The amendment to the Schengen Agreement in the face of the mass influx of refugees opened the floodgates and now the Member States may restore border control for a period of up to three months without Commission’s approval.

The Arab Spring, which has swept through Arab countries starting from 2011, caused an exodus of millions of people inhabiting that region. The migrants moved first to neighbouring countries and later to Europe. It is not the purpose of this article to conduct an analysis of the reasons behind these events; it is necessary, however, to highlight the fights that were at their core: for human rights (Tunisia, Egypt, Syria), against corruption (Tunisia, Egypt), for improvement of living conditions (Tunisia, Egypt, Libya, Syria), for liberalisation of the political system (Libya, Yemen, Syria), or motivated by ethnic (Libya, Yemen) and religious (Bahrain, Syria) differences. The simultaneous rising of these movements was possible due to broad use of the Internet and social media for communication, which also made it possible to learn about life in other parts of the world and awakened the desire to move there.

It is generally agreed that the migration crisis began in 2015, when more than 1.2 million applications for asylum were filed in the EU Member States.\(^{14}\) According to UNHCR data, the migrants who came to Europe in 2015 were mainly Syrian nationals (49%), followed by Afghans (21%) and Iraqis (8%). The most numerous applications for asylum were filed in Germany (476,000), followed by Sweden, Austria and Hungary.\(^{15}\)

In May 2015, the European Commission announced the European Agenda on Migration.\(^{16}\) High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini said back then: ‘With this bold agenda, the European Union has proven itself ready to address the plight of those escaping from wars, persecution and poverty. Migration is a shared responsibility of all Member States and all member States are called now to contribute to tackling this historical challenge’, and First Vice-President of the European Commission Frans Timmermans said: ‘The European Council clearly stated that we need to find European solutions, based on internal solidarity and the realisation that we have a common responsibility to create an effective migration policy’.\(^{17}\)

The rescue package included, among others: intensifying Frontex activities, collecting data on smugglers, employing additional officials in Italy and Greece, implementing fingerprints checks and a preliminary draft on the relocation of refugees throughout Europe. The reaction to this project has shown that the much publicised migration or refugee crisis is in fact a crisis of the fundamental principle of European integration: the principle of solidarity, and therefore a crisis of the integration project. When Brussels called on all Member States to support each other, to show solidarity, the Visegrad Group (Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia), composed of EU Member States that had been benefiting from various forms of solidarity since their accession, refused to accept refugees and called them ‘unwanted foreigners’.

Because of the refugee crisis, from September 2015 Austria, Germany, Denmark, Sweden, Slovenia, Hungary, Malta and Norway restored border controls on their internal borders based on unilateral decisions under the Schengen Borders Code (Articles 23–25). The Code allows for the introduction of control on the EU’s internal borders ‘[i]n exceptional


circumstances where the overall functioning of the area without internal border control is put at risk as a result of persistent serious deficiencies relating to external border control [...]'. In these circumstances, controls may be introduced for a period of six months and may be extended three times, meaning that the maximum time they can be in force is two years.

Given that the measures taken were not yielding expected results, on 4 March 2016 the Commission presented a roadmap for restoring the Schengen system to full functionality, and Vice-President of the Commission Frans Timmermans assured in it that its aim was to abolish all border controls as soon as possible, by December 2016. The document also included the estimated cost of abolishing the Schengen Area, a proposal for establishing a European Border and Coast Guard, as well as providing assistance to Greece.19

In April 2016, the European Commission prepared another proposal for reforming the Dublin system, where it identified five priority areas in which the common European asylum system should be improved. According to the plan, it was necessary to: achieve greater convergence and restrict asylum tourism, prevent secondary flows within the EU, propose a change of the competences of the European Asylum Support Office and strengthen the Eurodac system.20 This was yet another desperate step that confirmed the ineffectiveness of EU institutions in the face of the refugee crisis.

### 3. The Visegrad Group’s position on the crisis

The Visegrad Group (V4), created in the period of systemic transformations in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, is a regional form of cooperation of four Central European countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, established in 1991 on the basis of neighbour relations as well as historical and cultural similarity.21 Initially, its core concept was the development of democratic state structures and free-market economy, but later it was the common goal of participating in the

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20 Z. Czachór, A. Jaskulski, Polska wobec kryzysu migracyjnego w Europie (Poland Vis-à-vis the Migration Crisis in Europe), Instytut Obywatelski, Analysis 2015/7, p. 9.

21 For more see: Informacja na temat Grupy Wyszehradzkiej (Information of the Visegrad Group), Kancelaria Senatu, Czerwiec 2012.
process of European integration (albeit the countries quickly moved from cooperation to rivalry in the process). As has already been mentioned, the V4 adopted a common stance in May 2015, when the European Commission announced the European Agenda on Migration – they refused to accept migrants. In February 2016, at a meeting in Prague, the prime ministers of the four V4 countries and Bulgaria as well the president of Macedonia adopted a joint declaration concerning the migration crisis, where they stressed that unless appropriate steps are taken to improve control over the most exposed sections of the European Union’s external border and the influx of migrants is stopped, the situation could get out of control. Furthermore, the declaration stressed that the measures implemented to deal with the crisis should be developed on the EU level, and Polish Prime Minister Beata Szydło even said that the crisis was the greatest one among those Europe was going through and therefore a matter of concern to all of us. At the same time, the V4 countries were taking actions going directly against what they were advocating, such as Hungary’s independent decision to erect a fence on its border with Serbia and Croatia or the criticism of the relocation and resettlement system. In the context of the declaration, Prime Minister of the Czech Republic Bohuslav Sobotka mentioned a contingency plan – which Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán called ‘plan B’ – that could help solve the migration crisis (the plan included the improvement of the protection of the borders between Bulgaria and Turkey and between Macedonia and Greece), while Prime Minister of Slovakia Robert Fico refuted accusations made against the V4 countries that they had failed to show solidarity with the other EU countries, stressing that the V4 countries had offered financial and technical assistance to support border protection.

The next meeting of the V4 focused on the refugee crisis was held in Warsaw in November 2016, this time between ministers of internal affairs. On behalf of their governments, the ministers once again expressed opposition to the EU system of refugee relocation, advocated support to refugees outside the Union, further sealing the external borders and placing greater emphasis on returning migrants to their countries of origin.  

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They also announced plans to establish a refugee crisis management centre, to be administered by Poland. The purpose of the centre would be to support refugees staying in camps outside the EU – in, for example, Lebanon, Jordan. Slovak Minister of Internal Affairs Robert Kaliniak stressed the need to convince the EU Member States to adopt the concept of ‘effective solidarity’, pointing out that the migrant relocation system was not yielding the expected results. The numerous speeches delivered in the context of this meeting failed, however, to provide an answer to the question of how to solve the problem of those refugees who are already in the EU. Somewhere in the background is the unvoiced opinion that the responsibility lies with those who said: ‘we can do it’ (Wir schaffen das – German Chancellor Angela Merkel); and those call from the abyss of an ever deeper crisis for the observance of one of the fundamental principles of the European Union – solidarity. On 7 October 2015, Angela Merkel and François Hollande delivered a joint speech in the European Parliament concerning the refugee crisis. Important words were said on the need for the EU Member States to maintain solidarity and stick together. President Hollande pointed out: ‘There is a temptation to retreat into our own national shells in time of crisis. However, experience and history tell us that doing it alone is not the way’. Angela Merkel, in turn, stressed that only with the Member States acting together could the refugees be distributed fairly among the countries; she reiterated the values on which the EU is founded, including solidarity, stressed that refugees are no anonymous mass but real people and that the EU is obliged to protect them under the conventions it had signed. Some Member States chose to ignore these appeals. Poland has been one of them.

4. Poland’s position on the refugee crisis

Poland’s position on the refugee/migration crisis has been already partially discussed above as the country is one of the members of the Visegrad Group and speaks in the European arena together with the other V4 countries. However, since this is not ‘merely’ a refugee/migration crisis but one entailing a much greater threat – a conflict among the EU Member States as well as between the Member States and the European Commission – we should analyse Poland’s position on the matter in more detail and in a broader context, including the national context.

Poland’s position on the plan of distributing refugees among the EU Member States was expressed in the resolution of the Polish Sejm of 1 April 2016. The Sejm voiced a negative opinion on the decision of the Council of the European Union on relocation and transfer of refugees issued in September 2015. It also criticised the previous Polish government’s support for this decision, even though the position agreed upon by the Visegrad Group was different. According to the resolution, the point of reference for the Polish government should be the national refugee policy criteria, which stress the need to provide special protection to single women, children, families with two or more children, and religious minorities. At the same time, the Sejm categorically opposed any attempts to establish permanent EU mechanisms of allocation of refugees or migrants, stating that instruments of refugee and migration policy should be in the hands of the Polish state, especially given what it referred to as growing social tensions caused by the excessive wave of migration from the Middle East to Europe. The Sejm added, however, that it fully supported the provision and financing of humanitarian aid in areas ravaged by armed conflicts and countries neighbouring on these areas.

The refugee issue has been the source of a broad discussion in the Polish society. This is, however, unfortunately not a public debate but much rather politicians and the media playing on the people’s emotions. The catchphrase ‘Poland for Poles’ (Polska dla Polaków) seems rather peculiar given that 2.5 million Polish labour migrants work in the countries of the ‘old’ EU and that there is growing deficiency of workforce in the Polish market. The refusal to accept refugees, even though some 7,000 were to be relocated to Poland, has marked Poland as one of those countries where the common value of solidarity has been sacrificed on the altar of national interest, and to call a spade a spade – of the struggle to gain the support of a specific electorate. Anti-migration sentiments are an easy source of political capital, as proven by the rise of various nationalist movements in many European countries. It would not bid well for the future of Polish economy if the functioning of the Schengen Area was restricted (checkpoints, tariffs, tourism, etc.); moreover, faced with the lack of declarations of support from their partners, the countries that are most severely affected by the influx of refugees (Germany, Austria, Italy, Sweden, France) might just choose to opt for such solutions as closing their borders.


Ibidem.
It is in the interest of Poland to look for solutions to the crisis situation on the European level instead of shutting itself away within its national borders. At this stage, however, it would be necessary to have many social forces involved, not only politicians but also the media (especially the public ones), social media, the Church (which has considerable opinion-forming influence in Poland), and finally the education system. The problem needs to be shown in its proper proportion. Only a small number of the refugees who would be relocated to Poland would in fact remain there. This is because first, they would have to be found eligible for international protection. Some would be verified as labour migrants, others would be sent back to their countries of origin, provided that these are deemed safe countries, or to safe third countries. And those who would potentially remain in Poland would most likely soon start looking for a way to leave for Western Europe, the Eldorado they learned about on the Internet.

In the present reality, convincing the Polish society that it needs to live in a nation state has no raison d’être. The ongoing processes of globalisation cannot be stopped, the existing economic, financial, social and cultural ties cannot be undone. Many problems of the contemporary world cannot be solved within nation states. The demographic situation in Poland – and in Europe in general, for that matter – is detrimental to the economy and to the pension systems. The predominant family model is an important factor in this respect, with children coming only third, after professional career and material stability. Pro-family policy requires huge financial outlays, but it yields results only in the long-term perspective. The lack of workforce resulting from demographic trends and migration of young people in search of better living conditions will have to be filled. Refusing to accept ‘others’/foreigners for national, cultural or religious reasons deprives the country of opportunities for development and forces it into stagnation. And this would be against the Polish national interest.

It is a very apt observation that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe fought too long for independence to now surrender it to any community institutions. But it is them who wanted to join the European Union, and it was what their societies wanted. Before they contribute to the annihilation of the European project, they should therefore take a break from populism and embrace higher values, the ones they have once adopted.

Conclusions

For the proponents of the federalist vision of European integration, the ultimate goal of the project is turning Europe into a single state; and this means state authority, exercised over a nation aware of its national
identity, inhabiting a specific territory enclosed by state borders. And such an entity was in fact being formed: the Schengen Agreement created external EU borders; EU citizenship was enshrined in Article 9 of the Treaty on European Union, according to which every person with citizenship of a Member State is an EU citizen as well; EU institutions received a number of new competences with each Treaty, to make decisions for the common good. The potential decisions included those concerning the common migration, asylum and visa policy as well as those concerning non-EU citizens crossing the external borders. But in the face of the refugee and migrant wave, control of the external borders became impossible, and the carefully developed foundations of the common migration policy fell apart, revealing the weakness of the system. EU institutions were unable to develop effective anti-crisis mechanisms and assure the European society that it could feel safe at home. And, as has been mentioned before, many Member States saw the rise of radical, nationalist groups, making politicians much more reluctant to search for common solutions to the situation on the EU level.

Europe was not European even before the crisis. As previously mentioned, on 1 January 2015 34.3 million people born outside the EU-28 lived in the EU Member States. This is more than 6 per cent of the European population. For some political parties they constitute an important electorate; for state authorities and security structures they is a very real threat in the event of discontent and riot; but for those who respect ethical values, these people are Europeans just as we are. Civilisational progress has led to the drafting and conclusion of the 1951 Refugee Convention, in which the signatories committed to protecting refugees, a refugee being ‘any person who […] owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it’. Among the masses migrating to Europe after conflicts and wars, there are many who are eligible for refugee status, but there are also many labour migrants who, after becoming familiar with the situation in Europe, intend to move to specific countries, where they are hoping to make a better life. The decision on granting refugee status requires examining each application

27 The 1951 Refugee Convention, Chapter 1, Article 1(2), http://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10 (last visited 22.03.2016).
individually. It is subject to a procedure of appeal and can take months or even years. The individuals subject to the procedure remain in refugee centres or receive the necessary support while residing outside refugee centres or camps. Those foreigners who already live in the Member States have so far not upset their legal and social order. What is needed is a well-thought-out, responsible and common policy towards them, integrating them in the European social systems while respecting their cultural specificity, but also enforcing respect for the European cultural heritage and fundamental values. The bond with the host societies should be developed as a result of common rights and obligations. Living in separate parallel realities, constantly talking about egalitarianism and misunderstood political correctness is a temporary and short-sighted solution. It should not be implemented even as a provisional measure to address the need of the hour, and it should certainly not be the strategy pursued by an integration grouping, if it wants to survive and keep developing. Europe can be European through its values, rooted and nurtured in the awareness of its societies and shaped in the process of educating future generations. In the age of globalisation and the Internet, the alternative in the form of nation states fencing themselves off from others seems unfeasible and obscures any constructive discussion on how to address the problem of foreigners in the European Union.

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Marta Pachocka*

Understanding the Visegrad Group States’ Response to the Migrant and Refugee Crises 2014+ in the European Union

Abstract: At least since 2014 the European Union (EU) has been facing the migrant and refugee crises, which have become an important test of solidarity of the Member States (MS). The effectiveness of the common migration and asylum policy has proven to be limited. The crises became a destabilizing factor leading to disagreements and divisions between MS. The position of the Visegrad Group (V4) states stood out in the debate on migration and refugee challenges. The objective of this article is to examine to what extent the migrant and refugee crises 2014+ in Europe, the limited effectiveness of the EU migration and asylum policy and the differences between the MS in their approaches influenced the situation, in which the Visegrad states attempted to find a common voice, strengthen their position in the EU and formulate the basis for the future common policy.

*Marta Pachocka, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor Department of Political Studies, Collegium of Socio-Economics, Warsaw School of Economics; Coordinator of the project EUMIGRO – “Jean Monnet Module on the European Union and contemporary international migration: an interdisciplinary approach” (2016–2019); website: eumigro.eu. Contact at: marta.pachocka@sgh.waw.pl.

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on migration and asylum. The article presents the migration and asylum situation in the Visegrad Group countries in recent years, then it discusses the V4 response to the migrant and refugee crisis and the EU solutions with a special focus on relocation and resettlement schemes and finally it provides the content analysis of the V4 official documents.

Keywords: Visegrad Group, V4, European Union, EU, Europe, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, Czech Republic, European Agenda on Migration, migration, asylum, migrant crisis, refugee crisis, migrant and refugee crises, relocation, resettlement, EU migration and asylum policy

Introduction

At least since 2014 the European Union (EU) has been facing the migrant and refugee crises, which have become an important test of solidarity of the Member States (MS). The effectiveness of the common migration and asylum policy has proven to be limited. The crises became a destabilizing factor leading to disagreements and divisions between MS. The position of the Visegrad Group (V4) states stood out in the debate on migration and refugee challenges. The objective of this article is to examine to what extent the migrant and refugee crises 2014+ in Europe, the limited effectiveness of the EU migration and asylum policy and the differences between the MS in their approaches influenced the situation, in which the Visegrad states attempted to find a common voice, strengthen their position in the EU and formulate the basis for the future regional common policy on migration and asylum. The article presents the migration and asylum situation in the Visegrad Group countries in recent years, then it discusses the V4 response to the migrant and refugee crisis and the EU solutions with a special focus on relocation and resettlement schemes and finally it provides the content analysis of the V4 official documents.

1. Migration and asylum situation in the V4 countries in times of the migrant and refugee crises 2014+ in Europe – an overview

Taking into consideration the recent developments in Europe and its neighbourhood in the field of migration and asylum, the term ‘crisis’ has been often used in media coverage, political discourse and academic debate since 2014 to describe the ongoing situation.2 In fact, there are at least

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two overlapping and interdependent crises that can be identified. The migration crisis, which is demographic in nature, manifests itself through an increasing number of people crossing the EU external borders, both legally and illegally. Simultaneously, it is the largest refugee crisis since World War II if we consider the high numbers of newcomers from North Africa and the Middle East, often forced to flee their countries of origin, many of who seek international protection in Europe.³ So far, 2015 was the peak year of the crisis in terms of numbers, while 2016 is characterized by the decrease in the number of migrants due to the implementation of the EU–Turkey Statement from March 2016.

It is difficult to show a comprehensive and precise picture of the migration and refugee crises in the EU as data sets used to describe it are gathered by various national, international and non-governmental bodies according to different methodologies for their own analytical purposes. This is why the EU took steps to standardize the data collected in the field of migration and international protection from its MS and some other countries in early 2000s. In 2008 Joint Annual International Migration Data Collection was established under the requirements of Regulation (EC) 862/2007 of the European Parliament and of the Council on Community statistics on migration and international protection⁴ which is administrated by Eurostat⁵.

According to the Frontex data, there were more than 1.82 million detections of illegal border-crossing between border crossing points (BCPs) along the EU external borders in 2015, a 6-fold increase when compared with 2014. In addition, 701.6 thousand cases of persons staying illegally on the EU territory were detected in 2015 in comparison to 425 thou-

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sand in 2014. Similarly to the previous year, in 2015 among eight main migratory routes to Europe regularly monitored by Frontex, only three were of key importance due to the highest number of arrivals, i.e. Eastern Mediterranean route (885,386), Western Balkan route (764,038) and Central Mediterranean route (153,946). In this context the so called Eastern borders route to the EU through Poland was of little significance with the number of detections of 1.9 thousand in 2015 and 1.3 thousand one year prior. In total, in 2015 the highest number of people crossing the border illegally originated in Syria and Afghanistan. They predominantly arrived from Turkey to Greece.

Frontex statistics can be supplemented with the data on the number of people crossing the Mediterranean Sea to reach Europe published by the UNHCR. There were more than one million sea arrivals by the Mediterranean to European countries only in 2015 with the highest number recorded in Greece (more than 850 thousand people) and Italy (more than 150 thousand people). UN Agency for Refugees assumes that the vast majority of them were in need of international protection and were forced to move from their country of origin or previous usual residence. Among top ten nationalities of migrants were Syrians (49%), Afghans (21%) and Iraqis (9%). Moreover, there were 3.5 thousand persons considered dead or went missing in 2014 and 3.8 thousand in 2015 in comparison to 600 in 2013. From 1 January until 26 May 2016 it was the case of at least 1.4 thousand people. One must be aware that Frontex and UNHCR numbers are underestimated as many people were not detected and not recorded on their way through the sea or while crossing the EU external borders.

The EU Member States have been affected unevenly by the crises in terms of numbers and consequences. Among them, there are frontline and first reception countries for migrants (e.g. Greece, Italy), transitory countries (e.g. Hungary, Croatia, and France), target countries (e.g. Germany, the UK) and countries not affected directly (e.g. Poland, Slovakia). The different experience of these countries was one of the key factors that strongly influenced both the official positions taken by the governments of EU members towards the crises and the attempts to solve them at the EU level.

The increasing number of migrants in Europe has resulted in the increasing number of asylum applications, in other words applications for interna-

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7  Ibidem, pp. 16–17.

tional protection, submitted in European countries. According to the Regulation (EC) 862/2007 the international protection procedures in EU MS can lead to different outcomes that are reported to the Eurostat. The asylum claim may be rejected or approved and consequently the applicant may be granted: a refugee status (under Geneva Convention 1951), a subsidiary protection status, an authorisation to stay for humanitarian reasons under national law concerning international protection or a temporary protection status under EU legislation. The so called humanitarian protection is not harmonized at the EU level and is not reported to the EU by all MS.9

Having in mind the overall picture of the crisis in Europe and its neighbourhood since 2014, it is important to take a closer look at the situation in the field of migration and asylum in Visegrad countries compared to the EU where relevant. Since 2008 the number of asylum applicants in the EU-28 has been growing year by year. There were 225 150 asylum applications submitted from outside the EU-28 (Figure 1) in 2008, which was the first year of the EU-wide data collection on migration and international protection. In 2011 their number exceeded 300 thousand. They were 431 090 in 2013, 626 960 in 2014 and 1 321 600 in 2015. This means that between 2008 and 2015 this number increased almost 5-fold, while between 2014 and 2015 the growth was 2-fold.10

Figure 1. Asylum applications from outside the EU-28 in 2008–2015

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza] (last visited 26.05.2016).

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10 Eurostat, Asylum and first time asylum applicants by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) [migr_asyappctza] (last visited 26.05.2016).
Asylum applications submitted in four Visegrad states, including first time applications, represented 8.4% of the total 626,960 applications for the EU-28 in 2014 and 14.4% of 1.3 million one year later. It was not a very significant contribution while comparing to the top EU receiving state – Germany with a share of 32.3% in 2014 and 36.1% in 2015. However, one of V4 countries stood out in 2015 because of a high increase of asylum applicants recorded in absolute and relative terms. It was the case of Hungary due to its geographical proximity to the Western Balkan migration route, the importance of which increased in 2015.

In 2014 asylum applications submitted in Hungary equalled 6.8% of the total for the EU-28 and in 2015 their share grew almost 2-fold to 13.4% (Table 1). Poland’s contribution was much lower and amounted to 1.3% in 2014 and only 0.9% a year later. The total contribution of the Czech Republic and Slovakia should be considered as marginal and symbolic in relative terms. It fell from 0.3% to 0.1% in the 2014–2015 period. In absolute terms the number of applications for international protection in Hungary saw an increase from 42.8 thousand to 177.1 thousand. At the same time, for the other three Visegrad countries it increased from 17.6 thousand in 2014 to 36.4 thousand in 2015. In all V4 states, both in 2014 and 2015, first time asylum applications prevailed.

**Figure 2. Asylum applications from outside the EU-28 in V4 states in 2008–2015**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Hungary</th>
<th>Poland</th>
<th>Czech Republic</th>
<th>Slovakia</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>20000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>40000</td>
<td>40000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>60000</td>
<td>60000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>80000</td>
<td>80000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2012</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>100000</td>
<td>100000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>120000</td>
<td>120000</td>
<td>120000</td>
<td>120000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2014</td>
<td>140000</td>
<td>140000</td>
<td>140000</td>
<td>140000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2015</td>
<td>160000</td>
<td>160000</td>
<td>160000</td>
<td>160000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Figure 1.
Table 1. Asylum applications from outside the EU-28 in V4 states in 2014–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th>% of EU-28 2014</th>
<th>2015</th>
<th>% of EU-28 2015</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>626,960</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>1,321,600</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>42,775</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>177,135</td>
<td>13.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8,020</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>12,190</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,515</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: as Figure 1.

As shown in Table 2, 366,850 first instance decisions were made by the national authorities of 28 EU Member States in 2014, 46% of which were positive. In 2015 the total number of first instance decisions in the EU-28 was 592,845, and recognition rate understood as a share of total positive decisions in the total of first instance decisions, increased to 52%. Among Visegrad states the most first instance decisions were issued by Hungary in 2014 (5.4 thousand) and by Poland in 2015 (3.5 thousand). In 2014 recognition rate was the highest for Slovakia (61%) and even exceeded the rate for the EU-28 (46%). However, we have to remember, that this was the state with the lowest number of applications submitted that year (only 330). It means that far fewer asylum procedures were to be carried out and consequently public authorities dealing with the asylum mechanism were not as burdened. Slovakia was followed by the Czech Republic (38%), Poland (27%) and Hungary (9%). This data shows that Hungary, a V4 country with the highest number of asylum applications, issued relatively few decisions in absolute terms, 90% of which were negative. The situation was similar in 2015 with Slovakia characterised by 62% of positive decisions and followed by the Czech Republic with 34%. Recognition rate fell to 18% in case of Poland and grew to 15% for Hungary. The rate for the EU of 52% was surpassed once again only by Slovakia.
Table 2. First instance total positive decisions and recognition rate in V4 states 2014–2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th></th>
<th>2014</th>
<th></th>
<th>2015</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Asylum applications</td>
<td>Total first instance decisions</td>
<td>Total positive decisions (granting any form of international protection)</td>
<td>Recognition rate (positive out of total decisions), %</td>
<td>Asylum applications</td>
<td>Total first instance decisions</td>
<td>Total positive decisions (granting any form of international protection)</td>
<td>Recognition rate (positive out of total decisions), %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU-28</td>
<td>626</td>
<td>960</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>385</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>1 321</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>307</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>5445</td>
<td>510</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>177 135</td>
<td>3 420</td>
<td>505</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>8 020</td>
<td>2 700</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1 515</td>
<td>1 335</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>1 145</td>
<td>1 000</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>1 515</td>
<td>1 335</td>
<td>460</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) (migr_asydcfsta) (last visited 26.05.2016) and as Figure 1.

First instance positive decisions issued in 2014–2015 in the Visegrad states covered three forms of international protection granted to applicants, i.a. refugee status under Geneva Convention 1951, subsidiary protection and humanitarian protection. In the EU-28 in absolute terms refugee status was granted most often (95.4 thousand), while around 56.3 thousand people were given subsidiary protection and 15.7 thousand humanitarian protection. In 2015 the number of first instance decisions increased by 140.2 thousand reaching a total of 307 620: the number of people given refugee status increased 2.4-fold, while the number of people being granted humanitarian protection increased only slightly (+6,4 thousand) and the number referring to subsidiary protection reported an insignificant decrease. As we can see from Figure 3, at the EU-level the most commonly granted form of international protection in 2014 was refugee status (57% of positive decisions). Subsidiary protection status was granted in 34% of cases, while humanitarian protection in 9%. The distribution of decisions issued by types of international protection granted varied among V4 countries. In contrast to the EU level, in neither Visegrad states refugee status was the main
form of international protection granted – the most people received this status in Hungary (47% of all positive decisions) followed by Poland (36%) and the Czech Republic (20%), while nobody was granted refugee status in Slovakia. In Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary the largest proportion of applicants received subsidiary protection which is usually offered in situations of generalised violence in the country of origin. It was 76%, 56% and 49% respectively. In Poland most applicants were granted humanitarian protection (41%).

Figure 3. Types of first instance positive decisions by types (forms) of international protection granted to applicants in V4 states in 2014

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) (migr_asydcfsta) (last visited 26.05.2016).

According to Figure 4, in 2015 the importance of refugee status increased significantly in the EU to 75% of all positive first instance decisions taken in 28 MS. At the same time the share of cases of granting subsidiary protection dropped to 18%, and the share of people having received humanitarian protection was 7%. In the Visegrad states the Geneva Convention refugee status was granted in 55% of cases in Poland, 29% in Hungary, 12% in the Czech Republic and 6% in Slovakia. Subsidiary protection gained in importance as the dominant form of international protection in the Czech Republic (85%) and in Hungary (70%). It was also given in case of half of the positive decisions in Slovakia and 26% in Poland. Humanitarian protection was most commonly granted in Slovakia (44%).

It is worth noting that in the state which has been influenced by the migration and refugee crises the most out of the V4 countries – Hungary – the number of asylum applications increased significantly in absolute terms on a year-to-year basis, the number of first instance decisions dropped, while
the number of positive decisions remained stable, resulting in the recognition rate’s increase from 9% to 15%, which is still a low number in comparison to the EU as a whole. It is also interesting to look at the distribution of different types of international protection granted. In 2014, in Hungary the refugee status and subsidiary protection decision shares were on a similar level of 47% and 49% respectively, while just a year earlier, the most popular form of international protection was subsidiary protection at 70%.

**Figure 4. Types of first instance positive decisions by types (forms) of international protection granted to applicants in V4 states in 2015**

![Graph showing distribution of positive decisions by type of protection in V4 states in 2015](source)

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, First instance decisions on applications by citizenship, age and sex Annual aggregated data (rounded) (migr_asydcfsta) (last visited 26.05.2016).

In accordance with art. 1 par. 1 (b) and (f) of Regulation (EC) No 862/2007 an immigrant is a person undertaking immigration denoted as ‘the action by which a person establishes his or her usual residence in the territory of a Member State for a period that is, or is expected to be, of at least 12 months, having previously been usually resident in another Member State or a third country.’ It means that data provided by Eurostat focuses on long-term immigration, also to Visegrad states. Below, immigration is briefly discussed to V4 states taking into consideration three criteria: citizenship, country of birth11 and previous country of residence.12

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11 Country of birth denotes ‘the country of residence (in its current borders, if information is available) of the mother at the time of the birth or, in default, the country (in its current borders, if information is available) in which the birth took place’ (art 1. par. 1 (c) of Regulation (EC) 862/2007).

12 It refers to the ‘usual residence’ that means ‘the place at which a person normally spends the daily period of rest, regardless of temporary absences for purposes of recreation, holiday, visits to friends and relatives, business, medical treatment or religious pilgrimage.
Between the years 2010–2014 each year Poland recorded the biggest number of long-term migrants in absolute terms (Table 3, Figure 5) among Visegrad states. The number of immigrants rose by 43% from 155 131 in 2010 to 222 275 in 2014. At the same time Hungary was exhibiting an upwards trend with the number of immigrants rising from 25 519 people to 54 581. In case of the Czech Republic the number of immigrants between 2010 and 2014 dropped by 68%, with the number of migrants of fewer than 30 thousand people in 2014. Slovakia saw the fall from 13 770 in 2010 to 5357 in 2014.

**Table 3. Immigration to V4 states in 2010–2014**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>2010</th>
<th>2011</th>
<th>2012</th>
<th>2013</th>
<th>2014</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>155 131</td>
<td>157 059</td>
<td>217 546</td>
<td>220 311</td>
<td>222 275</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>25 519</td>
<td>28 018</td>
<td>33 702</td>
<td>38 968</td>
<td>54 581</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>48 317</td>
<td>27 114</td>
<td>34 337</td>
<td>30 124</td>
<td>29 897</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>13 770</td>
<td>4 829</td>
<td>5 419</td>
<td>5 149</td>
<td>5 357</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and country of birth [migr_imm3ctb] (last visited: 26.05.2016).

**Figure 5. Immigration to V4 states in 2010–2014**

Source: as Table 3.

or, in default, the place of legal or registered residence’ (art. 1 par. 1 (a) of Regulation (EC) 862/2007).
The rates of immigration in the Visegrad countries in 2010–2014 inform about the number of immigrants per 1000 inhabitants of a state in a given year. Relative to the size of the resident population, it is Poland that has been recording the highest number of immigrants per 1000 people since 2011 followed by Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia. In 2014 there were approximately 6 immigrants per 1000 persons in Poland, similarly to the numbers from 2012–2013. Hungary saw an increase from 4 to 6 people between 2013 and 2014. In the years 2011–2014 Slovakia had a marginal immigration rate of 1 immigrant per 1000 inhabitants. For the Czech Republic it was constant at around 3 people per 1000 inhabitants since 2011.

**Figure 6. Immigrants in V4 states per 1 000 people in 2010–2014**

![Figure 6. Immigrants in V4 states per 1 000 people in 2010–2014](image-url)

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship (migr_imm1ctz); Population on 1 January by five year age group, sex and citizenship (migr_pop1ctz) (last visited 26.05.2016).

In 2014 immigrants with the citizenship of their target state, called ‘nationals’, constituted over half of the immigrants to Poland (58%), Slovakia (55%) and Hungary (52%). The Czech Republic was an outlier, since for this country, foreign immigrants represented 81% of the total number. At the same time the biggest share of the citizens of non-EU-28 states among immigrants in 2014 was similar for three Visegrad states, i.e. for the Czech Republic (31%), Poland (30%) and Hungary (28%).
Slovakia was an exception with 8% of non-national immigrants from other than EU countries. All of this means that the immigration into the Visegrad states, excluding the Czech Republic, encompassed in 2014 at least half of its nationals.\textsuperscript{13}

In 2014 there were 131,795 native-born immigrants to all Visegrad states, which amounted to 42% of total immigration of 312,110 people. The contribution of foreign-born population born outside the EU-28 within the total immigration to V4 countries was 34%, which meant, that among the immigrants to the Visegrad states native-born (in a reporting state) and born in one of the EU-28 were the majority. Most native-born immigrants came to Poland – they constituted half of the total immigration inflow to that country in 2014. For the other three countries the share varied from 15% for Slovakia up to 26% in the Czech Republic. Another interesting observation was that almost half of the immigrants to Hungary in 2014 were people born outside the EU-28. In the case of Slovakia, the number was the lowest at 19%.\textsuperscript{14}

The analysis of immigration by state of previous residence allows to conclude that the share of immigrants staying previously outside the EU territory was the highest for Hungary and Czech Republic, constituting almost half of all. For Poland 84,644 persons arrived in 2014 from non-EU Member States, which stood for 38%. For Slovakia the same rate was at 20%.\textsuperscript{15}

As Figure 7 shows the Visegrad states varied in terms of their migration balance in the period of 2010–2014 and migration situation of each country evolved from year to year. Hungary was the only V4 country, which every year was a net immigration state. The Czech Republic was a net immigration state with the exception of 2013. Slovakia was a net emigration country in 2010, but since 2011 it has recorded a positive migration balance. Poland in 2010 was a net immigration country, but in the years 2011–2014 it noted a negative migration balance, with more emigrants than immigrants.

\textsuperscript{13} Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and citizenship (migr_imm1ctz) (last visited 26.05.2016).

\textsuperscript{14} Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and country of birth (migr_imm3ctb) (last visited: 26.05.2016).

\textsuperscript{15} Eurostat, Immigration by five year age group, sex and country of previous residence (migr_imm5prv) (last visited: 26.05.2016).
Figure 7. Net migration plus statistical adjustment in V4 states in 2010–2014

Source: author’s own elaboration based on: Eurostat, Population change – Demographic balance and crude rates at national level (demo_gind) (last visited 26.05.2016).

In 2014 slightly more than half of the EU-28 were countries of net immigration (Figure 8). This group, however, was diversified – the biggest absolute value was reached by Germany (583,503 people) and the smallest one by Slovakia (1,713 people). Among the 13 countries of net emigration, Slovenia was the country with the lowest net migration (-490 persons), while Spain noted the highest negative balance (-94,976 people). Three of out of four Visegrad states – Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia – were among net immigration states of the EU, while Poland was the only net emigration state. Slovakia was close to the state of balance.

2. V4 countries towards the migrant and refugee crises and the EU response: the case of the relocation and resettlement schemes

Due to intensifying migratory movements into the EU territory since 2014 and a growing number of Member States affected by the scale and pace of developments, the European Union started to look for the solutions in the framework of a common migration and asylum policy. Therefore, in early March 2015 work started on the European Agenda on Migration (EAM), and the European Commission (EC) announced it in mid-May 2015.16 EAM covered an immediate action plan to solve

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the difficulties in the Mediterranean, as well as medium- and long-term measures. The relocation and resettlement schemes were proposed under the Commission's Agenda as part of immediate steps to be taken by the EU and its members. Initially, the overall goal of the relocation mechanism was to transfer asylum seekers arriving in large numbers to the EU from the most affected EU countries such as Italy and Greece to other MS in accordance with the mandatory distribution key. In turn, the resettlement mechanism aimed at a safe and legal transfer of an increasing number of people in need of international protection from third countries to the EU. The common distribution key for both EU relocation and resettlement schemes proposed in the agenda was based on measurable and weighted criteria to estimate the capacity of each Member State to take in refugees. They were as follows: (1) the size of the population (40%) to reflect the capacity of a state to absorb a certain number of refugees, (2) total GDP (40%) to show the absolute wealth of a state and the capacity of a national economy to absorb and integrate refugees, (3) the average number of asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees per 1 million inhabitants in 2010–2014 (10%) to indicate the efforts made by a state in the recent past, and (4) the unemployment rate (10%) to reflect the capacity of a state to integrate refu-

eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/policies/european-agendamigration/background-
24information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf
(last visited 26.05.2016).
Details of these mechanisms were subject to further works and adjustments, among other things, in terms of participating states, the total number of asylum seekers to be relocated or resettled in the EU and the key of their distribution among countries involved.

On 27 May 2015, the Commission presented the first package of measures to be implemented under the European Agenda on Migration. It proposed to, in the period of 2 years, relocate a total of 40 thousand asylum seekers according to the mandatory distribution key to different EU MS mostly from Italy (24 thousand) and from Greece (16 thousand). The second package was announced by the Commission on 9 September 2015 and it included a temporary two-year relocation mechanism for another 120 thousand asylum seekers from Italy (15.6 thousand), Greece (50.4 thousand) and Hungary (54 thousand) to other EU MS based on the mandatory distribution key. Commission’s proposals were approved by the European Parliament (EP).

Following the Commission’s proposal of May 2015, on 14 September 2015 the Council adopted through unanimous vote the Decision (EU) 2015/1523 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, according to which, based on a voluntary distribution scheme from 20 July 2015 Italy and Greece would be able to relocate 40 thousand asylum seekers to other MS over the period of two years. These were supplemented by the adoption of the second Decision (EU) 2015/1601, on 22 September, which was to implement provisional measures to aid frontline Italy and Greece. Even despite the fact that the Commission’s proposal from 9 September also related to Hungary, this country did not want to take advantage of the emergency relocation scheme as it did not think of itself as a ‘frontline state’. As a result, the proposal was reworked and passed, on 22 September by a qualified majority vote (Slovakia, the Czech Republic, Romania and Hungary voted against while Finland abstained). It put in place a time-limited and exceptional mechanism to relocate 120 thousand asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other MS, 66 thousand in the first year, and the remaining 54 thousand in the second. Only the people in clear need of international protection were to fall under this scheme.

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19 Ibidem.
To sum up, in September 2015 two Decisions\textsuperscript{20} concerning the temporary emergency relocation scheme, based on the EC proposals, were adopted by the Council of the European Union (CEU). According to these decisions the total of 160 thousand asylum seekers from Italy and Greece (and from other MS if relevant) should be relocated by September 2017 to other EU MS to undergo the asylum procedure.\textsuperscript{21}

In the meantime, the European Resettlement Scheme proposed by the Commission in May-June 2015 was adopted by the Council of the European Union on 20 July 2015 establishing a two-year resettlement system of over 22 thousand people in clear need of international protection from outside of the EU to the EU MS.\textsuperscript{22} Moreover, as a result of negotiations held since late November 2015, the EU and Turkey agreed in their statement of 18 March 2016 that for every Syrian returned from the Greek islands to Turkey another Syrian national will be resettled directly from Turkey to the EU. In this way, so called ‘1:1 mechanism’ was set up as a part of resettlement scheme.\textsuperscript{23}

As of 13 May 2016 effective relocation from Greece and Italy covered 1 500 persons, including 909 persons from Greece and 591 from Italy. Most people in absolute numbers were relocated from Greece to France (362 persons), the Netherlands (142), Finland (111) and Portugal (89), bearing in mind the fact that relocation took place to 16 EU MS. Effective relocation from Italy concerned 11 EU members and Switzerland. The highest number of asylum seekers in this case were relocated to Finland (148 persons), France (137), Portugal (122) and the Netherlands (50). Based on the information received from the European countries involved, 6321 persons out of the total number of 22 504 people have been resettled by 13 May 2016 since the launch of the European Resettlement Scheme in 2015. This number included people resettled under the 20 July scheme and 1:1 agreement between the EU and Turkey. So far 13 EU members

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\textsuperscript{22} Ibidem.

(Austria, Belgium, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Lithuania, the Netherlands, Sweden and the United Kingdom) and four associated Schengen States (Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland) received the resettled people. Most people in need of international protection from outside of the EU under the 20 July scheme were resettled to the United Kingdom (1864) and Austria (1443). In the framework of 1:1 mechanism in force since 4 April 2016 the total number of the resettled was 177 Syrians from Turkey to Sweden (55 persons), the Netherlands (52), Germany (54), Finland (11) and Lithuania (5).24

From the beginning these were the Visegrad Group countries that were opposed to obligatory migrant quotas for refugee relocation. Concerning this topic, at the EU and members’ levels, before the Council Decisions of September 2015 were adopted, these countries vouched their support for migrant quotas based on a voluntary approach.25 They officially expressed their common attitude in the V4 Prime Ministers’ joint statement issued on 4 September 2015 and later on, in the joint declaration of the V4 Ministers of the Interior on 19 January 2016. Three out of four Visegrad states – the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary – voted against the Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing a temporary procedure for additional 120 thousand persons in clear need of international protection to be relocated from Italy and Greece to other EU MS over the next two years.26 Poland was not among the countries voting against, which undermined the supposed unity of the Visegrad states. Interestingly, it was Romania that voted against as the fourth country refusing its support, and Finland abstained. On 2 December 2015, Slovakia brought before the Court of Justice of the European Union an action for annulment of the Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece (pending case C-643/15). This step was followed by a similar move by Hungary on 3 December 2015 (pending case C-647/15).27

As of May 2016, the Czech Republic is the only Visegrad country that effectively relocated any asylum seeker from Greece – namely 4 persons,

24 European Commission, Relocation and resettlement – State of Play, op.cit.
26 European Parliament, Legislation on emergency..., op.cit.
and there was no effective relocation from Italy to V4 states. Also Czech Republic is the only country from the Visegrad Group that resettled 52 persons in need of international protection under the 20 July 2015 scheme. These were 32 asylum seekers from Lebanon and 20 from Jordan.28

By mid-May 2016 the total number of so called ‘formal pledges’ made by EU MS in the framework of the relocation process from Italy and Greece was limited. The formal pledges are understood as the indications of readiness to relocate applicants for international protection from Greece or Italy under the temporary emergency relocation scheme submitted by each Member State.29

According to the third report of the Commission on relocation and resettlement from mid-May 2016, there were 5736 formal pledges by MS (1658 to Italy and 4078 to Greece) with Austria,30 Hungary and Slovakia not submitting any. Additionally, Germany and Poland have not honoured their obligation to report every three months how many applicants they can accept under the relocation scheme. What is more, most MS, including Croatia, Czech Republic, Germany and the Netherlands, did not submit pledges large enough to allow them to meet their allocation targets established by the Council Decisions, whereas Poland and Spain stood out by having pledged 5% or less of their allocation. Meanwhile, the Czech Republic, Bulgaria and Estonia rejected relocation requests without sufficient grounds, while Poland effectively suspended the relocation procedure by freezing the processing of relocation requests from the Greek Asylum Service and from Italy since April 2016.31

3. V4 official political discourse towards migrant and refugee crises 2014+ and the EU response

As the study concerns the V4 states considered as one group of countries, hence the interest in this part of the paper is concentrated on the of-

29 Ibidem, p. 3.
30 The processing of 30% of asylum seekers allocated to Austria (Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601) was frozen for one year, which affects 1 065 persons. However, the remaining allocations are expected to be processed normally.
ficial approach and the resulting position of the Visegrad Group towards the migrant and refugee crises 2014+ and the solutions proposed at the EU level. Consequently, the analysis does not cover the overview of national approaches of these four countries. The content analysis of the V4 official documents includes the period from early 2014 to April 2016, taking into account such key issues as: international migration, international protection, asylum and borders.

There are several strategic documents for the Visegrad initiative that are the basis for the functioning of the group with three on the top known as Visegrad Declarations adopted in 1991, 2004 and 2011. Another key document is Contents of Visegrad Cooperation approved by the Prime Ministers’ Summit Bratislava in 1999 with its annex approved by the Prime Ministers at the summit in Esztergom in 2002. Other V4 source documents include joint statements and declarations (general ones and on specific topics such as migration) and annual presidency programs and reports.32

In 2014 most of common Visegrad official statements were concentrated on Ukraine-related issues and defence cooperation as well as V4 relations with some partners such as Slovenia and Austria, Bulgaria and Romania, Swiss Confederation, the Republic of Korea and the Eastern Partnership.33 Along with the further escalation of the migrant and refugee crises in Europe in 2015, this topic became one of the key issues raised and discussed at the forum of the Visegrad Group. Since then it has regularly appeared in political statements and declarations during different meetings. A brief overview of a common approach of Visegrad countries to migration and refugee crises based on the official V4 documents follows, with the aim to examine the evolution of the approach towards migration, the context in which it is communicated and the way it is presented.

The Foreign Affairs Committees of the national parliaments of the Visegrad Group countries in their conclusions from the meeting held on 25 February 2015 in Bratislava referred to the difficult and unstable situation in the Middle East emphasizing that ‘[...] the politically fragile situation in Iraq, the war in Syria, later exacerbated by military activities of ISIL in both Syria and Iraq, have contributed to the largest wave of refugees since World War II. The efforts to deal with this humanitarian crisis have so far proven insufficient and inadequate. Therefore, the

V4 Parliamentarians call on their governments to increase the support to sustain the needs of the refugees, internally displaced persons, as well as protect religious minorities, including Christians’.34

Ministers of Foreign Affairs of Visegrad, Nordic and Baltic countries met in the High Tatras on 12 and 13 March 2015 for their third regular meeting. Discussing the current foreign and security policy issues, they stressed that: ‘terrorism and violent extremism, mainly related to the situation in Syria and Iraq and the threat represented by ISIL/Daesh to the region as well as its possible global impact’ require ‘a systematic and comprehensive approach as well as long-term commitment covering various areas such as military means, fight against terrorism and radicalization, migration, stabilisation efforts as well as humanitarian assistance’.35

On 19 June 2015 in Bratislava the issues concerning migration and the crisis in Europe have been raised several times by the V4 policy-makers in various contexts. The Prime Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia in their Bratislava Declaration of the Visegrad Group Heads of Government on a Stronger CSDP stated that: ‘The security environment of Europe is dynamic and unpredictable, with threats growing in EU’s imminent neighbourhood and beyond. [...] In the South, a belt of weak and destabilized states now stretches from North Africa via the Horn of Africa to Iraq and Yemen, creating an environment conducive to challenges like unprecedented migration flows. In this context, we underline the necessity of a balanced and inclusive approach, addressing threats and challenges that the EU faces both in the East and the South. [...] The urgency and complexity of these challenges demand that the EU acts with unity and solidarity, based on a common strategic vision. The Visegrad countries stand ready to bear their share of responsibility for European security as a whole and play an active role in addressing the challenges in both the Eastern and Southern neighbourhoods’.36

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On the same day in their joint statement on the area of migration the Heads of Governments of the Visegrad states declared their readiness to examine the outcome of the Commission’s package from 27 May 2015 referring to the EAM in an effort to work out a more fundamental approach to migration which would take into account both the Western Balkan route and the Eastern route. They also mentioned contradictory consequences of the mandatory redistribution scheme and argued for the effective return of the people who are not in clear need of international protection.37

Finally, in the press statement issued on the occasion of the summit of V4 Prime Ministers and the President of the French Republic on 19 June 2015 in Bratislava migration and the related circumstances in the Mediterranean were deemed tragic and recognized as needing both short- and long-term measures for a satisfactory resolution and to save lives of the migrants. Both V4 states and France supported the European Agenda on Migration and stated that they look forward to the European Council meeting of June 25–26 to outline and decide on measures to tackle the issue.38

In September 2015 there was an extraordinary Visegrad Group Summit in Prague dedicated to migration issues. On this occasion the V4 Prime Ministers announced their joint statement on 4 September. They underlined that ‘migration flows present a complex and serious challenge for the EU and its Member States’, including one of the Visegrad states – Hungary – that was among those EU members most exposed to migratory pressures and affected by their impacts. Heads of four Central European governments declared that ‘they will continue to fulfil their obligations under the EU acquis, including the responsibility to protect the EU and Schengen Area external borders.’ On one hand V4 countries ensured that, so far, they have been actively involved in the process of defining and implementing measures in response to migration challenges. On the other hand, they confirmed their further contribution to the joint EU actions among other things, through: enhancing bilateral assistance and aid schemes with particular focus on countries of transit and origin such as Turkey, Jordan, Lebanon, Iraq; providing experts and technical equipment for Frontex, European Asylum Support Office (EASO), Western Balkan states and other most exposed countries; using the potential of


the foreign development cooperation in the field of migration; increasing involvement in the EU Common Security and Defence Policy mission combating smugglers and traffickers; further supporting the international coalition fighting Da’esh in Iraq and Syria to help fight the root causes of migration.39

The Prime Ministers also drew attention to the key elements to be included in the EU common approach towards the migration crisis for the coming months. They expected among others the protection of the external borders of the EU; a full implementation of the EU asylum system, especially Dublin regulation; an effective return policy and readmission agreements; hotspot-like structures to be set up with EU assistance in the most affected transit countries, including Western Balkans migration route; as well as EU Common Security and Defence Policy missions. They also requested a more balanced distribution of the EU financial assistance so that it does not focus only on the Mediterranean region. Moreover, they called for ‘preserving the voluntary nature of EU solidarity measures’ with the assumption that each EU Member State should take lessons and implement best practices based on its own experience. In addition, ‘principles agreed at the highest political level, including in European Council conclusions must be respected’ and ‘any proposal leading to introduction of mandatory and permanent quota for solidarity measures would be unacceptable’.40

More active contribution of the EU and its MS is necessary to improve the political situation in Libya, Syria and the Middle East with the involvement of all relevant global players, including the UN, the USA and Russia, to provide stabilization, recovery and reconstruction in the migrant-sending countries. Moreover, the EU should cooperate more closely with the countries of origin and transit and lead a coordinated effort joined by other global players to fight irregular migration and its root causes. The four countries of the CE region underlined the problem of irregular migration, which should be countered by, among other things, supporting the struggle to combat trafficking and organized crime as well as by intensifying cooperation in this area with the international community, including the United Nations, African Union and the Arab League.41

40 Ibidem.
41 Ibidem.
The V4 reiterated the above-mentioned issues in their Prime Ministers’ joint statement adopted on 3 December 2015 in Prague during the Visegrad Group Summit, clearly and decisively presenting their attitude that while it is important to address the challenges related to migration, other EU policies (e.g. cohesion policy) must remain unaffected, or any proposal will be rejected. Likewise, they expressed a strong belief that the proper functioning of Schengen area should be a key goal for all the EU MS to allow free movement of people. This should be ensured while respecting the rules within the existing legislative framework. Attempts to establish ‘mini-Schengens’ in any form and of any scope are a step back for the European integration and do not tackle the root causes of the problem but only divert attention. Moreover, the V4 countries pledged to continue to strengthen the protection of EU external borders (supporting Frontex and EASO with experts, implementing hotspots with detention function, speedy asylum procedures, rigorous registration and fingerprinting rules), also by assisting other affected countries, with special attention given to the Western Balkans. They also embraced the outcome of the EU–Turkey summit held on 29 November 2015 such as the implementation of instruments to stabilize and control the influx of migrants from the south and supported the EU-Turkish dialogue as a whole.\footnote{Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Countries, Prague, 3 December 2015, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-151204 (last visited 26.05.2016).}

In a similarly decisive manner the V4 Prime Ministers expressed their opinions in a joint statement of the Visegrad Group countries in Brussels on 17 December 2015 on the occasion of the European Council meeting. The Visegrad Group’s attention was focused on: elimination of the root causes of migratory pressure in Europe, EU and its members’ full control at the external border and their effective protection (systematic and coordinated security checks, a truly functional system of hotspots) and maintenance and improvement of Schengen area. They once again stressed the priority of registering and fingerprinting the arriving migrants and adding detention capacity to hotspots in the frontline as a way to assume control over the external borders of the EU, which they insisted should be done before any other measures are considered and current measures are assessed.\footnote{Joint Statement of the Visegrad Group Countries, Brussels, 17 December 2015, http://www.visegradgroup.eu/calendar/2015/joint-statement-of-the-151221-1 (last visited 26.05.2016).}

Between January and April 2016 the migration issues were also present in the V4 official discourse. First, there was a meeting of Ministers of the Interior of the Visegrad Group in Prague on 19 January 2016, during which
issue of illegal migration was indicated as one of the challenges Europe is currently facing in the field of internal affairs. The representatives of Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia discussed the measures regarding the Western Balkan migration route. In the joint declaration of Ministers of the Interior of the Visegrad Group, Slovenia, Serbia and Macedonia agreed on the need to stabilize the way migration is managed in Europe and to further enhance the way the external EU borders are protected to reduce migration pressure. To this end, they claimed it is crucial to consistently register and identify all people arriving to the EU at, so called hotspots, to restore full control of the border and help distinguish refugees, who are in need of international protection from economic migrants, who should be returned to their countries of origin. They also expressed the opinion that the issues of migration are linked to the proper functioning of the Schengen area, which is seen as one of key achievements of European integration with its free movement of people and goods. They agreed that any attempts to restrict it which will not be in accordance with the EU legal framework will be rejected. Additionally, they stressed again that any measures, such as revisiting the Dublin regulation, can only be considered once control over EU external border is regained, and the influx of migrants is reduced. They also agreed to reject proposals that suggested to relocate migrants entering the EU automatically. The V4 Ministers ensured their will to continue cooperation with the EU MS efforts to regain control over the EU external border, also regarding the route through Western Balkans. Simultaneously, they stated that the current strategic approach is lacking as it does not lead to reducing the influx of migrants and working out a well-balanced solution to help correctly identify the migrants in real need of international protection from other migrants who abuse asylum and want to enter illegally. In this context, they also stressed the importance of a proper return policy, since the current one is ineffective. Regarding the Western Balkan route the ministers discussed Macedonia’s request for support concerning its migration situation. In response, the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group presented for consideration a draft programme of a possible model of cooperation to be launched in early 2016 with the aim to target the flow through Macedonian-Greek border and thus, reduce the movement of unregistered migrants via this route. This programme is designed to complement the support of the EU, e.g. the Poseidon Rapid Intervention 2015 in Greece coordinated by Frontex.44

Until April 2016, the last official strategic document directly dealing with migration was the joint statement of V4 Prime Ministers on migration gathered at an extraordinary summit in Prague on 15 February 2016 on the occasion of 25th anniversary of the Visegrad Group cooperation. 2015 proved that while the effects of migration on all the countries may differ, there are challenges which have to be tackled by Europe as a whole. Therefore, working out common agendas, tools and programmes is crucial to regain control, by confronting the root causes of migration – such as the war in Syria which should be brought to an end. In this light the Prime Ministers of the Visegrad Group urged to make best use of EU’ and NATO’s instruments and resources to support this cause, and protect EU’s internal borders, while keeping the humanitarian aspects in mind and to swiftly adopt the Council position of ‘European Border and Coast Guard,’ which employs the principle of balance between Member States’ sovereignty and EU competences. Moreover, they recognized the role of Turkey in efforts to resolve the migration situation and the problem of human trafficking and advised to implement European Union-Turkey Joint Action Plan in a timely and effective manner. Overall, they reiterated the importance of preserving Schengen area by assuming control of the external borders of the EU so that EU members’ citizens may continue to benefit from the European integration.45

The issues of migration and the crisis in the EU have not been mentioned in the Program of the Slovak Presidency in the Visegrad Group under the banner of ‘Dynamic Visegrad for Europe and Beyond’ for the period from July 2014 to June 2015.46 However, the events observed in the Mediterranean and in Europe in the first half of 2015 in the field of migration and asylum contributed to the inclusion of these problems into the next Program of the Czech Presidency of the Visegrad Group entitled ‘V4 Trust,’ in force from July 2015 to June 2016. One of the thematic priorities of the Czech Presidency 2015–2016 was formulated as ‘active practising of the solidarity principle in the EU’ assuming that the Czech Republic will ‘continue in the current practice of close cooperation and coordination of positions of the V4 countries both before important EU meetings, as well as during regular meetings at the political and expert level.’ Asylum and migration issues were indicated among key areas of cooperation of V4 Prime Ministers and V4 ministries of the interior during the Czech Presi-

dency. Consequently, a formal meeting of (deputy) ministers regarding EU migration legislature (e.g. European Agenda on Migration) was scheduled during which the ministers responsible for migration were to discuss how to coordinate V4 position on this matter.\textsuperscript{47}

In its report summarizing a one-year Presidency of the Visegrad Group, in reference to new migration challenges having arisen in 2015, Slovakia stated that its Presidency was quick to react to the challenges of migration, which is evident from the fact that these were the main issues discussed in the second half of its mandate. They also recalled the coordination meetings organized, which resulted in a V4 common stance e.g. against the mandatory migration quotas. According to them, the European Council’s conclusions from 25 to 26 June 2015 prove that the V4 position is respected within the European Union, which they count as one of their successes.\textsuperscript{48}

Analysis of the Visegrad Group’s official documents from 2014 to April 2016 shows that the V4 countries have sought to increase interest of the EU and its institutions (EC, Frontex, EASO) in the Western Balkan migration route. A very crucial issue for the Visegrad states seems to be the integrity of the Schengen area, which would not be possible without an effective external border management. In various official Visegrad documents the four Central European states have stressed repeatedly that the EU should have a key focus on the root causes of migration flows (striving for improvement and stabilization of the situation in the countries of origin and transit outside the EU) and on counteracting illegal migration, which encompasses, among other things, prioritizing the struggle with smugglers and human traffickers. It is the EU as a whole that should take care of the most complete implementation of specific solutions to the crisis through i.a. the readmission agreements, hotspots, effective return policy and external border control. Achieving satisfactory results by the EU in this field would condition the V4 activity and involvement in further EU actions. Another important conclusion is that V4 countries pay marginal attention to the situation of refugees themselves, at least in official political discourse expressed in their statements and declarations.


Conclusions

Migrant and asylum situation in the EU and its neighbourhood have been evolving considerably in recent years. The EU has continued to propose its response and implement its solutions to the migrant and refugee crises in specific areas, which caused and will be causing varied reactions from different MS, including the four countries from the Visegrad Group. In this paper a quantitative analysis of statistical data was conducted in order to present the scale of the crises. The qualitative analysis concerning the contents of the Visegrad Group’s official documents was limited to the period from 2014 to April 2016 to provide the most up-to-date picture of the situation.

The analysis carried out clearly shows that the Visegrad countries have been expressing a unified stand for less than a year in an increasing number of issues concerning migration and asylum in the EU. It is however difficult to notice an established common approach which could serve as a firm basis of a new regional common migration and asylum policy. Even though the migration and refugee crises contributed to the rise of interest of V4 states in this matter, it was not because of direct effects of these crises on their territories, but rather as a reaction to the direction of EU response, both short-term actions and the future long-term policy. Since mid-2015 the Visegrad countries have been considering the migration issues in the EU context more often in order to work out a common stand, which could be communicated jointly on the EU forum. It is an effect of an ad hoc reaction to the current events and the need of the moment, and not a committed long-term strategy. In this way, the four Central European countries were able to mark their position in a clearer and stronger manner as opposing some of the EU solutions, for example the relocation scheme.

Visegrad states are not major immigrant-receiving EU countries, not in absolute numbers and not as a percentage of the total migration to the EU. What is more, there is a net emigration state among them, i.e. Poland. The migration and refugee crises affected significantly only one of the four V4 countries since 2015 – Hungary – and only because of its location on the Western Balkan migration route leading from the Mediterranean Sea deeper into Europe. Therefore, with limited migration experience after World War II, the Visegrad states were acting in the analysed period as if they intend to ‘escape forward’ from what is unknown.

Concerning the broad spectrum of different actions proposed under the European Agenda on Migration, the V4 countries were most critical and opposed towards the relocation and resettlement schemes. They
have objected to the compulsory migrant quotas twice at V4 level, first in September 2015 and then in January 2016. What is more, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the Council Decision of 22 September 2015 on relocation of further 120 thousand asylum seekers from Italy and Greece to other EU members. Interestingly, Poland voted in favour of this decision. In December 2015 Slovakia and Hungary challenged this decision in the Court of Justice of the EU. Regardless of their official stand, effectively, the Visegrad Group countries did not take part in the implementation of the relocation and resettlement schemes, except for the Czech Republic, which participated in the discussed period to a limited extent (4 persons relocated from Greece and 52 Syrian asylum seekers resettled from Lebanon and Jordan by 13 May 2016).

While seeking solutions for the migration and refugee crises in Europe and clarifying their stand on the issue, the attention of the V4 countries was turned towards mostly preventing the root causes in the countries of origin and the effective protection of EU external borders from migrants, rather than on immediate actions proposed in the EAM. The analysis of the situation made it possible to notice that these countries had a more positive attitude towards the anti-crisis measures which further their own interests and goals, such as limiting the potential influx of immigrants to their territories. In this spirit Hungary even built fences around its borders with Serbia and Croatia. Retaining the unhindered movement within Schengen zone was one of the key aspects for V4 countries as they believed it furthers the economic cooperation and benefits their citizens. Anti-migrant and anti-refugee rhetoric noticeable from the second half of 2015 in Visegrad states was propagated mostly by the ruling groups; however, it was in line with the eurosceptic moods observed in EU countries, also in Austria or the UK.

The quantitative and qualitative analyses conducted in this paper suggest that the strengthening of the subject cooperation within the V4 in times of crises was not intentional. Undoubtedly, their stand towards the migration and refugee crises and proposed EU-wide solutions, especially the relocation and resettlement schemes, pulled the V4 countries together, however not enough to contribute to the development of deeper cooperation within the V4 in other areas or to favour the institutionalization of the Group as an independent body. It is also not possible to state, that the cooperation under the V4 initiative has been leading to the strengthening of anti-European orientation of governments and societies in these four countries, since rising eurosceptic attitudes and the popularity of xenophobic parties have been observed in other EU countries, including Germany, Austria, Sweden and the Netherlands.
The close cooperation of the four Visegrad countries should therefore be seen as fragmentary and ad hoc. At this time it is difficult to assume that a further institutionalization of the cooperation under the Visegrad Group concerning the issues of migration or the attempts to unify their policy, not as a counter-response to the EU policy in the field of migration and asylum is to be expected. It is evident that the joint expression of their stand as Visegrad Group at the EU level is an attempt to strengthen the Central European countries’ bargaining position – their main aim being to further their individual goals.

‘The Economist’ in early 2016 noted that what seems to unite the four countries is an ‘anti-migrant sentiment’ which stems from the ruling political groups in these states rather than opposite groups that express their negative attitude towards migrants and refugees in the EU and especially their relocation among EU members. Hungary (Fidesz) and Poland (Law and Justice) are the leaders here. What is more, this anti-migrant fervour seems to be used to ‘implement an illiberal agenda on other fronts’.49 It is the populist politics currently dominant in Visegrad states combined with the lack of understanding of migration and refugee issues, limited experience in this field and the fear of the unknown, that are contributing factors for the tightening of ties among the four countries and the strengthening of the ruling powers’ positions.

Despite their membership in the EU, national migration policies of Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia, predominate over the European approach. Whereas their cooperation on the EU forum as V4 countries appears to be limited to the pledges to protect the external border by regulating the flow of migrants to ‘hotspots’ where they can be registered and processed and to support the affected countries of origin and transit by strengthening their borders – both goals aligned with limiting the flow of migrants and thus protecting the Schengen zone, and both not fully or comprehensively addressing the humanitarian aspect of the crisis of the people who had already, or are in the process of arriving to the EU, regardless if they are in real need of international protection or if they migrated for economic reasons.

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Viktor Glied*  
Norbert Pap**

The ‘Christian Fortress of Hungary’ –  
The Anatomy of the Migration Crisis in Hungary

Abstract: This paper discusses the unique phenomenon of what role the political debate about Islam, the construction of the temporary border barrier protecting the Hungarian national borders and altering the Hungarian Constitution played in the competitive communication of the national-radical Jobbik party and the centre-right governing parties Fidesz-KDNP which typically emphasise their Christian character. Furthermore this essay follows up the elements of political campaign related to the referendum on relocation quota between the end of 2014 and November 2016.

Keywords: migration, crisis, Fidesz, Jobbik, party competition, campaign

Introduction

Since the early spring of 2015, an unprecedented wave of migration has reached the Balkans countries and Hungary. The flood of migrants appearing in Central Europe – and heading toward Western Europe – posed an almost unresolvable challenge to the asylum management systems at the national and the EU level. The critical state of European Union migration policy, as well as the obstacles in decision-making in Brussels signalled that this extremely complex issue divides European societies and also touches on deeply rooted issues, without European policies offering any effective treatment.

*Viktor Glied, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor at the University of Pécs. Contact at: glied.victor@pte.hu.

**Norbert Pap, Ph.D. – Associate Professor at the University of Pécs. Contact at: pnorbert@gamma.ttk.pte.hu.
The social and economic concerns related to the migrant crisis were very efficiently made a theme of primary importance by the Hungarian government, expressing statements and questions – almost unprecedented in Hungary – which led to an upheaval of discussions related to living together with Muslims, the relationship of Islam and Christianity, as well as the consequences of mixing different cultures. The crisis became another chapter in party competition, with the government constantly raising the political stakes and focusing entirely on this set of problems in its communication. Meanwhile, opposition parties – including the primary challenger, the radical nationalist Jobbik (Jobbik – Movement for a Better Hungary) – have been unable to gain political advantage from what happened. Therefore the governing Fidesz-KDNP could stabilise its position, and by the end of 2015 it increased its lead.

This paper presents the political communication and party competition built around the migrant crisis from late 2014 to November 2016, and seeks an answer to how the articulated statements impacted the Hungarian society. It also presents the main characteristics of the government’s actions based on a ‘civilisation’ narrative and the campaign, as well as the key elements of the referendum on the relocation quota held in October 2016.

1. From crisis to crisis

In Hungary, the political crisis has commenced already in 2006 and there has been a permanent campaign ever since. The governing Socialist/Free Democrat coalition successfully won again at the 2006 elections using a propaganda of success, however during the months following the elections, the public was practically shocked by the introduction of austerity measures. After the public disclosure of the speech of the socialist prime minister Ferenc Gyurcsány, held at a closed meeting and recognising lies and acts of fraud, street riots erupted in Budapest and major Hungarian cities. The anti-government protests continued all around the country until the 2010 elections. The major opposition party, the right-wing conservative Fidesz launched a powerful campaign calling the prime minister illegitimate and rejecting any type of cooperation with the government. A long political crisis began, contributing to a moral and ethical crisis. The financial and economic crisis of 2008 hit the country in this state, while unemployment and the prices of public utilities rose, and the country could only avoid financial collapse with an IMF loan taken out in October 2008. Simultaneously, Jobbik gained strength. It was originally established as a party in 2003, but could only become visible after 2006, while the crisis was deepening and the conflicts between the
majority Hungarians and the Gypsy (Romani) minority escalated. After hopelessness and misery surfaced, more and more people felt attracted to the party with anti-Semitic roots, vocalising antidemocratic, anti-EU, anti-globalisation and racist buzzwords.

The alliance of Fidesz and the Christian Democrats won the 2010 elections with a two-thirds majority, with the Hungarian Socialist Party and Jobbik finishing second and last (respectively) and delegating members to the legislative body. The mostly two-party system has been disbanded, the left-wing socialist and liberal bloc shrank, and Fidesz could start to transform the economic and social subsystems practically without an opposition.\(^1\) System-level transformations impacts personal livelihoods, economic hinterlands of the political poles, the intelligentsia and turned social groups, professions and generations against each other, further straining the relationship of Hungary and the European Union, which has only been made worse by the migrant crisis commencing in 2015.

The pro-government polling institute, Századvég conducted a survey in January 2015,\(^2\) and identified four key areas in which the success of the government was doubtful from 2010 to 2014. The international reputation of Hungary only improved according to a little more than half of the respondents. The permanent disputes with the European Union surely played a major role in this. It should also be emphasised that Hungarian-American relations gradually worsened as the foreign policy orientation of the Hungarian government changed: with the policy of Opening to the East and the improving ties with Russia.\(^3\)

A similarly unfavourable action from the US point-of-view was when the NATO-member Hungary failed to condemn Russia for the annexation of Crimea and the military action in the eastern part of Ukraine.\(^4\) During the spring of 2014 it was reiterated that after the fall of Communism, the

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\(^1\) V. Glied, From the Green movement into a party. Effect of the crisis and democratic movements in Hungary, “Politeja” nr 28/2014, pp. 31–61.
\(^3\) A key element thereof was the cooperation agreement signed in January 2014 in Moscow, stipulating that Russia is going to build to new nuclear power plant units in Paks and provide a 10 billion EUR credit for this purpose to Hungary. Orbán–Putyin: Az oroszok bővítik Pakst (Orbán–Putin: The Russians will expand Paks), 15.01.2014, HVG, http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20140114_OrbanPutyin_megallapodtak_Paksrol (last visited 15.01.2016).
competition of the great powers for preserving and expanding their zones of influence has not ended. In order to enforce its geostrategic interests, both the United States and Russia used their tools of ‘soft and hard’ political influence in the Central European countries, including Hungary. The case known as the ‘entry ban scandal’ was an emblematic step, when the United States banned six unidentified Hungarian public servants from entering the country.

According to the result of the aforementioned Századvég survey, respondents did not find the reform of major state social systems successful. After the regime change, each government favoured spending on infrastructural developments and welfare measures from the central budget, and spent less on education (required for building a knowledge-based society, as well as the development of competitive and high added value sectors) and healthcare. The Fidesz-cabinet also failed to rectify the state of healthcare and education. More and more apparent and perceptible social-economic problems culminated in the period following the repeated success of Fidesz at the 2014 elections, and by the autumn the communication of the government clearly ran out of ideas. Without a competitive opposition, in October 2014 Fidesz also won at the municipality elections, but then the party’s popularity started to decline.

2. The breakthrough of Jobbik

During a brief century the society of Hungary has undergone eight revolutions and regime changes. Deeply rooted social and political conflicts could not be resolved, but they have kept adding up, and so the traumas of 20th century Hungarian history have still burdened the society in the 2000s. As an impact of the constant social crises, the soft elements of the social climate favourable for the far-right have been created during the years after the transition to democracy. Indeed, these changes can clearly facilitate the increasing popularity of parties communicating messages in which they urge radical solutions. Basically two facts hindered the expansion of the nationalist-radical Jobbik: their themes being

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5 While in 2003 the budget spent 5.85% of the GDP on the healthcare system, in 2012 this figure was only 4.78%. The GDP in 2012 failed to reach the 2007 level, it could only return to the economic performance before the global financial crisis by the second half of 2015. In. Pénzkivonás az oktatásból és az egészségügyből: megint a szegényeken csattan (Education and healthcare budget shrinks: the poor will be badly hit) http://tenytar.hu/ elemzes/penzkivonas_az_oktatasbol_es_az_egeszsegugybolMegint_szegenyenek_csattan#.WERzWfnhC00 (last visited 21.12.2016).

rendered obsolete and the similarly populist approach of Fidesz-KDNP. When Viktor Orbán gained power, his government implemented the actions originally initiated by Jobbik (increasing public safety, accountability of former governments, introduction of a stricter Criminal Code) one by one, and Fidesz gradually started to strangle the opposition party’s issues.7

To answer the problems of Hungarian economy and democracy, after 2010 Viktor Orbán was committed to establishing his own political system, economic hinterland and influence over public discourse. The intention of the prime minister is to leave behind the political rotation which failed to ensure catching up with Europe, and to provide powerful political stability to the country, even in time of crisis, under his own leadership. This considers the West a declining way of living and cultural environment, in which political conformity and correctness veils real problems, and therefore cannot provide any answers to them. However Hungary already follows a different path where national interest enjoys primacy compared to external expectation and EU demands (as well as promises). This framework ideology gives birth to the ‘notion of Hungarians who are uniquely talented, but are suppressed by the overwhelming force of foreign powers, the betrayal of the left-wing elites and the excessive profit demand of foreign investors, banks and [...] traders’.8 The following parties are responsible for the troubles: the Left, the EU, banks (global capital) and energy service providers wanting to exploit extra profit, as well as migrants. These topics have a strong national character, as well as a bias toward alter- and anti-globalisation, and thus they occupy the territory of Jobbik.9 The political credo and ideology of Jobbik is extremely diverse and contradictory. The radical party is constructed of different subcultures. It is political home to such distant groups as certain esoteric and Turanist groups, Hungarian Muslims,10 as well as Western-style far-

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7 P. Bándy, Nyolc lépés, “Demokrata”, 5.05.2010.
9 Uniós zászlót égetett a Jobbik (Jobbik burnt an EU-fl ag). http://index.hu/belfold/2012/01/14/unios_zaszlot_egetett_a_jobbik/ (last visited 14.01.2015).
10 Regarding Islam, Hungary has a special and unique history in Europe. A minority of the Hungarians (Magyars) settling in the Carpathian Basin during the 10th century were the followers of Islam, which was preserved as a base of royal power for centuries (Pap et al 2014). Later on also, in the periods between specific instances of assimilation, Muslim communities have numerously appeared in the territory of the country. Sometimes co-existence has severe social and economic consequences, such as during the period of Ottoman occupation in the 16–17th century. The Battle of Mohács in 1526 lead to the demise of the Kingdom of Hungary in the Middle Ages. The 150-year Turkish occupa-
right groups such as skinheads, militant groups, such as *Magyar Gárda* (Hungarian Guard) or *Betyársereg* (Army of Outlaws). Gábor Vona, the chairman of Jobbik has repeatedly express between 2010 and 2013 that he considers Islam – which builds on traditions, as opposed to globalisation and liberalism – the last hope of mankind. From 2015, in alignment with the majority expectation of voters, Jobbik has also switched to an anti-migrant and anti-Muslim tone, apparently giving up their previous pro-Muslim approach.

After the defeat of Jobbik at the 2014 elections, Gábor Vona drew the conclusion that radical slogans and appearances are barriers of continued expansion. Since Vona made it clear that the objective of Jobbik was governing, he launched a new direction in late 2014. They toned down the most radical topics – such as anti-Semitism, ‘gypsy crime’, anti-EU sentiment, etc. – and rhetoric. Instead, they included issues on their agenda which face general discontent from the society, such as healthcare, the wages of school teachers, the failure of transformations in the education system and corruption.

The political bombshell called the ‘entry ban scandal’ in the press exploded in October 2014, after the municipality elections. Shock waves of
the scandal also reached the prime minister who had to comment on the matter. The US Embassy in Budapest did not provide the details of the banned persons to the Hungarian government, so the press started to speculate about American sanctions and a major corruption scandal that could have been the reason for them. On 5 November it was disclosed that one of the banned persons was Ildikó Vida, the president of the National Tax and Customs Administration who was accused of intentionally covering up tax fraud and corruption at the authority, and therefore being an accomplice. The theory of diplomatic pressure because of political reasons is also supported by the fact that a US official announced in August 2016 that the American authorities had no concrete evidence, they gathered information from the media and the internet, i.e. from public sources.\footnote{Új fordulat a kitiltási botrányban: megjött a válasz Amerikából (New development in the entry ban case: answer from the US), http://hvg.hu/gazdasag/20160928_Uj_fordulat_a_kitiltasi_botranyban_megjott_az_USA_valasza?utm_expid=1324304-9.JvgK46VJQ96PBmQcdWWPlQ.0&utm_referrer=http%3A%2F%2Fhvg.hu%2F (last visited 28.09.2016).}

Based on the analyses of the pro-government Nézőpont Intézet, the governing parties enjoyed the popular support of 32% in the entire population before the entry ban scandal, which shrank to 29% in November. Meanwhile, the popularity of Jobbik rose by 3%.\footnote{Csökkent a Fidesz népsterülsége a kitiltási botrány óta (The popularity of Fidesz shrinks after the scandal), Index, http://index.hu/belfold/2014/11/10/csokkent_a_fidesz_nepszerusege_a_kitiltasi_botrany_ota (last visited 10.11.2014).} The series of protests that had taken place in the country and foreign cities populated by Hungarians in late October and early November 2014 surely play a major role in this. On 26 October 2014, tens of thousands protested against the internet tax proposed by the government and other government policies. Because of the scandals, the popularity of Fidesz has decreased by 12% in merely a month, which is exceptional in the period after the regime change.\footnote{Medián: 16 százalékot esett Orbán népszerűsége egy hónap alatt, (Orbán’s popularity falls 16 percent in one month), http://hvg.hu/itthon/201450_kiabrandulasrol_tanuskodo_part-preferenciak_ (last visited 10.12.2014).} MSZP was only able to benefit from the drop in the numbers of the governing party to a smaller extent, while Jobbik increased popularity more, but neither opposition party earned a permanent increase. The migrant crisis hit Hungary hard in April 2015, and it was able to stop and reverse the rapid loss of popularity.
3. The Hungarian civilisation narrative and the anti-migrant fence

In the summer of 2015 Viktor Orbán reportedly said: the failed politics of Western Europe cannot protect the continent from migration, and therefore Hungary is going to protect its borders independently by constructing a physical barrier (a temporary barrier – fence). The communication of the government significantly built on the historic concepts of ‘Hungary, the Fortress of Christianity’ and the ‘Bastion of Europe’ as regards the fence and protecting the borders, as these are omnipresent in Hungarian political thinking.

On 19 September 2015, the Hungarian premier attended the meeting of the state legislature group of the German conservative CSU party in the Banz abbey in Bavaria and argued in favour of this role: ‘because of the European Union and the Schengen Agreement the borders of Bavaria can currently be protected at the external border of the Schengen Area, which is currently the southern border of Hungary’. According to the remark of the prime minister, Hungary is currently the protector of the southern

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16 Orbán Viktor: Ha nem védjük meg a határainkat, újabb tízmilliók jönnek, és vége Európának (If we can't protect our borders, tens of millions will come), Kossuth Rádió, 180 perc címú adásában – http://www.hirado.hu/2015/09/04/hallgassa-itt-ebelen-a-miniszterelnoki-interjut/ (last visited 4.09.2015).

17 The anti-Turkish wars lasting for almost 300 years (till 1718) played a central role in the development of Hungarian identity during the Middle Ages, and Protestantism was born at the same time.
border of Europe, and therefore he is the fortress captain. Fortress captains are important parts of Hungarian historic thinking, since all Hungarians remember the heroic resistance of fortress soldiers in the 16–17th century against the Ottoman forces superior in number. They know the victorious protector of Belgrade, János Hunyadi, the men and women defending the fortress of Eger (and their captain, István Dobó) and the sacrificial sortie of Miklós Zrínyi, after holding the Szigetvár fortress till the last breath. The parallel with the struggle of the intruding Muslim ‘forces’ (refugees, illegal migrants) and the handful of Christian defenders (Hungarian police and army) is apparent. However combat around the border fortresses also meant suffering throughout history, it is no surprise that Viktor Orbán tried to neutralise the simile by adding that Hungary is not keen to fulfil the role, but discharges the obligation of protecting the southern border. The billboard campaign launched in mid-September also supported this, with the main message being centred around the word protected. ‘People have decided: the country shall be protected.’

By the early autumn of 2015, discussions got a new interpretation. The messages highlighted the issues of co-existence with Muslims and the failure of multiculturalism in Europe. An extract from a book of Nobel laureate Hungarian writer Imre Kertész, published in 2014 has spread all over the internet. In the extract the author argues that based on the liberal immigration policy of Europe, Muslims spread all over, take over and destroy Europe with their own means.18

Lajos Kósa, head of Fidesz parliamentary group stated in October 2015 that Muslim culture is so radically different from European culture that integration is hopeless. This message resonated with what Gábor Vona said, i.e. that Islam was the last hope of mankind. Kósa contrasted hope with the hopelessness of integration policies, and therefore suggested that the solution underlies in stopping the migration wave, instead of co-existence. He claims that migrants are economic immigrants, who travel to Europe as especially in order to ‘occupy territory’ and the left in the West sees them as future voters.19 The messages of pro-government politicians and their proxies were in perfect alignment with the expectations of the majority of the society.20

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18 Numerous media outlets quoted this part of the turbulent work both in Hungary and abroad. I. Kertész, A végső kocsma, Budapest 2014.
20 While the issue of constructing the fence somewhat divided the public in the summer of 2015 (with the average of 60 to 65% of the entire population supporting it then), by
After the massacre in Paris in November 2015, the government ‘raised the stakes’ again. According to the Hungarian premier, the link between immigration and terrorism is undisputed, because all terrorists are migrants. The question remains ‘why did they come to Europe then?’ The West is at war with Islamists in the Middle East, so it is no surprise that the enemies send warriors among the arriving migrants. If we allow millions of people into Europe without identifying them, the danger of terror is going to increase. Therefore, according to him, external borders have to be secured, Schengen has to be protected, and finding alternatives to it will not work.21

Figure 2. The barrier at the southern border in 2015


In addition to its practical role restricting migration, the temporary fence constructed at the southern borders of Hungary during the summer and autumn of 2015 has also appeared as a defence and civilisation metaphor in Hungarian and European public discourse. As a very expensive, but efficient, symbolic means, it perfectly served the purpose of intermediating

December, after the Paris terror attacks, 85% of all respondents thought that the physical barrier was a good decision. The communication of the governing party was successful which is clearly supported by the fact that the share of those who reject accepting refugees rose to 83% and almost half of the population thought that Hungary could also be affected by the terror.

the important political messages of the government. However, it also involved serious contradictions, as Hungarians are also living on the other side of this border. Their national integration has long been a priority for the Hungarian right, and the construction of fence meant a complete U-turn in this policy.

The current southern border of Hungary is a product of the Trianon Peace Treaty of 1920. During the 20th century the Hungarian-Serbian, Hungarian-Croatian and Hungarian-Slovenian borders have changed on multiple occasions physically, regarding their role in linking the countries and symbolically as well, but the outline has not changed since 4 June 1920. The migration crisis of 2015 disrupted the relationships with the neighbouring countries temporarily, and the impacts, the duration of the relapse and its permanence are yet to be seen. However it is already clear that the quite complex issue of the border barrier has a negative impact on the European integration and the Hungarian national reintegration process.

The majority of the southern borders with Hungary are linked to (and divided from) territories of the (Romanian, Serbian and Croatian) nation states which the Hungarian public considers ‘Balkans’, i.e. belong to a different degree of civilisation. From the religious viewpoint, this civilisation difference used to mean Islam (for centuries, the Ottoman Empire was located on the other side of the border), then Orthodoxy (toward Serbia and Romania), against which Hungarians have played the role of the ‘Bastion of Europe’ for ‘a thousand years.’

4. The anti-migrant campaign

In Central and Eastern Europe, immigration is not an everyday issue. Numerous studies support the notion that until 2015, Hungarian citizens did not consider the process particularly dangerous. There are no major immigrant groups in Hungary, religious citizens typically follow a Christian denomination and cultural identity is based on Judeo-Christian cultural cornerstones. After the transition to democracy, numerous studies have examined xenophobia and discrimination in Hungary. TÁRKI Institute has studied xenophobia since 1992, as well as the attitude of the Hungarian society toward foreigners and minorities. In summary, almost

22 Poverty, fear of an uncertain future, emigration all ranked higher in the polls than fear of immigration, however among other Central and Eastern European countries, the degree of xenophobia is extremely high in Hungary. This is also supported by the Eurobarometer surveys – Standard Eurobarometer 82, Autumn 2014, http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb82/eb82_anx_en.pdf (last visited 20.05.2016).
half of all Hungarians, and since 2015 two-thirds of them basically express rejection, but at least prejudice toward immigrants from third countries. The higher rate of xenophobia compared to other countries in the region is party caused by the problems of co-existence with the Romani minority, as well as the lack of information. Citizens project Western European problems to their own country, and the traditional approach that Hungarians – with their unique language, culture and history – are an island in Europe which have to protect their sovereignty also plays an important role. Among the voters of Jobbik, the rate of openly xenophobic people is above average, but according to surveys made in 2015–2016, the differences were very small based on party preferences, and therefore the migrant crisis and the anti-migrant government campaign caused rejection to become generally widespread.23

The political discourse and communication space created in relation to the migrant crisis balanced on the verge of reality and semi-reality when it expressed and conveyed powerful messages to both the Hungarian citizens and the migrants. Initially, these caused a great divide in public opinion. The main semantic element of the discourse was the need to protect Hungary and its residents from the impacts of the migrant wave, utilising the people’s need for safety, their instinctive fear and it also highlights the importance of preventive action, thus legitimising the measures taken by the acting party. Conscious of all the above, government political communication succeeded in deliberately linking refugees with immigrants, illegal migration with legal, as well as migrants and terrorism. The anti-migrant campaign was immediately launched after the attack on Paris offices of the satirical magazine Charlie Hebdo. The first step of the communication campaign was raising awareness, with three distinct elements:

1. As regards to increasing volume of migration in March-April 2015, the Hungarian citizens needed an explanation as to why hundreds of thousands of migrants with a different culture and religion cross Hungary to Western Europe. The main message was ‘If you come to Hungary, you have to respect...’. The billboards and the television commercials launched in the early summer raised awareness in the Hungarian public through messages sent to migrants that the situation was severe, since the public had (and could not have had) any personal experience related to the phenomenon.

2. The government also launched a national consultation about immigration and terrorism via mail and the internet. The two expressions were thus linked.

3. The government’s communication and its politicians attached the sluggishness of EU decision-making, the permissive and liberal migration policy of Brussels, as well as its politically correct communication, and also Berlin’s Wilkommenskultur approach based on unconditional acceptance.

By appropriating the word *protection*, the government could also support the coherence of its own communication, since it logically had the political, legal and policing means to halt the wave of migrants. The same was not available to the opposition parties, and they had also been hesitant when the crisis erupted, without adequate information to properly understand the process. Since Fidesz was very successful in constructing its communication, the opposition (including Jobbik) could only follow up on the government’s communication after the summer of 2015, and failed to control it in any manner. Fidesz-KDNP gradually took over almost the entire communication space.

In the summer of 2015, political statements and messages on the failure of the migration policy quickly followed each other, in which leading politicians of the Balkans, Central and Western Europe blamed and criticised each other for the situation. Meanwhile, at the Keleti Railway Station of Budapest, thousands of refugees demand to be let to proceed to Austria without registering in Hungary. In addition to its practical role restricting migration, the fence constructed at the southern borders of Hungary during the summer and autumn of 2015 has also appeared as a defence and civilisation metaphor in Hungarian and European public discourse, involving significant contradictions at the same time.

The shocking terror attack in Paris brought to the surface the narrative already used by the government then, which claimed that there were many terrorists among the migrants who are responsible for the attacks in Western European cities. Based on this, the government has protected Hungary from terrorists, and at the same time it took the wind out of the sails of the ‘far-right’ Jobbik party, because it left no space for the party’s opinion. Opposition powers kept their reactive stance, merely following up on the issues, without any suggested solutions, so all in all only one party was able to play an active and proactive role during the crisis, Fidesz-KDNP.

According to the surveys of TÁRKI and Závecz Research, the level of xenophobia has reached unprecedented heights. By October 2016 not
the Romani minority, but Arabs have become the most rejected ethnic group. 58% of the respondents considered themselves xenophobic, which is clearly a consequence of the anti-migrant political campaign, peaking at the referendum of 2 October 2016.24

Viktor Orbán Viktor announced on 24 February 2016 that the government had decided to hold a referendum on the obligatory relocation quota. In 2016 Jobbik tried to take the initiative in finding solutions to the migrant crisis. The parliamentary group of Jobbik submitted a bill to amend the constitution in April 2016 on the relocation quota proposed by the EU, claiming that the party supports amending the Fundamental Law, which requires a two-thirds majority in the National Assembly. Therefore, apparently Jobbik would have consented to the proposal of Fidesz regarding discussing the amendment of the constitution, stating that the EU would have no powers relocating refugees to Hungary without the approval of the National Assembly. With this however, the anti-quota referendum proposed by Viktor Orbán (providing good communication opportunities) would have lost its meaning, and therefore the judicial committee of the National Assembly voted down the proposal.

The government basically built the referendum campaign on two narratives. The first one focused on the challenge of blaming Brussels, and thus the liberal European elite, unable to protect itself and to find real solution, for everything. The main statement in these rhetoric was ‘Send a message to Brussels, to let them understand,’ i.e. Hungarian shall pioneer efforts in making the leading politicians of Europe explicitly say that the previous migration policy (or the lack thereof) and multiculturalism have failed. Fidesz politicians said the following during the campaign25:

‘The position of the government is that instead of dangerous relocation plans, the reinforced protection of the borders is necessary.’
‘The quota package of Brussels involves significant economic, cultural and safety risks.’
‘What Brussels pursues is going to lead to a civilisation catastrophe.’
‘There are more than 900 no-go zones in Europe.’

The other direction in the communication reinforces the civilisation narrative, aiming to support the already existing attitude towards the mostly Muslim migrants. This panel was based on the campaign element

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'Did you know?' with questions on billboards, television and radio commercials that emphasised the risks of migration. Despite of these, Hungary was on the right track, since it was protecting the borders of the country and Europe.

'The government’s foremost reason for rejecting the relocation quota is that it would significantly destruct the security of Europe. Events of the last few months have reassured us that there is a link between immigration and terrorism.'

'Protecting our communities, families, culture and everything that defines Hungary are all at stake.'

'If we fail to act, we will not be able to recognise Europe in a few decades.'

'In Europe, terror and violence have become a part of everyday life.'

The referendum on the quota was held on 2 October 2016. During the campaign Jobbik had a consistently anti-quota stance, like Fidesz. Still however the referendum was invalid, as less than 50% of those eligible to vote participated. Despite of the invalidity, Fidesz has submitted its bill on the amendment of the constitution, but Jobbik did not support this, and therefore this proposal also failed. According to independent assessment, the government has suffered a defeat (although not too severe), as it failed to reach its declared objectives. It failed to reach a valid result at the referendum, and the amendment of the constitution was not approved by the National Assembly either.

The government subscribed to the view that – although not legally – the referendum was successful in the political sense. 3.2 million voters (98% of all voters, with an opposition boycott) expressed their support for the actions recommended by the government, thus forming a ‘new coalition’ which means major support and strong legitimacy. Regardless of the result of the referendum, the government’s politics succeeded in the sense that the opposition could not show any determined, characteristic alternative or even show the appearance of being capable of action, and these confirmed the legitimacy of the government.

Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt (Hungarian Two-tailed Dog Party) has earned the only significant success on the opposition side, as their campaign for invalid votes, financed by public donations was practically the

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26 The number of votes required for a valid referendum was 4.1 million, while in the end 3 418 387 valid votes were cast (41.32%). The share of ‘no’ votes was 98.36%, while 1.64% voted ‘yes.’ The high number of invalid votes shall also be highlighted (6.17%). http://valasztas.hu/hu/ref2016/1154/1154_0_index.html (last visited 11.12.2016).
only potent opponent of the government. Their cynical and ironic campaign messages reached voters and garnered support that exceeds the actual support for the party by far.

Figure 3. October 2016: Popularity of the parties among voters

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Support</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fidesz</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jobbik</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSZP</td>
<td>14</td>
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<tr>
<td>DK</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td>LMP</td>
<td>5</td>
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<tr>
<td>Együtt</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberálisok</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Párbeszéd</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>egyéb párt</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Conclusion

During the 2014–2016 period, the Hungarian government could perform adequately in managing the European migrant crisis according to the overwhelming majority of Hungarian citizens. It could remain potent and prevented the far-right Jobbik from appropriating and using the migration issue to gain significant strength. Its measures met the sympathy of the vast majority of Hungarians, which is not only because the traditional xenophobia, but also because it used the memory of anti-Turkish (anti-Muslims) fights in its communication which played a substantial role in the development of Hungarian national identity. The imagery of ‘Hungary, the Fortress of Christianity’ and the ‘Bastion of Europe’ had an impact and mobilised voters, especially the less educated and those living in rural areas. The government campaign was so successful and efficient that many of the traditionally rejected members of the Romani minority also supported it.

The government could fulfil its objectives of strengthening the support of Fidesz-KDNP and defining the themes of public discourse with topics that are favourable for the government. However, they failed in organising a legally valid referendum or making the National Assembly approve the amendment of the constitution that would have guaran-
teed efficient defence. Because of these political failures, the referendum lacked international impact, and these results were inadequate to provide efficient power for international actions. Meanwhile, European politics have also changed, the issue of the quota is no longer in the forefront and it has mostly lost its European political dimensions. In the future, the experiences of the campaign may become very significant, since the tested communication and propaganda elements will surely be applied in the upcoming campaigns by the political actors.

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Factors Influencing Immigration to Poland
As an EU Member State

Abstract: The European Commission has lately been exposed to increasing pressure from the Italian and Greek Governments to actively participate in solving the problem of growing immigration from African and Middle East countries. This surging pressure has resulted in actions aimed at redistributing immigrants among the EU Member States. The implementation of this solution would mean that the immigration issue is most likely to also affect countries which have not had to deal with large immigrant populations in the past. This article focuses on potential immigration to Poland, as one the largest economies in the EU Member States. It aims to answer the question whether Poland needs and is ready, in social, economic and cultural terms, to accept international immigrants from developing countries. Another problem tackled by this paper is the European Union’s attitude towards immigration. It is argued that the redistribution of migrants will be pointless unless other accompanying actions are taken simultaneously. The twin issues of the immigration crisis and the distribution of immigrants have revealed problems resulting from differences between the Member States in terms of their quality of life, including differences in wages and social benefits. This article posits that had the EU met the cohesion goal many economic and social problems, including migrants’ distribution, would not have arisen.

Keywords: migration, Poland, immigrants’ assimilation, economic migrants, migrants’ relocation

* Prof. Adam A. Ambroziak, Ph.D. – Associate Professor at the Warsaw School of Economics, Jean Monnet Chair of European Integration, Collegium of World Economy, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw. Contact at: adam.a.ambroziak@gmail.com.

** Michal Schwabe, Ph.D. – Assistant Professor at the Warsaw School of Economics, Institute of International Economics, Collegium of World Economy, Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw. Contact at: michal.schwabe@sgh.waw.pl.
Introduction

In the neoclassical approach to migration theory, the main force behind labour migration is considered as differences in wages, which stems from differences in the marginal productivity of labour between countries. It is generally assumed that people are rational individuals (based on the homo oeconomicus concept), who aim to increase their wellbeing by maximizing the wages and salaries which they receive for their work. Migration processes are hence driven by the differences in remuneration received by an individual in his or her current place of residence and potential remuneration in another country (potential destination).\(^1\)

In the latest migration research (New Economics of Labor Migration), the emphasis in migration studies is placed on family, which is perceived as the decision-making unit in migration processes, rather than on individuals. A family considers the migration opportunities for one (or more) of its members in order to diversify sources of income, with the aim of eliminating the risk of insufficient income to the household budget.\(^2\)

However, every approach to migration studies must take into account the fact that immigration is a socially sensitive topic and that migration processes are hampered by the immigration policies of developed countries, as well as other barriers which potential immigrants necessarily face. The general role of obstacles to migration was first emphasized in a study by E. Lee,\(^3\) who claimed that all barriers to the migration process must be considered individually for each migrant, similarly as to the expected gains from migration. Some barriers, however, can be perceived as universal for migrants willing to enter a country which could offer them higher wages. In this paper we consider these obstacles as regulations preventing migrants from third countries to enter the European Union or the United States, which obviously hamper the migration process on the global scale. What is important to bear in mind, however, is that such barriers do not exist within the European Union, due to the common policies (i.e. free movement of people) which allow the EU workforce to migrate to and look for a job in any of the EU Member States.\(^4\)

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Nonetheless, the decisions taken by the Council of the European Union in 2015 regarding the redistribution of asylum seekers among all EU Member State poses new challenges for many member state countries (particularly those which joined the EU during or after 2004) in terms of immigrants’ assimilation into their societies. It is here argued if actions aimed at the social integration of immigrants are not undertaken, social tensions are likely to emerge, which can lead to the development of immigrant ethnic enclaves in the major Member States.\(^5\)

At the same time, it should be borne in mind that from the legal point of view there is a substantial difference between refugees, who leave their country in search of a safe place to live while waiting to return their home country when an ongoing situation is stabilised (end of war, introduction of democracy, etc.) and economic migrants, who leave their home countries looking for a better paying jobs and a higher quality of life and standards of living for themselves and their families. Therefore it is worth noting that albeit the aforementioned Council decisions concerned only refugees, there is an intensive debate on general immigration from the African and Middle East Countries. Therefore we decided to analyse the overall movement of foreign migrants to the EU.

In this paper we place a special emphasis on Poland as a migrant-receiving economy, in order to assess its needs and readiness to accept international immigrants from developing countries in social, economic and cultural terms. Another problem tackled by this paper is the EU’s attitude towards immigration. It is argued herein that the migrant redistribution will be pointless unless other accompanying actions are taken simultaneously. To this end we analyse data concerning social, economic and cultural factors which can have an influence on migrants’ decisions regarding to their possible destinations. The period under research is 2008-2015 (or 2014 in some cases, where data for 2015 are not available), due to the fact that it corresponds to the most recent wave of migration to Europe from African and Middle Eastern countries. Therefore, all remarks concerning the EU Member States, especially those concerning Poland, were formulated on the basis of economic and social programs as well as support schemes available during this period.

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1. African migration to Europe – common regulations, individual problems

One of the most popular routes for migrants from Africa attempting to enter the European Union is the Central Mediterranean Route, which is used by migrants from Northern Africa who aim to reach Italy or Malta, usually departing from Libya. The first symptoms of increasing migration on this route were observed in 2008, when over 40,000\(^6\) African immigrants were detected in the direct proximity of the Italian borders. However, the problem of immigration from Africa was temporarily resolved by the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation which was signed between Italy and Libya at the end of that year.

The Treaty broadly regulated the countries’ bilateral relations, tackling numerous issues which seemed important from the political point of view at that time, such as the consequences of the Italian colonial reign as well as the compensation for Italians deported under Gaddafi’s regime, but it also included a chapter on partnership, with both sides’ agreeing to prevent illegal immigration to Italy. Article 19 of the Treaty provided operational guidelines in this regard, whereby both sides agreed to form mixed Italian – Libyan patrol crews, which would monitor the 2,000 kilometres of Libyan coastline, as well as to introduce a satellite monitoring system for Libyan land boarders.\(^7\)

As the Treaty went into effect, the number of intercepted African migrants significantly declined, amounting to 11,000 in 2009 and only 4,500 in 2010. In 2011 the unstable political situation in Libya resulted in increased immigration (64,300) as thousands of citizens were expelled from the country, but the statistics for 2012 gave reason to believe that it was only a temporary phenomenon. However, in 2014 the Italian Government had to face the largest inflow of immigrants into a single country in the European Union’s history, as the number of immigrants reached over 170,000. These migrants came mostly from Libya, which after the collapse of Gaddafi’s regime was a country without a stable legal and political system, as well as from other African and Middle East countries, with a majority of Syrians and Eritreans.

At that point of time the Italian Government urged the European Commission to redistribute migrants among the other EU countries, claiming that Italy was often perceived only as a gateway to the European Union,

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\(^6\) All the numbers quoted in this paragraph were derived from the Frontex data base.

and not as the migrants’ final destination on the European continent. However, according to Regulation no. 604/2013, colloquially referred to as the Dublin III Regulation, the country responsible for processing the asylum claim is the country where immigrant first applies for asylum, which in most cases is the first country through which the asylum seeker enters the European Union.

The idea behind Regulation no. 604/2013 was to prevent illegal immigrants from applying for asylum in several EU Member States in search of a country which would be willing to grant it to them. Narrowing down immigrants’ choice to only one country resolved that particular problem, but at the same time it created many others, especially for the EU border states. In Italy’s case it had to cope with growing number of asylum applications and immigrants, whose numbers were far beyond the country’s capacity to absorb, while the Italian Government realized that it was not Italy itself which was the primary targeted destination for the vast majority of migrants.

In October 2014 the Council adopted conclusions on Taking action to better manage migration flows, which stated that the challenge linked to increasing migration flows and the shifting routes of access to the EU, in part as a consequence of measures taken at the national level, needed to be addressed with common actions. It was stated that these migration flows not only affect countries on the frontline, but Europe as a whole due to the large secondary movement taking place. On this basis, in April 2015 the European Council committed, within the framework of reinforcing internal solidarity and responsibility, to set up the first voluntary pilot project on resettlement across the EU, offering opportunities to persons qualifying for protection. Then the Commission proposed the distribution key, which was based on a) the size of the population (40% weight); b) the total GDP (40% weight); c) the average number of spontaneous asylum applications and the number of resettled refugees per one million inhabitants over the period of 2010–2014 (10% weight); and finally the unemployment rate (10% weight).

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9 Council Conclusions on “Taking action to better manage migration flows”, Brussels, 10 October 2014.

10 European Council Statement, Special meeting of the European Council, 23 April 2015.

In June 2015 the European Council came to conclusion that the EU needed a balanced and geographically comprehensive approach to migration, based on solidarity and responsibility. Thus the European Council agreed on the temporary and exceptional relocation of 40,000 migrants, as well as resettlement of another 20,000 displaced persons from Italy and Greece, to other EU Member States. The process was assumed to last over two years and involve the active participation of the Member States, taking into consideration the specific conditions of each of the countries involved. These provisions allowed the Justice and Home Affairs Council of the European Union to adopt a resolution on relocating 40,000 immigrants from Greece and Italy (32,256 as a first step) to certain EU Member States, as well as on resettlement to the European Economic Areas Countries – through multilateral and national schemes – of 20,000 persons who were found to be in clear need of international protection (Table 1). Moreover, a few days later the Council took the decision to introduce provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and of Greece. The decision was aimed at providing support to these countries in emergency situations, such as sudden inflows of immigrants into their territories.

This mechanism covered 120,000 applicants (15,600 from Italy, 50,400 from Greece, as well as 54,000 applicants from other Member States) (Table 1). In accordance with Protocol nos. 21 and 22 on the position of the United Kingdom, Ireland and Denmark in respect of the area of freedom, security and justice (annexed to the TEU and to the TFEU, and without prejudice to Article 4 of that Protocol), those countries were not deemed to be taking part in the adoption of the aforementioned decisions and were not bound by them. However it is worth noting that Liechtenstein, Norway and Switzerland approved of this concept and agreed to receive some relocated persons based on bilateral arrangements with Italy and Greece.

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Table 1. Number of relocated and resettled persons according to the European Commission’s proposals and final Council decisions of 2015

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Share</td>
<td>Allocation number</td>
<td>Relocation of 32,256 persons</td>
<td>Resettlement of 22,504 persons</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Austria</td>
<td>2.22%</td>
<td>444</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,900</td>
<td>1,953</td>
<td>1,953</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>2.45%</td>
<td>490</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>2,448</td>
<td>2,004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>1.08%</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>558</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Croatia</td>
<td>1.58%</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>568</td>
<td>464</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
<td>0.34%</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>215</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>147</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Czech Republic</td>
<td>2.63%</td>
<td>525</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>1,591</td>
<td>1,301</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>1.73%</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Estonia</td>
<td>1.63%</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>199</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Finland</td>
<td>1.46%</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>982</td>
<td>293</td>
<td>1,286</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>11.87%</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>6,752</td>
<td>8,373</td>
<td>2,375</td>
<td>12,962</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>15.43%</td>
<td>3,086</td>
<td>10,500</td>
<td>13,021</td>
<td>1,600</td>
<td>17,036</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.61%</td>
<td>323</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>354</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>354</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hungary</td>
<td>1.53%</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,294</td>
<td>1,059</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Country</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>New Residents</td>
<td>Asylum Seekers</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Deportees</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------</td>
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<td>---------------</td>
<td>----------------</td>
<td>--------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ireland</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>272</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>744</td>
<td>520</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>9.94%</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,989</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
<td>1.10%</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>281</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>416</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>0.74%</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>320</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>237</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malta</td>
<td>0.60%</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>74</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.66%</td>
<td>732</td>
<td>2,047</td>
<td>2,538</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,900</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Poland</td>
<td>4.81%</td>
<td>962</td>
<td>1,100</td>
<td>1,364</td>
<td>900</td>
<td>5,082</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>3.52%</td>
<td>704</td>
<td>1,309</td>
<td>1,623</td>
<td>191</td>
<td>1,642</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Romania</td>
<td>3.29%</td>
<td>657</td>
<td>1,705</td>
<td>2,114</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>2,475</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovakia</td>
<td>1.60%</td>
<td>319</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>802</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Slovenia</td>
<td>1.03%</td>
<td>207</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>285</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>337</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>7.75%</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>1,300</td>
<td>1,612</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>8,023</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sweden</td>
<td>2.46%</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>1,369</td>
<td>1,698</td>
<td>491</td>
<td>2,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>11.54%</td>
<td>2,309</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2,200</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td></td>
<td>3,500</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
<td></td>
<td>50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liechtenstein</td>
<td></td>
<td>20</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Switzerland</td>
<td></td>
<td>519</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both Council decisions mentioned above obliged Poland to host over 11,500 immigrants, which amounted to 6.3% of all persons subject to relocation and resettlement procedures. This was the fourth largest share among all the EU Member States (only three countries were assigned a higher percentage of immigrants: Germany 24.98%; France 18.80%; and Spain 9.67%). The Polish ratio stemmed primarily from the percentage share of Poland’s population in the overall number of inhabitants of the European Union (7.48% in 2015).

However, the ethnic characteristics of the immigrant population subject to this redistribution were substantially different from the regular migration of workforce within the internal market of the European Union, especially with regard to Poland, which until then was not a popular destination country for immigrants (with the exception of immigrants from the former Soviet republics). Thus, because it represented an extraordinary phenomenon in terms of the economic reasons, culture, religion and country of origin of immigrants, we decided to confront the numbers of relocated and resettled persons with the ratio of non-EU 28 foreigners who lived in the EU Member States (Figure 1). Taking into account the above-mentioned indices, the proportion of the number of relocated and resettled persons under the Council decisions of 2015 to Poland’s overall population (0.03%) was one of the lowest among all the EU Member States (comparable to Bulgaria’s 0.03%, Hungary’s 0.024%, and Ireland’s, which voluntarily – outside the binding decision – decided to accept immigrants amounting to 0.027% of its population, as well as Denmark, with corresponding value of 0.018%, and the United Kingdom with 0.003%). Therefore we can state that the number of immigrants assigned to Poland is relatively small (in relation to the country’s population) in comparison to other EU Member States.

In concluding this section it is worth noting that on one hand the European Council agreed on the temporary and exceptional relocation and resettling of migrants taking into account the specific situations of the hosting Member States, while on the other the Commission proposed a strict distribution formula for relocation, and the Council adopted a predefined number of persons who should be received by each Member State. However in both the aforementioned decisions the Council underlined that in order to decide which EU Member State should be the country of relocation for each migrant, emphasis should be placed on certain qualifications and characteristics of the applicants, such as their foreign language skills and other individual characteristics (family, cultural or social ties) which could facilitate their integration in the society of the targeted Member State.
Moreover, it was decided that in the case of *vulnerable* applicants, consideration should be given to the capacity of the target Member States to provide adequate support to these applicants. Furthermore the necessity of ensuring a fair distribution of applicants among the Member States was stressed.\textsuperscript{15}

**Figure 1. Ratio of relocated and resettled persons to population and share of non-EU28 immigrants to the overall population in the EU Member States**


2. Social incentives and economic reality for migration to Poland in comparison to other the EU Member States

There are many economic factors which encourage or discourage immigration to a given region or country. It is clear that when it comes to refugees we should not focus on their economic incentives for migration, as their primary motivation is to escape from a war zone or some other exceptionally dire situation. At the same time however, we believe that while refugees do not tend to carefully consider and compare economic and social benefits as well as quality of life in each of the EU Member States, their secondary motivation is related to improving their wellbeing and therefore some economic factors are likely to influence their decision regarding choice of destination country. Therefore we distinguished some indices describing particular sectors of the economy which could be of the highest importance to immigrants. In order to grasp the position of Poland in comparison to the other EU Member states, we analysed data for all the countries involved in and covered by the EU migration policy and actions.

2.1. Demographical factors

We believe that one of the most important demographical characteristics that needs to be addressed is the structure of population in terms of its ethnic homogeneity. We argue that the share of foreigners in the population of a given country matters to potential immigrants. Firstly, a higher share of foreigners in society, (understood as first or second generation immigrants), allows potential immigrants to formulate an assumption that the national residents generally accept (or at least tolerate) foreigners and hence that the immigration policy of such country can be described as liberal or flexible. Secondly, many immigrants tend to migrate to countries with which they have some vicarious experience, i.e. that have already been visited and verified by their families, relatives and/or friends. This, in line with Migrant Networks theory, is a factor of the highest importance to migrants, who are looking for information about the labour market and general living conditions in the destination country, as well as for assistance from their compatriots in the job search process.16

A similar phenomena is observed with respect to entrepreneurs who, on the basis of the New Economic Geography Theory, agglomer-
ate close to their competitors so that they can benefit from common suppliers and common means of distribution of their goods. Moreover, new entrepreneurs in a given sector tend to invest close to their competitors, knowing that by doing so they will be able to *a priori* verify the profitability of investment in a given region. A somewhat similar approach is taken, from economic point of view, by immigrants looking for the best and the safest place to move and resettle. Thus new immigrants are convinced that if numerous immigrants of their own ethnic/cultural background are settled in a given location, that is an indication they can be successful there.

It is undeniable that there are significant economic differences between African and the poorest Middle Eastern countries and the European Countries (especially with respect to the EU Member States). And it is also a fact that economic immigrants from those regions have been present in European countries for many decades. However, due to the rapid developments in ICT, including cheap communication via Internet, smartphones and other mobile communication devices, potential immigrants can now easily communicate with their families, relatives and friends living abroad. These technological innovations make it extremely easy for them to gain knowledge about available employment opportunities, social benefits, quality of life, as well as the perception of foreigners by residents in a given country, region, or city.

Given that migrants are able to easily compare countries using the available data, as well as through migrant networks, we analysed the structure and dynamics of Poland’s immigrant population and we compared it to other EU Member States.

Poland recorded the lowest share among all other the EU Member States of foreigners in the total population (0.3% in 2015) (Figure 2). The rate of non-EU28 citizens among all foreigners living in Poland amounted to 70.7%, however the majority of them migrated to Poland from the neighbouring countries of Ukraine and Belarus, which is a result of this region's history.

The highest share of foreigners among the EU countries was in Luxembourg, Cyprus, Latvia, Estonia and Austria (respectively 45.9%, 17.1%, 14.7%, 14.0%, 13.2%). However, the highest share of non-EU28 citizens in the immigrant population in 2015 was recorded in Latvia and Estonia, as well as Slovenia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, and Poland in 2015 (from 97.7% – Latvia, to 70.7% Poland). Notwithstanding this fact, it should be emphasized that these countries observed substantial (Latvia, Estonia) or moderate (Lithuania) decreases, or at most a very slight increase (Poland, Bulgaria, Croatia) in the share of non-EU28 foreigners in their popula-
tions, while the wealthiest EU Member States recorded a substantial increase in the share of non-EU28 citizens in their foreign population. This shows that Poland, together with other less wealthy Central and Eastern European countries, was not the primary destination for the recent wave of immigrants.

The aforementioned conclusions were positively verified by a study on the inflow of immigrants to the EU Member States in recent years (2008–2014). Although for Poland the annual rate of incoming immigrants in the total population increased eight times over this period (from 0.03% in 2008 to 0.25% in 2014), this index’s value is still below the EU average (0.66%) (Figure 3). The highest ratio of immigrants’ inflow to the total population was recorded in Luxembourg (3.82% in 2014) and then in Malta (1.67%), Austria (1.26%), Ireland (1.19%), and Sweden (1.09%). Countries with an annual ratio slightly below 1% included Germany (0.98%), Belgium (0.95%), Cyprus (0.90), Denmark (0.87%) and the United Kingdom (0.87%). At the same time, Member States which recently (during and after 2004) joined the EU, as well as Portugal, observed the lowest annual rate of immigrants’ inflow in relation to their total population in the period under research.

Figure 2. Share of foreigners in the population of the EU Member States in 2008–201.

Source: Eurostat.
Figure 3. Annual ratio of immigrants’ inflow to population in the EU Member States in 2008–2014

Source: Eurostat.

A similar distribution was found with respect to the relationship between the number of new incoming immigrants from non-EU28 countries to the total populations of the EU Member States. In 2014 the highest ratio was reported by Luxembourg (0.81%), Sweden (0.73%), Malta (0.63) and Ireland (0.62%), while the lowest (below 0.18%) was in Poland and the other Central European countries, with the exception of Bulgaria (0.21%) (Figure 4).

Figure 4. Relationship between the number of immigrants from non-EU28 countries and total population in the EU Member States in 2013–2014

Source: Eurostat.

In our view the Polish case is not so straightforward and cannot be explained by quoting the statistics alone. This is due to historical reasons,
The migration numbers and proportions have been influenced not only by the unstable situation in Africa, which resulted in the Council decisions of 2015 on the migrants’ redistribution, but also by the unstable
political situation in the Ukraine, which caused growth in migration to Poland from that country.

The growing migration from Ukraine was enabled by the Polish labour market regulations, which included a simplified procedure for the citizens of Ukraine, Armenia, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Russia to acquire a work permit. This simplified procedure basically required the employer to request a working permit for a person whom they were about to hire. The requests placed in the first half of 2015 by Polish employers concerning their demand for foreign workers indicated that they were willing to hire over 400,000 foreign employees in the forthcoming months. This number does not reflect the reality however, as firstly not all of the requests were accepted, and secondly many of these workers were likely to quit their jobs after the first few days, or even not to show up in their place of employment at all. Nonetheless the data may be considered as giving a general impression of how attractive Poland was becoming for foreign workers during that period of time.

2.2. Socio-economic factors

Although demographic factors are generally important, it is the socio-economic determinants which can be decisive when analysing the influence of different groups of factors on decisions regarding immigrants’ destination – especially for those who migrate due to economic reasons. The most commonly known and widely accepted index, which shows a country’s economic development while taking into account the wellbeing of its inhabitants, is the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita.

In 2013, Poland’s per capita GDP amounted to EUR 10,100, which was the fourth lowest value among all the EU Member States [the lowest being Bulgaria (5,500), followed by Romania (7,100) and Hungary (9,900)] although it should be noted that its dynamics was above the EU average in comparison to 2008 (Figure 5). It is worth noting that the Poland’s per capita GDP value was not only lower than the EU-15 countries, but also lower than that of some other Central European countries. Also, when we analysed changes in countries’ per capita GDP we noticed that the increase in the corresponding value for Poland in the period of 2008–2013 by 4% was lower than the increases recorded by smaller economies [Lithuania (16%), Estonia (15%), Slovakia (12%), and Latvia (10%)], as well as the wealthiest EU economies [Sweden (21%), Germany (11%), Luxembourg (9%), Austria (9%), and Belgium (6%)].

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19 Source: www.migrant.info.pl.
20 Source: Ministry of Labour and Social Policy.
Looking from migrants’ perspective, if we take into account the economic dimension of the destination-choosing process, then it is obvious that Poland will definitely not be their first choice of destination. In the EU there are many far better-developed countries – with GDP per capita over three times higher than in Poland, in this same time, a positive growth in GDP per capita [France (4%), Denmark (4%) and Finland (2%)] or just a slightly negative trend in GDP per capita trend [the United Kingdom (-1%), the Netherlands (-1%)]. Hence there is a high probability that these countries will be considered as a destination by voluntary economic immigrants rather than the Member States from the Central and Eastern part of the EU, including Poland.

Our research also shows that there seem to be at least two different groups of economic migrants – the first group consists of migrants who are willing to and wish to improve their economic situation by taking on employment in the destination country, and the second group consists of those migrants who look forward to receiving social benefits in the host country. Nonetheless, the situation on a given labour market is important for both groups, because a lower unemployment rate usually translates into: (a) a wider possibility and a higher probability of finding a better paid job by job-seeking immigrants, and (b) a higher level of wealth in the society and hence lower competition for social assistance.

Figure 5. GDP per capita in the EU Member States in 2008–2013 (in euro)

Source: Eurostat.
Hence we argue that a relatively low unemployment rate is one of the most crucial indices for potential immigrants. The highest unemployment rate (as a percentage of the active population) was recorded in 2015 in the Southern European countries: Greece (24.9%), Spain (22.1%), Croatia (16.3%), Portugal (12.6%) (Figure 6). In addition, with the exception of Portugal these countries reported a very low employment rate (as a percentage of total population), respectively 54.9%, 62.0%, 60.5%, 69.1%. The second group of the EU Member States consists of France, Ireland and the majority of Central European countries, including Poland (with the exception of the Czech Republic and Estonia), with employment rates ranging between 65–70%, and unemployment rates between 5.4% – 11.5% in 2015. These indices show that the situation in these countries' labour markets was much better than that of the Southern European countries, yet not as good as observed in the rest of the EU. The third group of the EU Member States consists of countries in which the employment rate reached circa 75–80%, while unemployment amounted to less than 7% (Sweden, Germany, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Denmark, the Czech Republic, and Austria). Thus, taking into consideration only the countries with the best labour market indices, immigrants from both aforementioned groups – i.e., those interested as well as those not interested in finding employment in the destination country – theoretically should look for immigration opportunities in the third, most affluent, group of the EU Member States.

From the point of view of economic migrants (i.e. those who migrate to actively look for a job), one of the key factors when considering potential destination countries should also be the level of salaries. However it is most often the case that potential immigrants tend to compare salaries in absolute (nominal) terms and not in relation to the cost of living in a given country. Also, migrants who are not interested in employment seem to be interested in the salary levels in potential destination countries because this value usually reflects the level of social payments which are offered within this country’s social policy. It must be noted that comparing salaries in nominal values is to some extent justified, especially for migrants whose strategy is based on maximizing remittances to their home countries while reducing costs of living to the necessary minimum.

In order to find out which countries could be the most interesting for immigrants in terms of salaries we analysed salary levels, defined as the total remuneration (in current prices), in cash or in kind, payable by an employer to an employee in return for work performed by the employee during the accounting period.

In the EU the highest annual net earnings in 2014 were registered in Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, Denmark, Finland, Austria, Germany, Belgium and France (Figure 7). In all other
Figure 6. Employment, and unemployment rates in the EU Member States in 2015

![Chart showing employment and unemployment rates in EU Member States in 2015.](chart)

Note: Employment (percentage of total population (from 20 to 64 years), unemployment (percentage of active population).
Source: Eurostat.

Figure 7. Annual net earnings in the EU Member States in 2014

![Chart showing annual net earnings in EU Member States in 2014.](chart)

Source: Eurostat.
Member States, including Poland, we observed annual average remuneration below the EU average (23,431 EUR for a single person without a child). Therefore we can say that the EU average value of annual net earnings constitutes a demarcation line between countries which, due to their relatively high wages, can become a targeted destination for economic immigrants; and those, including Poland (7,613 EUR), where significantly lower wages do not attract economic migrants.

For those immigrants who are looking only (or mainly) for social benefits, it is also relevant to analyse the data concerning social policy instruments offered in all Member States. With regard to social protection benefits, the most generous social protection package is offered by a group of countries representing the most developed and the richest EU economies (Figure 8), where both indices, i.e. the social protection benefits as a percentage of GDP as well as the value of social protection benefits per inhabitant were above the EU28 average. At the same time, the Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, as well as Ireland, Spain, and Portugal recorded much lower social expenditures. In Poland, for example, average social benefits per inhabitant amounted to 1,763 EUR annually in 2013, while the EU28 average equalled 7,320 EUR. The value for Poland was very much lower than in the EU’s most wealthy countries, where the corresponding value reached, respectively: Luxembourg 19,442 EUR, Denmark 14,425 EUR, Sweden 13,376 EUR, Finland, 11,321 EUR, the Netherlands 11,333 EUR, Austria 11,011 EUR, France 10,229 EUR, Belgium 10,154 EUR, Germany 9,606 EUR and the United Kingdom 8,859 EUR. On top of the value of average social benefits, one of the biggest concerns of migrants are the conditions for receiving these benefits, which significantly vary among the EU Member States. The simple comparison performed in this section of our paper shows that countries which joined the EU during or after 2004 offered much lower social benefits than the EU-15 countries, and it is clear that none of the Central and Eastern European Member States, including Poland, could compete with the better developed EU Member States in terms of offering social benefits to immigrants.

When analysing the most recent data on the total social benefits for a family in the EU Member States, we can observe that the majority of the EU Member States offer social payments to support pro-family policies (this is however linked only to number of children), and very few offer social tax exemptions. This distinction is of paramount importance, because only the richest and the most highly developed countries can offer the highest pro-family benefits in nominal value. The highest amounts of pro-family benefits in 2015 were available in Luxembourg (6,715 EUR),
Austria (4,378 EUR) and Slovenia (3,925 EUR), while the lowest values were in Bulgaria (20.5 EUR), Lithuania (216 EUR) and Poland (530 EUR) in 2015 (Figure 9). It is worth noting that wealthy countries offered higher values of pro-family benefits, while the lesser developed Central and Eastern European countries preferred to grant social tax exemptions. Therefore we can state that the richer countries of the EU can offer some additional social incentives in order to increase the birth rate, while the countries which joined the EU during or after 2004, including Poland, as of the end of 2015 offered more pro-labour and pro-economic incentives, granting social assistance on the basis of the employment of at least one of parents. This leads us to conclusion that Poland, which together with other less wealthy EU countries offered work-related social benefits, could be at most a potential destination for work-driven immigrants, while the other (most wealthy) EU Member States can be the targeted destinations of those immigrants wishing to benefit from generous social policies. While these two immigrant groups can both be classified as economic immigrants, their motivations can lead them to different choices in terms of their destination country.

Although it might not be a common thesis, we argue that – taking into account economic indicators – the immigrants who are willing to find employment and settle in the host country can justifiably consider the CEE countries as their destination. As we prove in the next section of this paper, this is especially true for immigrants with similar cultural and
religious backgrounds and/or speaking a language of the same linguistic family. Although the salaries in these countries are lower than in EU-15, still their standard of living can be rather similar due to the significantly lower costs of living and lower taxation levels.

**Figure 9. Total social benefits for a family in the EU Member States in 2015 (annually in euro)**

Note: A family: 2 Adults (each earns an average wage) + 2 kids (4 and 8 years old, in a public pre-school and a public primary school).
Source: PWC.

2.3. Cultural issues

Apart from the economic factors which can influence migration directions, cultural issues are also of great importance, especially those related to two aspects: language proficiency in the host country; and religions which are professed (or at least accepted) in the host country.

Foreign language proficiency is especially important for immigrants who do not want to rely on their ethnic network in the job search process. Lack of knowledge of the host country’s language is likely to result in immigrants being unemployed (with employment opportunities reduced basically to ethnic businesses within their diaspora) and few (if any) possibilities to assimilate into the host country’s society.

However the analysis of language proficiency is more complicated due to the fact that some official languages used in some of the EU Member States are widely known by incoming immigrants. Therefore, we focused on French-speaking (France, Luxembourg and Belgium) and English-speaking (the United Kingdom, Ireland) countries in order to compare them to the other EU Member States. Moreover, we argue that some
countries should be added to that group – i.e. small countries (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg), as well as the Scandinavian countries, where English is well known.

Taking into account the aforementioned assumptions, the lowest percentage rate of respondents who declared that they do not know any language other than their mother tongue was recorded, in 2011, in Lithuania, Latvia, Denmark, Slovenia, Finland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Austria (Figure 10). These countries make up a group of the EU Member States where the share of respondents who declared a knowledge of more than one language was above the EU28 average. However, many Central and Eastern European Countries, as well as Italy, Spain and Portugal (with the aforementioned French and English-speaking country exceptions) reported the highest rate of respondents who claimed not to have any foreign language proficiency.

If we assume that foreign language skills are essential to find a job and to assimilate into the host society, this can be in fact one of the decisive factors when choosing a destination country. It is also clear that the CEE countries, including Poland, cannot be perceived as a migration target based on this factor.

The second factor under cultural research which we think can have a tremendous impact on the infl ow of immigrants is the religion professed by a majority of citizens. It seems that if a religion is particularly dominant in a given country, then this country is likely to be a destination for immigrants who are of this particular religion, and is not likely to be targeted by migrants of other religions.

Figure 10. Number of foreign languages known in 2011 (in percentage)

Note: No data for the United Kingdom, Croatia and Romania. Source: Eurostat.
The European Commission data reveal that the lowest percentage of people who declared observance of any religion was in the Czech Republic (59%), the Netherlands (49%), Sweden (43%), Estonia (37%), France (37%), the United Kingdom (32%), Belgium (27%) and Denmark (27%) (Figure 11). At the same time, there is a relatively large group of EU Member States, including Poland, where it is possible to identify a predominant religion, i.e. one which marks its presence in everyday life. If this religion is not professed by immigrants, than there is a high probability that they will not be interested in joining this society. The highest share of inhabitants who declared being of certain religion concerned the following religions: Orthodox (Greece – 96%, Cyprus – 96%, Romania – 87% and Bulgaria 82%); Catholic (Malta – 95%, Poland – 91%, Italy – 90%, Portugal – 88%, Ireland – 88%, Lithuania 84% and Austria – 77%); and Protestant (Finland – 70%, Denmark – 64%). A very interesting situation was observed in Germany, where there no dominant position is held by any of the major religions (Catholic – 31%, and Protestant – 30%), with a quarter of society reporting the non-observance of any religion. Taking into consideration aforementioned findings we can observe a tendency which shows that the lower the share of (a) major religion(s) professed in a given country, the higher is the probability that that country will be a destination for migrants professing other religions.

When we think about Poland in terms of the cultural and religious aspects of immigration, it is worth observing that Polish society has not suffered any major social problems caused by the presence of any immigrant population since World War 2. A Pew Research Center analysis revealed that Poland, among the EU countries analysed in the report, was the one with the lowest percentage of respondents (40%) who claimed that their country should accept fewer immigrants. Moreover, it was the third-ranked country (after Germany and Spain) where respondents claimed that more immigrants should be allowed to work in their country (9%). The worst results in this regard were observed in Greece and Italy, where respectively 86% and 80% claimed that immigration to their country must be subject to limitations, and only 1% and 2% said their country should accept more immigrants. According to the report, Poland was also the country where the lowest share of respondents (42%) who claimed that (in their opinion) immigrants living in Poland wished to be different from the Polish society and impose their cultural patterns on Polish society instead of making an attempt to assimilate.
2.4. A problematic issue: changes in population

In the analysed time period Poland, like many other EU Member States, struggled with demographic problems. Its birth rate decreased (while the death rate generally remained constant), and hence its natural changes in population recorded negative values. (-0.7% in 2015) (Figure 12). A similar, negative tendency was observed in a majority of the EU Member States. In the period 2008–2015 the biggest drop in the rate of population changes was recorded not only in countries with negative birth rates (Greece -2.7 in 2015, Italy -2.7, Spain -0.1, Portugal -2.2, Romania -3.8 and Croatia -4.0), but also in those which had positive birth rates (Ireland 7.7, France 3.0, the Netherlands 1.4, Finland 0.5 and Belgium 1.0). Only seven of 28 EU Member States reported an increase in the overall rate of population change (however among them only four – Sweden, Malta, Luxembourg and Slovakia – reported positive values in 2015).

In addition to a pro-family policy (including social benefits), a pro-immigration policy can increase demographic indices. Analysis of the net migration flows in Poland reveals (with exclusion of the crisis period) a relatively stable negative net migration index between 2008 and 2015. It is worth noting that although more people emigrated from Poland than immigrated to Poland during each of these years, the numbers in relation
to the total Polish population were not substantial (Figure 13). Therefore, taking into consideration the low number of immigrants to Poland, the rate of net migration to the total population decreased in comparison to the values recorded 8 years earlier (-0.07% in 2008 and -0.03% in 2015). Similarly, a relatively low impact of net migration on demographics was recorded in Bulgaria (slightly negative, up to -0.06% in 2015), or France (+0.07%), while significant negative changes were noted in the Czech Republic (from 0.65% to 0.10%), Italy (from 0.61% to 0.05%), Slovenia (from 0.92% to 0.02%), Spain (0.95% to -0.02%), Ireland (from 0.37% to -0.14%), and Cyprus (from 2.14% to -0.24%).

An increasing impact of migration on demographic changes, in terms of the rate of net migration in the population, was reported in Luxembourg (1.98% in 2015), Austria (1.43%), Germany (1.42%), Malta (0.97%), Sweden (0.82%), Denmark (0.74%), the United Kingdom (0.62%), and Belgium (0.62%). Also the Netherlands and Estonia recorded an increase in the ratio of net migration to population (respectively 0.33% and 0.31%). It is worth observing that there are EU Member States which suffered from relatively high emigration in comparison to immigration, which resulted in high values of net migration to the population ratio (e.g. Lithuania -0.77%, Latvia -0.54%, Croatia -0.42% and Greece -0.33%).

According to the Eurostat studies on projected populations in the EU Member States, Poland will record a substantial decrease in its number of inhabitants, which will drop by 6% in 2040 and by 23% in 2080 in comparison to the data from 2015 (Figure 14). Similar forecasts of substantial declines in population were reported in the cases of the lower developed EU countries, especially: Slovakia (up to 29%), Greece (30%), Portugal (31%), Bulgaria (32%), Latvia (32%) and Lithuania (37%). According to
the demographic projections, the populations of some of the most developed countries, as well as of the smallest ones, will increase in the upcoming decades (especially in Luxemburg, which is project to record a 129% increase in 2080, Belgium 47%, Sweden 45%, Cyprus 44%, the United Kingdom 32%, Ireland 28%, Denmark 20%, and France 19%).

3. Polish migration policy

In 2012, the Polish government – in response to the growing public discussion on migration issues – issued a document which addressed the problems and reviewed the legislation concerning immigration to Poland. The document, entitled *The Polish Migration Policy* (original Polish
Polityka Migracyjna Polski was approved by the Polish government in July 2012. This comprehensive document gathered together historical and empirical data concerning immigration to Poland, as well as introduced legal regulations, both at the country level as well as at the EU level. Moreover, it sought to interconnect migration policy with other policies on the national level.

The document, despite being comprehensive and well structured, definitely lacks an economic background. Despite that fact the overall assessment of The Polish Migration Policy can be seen as positive, inasmuch as it provides reasonable recommendations for Polish policy makers in terms of each problem introduced in the document, nevertheless it must be noted that the vast majority of the recommendations are very vague (e.g. ‘adoption of solutions aiming at solving the problem of low availability of apartments for foreigners under international protection’, or ‘fostering cooperation with immigrant groups in the process of immigrant assimilation’) and are not operationalized. However, in general terms the suggestions and directions included in the document are reasonable and may prove beneficial if more detailed operational documents are to follow.

One such operational document, which deals with the recommendations of the Polish Migration Policy, is the document entitled The Polish Policy of Foreign Citizens’ Assimilation (original Polish title: Polska Polityka Integracji Cudzoziemców – założenia i wytyczne), prepared by the Polish Ministry of Labour and Social Policy in 2013. It was created on the basis of the Polish Migration Policy and addresses the recommendations and suggestions included in the policy document.

This particular document seems to be the most important and urgent in the present political situation, especially taking into account the Council decisions of 2015 on the acceptance of quotas of foreign migrants. This is because Poland, being a country with no (or marginal) experience in

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22 Ibidem, p. 12.
23 The document Polityka Migracyjna Polski is divided into ten problem sections, which include a) legal immigration, b) prevention of the illegal immigration, c) protection of foreign citizens in Poland, d) integration of foreign citizens in the Polish society, e) citizenship and repatriation, f) labour migrations – return migration, g) efficiency of the legal and institutional system, h) international constraints on the Polish migration policy, i) interdependencies between the Polish migration policy and other policies, and j) monitoring of migration processes.
24 Polityka Migracyjna Polski..., op.cit., p. 18.
dealing with immigration populations, will be exposed to completely new challenges in terms of immigrants’ integration and assimilation.

Although the survey conducted by the Pew Research Center suggests that due to the general positive attitude of the Poles towards foreign immigrants the assimilation process might be relatively easy, it must be pointed out that the general positive perception of minorities in Poland most likely results from two factors: (a) the extremely low number of foreign immigrants in Poland at the time of conducting the survey, and hence the respondents’ lack of experience concerning the problems which might emerge in coexisting with different ethnic groups; and (b) the fact that the vast majority of immigrants living in Poland are of a quite similar cultural and religious background as Polish citizens.

The document addresses many important issues concerning the immigrants’ assimilation and integration, but the most relevant recommendation seems to be in connection with programs aimed at teaching the Polish language to immigrants and their children. Mastering the Polish language by foreigners is the most crucial issue, because language is the basic tool which enables communication between immigrants and the host society. Research shows that immigrants who are unable to speak the immigration country’s language tend to remain in their ethnic communities, which results in the creation of ethnic enclaves. Moreover, if many immigrants are unable to speak the host country’s language, the odds are relatively high that an ethnic labour market is going to emerge. This could create an incentive for new migrants to join their compatriots even if they cannot and/or are not willing to learn the host country’s language.

Immigrants who do not speak the host country’s language are often subject to social exclusion, even though they are able to perform jobs which do not require understanding this language. On the other hand, if immigrants to Poland are willing to learn Polish, it also means their readiness to assimilate.

Hence Polish language education seems to be the greatest challenge for the Polish authorities responsible for immigrants’ integration, both in terms of organizing the entire system for such education and financing it. Therefore, such education should be obligatory and provided without cost to the immigrants, or at least co-financed by the Polish state, and it should cover every immigrant who is to be granted a residence permit in Poland and declares his or her willingness to stay in Poland.26

26 Many actions in the field of immigrants’ integration into Polish society are conducted by Non Profit Organisations (and financed by them, as well as, by some Polish universities).
Another interesting tool introduced in the document consists of individual integration programmes (IIP) intended to be available to every asylum seeker. As of now only one person from the immigrant family is covered by the individual integration program, while the document emphasizes the need to provide an IIP for every family member. The IIP includes recommendation of mentoring programs for newcomer immigrant families, with mentors being immigrants already integrated into the Polish society. According to the recommendations included in the document, the mentor should closely cooperate with the social worker, who coordinates the program for a given family. This tandem should also seek out the best possible solutions in terms of family integration and assimilation.

Finally, it is important to note that the actions included in the integration policy should also be aimed at immigrants’ children. The most urgent need is to introduce a system and establish procedures for dealing with foreign-born children, who do not speak Polish upon their arrival in Poland. Each school should be able to provide such children with additional Polish language classes until they are able to actively participate in all the classes taught in Polish. This requires not only additional resources, but also a systemic approach and a change in the mentality of both Polish teachers as well as pupils – especially in the small cities and rural areas.

Conclusions

Carrying out a statistical analysis in terms of the demographical, social, economic, and cultural issues at the country level can be considered as just the initial step in understanding the role which migration plays in a country’s economy and demography. It is not wise to compare the rankings without additional analysis, as this can lead to false conclusions. The basic indicator which can be considered relevant is the share of foreigners in the overall population, as well as the increase in this share over time. However, after analysing these two indicators, with the aim of assessing the incentives offered by a country to economic migrants, we should make some additional remarks. These additional remarks are especially important for the Central and Eastern European Countries, where the vast majority of migrants are of East European origin (i.e. from Russia and the post-Soviet republics). Although the number of immigrants in the population and the increase in their share of the population in recent years can be considered relatively high, this does not necessarily mean that these countries (e.g. Poland) will be considered attractive to poten-
tial migrants from the African/Middle East countries. Taking this into account we claim that the countries which can be of the highest interest for economic immigrants looking for societies open for foreigners from non-EU countries would most likely be Sweden, Spain, Greece, France, Austria, Germany and Denmark (Figure 15). Although in nominal terms Poland is ranked only slightly behind this group of countries, it is not likely to be perceived as a destination for immigrants coming from countries other than the Eastern European region.

**Figure 15. Summarised ranks (from 1 to 28 in four categories) of the EU Member States in terms of demographic factors negatively influencing economic immigration**

![Graph showing summarised ranks of EU Member States](image)

Source: own calculations.

This points to the conclusion that it is immigrants’ perception of a given country which is the most important factor in the decision making process. And this perception is in most cases shaped during pre-migration contacts with immigrants’ friends and relatives who have already migrated to that country – which is in line with the Migrant Networks Theory.

Taking into account the purely economic performance of all the EU Member States, as well as the social benefits offered by them, the most desirable countries from migrants’ point of view should be Germany, Luxembourg, Sweden, Netherlands, Denmark, Austria, the United Kingdom, Belgium and France (up to 100 cumulated points in their ranks) (Figure 16). It is worth noting that from the perspective of economic immigrants the most interesting destination countries are those countries with the highest GDP per capita and the lowest employment rate (at least for those who are willing to look for employment opportunities), as well as the highest social benefits, which are positively correlated to economic outcomes in these countries. Taking into account all of the above-mentioned factors, we can assume that Poland is not likely to be targeted by economic immigrants (seeking relatively higher paying jobs and higher social benefits).
Figure 16. Summarised ranks (from 1 to 28 in four categories) of the EU Member States in terms of social and economic factors negatively influencing economic immigration

Source: own calculations.

The next conclusion which stems from our research is that when we consider a given country as a potential destination for international migrants we cannot underestimate factors such as its cultural and religious background. If the vast majority of citizens know only one language (their mother tongue), without having any foreign language skills, and there is one common religion professed by a majority of people, then the chances are high that this country will not be targeted by international migrants of a different religious and cultural background. Taking into account these assumptions, both some Central European Countries and the EU-15 Member States are much more popular destinations among economic migrants than Poland (Figure 17).

Figure 17. Summarised ranks (from 1 to 28 in four categories) of the EU Member States in terms of cultural and religious factors negatively influencing an economic immigration

Source: own calculations.

Taking into account the outcomes of the rankings of the demographic, socio-economic, and cultural issues which may influence an economic
immigrant’s decisions, we can rank the top ten EU Member States which can be considered as the prime destinations for immigrants to EU countries. These Member States are: the Netherlands, the Czech Republic, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany, Luxembourg, Denmark, Sweden, France and Slovakia (Figure 18). However, in the context of the recent immigration wave it is worth noting that the Czech Republic and Slovakia have qualified to this group due to the very high rate of foreigners in their populations, as well as their relatively open, liberal societies. At the same time their socio-economic indices were significantly lower in comparison to those of the other aforementioned Member States.

Figure 18. Summarised ranks of three categories of issues (demographical, socio-economic and cultural issues) of the EU Member States having an influence on an economic immigration

Source: own calculations.

In conclusion, on the basis of our research we can state that potential economic immigrants are not particularly interested in the most recent Member States of the EU or in any other countries with substantial economic problems or disadvantages in comparison to the better developed countries. Therefore we should not expect a high number of them to voluntarily and intentionally choose to locate in Central and Eastern European Countries, including Poland.

With respect to Poland specifically, uncertainty of employment combined with a lack of procedures and lack of experience in dealing with immigrant groups, especially those from different cultural backgrounds, can be considered a serious problem for Poland if it were about to face a significant immigrant influx in the nearest future. The Polish official documents that postulate specific actions with reference to the acceptance and assimilation of immigrants are very general, and even if some actions are indicated in detail they lack operationalization and information and – more importantly – financial backing for the indicated ventures.

183
Translating the suggestions contained in the documents into reality seems to be very urgent matter, even of paramount importance. The most important issue is to introduce a system of Polish language education, both for adults and their children. In the latter case the system should cover each public school, as many of them are likely to accept the immigrant children in the nearest future. In our opinion this seems to be most crucial and urgent action in the immigrant assimilation process.

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Abstract: In 2015 the European Union was faced with a huge problem – the migration crisis, which saw more than a million migrants crossing the EU borders. Almost 900,000 came to the EU from Turkey. Migrants travelled from the Turkish Anatolian coast to the nearby Greek islands in the Aegean Sea. The Aegean has for decades seen territorial disputes between Greece and Turkey concerning delimitation of the boundaries of the continental shelf, territorial waters, airspace. Turkey also claims the right to the Greek islands at its shores. Mass migration of Muslims to Greek islands contribute to escalations of tensions between Athens and Ankara. Greece is getting increasingly concerned about the possibility of Turkey using the ‘demographic weapon’.

Keywords: Greece, Turkey, European Union, foreign policy, international dispute, migration crisis

Introduction

The relations between Greece and its Turkish neighbour have been characterised by hostility and distrust since the very emergence of mod-
ern Greece. For a long time, the Greek society considered Turkey its traditional enemy, who had occupied the Hellenic territory for 400 years and had prevented the restoration of the Greek state in the 19th century. The Turkish perception of Greeks is very similar and in turn involves the Greek aggression on western Asia Minor between 1919 and 1922. In Turkey the campaign is considered a part of the Turkish War of Independence, which prevented Greek occupation and contributed to the establishment of the Republic of Turkey.

The relations between Greece and Turkey were regulated in the Treaty of Lausanne of 1924, which determined the Greek–Turkish border in Thrace and ownership of islands in the Aegean Sea. Additionally, the treaty also addressed the issue of population exchange between the two countries. The treaty brought about a rapprochement in the relations between Athens and Ankara that lasted for the next three decades.

After World War II, given the two-block nature of the international order, the two countries maintained relatively good relations, cemented by the existence of a common enemy – the Soviet Union – and their membership in NATO since 1952. The relations between Athens and Ankara deteriorated in the mid-1950s with the emergence of the Cyprus issue. The agreements signed between Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom concerning the independence of Cyprus only temporarily stabilised the situation between Athens and Ankara. Subsequent Cyprian crises of 1963/1964 and 1967 increased the tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean. The most serious crisis in the relations between Greece and Turkey took place in 1974 when the Greek junta attempted a coup d'état in Cyprus, to which Turkey responded by invading the northern part of the island. The Cypriot problem was undeniably the main cause of the deterioration of relations between the two neighbouring countries, but it also contributed to the rise of further antagonisms related to the delimitation of borders in the Aegean Sea.

The Aegean dispute comprises a number of elements, which concern: determining the boundaries of the continental shelf, delimiting the borders of territorial waters and airspace, as well as remilitarisation of Greek islands located off the Anatolian shore. In the recent years, Turkey also challenged the ‘Greekness’ of some Aegean Islands at its shore. The Aegean issue had regularly been causing tensions in the relations between the two countries. In 1996 a war almost broke out over the issue of ownership of

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2 For more on the history of Greek–Turkish relations see R. Clogg, A Concise History of Greece, Cambridge 2002.
the small island of Imia.\(^5\) Owing to permanent efforts of NATO, especially of the United States, so far all crises have been dealt with peacefully. Since 1999, there has been a rapprochement in the relations between Athens and Ankara. Paradoxically, catastrophic earthquakes that both Turkey and Greece suffered in mid-1999 gave rise to intensive dialogue between the two countries, referred to as ‘seismic diplomacy’.\(^6\) With Greece’s conciliatory attitude, in 1999 the European Union granted Turkey the status of official candidate for EU membership.

The honeymoon period in the relations between the two countries is, however, only illusory, as they are still shrouded in an aura of mistrust. The list of problems in bilateral relations keeps getting longer, and in the recent years yet another issue has arisen, which further complicates the situation in the Aegean Sea, namely the problem of migrants attempting to make their way from Turkey to Greece.

1. Greece’s policy towards the migration problem

Starting with 2010, we have been witnessing a clear, or even rapid, increase in the number of foreigners coming to Greece.\(^7\) Most of the people detained for attempting to illegally enter the country were crossing the land border with Turkey. Because the Greek government was unable to handle the problem of migrant flows, the European Union chose to assist it by launching Operation Poseidon in 2010, a land and sea-based border control mission coordinated by the EU agency FRONTEX.\(^8\) Greece’s ruling party, which at that time was the conservative New Democracy, rather negatively disposed to migrants, decided to definitively seal the land border with Turkey.\(^9\) For this purpose, Athens asked the European Commission for financial assistance, to be spent on erecting a barbed wire fence

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and an anti-tank trench at the Greek–Turkish border in Thrace.\textsuperscript{10} The Commission refused, arguing that this would not yield the results that Greeks were expecting.\textsuperscript{11} Athens chose to finance the undertaking – Operation Aspida (Shield) – on their own and completed it in 2012.\textsuperscript{12} Operation Shield was intended to show illegal migrants that it was impossible to enter Greece from Turkey, almost two thousand officers were therefore sent to the border in Thrace to patrol the area and apprehend suspects.

In the same year, police forces began Operation Xenios Zeus (Hospitalable Zeus) within the country, consistently controlling documents of people suspected of staying in Greece illegally. Over the course of the operation, which lasted until 2014, hundreds of thousands of ‘suspects’ had been controlled; only in the second half of 2012, 65,000 people were held for verification, of which some four thousand proved to be illegal migrants and were therefore deported.\textsuperscript{13}

The position of the Greek government towards refugees changed in January 2015, when the Syriza party formed a new cabinet. The party, composed of radical socialists, advocated a change of the migration policy, pointing out the need to observe human rights, close detention centres and allow for legalisation of migrants and refugees with no valid travel documents.\textsuperscript{14} One of the first decisions of Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras’s government was to gradually shut down detention centres and turn them into open or semi-open ‘hosting facilities’, where conditions would meet the fundamental requirements of human dignity.\textsuperscript{15} The government also ended Operation Xenios Zeus and instructed officials to use detention measures only in extreme cases. Greek officials were required to observe human rights when dealing with foreigners.\textsuperscript{16} Deputy Minister of Immigration Policy Tasia Christodouloupublicou publically stated that the expression ‘illegal’ should not be used towards migrants because they are people who deserve help.\textsuperscript{17} She also proposed that refugees be admitted to vari-

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{10} The anti-tank trench was much rather a manifestation of Greece’s eternal fear of a Turkish aggression than of the need to stop illegal migrants.
\item \textsuperscript{11} M. Martin, op.cit., p. 3.
\item \textsuperscript{12} Tsipras under pressure to tear down Turkish border fence, EuroActiv, 3.11.2015.
\item \textsuperscript{13} FRONTEX Between Greece and Turkey..., op.cit., pp. 68–69.
\item \textsuperscript{14} http://www.syriza.gr/pdfs/politiki_apofasi_idrytikou_synedriou_syriza.pdf (last visited 8.12.2016).
\item \textsuperscript{15} A. Triandafyllidou, E. Gemi, Irregular migration in Greece: What is at stake?, “ELIAMEP Policy Paper”, June 2015, p. 4.
\item \textsuperscript{16} C. Katsiavicas, A New day for Greek Migration Policy? The New Government and Prospects for reform, “BREF Commentary”, No. 33, 3.03.2015, pp. 2–3.
\item \textsuperscript{17} A.A. Nestoras, The Gatekeeper’s Gambit: SYRIZA, Left Populism and the European Migration Crisis, Institute of European Democrats Working Paper, Brussels, 23.12.2015, pp. 12, 16.
\end{itemize}
ous local administration units throughout the country, but local officials protested against this idea.\textsuperscript{18}

The policy of the new government was heavily criticised by the major opposition party, New Democracy, which had previously introduced the most restrictive measures against illegal migrants and refugees. New Democracy’s leader, A. Samaras, particularly criticised the termination of Operation Xenios Zeus and the shutting down of detention centres, arguing that this would lead to more crime and threats to Greek citizens. Furthermore, he especially strongly opposed the proposals to remove the barriers erected on the land border with Turkey.\textsuperscript{19}

When detention centres were shut down, large groups of migrants and refugees began occupying the main squares and parks of Athens. This angered both the capital’s inhabitants and local authorities, which were critical of the government policy. At the same time, the situation on the islands was deteriorating because now, with detention centres closed, there was nowhere to send the new waves of refugees to, and they started to establish huge illegal camps in places where they arrived.\textsuperscript{20} The foreigners coming to Greece did not, however, intend to stay there; their main goal was to leave as quickly as possible, going north along the Balkan Route towards the wealthier EU Member States.

The remaining members of the European Union initially underestimated and ignored the phenomenon of ever new waves of refugees arriving on Greek islands. Only in May 2015 the European Commission put forward a proposal of response to the mass migration in the form of the European Agenda On Migration.\textsuperscript{21} In consequence of the Commission’s initiative, in September 2015 the Council of the European Union adopted a decision aimed at stabilising the situation caused by the massive influx of refugees.\textsuperscript{22} The decision provided for assistance to the front-line EU Member States, Italy and Greece, which the refugee crisis had affected the most, in the form of relocation of 160,000 refugees, increased funding and establishment of hotspots in areas most exposed to the crisis.

\textsuperscript{18} A. Triandafyllidou, E. Gemi, op.cit., p. 4.

\textsuperscript{19} Tsipras under pressure to tear down Turkish border fence, EuroActiv, 3.11.2015.

\textsuperscript{20} A.A. Nestoras, op.cit., p. 16.


\textsuperscript{22} Council Decision Establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece, (EU) 2015/1601, 22.09.2015.
The attention of Greek politicians remained focused on the economic crisis, while Prime Minister Tsipras tried to take advantage of the refugee crisis in negotiations on financial assistance for Greece. The Syriza government invoked European solidarity, indicating that Greece was first and foremost in need of additional funds. During the campaign preceding the early parliamentary elections in Greece in September 2015, the migration issue was one of the main topics of political debates. Prime Minister Tsipras did not change his rhetoric concerning the treatment of refugees. In his speeches he blamed the migration crisis on Western countries, accusing them of pursuing a neo-colonialist policy and unwarranted interference with internal matters of the Middle East, causing one war after another – first in Afghanistan, then in Iraq, then in Libya, and now in Syria. Syriza politicians believed that this policy had led to the huge waves of refugees arriving in Europe and that Europe was to be blamed for this situation. Inveterate in their populism, they accused European politicians of being responsible for the death of the thousands who lost their lives attempting to cross the Aegean Sea into Greece. Obviously, the aim of this critical rhetoric voiced by leftist politicians was to link the two crises in Greece – the economic crisis and the financial crisis – with each other. When Syriza again won elections in September 2015, Prime Minister Tsipras did not hide that he was counting on EU financial assistance with regard to the refugee crisis. His negotiation strategy essentially consisted in presenting the Union with the following alternative: either it provides financial assistance to Greece to address the economic crisis, which would mean remittance of a part of Greece’s debt and reduction of debt servicing, or it will have to deal with thousands of migrants who will travel through Greece to the wealthiest EU countries, mainly Germany and Scandinavian countries. The Greek Minister of Foreign Affairs, Nikos Kotzias, supposedly spoke in a similar spirit: ‘There will be millions of migrants and thou-

25 Α.Α. Nestoras, op.cit., p. 17.
sands of jihadists who will come to Europe\textsuperscript{28} – unless an agreement is reached with Greece.

The members of the European Commission and the Council of the European Union spoke with one voice, clearly stressing to Greek politicians that the country was responsible for controlling and registering all people applying for asylum in its territory. Increasing numbers of migrants arrived from Greece through Macedonia, Slovenia, Hungary and Croatia in Austria and Germany as well as further north, in Denmark and Sweden. On 25 October 2015, a mini-summit was held by the countries most affected by the influx of refugees. It was attended by the leaders of Austria, Bulgaria, Croatia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Romania and Slovenia, as well as by the prime ministers of Macedonia, Serbia and Albania, the non-EU countries on the Balkan Route. The summit was not a success, however. Prime Minister Tspiras absolutely refused to expand refugee camps in Greece, but he officially agreed to EU countries’ assistance to the Greek border guard.\textsuperscript{29} He argued that the Dublin II Regulation was extremely prejudicial to his country given the ever deeper refugee crisis and that it should be renegotiated; he also requested greater relocation quotas and the establishment of a European Migration Policy, which would relieve the front-line countries of some of the burden.\textsuperscript{30}

Brussels, however, saw through Syriza’s attempts to use the fear of further refugee waves among Europeans to negotiate more lenient conditions of repaying the Greek debt. Individual EU Member States began accusing Greece of failing to observe the provisions of the Schengen Agreement. Criticism of Greece’s policies became especially strong after the November terrorist attacks in Paris, when it turned out that two Jihadists who participated in these attacks came to Europe through Greece.\textsuperscript{31} Some Member States proposed that Greece’s membership in the Schengen Area be suspended for two years.\textsuperscript{32} Given the lack of progress in Greece’s policy towards refugees, other countries along the Balkan Route announced they would seal their borders. Hungary had done this even earlier – in September 2015; like in a domino effect, further steps were announced by Austria, Slovenia, Croatia and Macedonia. Greece’s situation was be-

\textsuperscript{28} V. Gaetan, \textit{An Aegean Alliance. Greece, Turkey, and Migration Cooperation}, “Foreign Affairs”, 29.09.2015.


\textsuperscript{30} Ibidem.

\textsuperscript{31} Tension grows between Brussels and Athens over Schengen rules, EurActiv, 28.01.2016.

\textsuperscript{32} Greece told it could be kicked out of Schengen, EurActiv, 3.12.2015.
coming increasingly complicated because it could turn out that unable to travel northward, hundreds of thousands of refugees would be trapped in Greece. This was the worst scenario for Greece, especially given its already very bad economic situation.

However, EU Commissioner for Migration, Home Affairs and Citizenship Dimitris Avramopoulos stood up for Greece, stressing that the country had already taken steps to remedy the situation. The Council of the European Union also recommended remedial action to Greece. Criticism by the Member States put pressure on the government in Athens, and it asked the European Union for assistance. Greece also committed to opening five hotspots on the islands of Chios, Samos, Leros, Lesbos and Kos as well as two relocation camps: one in Sindos (Thessaloniki) and the second one in Schisto (Piraeus). In February 2016 Greece once again tried to blackmail Europe by threatening to veto the agreement negotiated with the United Kingdom before the Brexit referendum, if other EU Member States close their borders to refugees. Brussels, however, did not let itself be pressured and reiterated the threats that it would exclude Greece from the Schengen Area.

The argumentation used by Greek politicians increasingly involved playing the Turkey card, and Turkey was being blamed for the influx of migrants to the European Union (which, as a matter of fact, was justified to a certain extent). Greece and Turkey had signed an agreement on readmission already in 2002, and in the document Turkey committed to accepting illegal migrants deported from Greece provided they had Turkish citizenship or had come to Greece through Turkey. Greek officials believed that Turkey should be the one to control its borders, verify migrants in its territory and provide them with necessary assistance. Turkey, however, did not take such steps, and it was turning a blind eye to the activities of Turkish smugglers, who instructed the illegal migrants for whom they were organising transport to Greece that they should destroy their documents and pretend to be refugees, which made the process of identification difficult. Ankara, in turn, did not agree to accept people without

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documents deported from Greece to Turkey, even if they had come to Greek islands from Turkey. Consequently, Greece was unable to conduct readmissions of illegal migrants to Turkey. The fact that Ankara essentially facilitated the movement of refugees into Greece was perceived by some Greek politicians as the implementation of the doctrine of former Turkish President Turgut Özal, who supposedly had once said that Turkey had no need to wage war against Greece – a couple million illegal migrants sent over from Turkey would be enough to finish them off.37

2. Turkey’s position on the migration issue

From the very onset of the Republic of Turkey in 1923 its new authorities – especially President Mustafa Kemal Atatürk – stressed that homogeneity was the basis of its functioning and identity. The inhabitants of the young state were to speak Turkish and profess Sunni Islam.38 The application of this principle resulted in decisions that consolidated the uniformity of the country, such as exchanging population with Greece, when close to 1.5 million Orthodox Greeks were deported,39 and the established practice of discriminating Kurds, who still have not been granted the status of an ethnic minority. The principle of national homogeneity still remains the foundation of Turkish policies – internal and foreign alike – which translates into Turkey’s attitude to people attempting to cross the border.

Since 1961 Turkey is a signatory of the 1951 Refugee Convention, but it has adopted a protocol that limits its application to people from Europe, and specifically from Council of Europe member countries.40 The decision on introducing geographic restrictions to the application of the Convention is related to Turkey’s location in an extremely conflict-ridden region of the world, where various types of international crises keep emerging one after another, causing mass migrations.41 In order to ensure national homogeneousness, Turkey sent a clear signal to the international community that non-European citizens would not receive proper care in

38 G. Seufert, *Turkey as Partner of the EU in the Refugee Crisis*, “SWP Comments”, January 2016, Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik, German Institute for International and Security Affairs, p. 3.
40 One example of this is the fact that between 1995 and 2010, only approx. 20 people per year were granted refugee status, from: G. Seufert, op.cit.
its territory, that they were not welcome. This does not mean, however, that no refugees arrived to Turkey. Located at the meeting point of three continents: Europe, Asia and Africa, and forming a natural corridor connecting the East with the West, the country has always seen refugees appearing at its borders, whenever there was a crisis in its neighbourhood. Some 1.5 million refugees came to Turkey from Iran after the 1979 Iranian Revolution; people from Iraq were coming during the Iran–Iraq War waged in the 1980s;\textsuperscript{42} in 1991 almost 500,000 Iraqi Kurds fled to Turkey from Saddam Hussein’s repressions; later in the 1990s, Bosniaks and Kosovars were looking for shelter at the Bosphorus, fleeing from the war-ridden Balkans.\textsuperscript{43} The majority of these refugees either returned to their countries of origin when the situation settled down or went on to migrate to other countries, where they were hoping to be granted refugee status.

With growing numbers of refugees arriving at its doorstep, Turkey attempted to seal its borders. In early 21\textsuperscript{st} century, Turkey decreased the permeability of the border with Iran by erecting observation towers. The other borders in the east (with former members of the Soviet Union) were well guarded as well. The 900 kilometres long border with Syria, in turn, had been mined and fenced off using barbed wire since the 1950s, when Turkey began fearing Syria’s territorial revisionism concerning the Hatay Province.\textsuperscript{44} What is more, military cooperation between Turkish and Syrian Kurds forced Turkish border guard to increase controls. These efforts, however, did not alleviate the problem of illegal entries to Turkey.\textsuperscript{45}

The civil war that broke out in Syria in 2011 changed Turkey’s policy towards refugees coming from the south. President Erdogan assumed that Syrian insurgents would quickly overthrow the Assad regime and that Turkey would gain political influence in that country by providing assistance to the opposition and accepting refugees. Therefore Turkey chose to pursue and ‘open door’ policy towards Syrian refugees. The Turkish government began setting up refugee camps at the border with Syria, initially refusing to accept international assistance for Syrians. This restriction was


\textsuperscript{43} F. Düvell, \textit{Turkey, the Syrian Refugee Crisis and the Changing Dynamics of transit Migration}, “Mediterranean Yearbook”, January 2013, p. 278.

\textsuperscript{44} E. Lundgren Jorum, \textit{Beyond Syria’s Borders: A History of Territorial Disputes in the Middle East}, London 2014, p. 89 ff.

probably introduced due to the fact that Syrian insurgents were trained in these camps and encouraged to go back and continue fighting the Assad regime.\textsuperscript{46} Turkey’s policy towards Syria was an element of Ankara’s bigger plans concerning the Middle East: to rebuild its major power position in the region and become the religious leader among Sunni Islamic countries. When these plans failed, and especially when relations with Egypt, Israel, Iraq and Iran deteriorated, Turkey’s international position was considerably weakened. Erdogan’s failure was especially clear with regard to Syria, where Assad received military support from Russia, which further intensified the exodus of Syrian people to neighbouring countries, Turkey in particular.\textsuperscript{47} The situation in the region not only thwarted Ankara’s political ambitions but also showed that Turkish politicians were unable to handle the refugee crisis.\textsuperscript{48} Turkey began to cooperate with the UNHCR and allowed for UN presence in the country with the purpose of developing infrastructure covering the needs of the fleeing Syrians. Owing to cooperation with the UN agency and other non-government organisations, the Turkish government set up 25 camps along the border with Syria, with shelter for a total of 270,000 refugees.\textsuperscript{49} This was, however, just a drop in the ocean, given that almost 2 million Syrians and Iraqis were fleeing from the civil war. The situation was spinning out of control beyond the Turkish government’s capabilities to handle. In 2014 the government passed the Law on Foreigners and International Protection, introducing the ‘temporary protection’ status for Syrian refugees.\textsuperscript{50} This status ensures access to medical care and, to a limited extent, to the Turkish labour market. However, the law does not work in practice. First of all, it does not provide for family reunification and forces refugees to deal with their situation on their own and work illegally. It does not offer any real prospects for settling down in Turkey because it can be repealed at anytime.

Syrians do not want to stay in Turkey. They are aware that they cannot return to their country because of the war, unlikely to end in the foreseeable future, and they choose to look for a place to start a new life. Turkey is not such a place, because it does not grant them refugee status, does

\textsuperscript{46} G. Seufert, op.cit., p. 6; N. Gokalp Aras, Z. Sahin Mencutek, op. cit., p. 203.
\textsuperscript{47} A Deal between Turkey and the European Union: Selling Syrian Refugees Short, Assessment Report, Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, April 2016, pp. 2–3.
\textsuperscript{49} N.A. Şirin Öner, D. Genç, Vulnerability Leading to Mobility: Syrians’ Exodus from Turkey, “Migration Letters”, Vol. 12, No. 3, p. 255.
not provide them with guarantees of accommodation, work, medical care; hence, they try to leave this country.\textsuperscript{51}

The lack of real protection for refugees in Turkey contributed to mass-scale attempts to flee the country, reaching their peak in 2015. The Turkish government not only did not try to prevent this exodus but even turned a blind eye to the surge of human smuggling through the country’s western border. This way it got rid of a problem it was unable to handle. The scale of human smuggling operations was increasing and turned into an entire industry. It is estimated that in 2015 profits of the Turkish smuggler mafia amounted to EUR 5 billion,\textsuperscript{52} the cost per person being approximately EUR 2,500.\textsuperscript{53}

The migration crisis of 2015 forced EU Member States to engage in talks with Turkey on border control and on limiting migration. The EU accused Ankara of failing to guard its borders and admitting to its territory illegal migrants from third countries, who try to enter Europe with the waves of refugees.\textsuperscript{54} Under an agreement concluded with the EU, Turkey took steps to limit the influx of foreigners to its territory. In April 2016, Ankara ratified an agreement on readmission with Pakistan, which made it possible to even send Pakistanis from refugee camps in Greece back to Pakistan provided that they came to Greek islands from Turkey. Pakistan was also deemed a safe country by the EU.\textsuperscript{55} The Turkish government is planning to sign similar readmission agreements with Afghanistan, Iran, Iraq, Algeria, Morocco, Eritrea and Bangladesh.\textsuperscript{56}

3. The EU–Turkey agreement

The EU recognised the problem pointed out by Greece that Turkey’s border was insufficiently sealed. Already in 2012 the Union and Turkey signed an agreement on border cooperation providing for the exchange of information, joint operations and border guard personnel training (Memorandum of Understanding with FRONTEX), but the agreement did not


\textsuperscript{54} A. İÇduygû, op.cit., p. 11.

\textsuperscript{55} S.R. Powell, op.cit., p. 2.

\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Summary of Regional Migration Trends. Middle East}, Danish Refugee Council, April 2016.
yield the expected results. In December 2013 the EU and Turkey signed a readmission agreement, which entered into force only in June 2016. In order to pressure the government in Ankara into sealing its borders in the Aegean Sea, a special EU–Turkey summit on the migration crisis was held on 29 November 2015. The main goal European politicians wanted to achieve was to reach an agreement with Turkey that would ensure that refugees stay in Turkey and do not attempt to cross into the European Union. Brussels agreed to provide assistance to Turkey in the amount of EUR 3 billion to help Ankara finance the stay of refugees in Turkey. In a show of good faith, in December 2015 the EU decided to open a new chapter in the accession negotiations with Turkey (the Economic and Monetary Policy – Chapter 17). However, the expected results were not recorded – neither in December 2015, nor in January 2016, with thousands of refugees still arriving to Greek islands. The Greek President Prokopios Pavlopoulos and Minister Jannis Muzalas both accused Turkish authorities of turning a blind eye to smugglers who were openly organising transport to Greek islands. Both politicians were adamant that all illegal migrants needed to go back to Turkey, which is where they had come from. Greek politicians believed that Turkey was playing the key role in the migration crisis and that it depended on Turkey whether the flow of migrants would be stopped. European politicians joined Greece in criticising Turkey as they were also disappointed with Ankara’s actions regarding the migration crisis and its failure to fulfil the promises made at the November EU–Turkey summit.

But Ankara deliberately tried to play the migration card to its advantage in the relations with the European Union. Well aware that refugees were destabilising the political situation in many European countries, President Erdogan chose to use this fact to force Brussels to make concessions concerning accession negotiations and visa liberalisation.

57 FRONTEX Between Greece and Turkey: At the Border of Denial, op.cit., pp. 19–21.
60 Greek president accuses Turkish authorities of smuggling refugees, “Deutsche Welle”, 18.01.2016.
61 Greece says Turkey turning blind eye to refugee smugglers, “Ekathimerini”, 13.01.2016.
63 Athens given deadline as EU looks to send more refugees back to Greece, “The Guardian”, 10.02.2016.
Turkish leader repeatedly blackmailed the EU; at some point, for example, he said the following words to European Commission President Jean-Claude Juncker: ‘Sorry, we will open the doors and say goodbye to the migrants’. The agreement signed on 18 March 2016 following negotiations between Brussels and Ankara gives some hope for an effective resolution of the refugee crisis. Turkey committed to sealing its borders and cracking down on human smuggling to Greek islands. All illegal migrants who had come to Greece (Greek islands) from Turkey after 20 March 2016 were to be sent back to Turkey. In return, the European Union declared, among others, that for each Syrian sent back to Turkey it would accept one Syrian whose status has been confirmed and regulated in Turkey (the 1:1 scheme), but the number of Syrians accepted by the EU could not exceed 72,000. Furthermore, the EU committed to speeding up the process of visa liberalisation for Turkish citizens after requirements set out by the European Commission are met. Initially, the liberalisation was set to take place at the end of June 2016 but this has not happened so far, given that Turkey failed to meet the required criteria. Apart from that, Brussels also committed to providing Turkey with financial assistance in the amount of EUR 3 billion by the end of 2017 to be allocated to creating suitable living conditions for refugees. Another EUR 3 billion was to be allocated to refugee assistance in Turkey in 2018. Additionally, the agreement provided for intensification of Turkey’s accession process, including the opening of Chapter 33 of the negotiations (financial and budgetary provisions) and in the near future other chapters as well (e.g., energy – 15, education and culture – 26, foreign, security and defence policy – 31). It should be noted, however, that while agreeing to Turkey’s demands, the European Union kept stressing that at the same time Ankara needs to implement and observe the fundamental principles of European law. The agreement with Turkey, which came into

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65 Turkish President Threatens to Send Millions of Syrians Refugees to EU; “The Guardian”, 11.12.2016.
66 Initially Cyprus attempted to block the concessions to Turkey, but it withdrew its demands to help its ally – Greece. Cyprus had demanded that Turkey recognise the Republic of Cyprus as an entity in the international arena in return for opening new chapters of accession negotiations.
68 Ch. De Marcilly, A. Garde, op.cit., pp. 5–6.
force on 20 March 2016, contributed to a considerable decrease in the influx of foreigners to Greek islands.

4. Greek-Turkish relations after the conclusion of the EU–Turkey agreement on the refugee crisis

The responsibility for implementing the agreement between the European Union and Turkey rested with the governments of Greece and Turkey. Of course, in the name of the EU the European Commission committed to providing financial, advisory and expert assistance, but it were officials from the two Aegean countries who had to make the effort to solve the refugee problem. The European Commission declared financial assistance for the Greek government in the amount of EUR 700 million by the end of 2018 to be spent on infrastructure maintenance and support for refugees. Greece was to build infrastructure for 30,000 foreigners, and the UNHCR was to provide it for another 20,000 in Greece. Hotspots were to act as closed centres, so that Greek officials are fully able to control the presence of foreigners on the islands.

Alongside the EU–Turkey agreement, Brussels also negotiated closing of the border with Macedonia for refugees. Athens therefore found itself under pressure to solve the problem in its own territory. The Balkan Route was closed and Greece was no longer able to offload the problem on other countries. The closing of the Balkan Route was also a clear sign to migrants that was impossible to go further north from Greece, and given that the country was deep in a crisis, it was not an attractive target for refugees. There were, however, still some migrants in Greece (more than 45,500) who had not managed to leave the country by 20 March 2016 and therefore were neither subject to the EU–Turkey agreement nor able to leave the country northward along the Balkan Route; they could apply for asylum in Greece and be covered with the relocation procedure within the EU.

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70 There were plans to open another reception centre on Crete, among others. Greece: Refugee Reception Could Break Down in October, Oxford Analytica Daily Brief Service, 12.09.2016.
73 Ibidem, p. 3.
74 EU-Turkey Refugee Deal Hinges on Greece, “Deutche Welle”, 3.08.2016.
In order to implement the EU–Turkey agreement, Greece had to adjust its asylum law. This concerned accelerating the processing of applications of those refugees who had come to Greece after 20 March 2016 and sending them back to Turkey. There was a problem, however: so far Greece had not considered Turkey a safe country. Since by the EU–Turkey agreement Brussels recognised Turkey as safe country subject to the implementation of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive, Greece also had grounds to consider it a safe country and return refugees there.\(^76\) The European Commission argued that Turkey’s migration law, amended in 2014 and establishing the status of temporary protection for foreigners, met the criteria specified by the EU as sufficient guarantees for refugees coming to Turkey.\(^77\) The Greek parliament, which met in early April 2016 to adopt the new asylum law (Law 4375/2016) did not explicitly state that Turkey was a safe country; it merely stated that refugees could be sent to the ‘first country of asylum’ or to a ‘safe third country’.\(^78\) The parliament left the decision on whether a person should be sent back or not to the asylum committees that examined the applications.\(^79\) It turned out that the members of these commissions, composed partially from state officials and partially from representatives of international organisations (e.g., the UNHCR), did not decide to send migrants back to Turkey, as they believed that Turkey could not be considered safe for refugees since it did not give them proper protection.\(^80\) Only after the composition of these commissions was changed – under pressure from Brussels – they started issuing decisions on sending refugees back to Turkey.\(^81\)

In the operational dimension, initially the Greek–Turkish cooperation concerning readmission of refugees was going smoothly. Officers of the Turkish border guard were sent to the Greek islands with reception centres (previously referred to as hotspots) in order to participate in joint verification of refugees. It should be noted in this context that Greece failed to negotiate the presence of Greek police officers in control centres in

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\(^76\) No Safe Refugee. Asylum-Seekers and Refugees Denied Effective Protection in Turkey, Amnesty International 2016, p. 11.


Turkey.\textsuperscript{82} The cooperation between the two countries resulted in readmission of a couple hundred people over the first months after the agreement came into force; these were mostly people from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Iran, Iraq, India, Congo, Sri Lanka, Morocco, Nepal, Somalia, Ivory Coast, Egypt, Lebanon, and Palestine.\textsuperscript{83}

Local social groups in Turkey were very critical of the agreement itself as well as of the first transports of refugees sent back. The opposition was particularly strong in the town of Dikili, where Turks set up a reception centre. The inhabitants of the town held protests caused by, on the one hand, concern for financial losses due the presence of refugees in the region, as it is a popular tourist destination, and on the other hand, the losses resulting from the end of the smuggling business.\textsuperscript{84}

The positive effects of the cooperation between Greece and Turkey in refugee matters were undermined in consequence of a change of the Turkish policy after the failed coup of 15 July 2016. Startled by the coup attempt in Turkey, European politicians failed to quickly react to these events, focusing on observing rather than supporting Erdogan’s government.\textsuperscript{85} The EU first condemned the coup only three days after the attempt, and President Erdogan criticised European leaders for failing to immediately condemn the attack and support his government. In his opinion, the West showed disloyalty towards Ankara.\textsuperscript{86} His outrage at the European leaders’ attitude became even greater when they criticised the steps the Turkish government was taking against the opposition – Erdogan chose to use the failed coup as a pretext to deal with his political opponents and launched repressions against people opposing the governance of the Justice and Development Party, mass arrests of policemen, military men, teachers and university lecturers. The government also started suggesting that the moratorium on the death penalty could be repealed. In response to this, EU officials and European politicians made it clear that these actions were distancing Turkey from the EU and hampering further accession negotiations as well as making it impossible for the EU to abolish visas for Turkish citizens. The main reason against the abolishment

\textsuperscript{82} Greece Reaches EU Cap: 50,411 Refugees, New Arrivals with Fast-Track Asylum, op.cit.
\textsuperscript{84} Protests in Greece and Turkey over Refugee Deal, “Al Jazeera”, 3.04.2016.
\textsuperscript{85} It should to be stressed that over the last decades, the military staged a number of coups in Turkey (e.g., in 1960, 1980 and 1997), and they were always successful.
\textsuperscript{86} EU Migrant Deal Not Possible If Turkey’s Demands Not Met, Erdogan Says, “Ekathimerini”, 8.08.2016.
of visas quoted by the European Commission was Turkey’s failure to fully meet the requirements in this regard, especially concerning liberalisation of its very restrictive anti-terrorism law, which the government used against the opposition, among others.

In response to the EU’s position, Erdogan claimed that some 3 million refugees were staying in Turkey and that he did not have to keep them there; he warned that yet another exodus of foreigners to Europe might take place. Turkey’s blackmail worked on the EU, and in September 2016 High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Federica Mogherini and Commissioner for European Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations Johannes Hahn visited Turkey. However, the visit had little impact on Erdogan’s position.

Meanwhile, the number of refugees arriving on Greek islands increased after the coup. Turkish police officers were withdrawn from Greek islands, the official reason being the need to reinforce those who fought the coup supporters. The readmission procedure was de facto temporarily suspended as Turkey was not ready to take in refugees, and it was resumed only on 17 August. The number of people attempting to make it to Greece fell significantly by September 2016, mainly because of worse weather conditions.

The relations between Brussels and Ankara deteriorated even further after the European Parliament’s resolution of November 2016, in which it called on the EU to suspend the accession negotiations with Turkey. The position adopted by the European Council at the summit of 15 December 2016 had a much gentler overtone. The leaders of EU Member States declared the desire to continue talks with Turkey and scheduled another summit with Turkey devoted to cooperation in the sphere of migration policy, to be held in January 2017.

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87 The EU made a total of 72 conditions, of which Turkey fulfilled 68.
90 Refugee Flows to Greece Increase…., op.cit.
91 Withdrawal of Turkish Officers from Greece Has Hit EU-Turkey Refugee Pact, UNHCR Officials Says, “Ekathimerini”, 1.09.2016.
93 European Parliament resolutions are not binding from the point of view of the EU decision-making process, it is only a form of political declaration.
However, relations between Turkey and the EU remain tense. Erdogan keeps threatening Brussels with unleashing a wave of refugees unless the EU meets the conditions of the agreement of March 2016. Greece remains the main aggrieved party in this scenario because, as a front-line EU country, it will be the one most affected by the effects of that decision. It seems that Turkey is treating migrants as a form of weapon against the European Union carries a great risk of escalating the tensions between Athens and Ankara. Greece is getting increasingly concerned about losing sovereign control over the Aegean islands. These concerns are fuelled by rightist politicians, who warn that establishing huge refugee camps on the islands could cause a crisis between the Greek population and the foreigners, who have a different culture and do not respect local customs. The islands are constantly plagued by crime, theft and robbery. What scares Greeks the most, however, is the scale of this migration. For example, in 2015 the island of Samos, inhabited by some 33,000 Greeks, saw the arrival of 445,000 migrants (which means there were more than 10 ‘foreigners’ per one original inhabitant), and in 2016 – approximately 100,000. Had they stayed on the island longer, it would have lost its Greek character; moreover, the local Greeks, having become a minority in their own territory, would perhaps not have been able to stand such pressure and would have simply left the island, which would in fact have cost Greece sovereign control over Aegean islands. Such concerns emerged in the Greek society already at the turn of the 1980s and 1990s, when President Turgut Özal for the first time threatened that Greece could be flooded by illegal migrants from Turkey, used as the most effective weapon against Greeks. His vision was continued by Prime Minister Süleyman Demirel, who envisioned the establishment of a ‘Turkish World stretching from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China’.

The rhetoric used by present-day Turkish politicians remains largely in line with Özal’s doctrine. Both the former president of Turkey, Ahmet Davutoğlu, and the current one have publicly mentioned on many occasions that they were planning to increase Turkey’s influence in Eu-

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98 G. Tüysüzoglu, Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism, “Mediterranean Quaterly”, Spring 2014, p. 90.
roped by exporting Islamic religious institutions\(^{99}\) and, of course, through migration.\(^{100}\) In one of his speeches, Erdogan declared: ‘Creating a new, big Turkey is accomplished by helping to resettle a large, sympathetic community of Syrian brothers and sisters’.\(^{101}\) Erdogan also envisions his country as playing the key role of the religious centre of Sunni Islam for the nations inhabiting the Middle East and the Balkans.\(^{102}\) Such statements cause particular alarm among Greeks as they are concerned about being surrounded by Islam – all the more so as the Muslim population in the Balkans is constantly growing. The situation in the relations between Greece and Turkey was further exacerbated by a statement of Erdogan’s, who supposedly demanded a referendum in Western Thrace on whether it should remain a part of Greece.\(^{103}\) While the Turkish government denied to have made such a statement, mistrust in the relations between the two countries is growing.\(^{104}\)

However, Turkish politicians not only promote neo-Muslim attitudes but also start calling for a revision of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne, which regulates the external borders of Turkey. Of course, the promotion of dangerous revisionist ideas was initially aimed at supporting Turkey’s ambitions of using the civil war in Syria and Iraq to expand in the Middle East, especially as regards annexation of the oil-rich Mosul. But now Turkish politicians began increasingly challenging the borders in the Aegean Sea, claiming that the Aegean Islands should not have been given to Greece in the first place. This rhetoric appeared in the Turkish political debate already in 1974, but it disappeared again when the relations between the two countries improved in 1999, only to resurface quite recently. At the moment, the narration challenging the Greekness of the Aegean Islands is present in the statements of both Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Mevlüt Çavuşoğlu and President Erdogan himself.\(^{105}\) Furthermore, Greek


\(^{100}\) V. Gaetan, *An Aegean Alliance. Greece, Turkey, and Migration Cooperation*, op.cit.

\(^{101}\) Ibidem.

\(^{102}\) B. Park, *Turkey’s Isolated Stance: An Ally No More, or Just the Usual Turbulence?*, “International Affairs”, No. 3/2015, p. 595.


politicians do not ignore the Turkish provocations; Greek Minister of Defence Panos Kammenos responded defiantly: ‘If Erdogan wants to abolish the Treaty of Lausanne then we’ll return to the Treaty of Sevres’, the latter providing for the occupation of Turkey by the Allied Powers after World War I.

The tensions between Greece and Turkey keep escalating, Turkish aircraft keep violating Greek airspace, and Turkish warships keep sailing close to Greek islands. The present situation starts resembling the events of 1996, when the two countries came to the brink of war. With the addition of the ‘migration bomb’, the situation could easily spin out of control, leading not only to a confrontation in the Aegean Sea but also spilling over to the still unstable Balkans, causing direct threat not only to Greece but to other EU countries as well.

Conclusions

Stabilisation of the situation in the region is in the interest of all the actors involved in the political events taking place in the Aegean Sea. This is especially true of the tensions caused by the exodus of migrants attempting to make it through Turkey to the European Union as well as of the bilateral relations between Greece and Turkey. Until recently, Turkey remained a predictable country, with close ties to the West, aspiring to EU membership; it was also seen as a stable partner within NATO. The political changes that have taken place on the Turkish internal arena as well as the international challenges in the region have weakened the ties between Turkey and the European Union and those between Turkey and the United States. Turkey strives to improve its international position by working on several fronts. It shows that it is not anchored in Europe but open to cooperation with Russia and the countries of the Middle East. It is governed by politicians who have started using a strong nationalist rhetoric for internal reasons, causing strong international repercussions and antagonising its partners in the West. It is a country that has begun using the migration problem as a weapon in its relations with Europe in general, but with Greece in particular.


Since the 1970s, we have been witnessing a local arms race between Turkey and Greece as well as repeatedly resurfacing conflicts. If the ‘demographic bomb’ is added to the list of the problems already present, such as the unresolved dispute about the division of the Aegean Sea and repeated violations of Greek borders by Turkey, the situation could soon get out of control and disaster could ensue. Greece is very susceptible to provocation. Under the ‘protectorate’ of the European troika, the society is particularly sensitive about its independence, the economic crisis has damaged Greek national pride, and in its long history Greece had often felt humiliated and threatened by Turkey. The Greek culture, language, religion survived several hundred years of Turkish occupation and prevailed in the unstable region of the Middle East. Greece is a country that considers itself the bulwark of Christendom that has long defended Europe from Islam encroaching from the east. It is a country that is extremely focused on maintaining homogeneity and very suspicious of ‘strangers’.

Given these attitudes of the two countries and the heated internal and international situation, tragedy could ensue and spill over beyond the Aegean Sea into the Balkans, and this is something Europe had already experienced many times. It is therefore in the interest of both the European Union and Greece itself to maintain dialogue with Turkey. But Turkey cannot go about just blackmailing Europe, threatening it with a demographic weapon. The European Union has a weapon as well, an economic weapon, in the form of the EU–Turkey customs union, which provides Ankara with a wealthy recipient of goods, thus contributing significantly to Turkey’s economic success. Losing a partner like this would cause irreparable losses to the Turkish economy. Turkey has no alternative for exports of its products in its regional neighbourhood. Turkey needs Europe – a Europe that is stable and wealthy. With its international neighbourhood unstable, it needs predictable long-term allies, and these can mainly be found in European countries. It certainly cannot be Russia, with which Turkey will sooner or later enter into a dispute over the influence in the Caucasus, and it cannot be any of the unstable countries of the Middle East.

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Abstract: The aim of this article is a conceptual analysis of labour migration policies in the European Union and their implementation in the EU member-states and the Republic of Moldova during contemporary times. The paper outlines the current trends of labour migration in both the European Union and in the Republic of Moldova; analyzes the genesis and essence of migration policies within the EU in the modern period; identifies the underlying problems of integration faced by Moldovan labour migrants in the hosting societies; and investigates issues related to the repatriation and reintegration of Moldovan labourers from the EU to their home country.

Keywords: Migration, migration policies, models of migration policy, illegal migration, Mobility Partnerships, labour market, integration

Introduction

Currently, the obvious impact of globalization on international migration flows is reflected in the emergence of a new migration ‘wave’ arising from global geopolitical changes; globalization and intensification of migration processes in all world regions; stratification and feminization of migration; major global demographic changes; the impact of internation-
al migration on the global policy agenda, etc. These factors demonstrate the need for a thorough analysis of the essence and main manifestations of this phenomenon.

At the European Union level, migration processes are the subject of increased official attention, conditioned by the impact of migration in economic terms, its demographic, political, and social aspects, as well as its effects on national and regional security. Thus in order to maximize the development potential of migration policies and labour mobility in the maintenance of economic growth and the level of welfare and social cohesion within the EU, there is a need to formulate and adjust policies that would allow for the effective regulation of migration processes at the European level under the actual conditions of globalization.

At the same time, considering the political sensitivity of the ‘migration issue,’ it seems that authorities and European institutions will continue to face difficulties regarding the implementation of a migration policy aimed at, in particular, attracting and integrating migrants.

In light of the above, it can be concluded that the EU Member States currently need and will continue to need a common approach to the development and implementation of appropriate policies in the economic field and with respect to labour migration, as well as the harmonization of existing and future policies with respect to migration and related fields, such as integration, education, science, high skills, growth, the labour market, legislation etc. Such a situation leads to the need for scientific substantiation of labour migration policies, both in the EU and in the context of globalization processes.

In order to carry out this task it is necessary to analyse migration policies in a multidimensional framework, ranging from some theoretical approaches (theories of international labour migration, the role of theory in explaining the current migration trends, etc.) to application approaches (in order to maximize the opportunities created by forced migration employment in the EU Member States and minimize the negative consequences of these processes).

It also becomes increasingly apparent that the successful implementation of migration policies in the EU depends on good cooperation with those third countries which are the source of migration flows, one of which is the Republic of Moldova.

The complexity of these phenomena, as well as the social, economic, demographic, and political importance of Moldovan labour migration into the EU, has led Moldovan authorities, academics, and experts in the field to search for a deeper understanding of the respective processes. This will allow them to formulate migration policies correlated with both
national and European realities, and integrate the multitude of labour migration aspects into the various programs and development strategies of the country.

1. Labour migration processes and migration policies in the period of globalization

The elaboration and implementation of migration policies within the EU is one of the most controversial topics in the current political debate. The EU has started to officially recognize that active labour migration of non-EU citizens plays an important role in Community efforts to develop an adaptable and highly skilled workforce, facilitating it in overcoming the challenges linked to demographic, social, and economic changes. This orientation is placed in the context of the highly competitive and globalized economy, and such labour migration must be dealt with, despite the current negative trends in the EU vis-à-vis immigration.

By summarizing the views of experts it is possible to deduce the following main areas of change in international migration:

A. The ongoing globalization processes and changes in both source countries and countries of destination of migrants

Globalization has sparked a debate about the impact of migration on the countries of origin. While the United States and Western Europe have remained among the most important destinations, there have also been significant movements of migration to other ‘New World’ countries (Australia, New Zealand and Canada), and to countries rich in petroleum within Persian Gulf (primarily from South and East Asia), reflecting a huge increase in demand for labour following the oil shocks of the 1970s.\textsuperscript{1}

The European mainland – a traditional source of migration – has now become a region hosting a mass of immigrants. Currently, every third international migrant lives in Europe, representing 8.7% of Europe’s total population.\textsuperscript{2}

B. The intensification of migration and/or acceleration of economic growth and migration processes in all regions of the world

This is due in large part to the increasing availability of new means of transport (particularly air transport), which facilitate the movement of


people and significantly ‘shrinks’ the distances between countries. The spread of the global Internet also accelerates the pace of technological diffusion, and makes it easier for potential immigrants to perceive the opportunities and challenges of potential destination countries. The Web also enables migrants to increasingly take advantage of existing opportunities for collaboration while they reside in their home countries (outsourcing, etc.), while at the same time seeking migration opportunities worldwide. In these circumstances, temporary work abroad is often an attractive option for migrants because it causes less material and other costs offers opportunities to earn good money. In addition, attracting highly-qualified temporary foreign workers is consistent with the migration policy promoted by most countries of destination. At the same time, this trend hampers national states’ ability to control the migration flows across their own borders.33

C. Stratification of migration

Nowadays, international migration processes are characterized by various forms of international migration (migration, repatriation, emigration to a permanent residence, refugees, internally displaced of persons, etc.). For example, if during the 1950s the number of refugees was estimated at two million, while in 2015 the total number of refugees reached the figure of 15.2 million. The year 2015 was characterized by an unprecedented wave of refugees flowing into the EU, mainly from the unstable Middle East region – the most massive influx of immigrants after the Second World War. Situations wherein the migrant circuit starts with one type of migration and ends up with an entirely different form have become typical. This stratification is one of the main obstacles to national states managing their share of international migration effectively.4

D. The feminization of migration

Women now account for almost half of all international migrants, and in some regions of the world they are even more numerous than men. The movement of men and women in the world economy is different however, with women being employed particularly in the field of services provision and in the cultural sphere. This makes women more vulnerable in terms of human rights abuses, because they are ac-


tive much more frequently in areas of unstable and illegal economies, including offering services at home and in the sphere of entertainment and the sex industry, where the rights of migrants are not protected by local labour legislation.\(^5\)

E. The low birth rate and aging population in developed countries

The UN report on global population aging (updated to the period 2002–2007) showed that the number of people aged over 60 constituted 8% of the world population in 1950, rose to 11% in 2007, and is expected to reach 22% by 2050. The report points out that by 2050 the number of persons aged over 60 will constitute one third of the EU and US total populations. In the event such a scenario materializes, the share of working age people will be too small to support existing tax systems and ensure the normal operation of social programs related to public health and support for the elderly, which consequently will register a significant increase in costs due to the increasing number of elderly persons.

F. Globalization and the demand for workforce

The impact of globalization on labour force demand is ambiguous. On one hand, opportunities for social mobility have been created for those with scientific experience and the technical skills required for the new economy. On the other hand, we are witnesses to a process of redistribution of the remaining workforce in peripheral countries associated with a traditional economy.

These tendencies lead to different kinds of demand for labour in different regions. Thus, in the developed world, owing to its new economy there is a demand for highly qualified staff, while in the peripheral regions affected by the market economy there is a need for an industrial workforce, which in turn is badly paid but necessary for the economic growth associated with increasing industrial activities and production. The demand for a highly skilled workforce in countries hosting immigrants has increased and the demand for unskilled labour has moved to outlying regions, where there is much more than enough.\(^6\) When referring to highly qualified labour migration it is important to note its increased mobility compared to other types of international migration. The economists

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F. Docquier and H. Rapoport have determined that while the average level of migration in the world is 0.9% for unskilled labourers and 1.6% for average skilled specialists, the level reaches 5.5% for highly skilled persons. For example, more than 500,000 scientists and programmers from Russia left the country after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. In Moldova the number of researchers in the Academy of Sciences decreased from 29,850 persons in 1990 to 4,794 in 2004. The main countries of their destination were Israel, Germany, the USA, Russia etc.

G. The inclusion of migration issues in the global political agenda

An ever broader and intensifying dialogue is taking place with respect to the need for changes in the global institutional framework in order to better serve the developing world in migration issues. In 2003, the UN General Secretary and a number of governments launched the World Commission on International Migration, which presented its final report in 2005.

In September 2006, the UN forced the first high-level dialogue concerning Migration and International Development, which led to the creation of the Global Forum for Migration. Nevertheless, at the same time more and more foreign affairs experts are sceptical about the possibility of building a global migration regime in the near future. The protection of migrants’ rights has become an increasing priority, as well as the issue of protecting the rights of irregular migrants. But today there is still no common agreement at an international level that would promote universal policies on international migration, such as, for example, the principle of free trade enshrined in the World Trade Organization regulations. Russian researcher E. Tiurucanova has systematized the visions of many international experts and analyzed the broad meaning of the phrase ‘migration policy’, as follows:

- migration policy represents one of the distinct directions of state policy and is determined by the character of the polity and the objectives pursued by it;
- it represents the state doctrine or concept of regulating migration processes;
- it is indispensably linked to the implementation of economic, social, demographic, national, and cultural policies;

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- it can be divided into ‘real’ and ‘declared’ policies. Declared policies aim to protect the interests of migrants and refugees, while real policies express the interests of the host state and the government elites.\(^9\)

‘Migration policy’ in the narrow sense is geared towards changing the number, structure, and direction of migrants’ movements, with a view toward influencing their integration, which is directly related to the demographic problem.\(^10\)

The following basic conceptual models of migration policy have been identified:

1) The systemic model. Here migration policy is examined as part of the international political system. In this case, control over migration is interpreted as a structural necessity arising from the disparity between open market extra-state forces, typical of globalization, and closed forces confined to the state and its territory.

In accordance with this vision, the efficiency of control measures implemented by states depends on the existence of an international regime based on a so-called ‘fixed liberalism’, one which is focused on international agreements, especially in the field of human rights.

2) The pluralist model. In this model, migration policy is examined as a process characterized by a set of actuation forces – from entrepreneurs to churches, from syndicates to ethnic associations – seeking to gain concrete benefits, often ignoring the systemic quality of the whole.

3) The realistic model. The followers of this theoretical model believe that the priorities of the state are key to understanding the way in which it seeks to manage the migration flows.

4) The neo-corporativist model. Neocorporativist models in migration policy aim to adjust the transnational limitations to the national interests of countries of destination for migration flows. Neocorporativist models of migration policy aim adjusting the transnational constraints to national interests of countries of migration flows destination.

5) The communicative model. According to this model, migration policy is manifested by a system of communicative activities, which


\(^10\) Ibidem, p. 220.
act as a mediation chain. In this approach, researchers focus rather on the social aspects of migration policy. A number of features of migration policy depend more on the policy background than on migration aspects.\(^{11}\)

The specifics of migration policy is also determined by its structure, which in the corresponding literature is divided into the following three segments:

1) ‘Immigration policy’ refers to issues linked with offering the right of permanent residence to persons of certain categories, with the right of control over illegal immigration and with various degrees of social security offered to legal migrants (and sometimes illegal as well);

2) ‘Integration policy’ refers to the inclusion of immigrants (primarily from other ethnic, racial, religious backgrounds) in the life of their country of residence;

3) ‘Naturalization policy’ refers to the conditions and procedures for granting citizenship to legal immigrants.\(^{12}\)

In analyzing the characteristics of migration policies at the European level since the 1950s, when the EU foundations were laid, we can conclude that agreements entered into within the European community during the period 1950-1980 were aimed at regulation of migration processes in the EU Member States, demonstrating and realizing the importance of harmonizing this policy.\(^{13}\)

The examination of these agreements makes it visible that the EU Member States are not yet fully prepared to renounce national approaches to the regulation of migration processes and implement a common European Immigration policy. This is especially true today, at the beginning of the 21\(^{st}\) century, when EU Member States are facing a number of critical challenges in the field of migration, the solutions to which are of primary importance. These include:

- regulating the migration flows, which have gone from being an episodic phenomena to become a permanent factor in the EU;

- formulating and adjusting the EU policy with respect to illegal migrants and refugees;

- developing and implementing measures aimed at helping the migrants integrate into their countries of residence;

- identification of long-term solutions, with the goal of reducing the pressure of the demographic factor on economic development

\(^{11}\) Ibidem, p. 221.

\(^{12}\) Ibidem, p. 222.

\(^{13}\) Ibidem, p. 224.
Governments and EU institutions are increasingly accepting the impossibility of stopping migration, and instead are concentrating their attention on ‘migration management’. In this context, debates concerning the migration policy took place as early as the late 1990s, focused on the search for a way in which migration and development policies can be combined so that the effects of migration would be positive for both the developed and developing countries.\textsuperscript{14}

Thus, with the aim of efficiently managing the migration processes the EU’s migration policies are conventionally divided into four groups: a) policies for the regulation and control of migration flows; b) policies to combat illegal migration and the illegal employment of foreign workers; c) policies designed to integrate immigrants; and d) policies for international cooperation in the migration domain.\textsuperscript{15}

These policies are reflected in the European Union directives, strategies and programmes, including the following:

- The Tampere programme (1999), which introduces a common asylum policy;
- The Hague programme (2005) for strengthening freedom, security and justice in the EU, followed by the Solidarity and Management of Migration Flows for the period 2007–2013 (2006). This program provides a balanced approach to legal and illegal migration, comprising measures to combat illegal immigration and trafficking, as well as concrete action plans, including the Plan concerning legal migration and migrants’ integration, targeting, in particular, immigration from third countries, and includes the European Action Plan on job mobility in 2007-2010, which refers to professions and geographical mobility within the European Union;\textsuperscript{16}
- The Global Approach to Migration (GAM), adopted by the European Council in 2005 and 2006, which covers all stages of migration and aims to harness the benefits of legal migration while establishing insurance policies to fight against illegal immigration and

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\item \textsuperscript{14} E. Benedetti, \textit{EU migration policy and its relations with third countries: Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia and Moldova} in: EU Migration Policy and its Reflection in Third Countries: Belarus, Moldova, Russia, Ukraine. ISCOMET Institute for Ethnic and Regional Studies. 2012, pp. 5–75.
\item \textsuperscript{16} Ibidem, p. 11.
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
against human trafficking. As a political approach, the GAM was a well-balanced attempt to minimize the tensions surrounding the EU’s migration policy, giving equal weight to all its components and aimed at merging the skills and resources of the EU and Member States. However, the different political interests of Member States seem to deform the policy. As expected, the former colonial powers and the southern EU Member States are more interested in protecting their position with respect to African partners, while the Member States from Central Europe focus on their cooperation with Eastern Europe, Russia, and the Caucasus.\(^{17}\)

- The Stockholm Programme sets out priorities for the EU in the area of justice, freedom and security for the period 2010–2014. In accordance with the Programme, the EU will continue to develop its integrated border management, improve its policies concerning the issuance of visas in order to better access third country nationals in Europe, and guarantee the security of its own citizens.\(^{18}\)

Based on the European Pact on Immigration and Asylum (2008), the EU must develop a flexible and comprehensive migration policy. This policy takes into account the needs of the EU labour market while reducing to a minimum the ‘brain drain’ from third countries. The need to apply vigorous integration policies that guarantee the rights of migrants is also emphasised. A common policy on migration should include effective and sustainable returns, while at the same time, engaging in further activities to prevent, control, and combat illegal immigration;\(^{19}\)

- The revised new Global Approach to Migration and Mobility (GAMM).

Although as shown above migration has been a priority of the political agenda of the EU since the late 1990s, the Arab spring and the events in


the Southern Mediterranean in 2011 highlighted once again the need for a coherent and comprehensive migration policy at the EU level. Thus in November 2011 the European Commission proposed the GAMM in order to strengthen dialogue and operational cooperation with third countries on migration and mobility. By means of its third-country mobility, nationals have a central place and partnerships become more sustainable and strongly future-oriented.

Additionally, the GAMM was aimed at complementing the traditional three pillars of the Global Approach – legal migration, illegal migration and migration, and development – with a fourth pillar concerning international protection and the external dimension of asylum policy. Thus, the revised policy will be more integrated into EU foreign policy, developmental cooperation will be focused more on mobility, and the EU policy on visas will be better aligned with the goals of EU internal policy, in particular with its Strategy 2020 and with its policies on employment and education.

In order to analyze the migration policies of the EU at present, the categorization of the GAMM pillars, representing the most coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU, will continue to be used, as follows:20

a) Legal labour migration;

Improving existing legislation and administrative practices is a priority area with respect to increasing labour mobility within the EU. In its intermediary assessment of the Lisbon Strategy, the Council acknowledged the importance of attracting more people into the labour market, simultaneously providing high levels of social protection and promoting gender equality and social inclusion. Gender and the cultural environment appear as important determinants. The European Commission (EC) and the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) emphasized the need for an immigration policy and integration programs that take into account gender and pay attention to the situation of migrant women and their social inclusion.21

In this regard in July 2011 the European Commission proposed a program for the integration of non-EU citizens, with an emphasis on increas-
ing the shares of migrants’ participation in the economic, social, cultural and political spheres, and with taking more active actions at the local level. In 2012 the EU Member States acted on the process of implementing The Single Permit Directive (2011), offering to third-country nationals who fall under this Directive the right to equal treatment in relation to EU citizens, for example, in terms of working conditions, remuneration, education, vocational training, and social security.22

However, according to the researcher Benedetti the EU’s integration policy faces several challenges with respect to the inclusion of third country nationals.

In general, integration strategies target legal nationals of third countries and therefore directly exclude illegal workers.

They are the most vulnerable groups within European societies, and should benefit most from policies aimed at raising awareness about their rights. At the same time, legal economic migration is considered exclusively a ‘national matter’, and national competences are retained with respect to it.

b) Combating illegal migration

The importance of reducing illegal migration is highlighted in an EU Communication, published in 2000, which emphasizes the ‘fight against illegal immigration’ as part of a coherent immigration policy. The 2005 Hague Programme formulated a balanced perspective in its approach, according to which the fight against illegal migration is associated with combating trafficking in persons, especially women and children. In 2010, the European Commission appointed a coordinator of the European Union for the anti-trafficking policies of human beings, and has launched a website on anti-trafficking measures taken by the EU to improve cooperation and coherence between the various actions of institutions, agencies, non-members of EU, and international actors involved in combating illegal trafficking in persons. Also in 2012 the European Commission adopted the EU Strategy for the 2012–2016 period to eradicate human trafficking. Under this Strategy, the Commission will submit every two years a report on the state of EU measures to combat trafficking in persons. The first report was presented in 2014.23

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23 Ibidem, p. 28.
c) Migration and Development

Some policy documents suggest that increasing the development levels of countries of origin for migration flows will help eliminate the economic reasons for migration and therefore will reduce immigration into the EU. This approach is supported by the European Commission, which in its Communication of 2013 points out that the EU’s external migration policy had already achieved significant progress in linking the impact of EU migration with the development of countries of origin.

The EU is committed to continue working in the ‘traditional’ domains (remittances, diaspora, brain drain, circular migration). This effort is promoted by some countries of migrants’ origin. For example, in November 2012 the Republic of Moldova, as a country of origin of migrants, approved the National Development Strategy ‘Moldova 2020’, which addresses migration from the perspective of human capital and development of the economic growth model. The ‘Moldova 2020’ Strategy aims to stimulate capital formation by removing constraints on businesses and investing remittances and creating more opportunities in the country in order to retain its workforce, so that by 2020 the target aimed to be achieved is to reduce the number of young migrants to 10%.24

From 2007 to 2013, about 200 projects related to migration, including EC financial assistance, were implemented or were in the process of implementation in the Republic of Moldova. These ranged from the size of the effective governance of labour migration to the protection and empowerment of victims of domestic violence and human trafficking. In general, a considerable number of projects related to migration have been or are being implemented under the aegis of the Mobility Partnership, under which 85 initiatives pertaining to migration were implemented or are being implemented in various areas of the migration profile, including projects to promote circular migration.25

d) International protection and the external dimension of asylum policy

Cooperation with third countries is considered to be an important element of migration policy, and already in 1991 the Commission requested the inclusion of migration policy in EU external policy. This area of co-

24 E. Burdelnii, D. Terzi-Barbăroșie, Migration and Development. Chisinau, UNDP – Moldova, Common Pilot Program Integration of migration in the National Development Strategy (MOMID), 2013, p. 21
operation with third countries has become known as the ‘external dimension’ of EU cooperation in Justice and domestic affairs (JDA).26

Another element of outsourcing included a series of provisions to facilitate the return of asylum seekers and illegal migrants to third countries. The main instrument used was that of readmission agreements signed with third countries, by which they have been encouraged or, in case of candidate countries, obliged to apply the EU standards of migration management and to accept the readmission of irregular migrants. To increase their attractiveness, these agreements are often combined with visa facilitation agreements.

For example, in domain of readmission Moldova signed, between 2009 and 2011, additional protocols to implement the Readmission Agreement EU-RM with eleven EU Member States and readmission agreements with five non-EU countries.

The measures in the ‘preventive’ category include attempts to resolve the causes of migration and refugee flows and/or to provide refugees with access to protection closer to their home countries. Preventive approaches involve the implementation of a diverse range of tools to enhance the options of the potential refugees or migrants: developmental assistance, trade and foreign direct investment, or foreign policy instruments. In this context it is important to mention Mobility Partnerships as one such tool of interaction with countries of both origin and transit. The concept of Mobility Partnerships originated in the General Directorate (GD) for Freedom, Security and Justice of the European Commission, which negotiates with partner countries on behalf of the EU.27

Mobility Partnerships continued the EU tendency to link migration policies implemented at the EU level with other policy areas. There are two main reasons behind such links: First, the Commission recognized the need to provide an incentive for third countries to cooperate with the EU on illegal migration; and second, political arguments for a larger scale of cooperation (without any specific connection to migration) can be used to also effectuate migration policies. This refers to those partner countries

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selected to participate in the Mobility Partnerships and to the motivations proposed by the EU for accession to such agreements.\textsuperscript{28}

In December 2007, the EU Council for JDA adopted a decision to initiate a dialogue on Mobility Partnerships with two pilot countries, Moldova and Cape Verde. Mobility Partnerships have since been signed with Moldova (2008), the Republic of Cape Verde (2008), Georgia (2009) and Armenia (2011).

According to Mobility Partnership instruments, such a partnership is to be concluded with countries that commit themselves to cooperate with the EU in the management of migration flows and at the same time seek improved access to EU territory for their citizens. These countries will assume obligations in the field of countering illegal migration. In return, the EU Member States will assume engagements in some or all of the following areas: improving opportunities for legal migration for citizens of the partner country; assisting the partner country to develop capacity to manage legal migration flows; implementation of measures to combat the risk of brain drain and to promote circular migration and the return of migrants, and improving the procedures for issuing short-term visas for partner country citizens.

An important aspect of the common EU migration policies is the paradigm shift of this process. This is dictated, on the one hand, by internal EU phenomena (such as population aging and the decline in active labour participants), and on the other hand by the challenges and opportunities of globalization, in particular of the need to attract highly skilled workers. The impetus behind the responses to the given phenomena is that European policymakers recognize that the EU must become an economic actor, and a most innovative and competitive one at that. Thus, in order to realize the migration potential, the European Commission has developed a set of measures that were and still are to be achieved, among which may be mentioned the following:

- the implementation of the EU Skills Panorama, since 2012 aimed at improving transparency for those seeking a job, workers, companies and/or public institutions;
- the completion of the Classification of European Skills, Competences and Occupations (ESCO) in all European languages in the year 2012 as a common interface between the world of work and education and training;
- The launch in 2011 of the New Agenda for Integration of third countries, offering improved structures and tools to facilitate

\textsuperscript{28} E. Benedetti, op.cit., pp. 39–40
knowledge-sharing and including the integration priorities of the Member States in all relevant policy areas, etc.\(^{29}\)

In this context, it is worth mentioning that the year 2007 witnessed the adoption of one of the most important initiatives in attracting highly qualified migrants, i.e. the EU Blue Card. It aims to contribute to EU competitiveness and therefore economic growth by providing rights for all third-country nationals residing legally in the EU.

At the same time, migration policy at both the EU and national levels is one of the hottest topics in the current political debate. Political considerations go beyond the perceptions based on scientific research, and immigration policy can change suddenly due to electoral developments. European governments and electorates are facing major challenges, which in a way explains the ambivalent attitude towards the phenomenon of immigration: a tendency to encourage and at the same time signs of rejection; economic opportunism and disappointment with the results of integration processes, etc.

At the same time, as mentioned by the Romanian researcher N. Iancu, in many European countries conflicts are moving to the internal stage, and the economic and political power of ethnic groups increases. This generates new pressures and incentives to include ethnic minority interests in economic and social policies, yet once again these trends often contradict with populist movements.\(^{30}\)

On one hand, the promoted policies rely on arguments of an economic nature: the contribution of skills, coverage of some activities which EU natives do not feel attracted to, and counteracting the aging population in the European countries, which leads to their increased dependency.

On the other hand we have anti-migration reactions, often populist in nature, which are being used in the political struggle and sometimes obscure the scientific approach in their reasoning and their analysis of the effects of immigration. Local populations perceive the immigrants as a demographic threat (young families of migrants have more children, and integration is obviously slow), an economic threat (despite the actual economic benefits of migration for the receiving economies, emphasis is


put on the extent to which taxpayers pay for the consumed public services, and the effect of immigrants on low-skilled jobs held by domestic workers), or a socio-cultural threat (ethnic enclaves in suburbs of large cities, accompanied by rising tensions and ethnic violence, crime, terrorism, social fragmentation, dissolution of the collective identity, etc.).

At the political level, and against the background of states’ reduced capacities to guarantee social security their own citizens, the dissatisfaction and concerns of natives place the political powers in a dilemma.31 For example, in Britain in 2010, the Labour government, alarmed by the negative reaction of many voters about the spread of immigration, announced a series of measures designed to limit some immigration flows, while continuing to encourage the migration of skilled labour. Also, after the EU enlargements in 2004 and 2007 the EU’s full freedom of labour movement was perceived as a threat. Proof of this was presented by some opinion-moulders from Germany and Austria, who claimed that the abolition of restrictions on free movement would lead to significant inflows of workers from Eastern Europe, who would accept lower wages and thus threaten the stability of wages in these countries. As a result, since 2000, a 7-year formula (2 + 3 + 2) has been applied to the transitional period for new countries’ access to the EU labour market.32 The work restrictions on citizens from Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary have been lifted since 1 May 2011. Today they have the right to work without a permit and/or be self-employed or employed anywhere in the EU, Iceland and Norway. At the same time, the European Commission concluded transitional arrangements which provided for the possibility of imposing restrictions on Romanian and Bulgarian workers until 31 December 2013. Despite the official position of the European Commission, some EU member states continue to be against this decision as a result of political and economic national pressures.33

According to N. Iancu, the migration policy dilemma reflects much more than a tension between economic reasoning and political considerations. It unveils a basic ambiguity in democratic-liberal states: The logic of social welfare supports, on the one hand, an impressive project to

31 Ibidem, p. 10.
32 R. Cucuruzan, Migration and labour mobility within the European integration of Romania, Cluj Napoca 2009, p. 48.
promote equal rights for all, but on the other hand the democratic process allows for the establishment of well-defined protections in favour of some specific groups and against others (in particular immigrants) living within the state’s borders.

These divergent pressures were crystallized in a series of European political dilemmas that can be classified into four policy categories: policies relating to labour migration; migration control policies; asylum and protection systems; and policies regarding integration. All of these can be implemented only within the broader context of European cooperation, with management and migration control as its objective. Yet European labour markets vary greatly within the EU in terms of income opportunities and social benefits, which complicates the construction of a common migration policy.

When drafting and implementing migration policies, policymakers should understand that the phenomenon of migration is a social process with an inherent dynamic, characterized by three key principles: the factors leading to migration; the degree of becoming self-supporting immediately after the onset of migration; and the occurrence of a structural dependency between emigration (source) and immigration (host) countries. Migration policy is doomed to failure if it does not address the causes of economic migration, both with respect to countries’ respective economic development and the current model of global inequality. This includes looking at the interests of all segments of society and their ways of articulating them.

2. Labour migration from Republic of Moldova in the European Union

After the collapse of the USSR and the subsequent independence attained by the Republic of Moldova, labour migration in the country has gone through four distinct phases, resulting in a gradual annual increase in the number of Moldovans working abroad or engaged in job searches abroad.

The first phase – 1990–1994. The specifics of this phase was to regulate the migration processes, which had their roots in the Soviet and post-Soviet geopolitical space, including the protection of the Moldovans’ rights to work in the former Soviet republics (which concerned about 560,000 Moldovans). The deterioration of the socio-economic situation

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and deepening poverty caused the first half of the 1990s to be characterised by economic migration of a specific commercial type known as ‘shuttle’ (‘celnok’), characterised by migration abroad for the procurement of goods and return to sell them in the home country at a higher price.

Trade routes of this type of migration were towards Turkey, Russia, Romania, Germany and Poland (particularly in the northern districts). This period was also characterized by the internal migration of persons from the Transnistrian region, especially to the capital, caused primarily by the armed conflict of 1992.\(^{35}\) In the following years this type of migration gradually decreased and was replaced by labour migration.

**The second phase – 1995–2000.** This phase was characterized by the integration of migration processes oriented especially to Europe. The years 1998–1999 were marked by an acute economic crisis in Moldova, which led to the loss of jobs, a significant deterioration of the market, and increased poverty, affecting 73% of the total population. As a result, a spontaneous labour migration, mostly illegal, intensified significantly. At the same time, the positive effects of migration began to take shape, and up until 2000 the main destinations were Russia, and Italy (the latter in particular). Foreign currency inflows grew in Moldova, as did interest in migration on the part of both the general public as well as among policy makers. State authorities began to take measures to regulate the labour migration processes.\(^{36}\)

**The third phase – 2001–2006.** This phase was characterized by Government measures taken to promote the legalization and regulation of illegal migration flows and the protection of migrants’ rights in destination countries. During this period illegal migration stemmed in large part from the difficulty in obtaining visas and the lack of possibilities for working legally abroad, on account of the small number of employment agreements between Moldova and other countries, as well as the high fees that had to be paid to obtain the legal right to stay in the destination countries. This period was marked by the initiation of a series of dialogues with 19 countries, the signing of bilateral agreements on labour migration, and the opening of consulates in the main states where Moldovan migrants illegally worked (Portugal, Greece and Italy).\(^{37}\)

**The fourth phase – from 2006 onwards.** In May of 2006, during the reorganization of the central public administration, the State Migration Service was dissolved and its competences were divided between two

\(^{35}\) E. Burdelnîi et al., op.cit., p. 46.
\(^{36}\) Ibidem, p. 47.
\(^{37}\) Ibidem, pp. 47–48
ministries. The Ministry of Internal Affairs was created within the Department of Migration, which has taken over the powers of foreigners’ immigration and asylum, and the Ministry of Economy and Trade was assigned competences in the field of labour migration, including migrants’ integration.

Migrants’ integration is based on the methodology MIPEX, which is a guidance tool containing a fully interactive reference to assess, compare and improve integration policy in all the EU Member States, Norway, Switzerland, Canada, and the USA. The methodology assumes that the integration indexes of EU Member States’ national policies are determined in accordance with 150 parameters, consolidated into seven main groups: labour market mobility; family reunification; education; political participation; permanent residence; citizenship; and discrimination.38

Taking into account the abovementioned methodology it is possible to divide the different integration indicators into several key areas that are relevant to migrant workers from Moldova, as follows:

Integration through participation.
Integration suggests a commitment on the part of the host society to receive migrants, respect their rights and cultures, and inform them of their obligations. At the same time, migrants must show their willingness to integrate and respect the norms and values of the society in which they live. The most popular countries for Moldovan migrants in the EU (Portugal, Spain, Italy, Greece, Ireland, Romania, the Czech Republic, Germany, and France) promote integration policies that are characterized by sufficient openness, positive understanding, and the implementation of integration processes. Meanwhile, there are exceptions, accompanied by insufficient achievement of integration for all or for certain groups of citizens from third countries. These are relevant to immigrants from Moldova.

Acquiring language knowledge
Acquisition of language skills is critical for integration. A good knowledge of the host state’s language leads to employability, a greater independence, and greater involvement of migrant women in the labour market. Thus, while in 1999 only Germany introduced a compulsory language proficiency examination to obtain permanent resident status, today such a practice is legal and is used in other countries like Portugal, Czech Republic, Italy etc.

Participation and labour market mobility

The successful integration of migrants into a new social system depends on the availability of jobs. According to sociological research data, the majority of Moldovan migrants are employed in their host countries. For example, in Italy in 2007, as many as 51,149 persons out of 64,526 legal Moldovan migrants worked full time, i.e. for 252 days. Women constituted 2/3 of the total number of persons legally employed.\textsuperscript{39}

A common characteristic of all EU Member States is the over-qualification of third-country nationals, particularly women, in relation to the jobs they occupy. The ability to find employment abroad in the same area of economic activity in which the migrants were engaged in Moldova was characteristic for just for 12% of the number of migrants in the destination countries researched, usually for those in the construction sector, healthcare and social services, transport, telecommunications, and community, social and personal services. Thus, highly qualified Moldovan workers undertake and perform unskilled labour, leading to a reduction or even loss of their attained qualifications (the so-called ‘brain waste’). In addition, the salary of Moldovan migrant workers, both male and female, is considerably lower than the average wage.\textsuperscript{40}

Efforts in the education system

In referring to the situation of Moldovan migrants, a World Bank 2006 report found that a total of 9,000 persons were studying abroad. The Ministry of Education in Moldova keeps official data on the number of Moldovan citizens who went abroad to study under international treaties, which in 2010 was 4,000 persons, but there is no record of the number of those who request and obtain places to study abroad on their own. Hence, the number of Moldovans studying abroad is probably much higher.

According to statistics provided by representatives of the Moldovan Embassy in Italy, the number of Moldovan citizens enrolled in educational institutions in the academic year 2012–2013 was 1,756 people. We have already noted that Moldovan labour migrants’ status is characterized by over-qualification in their work activities, which means they have a high level of education and training, and distinguish themselves by their desire to integrate into the host society. As a result, their desire to educate


\textsuperscript{40} A.D. Cheianu, \textit{Mapping the Moldovan diaspora in Italy, Portugal, France and the United Kingdom}, Chisinau 2013, p. 41.
their children is often the critical factor conditioning the parents’ desire to either integrate into the host society or to return home.

**Ensuring better living conditions**

The process of immigrants’ adaptation and integration depends to a considerable extent on their legal and social protections in the country of residence. In the most directly affected way, such issues are perceived through the prism of the migrant wage level compared to the wage level of the host country’s native citizens, the presence (or absence) of health insurance, and the real possibility to protect their rights in their country of residence. In the destination countries referred to, Moldovan immigrants have a certain social protection, but it seems to be still quite modest. We also found that about one fourth of Moldovan migrants work informally. But in this case one must take into consideration differences in terms of employment modality in the different Member States of the EU. For example, in Italy and Portugal over 80% of Moldovan migrants work legally, under long or short-term contracts, while in France and Britain they work informally, based on verbal agreements (63% and 48%, respectively).

Moldovan authorities take certain measures intended to facilitate the integration of Moldovan immigrants in the EU. In this regard, the signing of a bilateral labour migration agreement with Italy (2003) is worth mentioning. Currently, an agreement regarding future Moldovan-Italian business activities is also in the process of negotiation and signing. Moldova plans to sign bilateral agreements on social insurance with those EU Member States on whose territory migrants from Moldova are significantly represented. With some countries such agreements have already been signed: Portugal (2009), Bulgaria (2009), Romania (2010), Luxembourg (2011), Austria (2011), Estonia (2011), the Czech Republic (2011), Belgium (2012), Poland (2013). Moreover, a number of other countries have expressed a willingness to regulate relations with respect to social insurance, including Latvia, Spain, Israel, and France.

**Family reunification**

EU Member States generally offer favourable conditions for the reunification of families, trying to accord national approaches and policies with EU standards. Already between 2003 and 2004 Moldovan authori-

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41 Information submitted by Mr. S. Sainciuc, Deputy Minister of Labour, Social Protection and Family in Moldova at the International Seminar “New trends in migration – demographic aspects”, organized in the working meeting of the UN Commission on Population and Development Bureau (Chisinau, 17 January 2013).
ties recorded an increase of 2.5 times in the number of passports issued to children. This trend is continuing today, with its share becoming even more significant.

**Permanent residence (long-term) and Citizenship**

An important parameter of migrant integration into the host society is represented by its permanent residence status (long-term). The average stay of Moldovan migrants abroad is 1.9 years: 2.8 years in the EU Member States, 1.5 years in the CIS; and 2.1 years in other countries.42

EU member state citizenship allows the migrant worker from Moldova to integrate more effectively into the host society, and have the same rights and freedoms as native citizens. For example, Romanian citizenship held by migrants from Moldova allows them not only free movement within the EU countries, but also legal residence in their territory. Sociological research data shows that in 2012, for example, 87% of Moldovan migrants in the UK, 49% in France and 24% in Italy possessed Romanian citizenship. During the period 2000–2010, 43,882 Moldovan citizens became citizens of the EU states (especially of Romania, Portugal, Italy, Bulgaria, Germany, Great Britain, and Ireland). The process of Moldovan migrants’ social adaptation and integration in host countries within the EU is fairly efficient. Most of the migrants own businesses more frequently abroad than their compatriots in Moldova. The purchase of real estate and starting a business reflects the fact that these Moldovans desire to integrate into their destination countries.

**Conclusions**

In order to contribute to the successful integration of Moldovan migrants in the EU, Moldovan governmental authorities must direct their actions towards the following: (i) signing social security agreements with the main destination countries of Moldovan migrants; (ii) supporting circular migration programs for Moldovans; (iii) elaborating programs for the Moldovan Diaspora to maintain relations with Moldovan migrants, as well as to maintain the national traditions and customs, including the promotion of Moldovan culture abroad; (iv) creating conditions for business development, and implementing programs to attract remittances into the economy to stimulate the return of Moldovan migrants in their country of origin, etc. Also, the Moldovan Diaspora organizations must develop partnerships and provide services and collaborate with local authorities in both the destination country and country of origin.
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Abstract: International public opinion, especially European one, is focused on the issue of migrants reaching Europe from the Near East. Due to the scale of migration, southern neighborhood draws attention of decision-makers and the public of individual EU member states. For some countries, the number of migrants has become a problem of social nature (e.g. approximately a million migrants reaching Germany in 2015). However, the fact that a war rages on in Donbas, right beyond the EU’s eastern border, cannot be disregarded as the conflict fosters further migration problems (internal and international migration).

Russo-Ukrainian conflict in Donbas has changed the perception of Ukraine’s internal situation. The conflict pertains not only to the issue of hard security (e.g. military capabilities), but touches upon soft security as well i.e. in this case, the issue of migration (both international, and one associated with Internally Displaced Persons, IDPs). It is noteworthy that events of the Euromaidan revolution resulted in one of the more violent transformations, not only in the post-Soviet space, but also continental Europe. In addition, Russia’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea undeniably constitute the greatest European security crisis since the Balkan war of 1990s. Undeniably, when faced with economic, military and social problems (e.g. IDPs), Ukraine will not be able to manage the situation on its own without external financial aid.

Keywords: Ukraine crisis, Ukraine’s security, migration, Internally Displaced Persons, EU’s eastern border

Tomasz Stępniewski*
Introduction

International public opinion, especially European one, is focused on the issue of migrants reaching Europe from the Near East. Due to the scale of migration, southern neighborhood draws attention of decision-makers and the public of individual EU member states. For some countries, the number of migrants has become a problem of social nature (e.g. approximately a million migrants reaching Germany in 2015). However, the fact that a war rages on in Donbas, right beyond the EU’s eastern border, cannot be disregarded as the conflict fosters further migration problems (internal and international migration).

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The objective of the present paper is an attempt at viewing Euromaidan events from the perspective of Ukraine’s political transformation and the Maidan’s aftermath embodied by the migration crisis. As a result of the conflict, Ukraine struggles with a tremendous number of Internally Displaced Persons. In addition, the problem is aggravated by international migration (neighboring countries as the destination) resulting from Ukraine’s difficult economic situation. The present paper discusses solely the issue of IDPs resulting from the armed conflict in Donbas. The issue of Ukrainian economic migration, on the other hand, will not be discussed at this time.

1. ‘Euromaidan’ as an attempt at Ukraine’s political transformation

When discussing Ukraine’s political transformation, the fact that the essential stage of public verification of independent Ukraine’s political system fell on the end of 2004 and 2014, ought to be highlighted. The verification was motivated by new realities experienced by Ukrainian public and state. The reality emerged as a result of the presidential election of 2004 and the subsequent so-called ‘Orange Revolution’ between 22nd November 2004 and 23rd January 2005, and Viktor Yanukovych’s, Ukraine’s president at that time, refusal to sign the association agreement with the EU on 21st November 2013, which resulted in the events commonly known as ‘the Revolution of Dignity’ or ‘the Euromaidan Revolution’ taking place between 21st November 2013 and 23rd February 2014.
Transition of power in Ukraine, taking place between 2013 and 2014, commonly named ‘the Revolution of Dignity’ and ‘Euromaidan’, was characterized by certain stages of evolution determined by the level of repressive actions undertaken by the government and its security forces. Sociologists examining participants of ‘Euromaidan’ in Kiev distinguished three distinct stages. The first stage was named Maidan-meeting. It occurred in the first half of December 2013, and revolved around protests resulting from the president’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU in Vilnius and brutal battery of defenseless students on the night of 29th/30th November 2013. The end of December is the time of Maidan-camp when protesters took residence in the Maidan of Independence. The government did not undertake wide-scale brutal and aggressive actions at that time. The third stage was the so-called Maidan-Sich (a reference to Zaporizhian Sich). Maidan-Sich witnessed regular clashes between protesters and law enforcement officers and armed forces subordinated to Yanukovych and the government. It should be noted that since the beginning of protests in Ukraine, public opinion and experts, not only in Poland, but in Europe and in the world, expressed keen interest in the problem of social representation of the so-called ‘Euromaidan’. Issues pertaining to the character and purposefulness of actions which were undertaken seemed significant as well. For skeptics, such actions constituted an attempt at overthrowing the existing constitutional order in the country, this time by a radical, pro-European minority of Ukrainian society. They also presented dilemmas pertaining to the scope of social legitimization required for ‘political and moral validity’ of these demonstrations. According to a Ukrainian sociologist, director of ‘Democratic Initiatives Foundation’ – Irina Berezkina, ‘even though the majority of protesters originated from western and central Ukraine, Maidan represented the whole country’. As far as imperatives and motivational objectives of demonstrations are concerned, initially, Euromaidan strived to coerce the government to sign the Association Agreement with the EU. The situation changed essentially with the battery of protesters, defenseless students, by Berkut on the night of 30th November 2013. This turning point transformed pro-European and pro-EU protests into wide-scale anti-government ones. When asked by sociologists about their motivation and objectives, respondents isolated three crucial reasons for participating in protests: brutal repressions against protesters; Yanukovych’s refusal to sign the Association Agreement with the EU; and desire to accomplish a qualitative change of life in Ukraine. Therefore, the fact that the main objective and motivation of protesters was not the desire to change the government itself, but rather the way power was exercised, is noteworthy. The association with the EU was considered, on the one hand, as a symbol of democracy and better life, and on the other, as an instrument which would
force political elites to change the way they executed power and foster respect for citizens’ fundamental rights. Symptomatically, appeals of key opposition politicians were indicated as reasons for participating in the Maidan very rarely. Maidan’s apoliticality, especially in its early stages, has been noted by Wojciech Konończuk and Tadeusz A. Olszański, authors of a publication of Centre for Eastern Studies. Initially, Euromaidan was consciously antiparty in character. In addition, rallies flew the Ukrainian national flag and the flag of the EU exclusively. Originally, there existed two separate Euromaidans, a fact of symbolic significance. The first Maidan was located at the Independence Square, and was organized bottom-up, in an informal manner, by public activists and students. The second Maidan was initiated by leaders of the parliamentary opposition at the European Square. The two Maidans stood only a few hundred meters apart. On 26th November 2013, the two combined into one, or rather ‘the opposition’s Euromaidan’ joined ‘Euromaidan of activists and students’. Three key opposition leaders: Arseniy Yatsenyuk, Vitali Klitschko, and Oleh Tyahnybok became the official voice of Euromaidan. However, they never gained full support and trust of protesters. According to authors of the Centre for Eastern Studies’ publication, a strong Maidan’s leader, who would manifest the same kind of authority as in the case of the Orange Revolution of 2004, was missing. As a consequence, problems in communicating and voicing demonstrators’ expectations emerged at specific stages of Euromaidan. To conclude, the fact that the description of Euromaidan, which was based on sociological studies, and its comparison to digital revolutions in the network society outlined by Manuel Castells, allows to consider Euromaidan as representing the whole Ukrainian society, ought to be acknowledged. It enables its diversity, and the common, and at the same time, specific and exceptional, to be captured. In other words, it allows Euromaidan to be perceived as a bottom-up protest which was focused on values rather than on a public or political leader (as opposed to the Orange Revolution of 2004). A decentralized, horizontal structure of the protest, instead of a vertical one, seems significant. Its symbols are manifested in a democratic, virtual, online dimension of the mobilization, and subsequently civil disobedience. What is even more meaningful, is the fact that the driving force behind Euromaidan and its symbols was the young, active, mobile, resourceful and moderate, those with ambitions to become a part of the new Ukrainian middle class, and maybe, prospectively, a part of political and ideological elites of the country.¹

2. Ukraine crisis, NATO and security issues

The war between Ukraine and Russia-supported separatists which rages on since 2014, and the annexation of Crimea in March 2014, resulted in a change of the state of security not only for Ukraine, but also Europe. In other words, the perception of security of both Eastern Europe and Europe in general altered. One may even risk an observation that Ukrainian conflict constitutes a symbolic end of the post-Cold-War international order. The order stipulated peaceful coexistence of states, integrity of borders and international legal regulations for states’ functioning. Moreover, the Russo-Ukrainian war constitutes a challenge for projects aiming at the reintegration of post-Soviet space by Russia. Such projects include, e.g., Eurasian Economic Union and the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

What is more, Russia’s aggression on Ukraine resulted in NATO becoming more active as an organization acting with Europe’s security in mind. The Warsaw NATO Summit (8–9 July 2016) followed the context of international qualitative changes, both on the southern and eastern flanks of the Alliance. Moreover, the year 2016 may prove to be critical from the point of view of NATO’s policy in East-Central Europe. It is associated with NATO participating countries’ change of perception as regards security, and changes occurring internationally and threats for NATO members. The accession of Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary in 1999 and Slovakia in 2004 resulted in divisions in Europe being cleared. The Warsaw Summit symbolized changes which emerged in Europe, but also acknowledged Poland’s significance as far as the Alliance’s security is concerned. In addition, the summit was symbolic due to the fact that it was in Warsaw in 1955 when Warsaw Pact, which divided East-Central Europe into two opposing military camps, was established. It resulted in a bipolar division of the region, and was removed only by the fall of communism in 1989.

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When analysing the Warsaw NATO Summit communiqué, the fact that its resolutions are both military (e.g. deployment of a battalion force in Poland and three in the Baltics) and political (emphasis on NATO’s internal cohesion, increased expenditures on defence) in character ought to be highlighted. The communiqué states that ‘the greatest responsibility of the Alliance is to protect and defend our territory and our populations against attack, as set out in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. And so renewed emphasis has been placed on deterrence and collective defence. At the same time, NATO must retain its ability to respond to crises beyond its borders, and remain actively engaged in projecting stability and enhancing international security through working with partners and other international organisations’.\(^4\)

The fact that, despite several rounds of peace talks and critical problems with the implementation of agreements (Geneva, Minsk 1, and Minsk 2 agreements), the war in Donbas goes on, which poses a critical challenge for Ukraine’s security, ought to be remembered. Peace talks concerning the Donbas issue may be briefly summarized by the following statement: from Geneva to Minsk and onwards. ‘The Minsk agreement endures only because a bad peace is better than no peace at all’.\(^5\) At the beginning of 2017, the conflict rekindled. Therefore, Thomas de Waal rightly observes ‘that looks a long way off. All the while, the two regions suffer from conflict, economic collapse, and emigration that will make it even more costly to rehabilitate and administer them in the future’.\(^6\)

3. War in Donbas and Internally Displace Persons (IDPs)

Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict in Donetsk and Luhanski Oblasts forced tens of thousands to leave their homes and flee in search of safety and stability. To make matters worse, fighting between Ukrainians and Russia-supported separatists intensified anew at the beginning of 2017. This will surely aggravate the migration issue. As a result of the conflict, some citizens of these regions decided to seek shelter in Russian Federation (their number is estimated at one million) and other neighboring countries. On the other hand, a significant number sought refuge in the Ukrainian-controlled territories.

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\(^6\) Ibidem.
Ukraine’s Ministry of Social Policy (data of 21st June 2016) registered 1,786 million internally displaced persons (IDPs). The fact that some of them fled to Ukrainian-controlled territories simply to be able to receive pensions, due to formal requirements, introduced by Ukrainian government in November 2014, ought to be noted. All this resulted in the fact that ‘since 2015 Ukraine has been among the ten countries with the largest IDP populations worldwide’. In addition, in the first half of 2016, Ukrainian government revised the number of IDPs qualifying for state aid, and reduced the number to 1,27 million.

Ukrainian authorities face a dire situation as far as IDPs are concerned. On the one hand, the country incurs extensive costs of the Donbas conflict, and on the other, IDPs consume a large portion of state’s resources. Lack of finances results in shortages for welfare pensions, adaptation of temporary places of residence. As a consequence, Ukraine is unable to implement any programs for social integration, psychological aid, or employment support. Therefore, the country ought to receive international financial aid. Otherwise, the situation will remain unchanged. Gwendolyn Sass observes that ‘their overall number, their territorial spread, and their extreme experiences make displaced people a group that the Ukrainian and Russian national and local governments – as well as the West – need to take into account’.

The armed conflict with Russia and the lack of a deliberate and long-term Ukrainian migration policy result in the emergence of highly complicated and complex political and social processes. In addition, Ukraine is facing problems associated with mass economic migration, low rate of natural increase, and economic factors exerting impact upon family-friendly policies, diseases, alcoholism, etc. They all contribute to Ukraine’s depopulation, which is progressing rapidly. The chart below, which outlines the population’s decline, acknowledges such an observation. At the beginning of 1990s, Ukraine’s population amounted to 52 million. As a result of social processes, economic migration, Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the war in Donbas, the number of citizens decreased to 42 million.

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10 G. Sasse, op.cit.
It is noteworthy that the prevalent trend associated with mass economic migration and the lack of successful social integration programs of IDPs, may be catastrophic for Ukraine’s internal stability and cohesion, which may be very disturbing from the point of view of the country’s neighbors.\textsuperscript{11} If Ukraine introduced a program integrating IDPs, the whole country may become united. This could take the form of a successful cultural integration of Ukrainian society, of people coming from east and west of the country. Therefore, the impact of the Russo-Ukrainian conflict may have a significant influence upon Ukraine’s consolidation, provided that the country implements a successful integration policy.

\textbf{Conclusions}

It is noteworthy that events of the Euromaidan revolution resulted in one of the more violent transformations, not only in the post-Soviet space, but also continental Europe. In addition, Russia’s destabilization of eastern Ukraine and annexation of Crimea undeniably constitute the greatest European security crisis since the Balkan war of 1990s. Nobody anticipated that, when Yanukovych halted Ukraine’s zooming in with the

\textsuperscript{11} Ibidem.
EU, he would instigate an internal crisis in the country, which resulted in strategic ramifications for the whole continent. When competing for Ukraine with the EU, Russia did not hesitate to apply the so-called hard power. As a consequence, the evolution and development of Ukrainian crisis, including a further Russia-instigated destabilization of other regions, were to depend on Ukraine's acceptance of Russia's demands, which are directly discrepant and asymmetric. A deeper aggravation of Ukraine's dysfunction and dependency seems to be the Federation's critical objective. This seems to be acknowledged by e.g. Russian demands pertaining to a change of Ukraine's political system into a federal one with significant autonomy of eastern and southern oblasts, including their right to sign international agreements. In response to such demands, the West (the EU and USA) decided to mediate the situation in order to de-escalate the conflict in the framework of the so-called Geneva and Normandy formats.¹²

Undeniably, when faced with economic, military and social problems (e.g. IDPs), Ukraine will not be able to manage the situation on its own without external financial aid. Therefore, a good solution to the issue would be to seek ways of utilizing the newly existing possibility of transferring unused funds from other ENP dimensions for the use of the EaP (especially for Ukraine). Moreover, internal political dynamics in the partner countries (Eastern Partnership countries) and growing disappointment with the EU's attitude towards them and decreasing of their engagement in genuine implementation of reforms and integration with the Union. That's why there is need to create a new political narrative about the EaP and the EU's policy towards its eastern neighbours.

Russia's policy towards Ukraine is of vital importance from the point of view of Ukraine's international situation. Russia still poses one of the biggest challenges for the EU's actions in the framework of the EaP. Ultimate goal of Russian policy towards countries of the EaP region is reintegration (Eurasian Economic Union) or at least strengthening its influence, limit ties of the EaP states with the EU, and even to cut it back, if possible. Russia uses various instruments in its policy, including aggressive ones i.e. anti-EU disinformation, political and economic pressure (including economic sanctions), support for local separatist movements and use of military power. It threatens to large degree a stability in the EU's partner

The instability of Ukraine’s security will translate into difficulties in introduction of reforms and dealing with the scale of problems. On the one hand, Euromaidan constituted an attempt at a change of Ukraine’s political situation, and on the other, was a response to prospects of the country’s European integration. Therefore, it seems that, from the perspective of the efficiency of the EU’s policy with regards to Ukraine’s pro-European future and restricting Russia’s neo-imperial policy, cohesion, coherence and unity will play a decisive role as far as these issues are concerned. It ought to be remembered that at present the situation in EaP countries is considerably less stable, with the military and frozen conflicts ongoing in the EU’s neighborhood and with growing internal problems in the EU. If the EU is unable to manage its own problems (e.g. Brexit), it will not be interested in problems of its eastern neighborhood. Such state of affairs may result in not only southern but also eastern neighborhood becoming destabilized.

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Abstract: Refugee/immigrant crisis in Europe is connected mostly with Arab or Muslim minorities. Negative perceiving of those groups in Poland is often based on stereotypes, myths and exaggerated facts. In this paper was made an attempt to confront the image of the Arab community living in Poland, which is functioning among Poles with the own image of the group, reconstructed on the basis of interviews and surveys conducted with representatives of the Arab community and Poles in the research field. Most frequently repeated myths about Arabs occurring among Polish respondents also was and the most popular stereotypes relating to the tested group. Myths and stereotypes have been confronted with the results of Author’s own research, which undermine their legitimacy.

Keywords: Arabs, Poland, Arabs in Poland, Arab community, Arab Diaspora, myths, facts

Introduction

Although not affecting Poland directly, the European migrant crisis has deepened the Islamophobic and Anti-Arab atmosphere in Poland. It is so because the uncontrolled wave of immigrants and refugees predominantly comprises inhabitants of Muslim or Arab countries, and negative occurrences related to it are featured in the media. As a result, many myths and
stereotypes of the Arab community, which mostly mirror those foreign experiences where the Arab Diaspora is numerous, circulate among the Poles. This article aims at introducing the most popular, as the research has demonstrated, of the aforementioned myths and stereotypes.¹

1. Researching the Arab Diaspora in Poland

This article is based on the results obtained during fieldwork conducted from May 2013 to March 2014. A hundred representatives of the Arab community in Poland and (to compare) a hundred Poles were examined using, i.a., the snowball sampling technique. The research was conducted in twelve Polish cities, in which branches of Polish-Arab organizations are located and most numerous Arab communities exist. In this text, I present a sample of opinions voiced by the study participants. The study was based on a triangulation method,² meaning the parallel usage of a couple of research techniques (individual in-depth interviewing, expert interviews and questionnaires).

The representatives of the Arab community were recruited according to their date of arrival in Poland. The Arabs who arrived most recently can be considered a ‘new’ Diaspora (50 respondents, marked ND in the text), whereas those who came before 1989 and stayed in Poland create an ‘old’ Diaspora (50 respondents, marked OD in the text). Three groups surfaced from amongst the Polish respondents: the favourable Poles (FP in the text), the unfavourable (UP in the text), and the undecided Poles (UDP in the text), that is those who replied ‘hard to say’ to the question ‘are you favourably disposed to the Arab community in Poland?’ The most, about two-third of the respondents, declared to be favourably disposed toward the Arabs, while there were a few of those who declared to be unfavourably disposed towards them.³

2. There are plenty of Arabs in Poland and they are expansive

When answering a question about their first contact with someone of Arab descent, one Pole said: ‘often, on the streets, there are a lot of them’ (UP8). After just a preliminary data analysis it can be jokingly said that

¹ The figures are presented for the purposes of this article and statistical inference was applied only with regards to the targeted sample. Therefore, the results of my research relate only to the examined representatives of both communities.
³ M. Switat – The Arab Community in Poland. The Old and the New Diaspora (Społeczność arabska w Polsce. Stara i nowa diaspora) (in print).
Arabs in Poland are like ghosts – nobody has seen them, but almost everybody is afraid of them. It is so because:

1) a relatively small number of Poles have direct contact with the Arabs (41%).
2) taking into account the fact that the Arab Diaspora in Poland amounts to approximately 10,000 persons, there is one person of Arab descent per approx. 3,850 inhabitants. Also, Poland is 134th in the world when it comes to the absolute number of immigrants (-0.47 migrants/1,000 population).
3) the official data on the number of foreigners in Poland lack detailed information regarding foreigners of the Arab descent (the data from the register of residents do not correspond with the data from the Office for Foreigners regarding valid residence cards).

Therefore, taking into account the numerosness of the Arab Diaspora in Germany, France or Great Britain (oscillating in hundreds of thousands), there is no expansion of the Arab community in Poland, especially since most of the respondents came to Poland in 1985–1989 (22 respondents). What is more, according to my research the ‘undecided’ Poles are not against any individuals of Arab descent, they are against large groups, which was confirmed by one of the respondents: ‘individually – when it comes to each person – yes, as a community – I am very afraid of them and I am afraid of the expansion’ (UDP11).

The Arab community in Poland is small, but it is highly mobile. The turnover of its members is particularly high within the ‘new’ Diaspora – some arrive to Poland and some leave Poland (only the representatives of the ‘new’ Diaspora, 54% of the respondents, hold residence permits for a specified period of time). At the same time, having a Polish citizenship or a long-term resident permit by other members of the Diaspora does not mean that the Arab respondents with such statuses will forever remain in Poland. Only about one-third of the interviewees declare that they do not plan on coming back to their country of origin due to, e.g. not having a place to go back to or not feeling a connection to their country.

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The remaining respondents would like to come back to their country of origin (usually in their old age or when the situation of their country improves). Yet, it should be said that 11% of them are doctoral students or students who plan on coming back when they graduate.

3. Arabs in Poland benefit from the Polish social welfare system just like they do in the Western countries

Polish respondents think that immigrants in Poland – including the Arabs – live at the expense of the host country by benefiting from the social welfare system, just like they do in the Western Europe. For instance, when answering the question ‘what is the attitude of the Polish state towards the Arabs,’ one Pole said that they get paid more than the Poles, ‘which is a scandal!’ (UP4). However, the real situation is the opposite – the Arabs in Poland do not use the help of the state (with the exception of the refugees who are subject to integration programs, but only 2 out of 100 of my respondents fell into that category) and 94% of the Arab respondents work or study in Poland. What is more, in accordance with the Polish law foreigners must confirm that they have health insurance and a stable and regular source of income, which allows them to cover their own costs of living, as well as those of their dependent family members. This applies to all types of residence permits in Poland: from a visa, through residence permits for a specified period of time, to a permission to settle or a long-term stay.6

4. Arabs (immigrants) ‘steal’ jobs from the Poles

According to the ‘unfavourable’ Poles and the majority of the ‘undecided’ it would be better if there were no Arabs in Poland, because there are now ‘fewer jobs for the Poles’ (UDP13) as they ‘snatch jobs’ (UP8). In reality, the most numerous group of the respondents from the Arab Diaspora (42%) run their own companies (e.g. trade, construction, training, gastronomy) and hire Poles, thus actually creating job opportunities. Moreover, some of the representatives of the Arab community in Poland work as specialists, i.a. teachers, lecturers, scientists, doctors or engineers. Those representatives are appreciated by the Poles – 84% of Poles accept an Arab doctor and 68% accept an Arab boss (according to the Bogardus social distance scale).

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6 Act of 12 December 2013 on foreigners (Ustawa o cudzoziemcach z dnia 12 grudnia 2013 r.), Dz.U., item 1650.
5. ‘When you buy a kebab, you settle an Arab’

When answering a question about the places where they meet people of Arab descent, one of the Polish respondents said: ‘I don’t meet them, I just see them, because I don’t go to [the kebab places] (“when you buy a kebab, you settle an Arab”)’ (UP3). It is one of the most complex myths. On the one hand, it denies the Arabs the right to live in Poland; on the other, it suggests that all the places in which kebab is sold in Poland are run by people of Arab descent and that every Arab living in Poland works there.

Such places have owners and workers of different nationalities, and some of them may be confused with members of the Arab community, e.g. the Turks, the Bengalis or Pakistanis. Also, many Poles open these types of dining facilities, capitalizing on the popularity of the oriental cuisine. In the centre of Warsaw, the most popular places are almost always crowded, which means that the Polish people enjoy the dishes served there (of the Polish respondents, 54% like the Arab cuisine and 25% associate it with a kebab). Only 5 respondents from the ‘new’ Arab Diaspora and 8 from the ‘old’ Arab Diaspora work or own a dining facility (13% of the respondents).

As it was mentioned above – representatives of the Arab community in Poland do not seek any social welfare from the Polish state. Just the opposite – they are enterprising, they create jobs. Those who criticize such dining establishments forget that that many Poles work there and that he state budget benefits from their taxes.

This myth is also connected with a subjective feeling that this type of work is for uneducated, low-level people. Consequently, it suggests that Arabs are uneducated, low-skilled people. Meanwhile, almost 80% of the Arab Diaspora in Poland hold university degrees (at least). What is more, there were no respondents with a lower than secondary level of education. The representatives of the Arab community in Poland either already have (1/5 of the respondents) or soon will have doctoral degrees in one or two fields of study (engineering, political, economic, judicial), while some are professors. What is more, 85% of the respondents from the Arab Diaspora who live in Poland know English and the following languages (apart from Polish and Arabic), i.a. French, Russian, German. 47% of them speak Polish, Arabic and one more language. 48% know at least 2 (up to 6) additional languages.

As it has been mentioned, 79% of the members of the examined Arab community are university graduates. If an Arab works in a dining establishment, he/she is an educated person with a diploma, so probably it is
out of necessity, not by choice. This type of work is treated as temporary and transient. Sometimes working in food establishments is the only way to earn money. This is a problem within the new Arab Diaspora – the lack of fluency in Polish makes it hard to find a job in line with one’s qualifications and education (12% of representatives of the ‘new’ Diaspora admit their knowledge of Polish is rudimentary). For many members of the ‘new’ Diaspora, working in food establishments constitutes a stigma and an almost inescapable vicious circle. They go into the food industry because they do not know Polish well enough. However, they do not have the time or the possibilities to learn Polish and integrate with the community when working there. Therefore, they are bound to work in such places for the remainder of their stay in Poland – when they look for jobs more in line with their education, they do so with food industry experience, which is not welcomed by potential employers.

6. Arabs in Poland do not integrate with the Polish people

The Arab respondents think of integration as, i.a. ‘common life, respecting others, respecting their individual rights and obligations, the law of the country, preserving their own identity while remaining open to that of the others’ (ND8); ‘firstly, an integrated recipient; secondly, a mutual respect for the two cultures, mine for the Polish culture and a Pole’s for my own, and tolerance. As I understand it, it’s integration on both sides. When somebody wants to integrate, a society must be willing to accept that person, which is why it’s a two-way process, the door must be open’ (ND27). Thus, as the research shows, the integration of a migrant community with a host community is dependent on both sides, but learning the language lies at its foundation. All of the Arab respondents know Polish: 82% at an at least satisfactory level. What is more, 90% are well-versed in Polish culture, history and famous Poles; 88% are interested in the future of Poland. Even though only 41% of the Polish respondents have personal contact with members of the Arab community in Poland, almost 90% of the Arab respondents declare that they have personal contact with Poles, e.g. family members, friends or colleagues.

Most Arab respondents claim that members of the Arab Diaspora (or other immigrants) have to adjust to the host society (Poland). What is more, similarly to the Polish respondents, they think that the best model of coexisting within a country is integration with partial maintenance of one’s own culture (an equivalence of cultures). Some Arab respondents also claim that there are members of the Arab Diaspora who acquired elements of the Polish culture, ‘tradition, customs, religious and cultural
celebrations, clothing, everything; they act like Poles and can only be distinguished in terms of their skin colour’ (ND29). This acquisition is considered an automatic integration, ‘due to living in Poland, there is no other way, we have to acquire some things, it’s out of control, we have no influence over it, we acquire it automatically, it’s an automatic integration’ (ND40).

Moreover, the Arab respondents point out things they have learned from the Polish people. Not only the language, but i.a. orderliness, patience, punctuality, self-organization or perseverance as well. It confirms the process of acculturation, meaning the gradual acquisition of the main elements of the surrounding cultural environment by the immigrants (without fully abandoning the original cultural identity),7 to which this community is subjected in Poland.

More than half of the Arab respondents feel that their level of integration is at least average. Their good level of integration is confirmed by one Polish respondent, ‘there are people of Arab descent who know more about Polish culture and history than some Poles’ (FP16), and 54% of the ‘new’ Diaspora representatives want to be more integrated with the Polish society. They want integration even though 42% of them claim that Poles are unfavourably disposed towards Arabs or that most of the Arab respondents think that Poles perceive them in negative and stereotypical ways, e.g. ‘every Pole who does not know any Arabs or any Arab countries immediately becomes afraid upon hearing the word “Arab”, because it is associated with barbarism, fun and love for women [...]’ (ND17); ‘they are judged as immigrants and their efforts to become integrated are not appreciated, all they know […] is something about polygamy and terrorism’ (ND27). Also, about one-quarter of Polish respondents claim that Poles perceive Arab immigrants in a negative way, that they are afraid of them, just like of any other immigrants, ‘it seems to me that most Poles do not like immigrants, it is not only about the Arabs, mostly about people from different cultures’ (FP48).

Identifying with Polishness and feeling a sense of identification with Poles are also indicative of the Arab respondents’ high level of integration – 54% of the respondents of Arab descent who hold Polish citizenship claim they feel Polish despite their Arab descent, e.g. ‘my children, wife and livelihood are in this country, so I feel Polish’ (ND25).

However, the Arabs from the ‘old’ Diaspora point out that Poles find it hard to get used to the fact that people without Slavic surnames or who

do not look Slavic may hold Polish citizenship. They are still pejoratively called ‘that swarthy’, ‘that foreigner’, and constantly asked ‘where are you from?’, ‘where did you come from?’ (ND49). Such an unconscious focus on someone’s origin hinders integration – at least according to Tamotsu Shibutani and Kian M. Kwan, whose approach was based on Herbert Mead’s interactionism. These two scholars found that the way a person is treated in a given society does not depend on who that person is, but on how that person is perceived. Individuals are subject to categorization and have certain traits and behaviours ascribed to them. As a result of this process, a social distance arises, not in the sense of a physical distance between groups, but rather a subjective state of nearness felt by the individuals. According to this concept, reducing the distance leads to structural assimilation.8

This theory is confirmed by, i.a., one comment made by a representative of the Arab community: ‘an Arab integrates completely when he has a job here and is treated with respect, it’s the best way [to integrate – M.S.]; kids integrate, but integration can’t be restricted, when there’s racism in schools or other places, it restricts integration, because when a person has a job and everything, then he subconsciously and naturally integrates, which is sometimes restricted, when somebody reminds you that you’re not a Pole or something racist, which gives one a reason to wonder about integration’ (OD19).

The aforementioned opinion corresponds with Amin Maalouf’s thesis according to which the more immigrants feel that their original culture’s tradition is respected in their new country, the less they feel hated, intimidated and discriminated against because of their different identity; the more they are open to the new country’s cultural opportunities, the less they cling to their separateness.9 The Polish respondents (17%) also claim that apart from typical, everyday problems, like the lack of work, money or health, the Arabs in Poland mostly face problems of discrimination and intolerance.

7. An Arab is a Muslim, a Muslim is an Arab

Many of the Polish respondents incorrectly believe that every Arab is a Muslim and that every Muslim is an Arab. Consequently, an image of an Arab is based on images of many different nationalities. When asked to name Arab countries, Polish respondents – apart from a couple correct answers – also mention Afghanistan, Turkey, Pakistan, Iran, and Tajikistan.

9 A. Maalouf, In the Name of Identity (Zabójcze tożsamości), Warsaw 2002, p. 51.
that is Muslim countries, not Arab countries. It is also possible that they think Arabs inhabit the aforementioned countries. For instance, when answering the question ‘have you ever been to an Arab country?’, one person replied, ‘yes, I’ve been to Turkey’ (UP7). In my research majority of Arabs were Muslim, but there are also Christians, atheists, or Druzes, and their level of religiousness varies.

In Poland, Muslims are not only Arabs, but also citizens of Asian or European countries, as well as Poles (the Tatars and converts). According to different statistics, there are thirty to forty thousand Muslims in Poland, meaning that they constitute about 0.1% of the Polish population. Thus, Islamophobia or Arabophobia and a negative attitude towards immigrants can be called ‘migrational hypochondria’ in Poland; an unfounded, exaggerated fear that has no basis in the actual social situation and that probably comes from observing Western countries with a large number of immigrants and Muslims (including the migrant crisis). Although small in numbers, this phenotypically dissimilar part of Polish population encounters attitudes of extreme animosity or obsessive hostility towards the so-called ‘others’ or ‘different’.

The Arab respondents draw attention to other cases of negative social mechanisms related to their perceived ‘otherness’ and ‘differentness’; besides racism, these are: social distance, prejudice, discrimination, stigma, marginalization, exclusion, xenophobia, intolerance and stereotyping. 48% of them experienced racist behaviour in Poland, most of which (26%) amounted to physical assaults/beatings. The representatives were also subjected to hate speech; as one of the Polish respondents confirms when saying what he thinks of the Arab community in Poland, ‘[burn them] at the stake, kill them all or go to their own damn country’ (UP7). At the same time, the respondents give their own definitions of racism. Among them are opinions that racism is perceiving somebody on the basis of differences in skin colour, religion or language; assuming that an Arab is an inferior human being; despising people because of their origin, even though nobody can influence their place of birth.

Despite the aforementioned cases of animosity, the Arab respondents generally do not think of Poles as racist and marginalize the meaning of such incidents, e.g. ‘there are some racists, but most Poles are not racist;

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when they get to know you, you show them what you think, they start to
like you, they get close to you and they change their opinions’ (OD1).

According to most of the participants, knowledge and education are
keys to accepting the ‘other’ and to fighting the mechanisms triggering
racist behaviour. One of the Polish participants confirms this by answer-
ing the question ‘how Poland should help the Arab immigrants’ in the
following manner: ‘a state should help, first of all, by treating Arab im-
migrants like any other citizen. [Immigrants] should have the same rights
and obligations as Poles. Also, the stereotype of an Arab-terrorist should
be challenged. After all, any foreign newcomer may be a terrorist, includ-
ing those of European origin’ (FP10).

8. Arabs are the most disliked nation in Poland

Up to 2012, according to the polls almost annually published by the
Centre for Public Opinion Research (CBOS), Arabs were the most dis-
liked nation in Poland.12 However, the polls had a methodological error
– other names of ‘nations’ referred only to the nationalities of people in-
habiting a given country, e.g. the Czechs or the French; Arabs did not fit
the definition of a nation used in the poll as the name ‘Arabs’ refers to
inhabitants of 22 countries. In 2012, apart from a nation called ‘Arabs’,
the table of nations used in the poll also included Libyans and Egyptians,
although Libyans and Egyptians are also Arabs. Interestingly, Libyans
and Egyptians were liked more than ‘Arabs’ as a whole. Perhaps the Polish
people associate the very word ‘Arab’ more negatively than ‘Egyptian’
or ‘Libyan’? In this case, the word ‘Arab’ would become pejorative and stigmatizing; Polish respondents solely associate it with negative stere-
otypes.

It was not until 2013 that the poll excluded this general idea listing
‘Egyptians’ and ‘Palestinians’ instead. According to the results, Palestin-
ians were liked less than Egyptians (ranking fourth from the bottom),
after ‘Gypsies’, the Romani and the Turks. According to more than half
of the Polish participants of my research, Arabs are not the most disliked
nation in Poland; only 13% of the Polish participants disagree with that.

9. The Arab Diaspora in Poland: the reality

The Polish respondents mention various sources of information on the
Arab community and culture that have influenced their opinions: televi-

12 Poles’ attitudes toward other nations. A survey report (Stosunek Polaków do innych narodów.
sion, the Internet, newspapers, books, personal contacts, work. When it comes to the favourably disposed towards the Arab community, personal contacts are at the basis of their opinions, while the Internet is of secondary importance. The opposite is true as far as the unfavourably disposed are concerned, with the Internet being of the primary importance. Thus, opinions are formed either on the basis of general information, or through the prism of personal experience.

It should be noted that some Polish respondents never personally met a person of Arab descent (4%) and they do not meet them in private (59%); never visited Arab countries (70%); incorrectly define Arab countries (apart from the correct ones, about 30 other countries were mentioned); do not know the Arab culture (19%); meet members of the Arab community in passing (on a street, in a store, in a restaurant); do not know any Polish-Arab marriages (38%). Despite all that, they still speak of this community extensively, which confirms Perry R. Hinton’s view that stereotypes endure because of limited knowledge.\textsuperscript{13}

Since most Polish respondents do not directly know the Arab community residing in their country, it can be said that their opinions of the community were formed on the basis of indirect or general information regarding the Arab community. No research has ever been conducted into the Arab Diaspora in Poland; its members are individuals scattered throughout the country. Those who have blended into the Polish community are mostly parts of Polish families, workplaces or businesses.

To sum up, it should be also added that myths, prejudices and stereotypes negatively influence the image of Arab community. However, it should be noted that the Polish state did not have any negative experiences with this community (some of the representatives have been residing in Poland for about 40 years) or with the Arab countries. From the beginning of their independence, the Poles helped build the infrastructure and economy in the Arab world.\textsuperscript{14} In turn, Arab influences are visible in Polish culture, including science, art, literature and the Polish language.\textsuperscript{15} Only to a small extent is it reflected in the image of the researched Arab community in Poland, which greatly differs from its actual image.

\textsuperscript{13} See P.R. Hinton, Stereotypes, Cognition and Culture, USA, Canada 2013.
\textsuperscript{14} J. Piotrowski, Poland’s relations with Arab countries (Stosunki Polski z krajami arabskimi), Warsaw 1989, pp. 5–9.
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Australia’s History and Background of Migration and Refugee Policies – Lessons for the EU and Its Member States?

Abstract: This paper explores Australia’s history and background of migration and refugee policies and examines the possibilities of applying the Australian solutions in the European Union. It has often been assumed that the history of Australia’s migration and refugee policies and the solutions it has applied are not relevant for the European Union (although they are sufficient, albeit controversial, in the case of Australia). In order to verify this assumption, first the origin and the current rules of Australia’s migration policy are presented and described, and then the determinants of immigration to Australia are indicated. Next, the overall state of relations between the EU, its Member States, and Australian immigration matters is explored. The main research questions posed in this text concern the key points of Australia’s immigration policies and its determinants, as well as the current state of the EU’s and its Member States’ relationship with Australia with respect to the refugee crisis and immigration. The paper ends by offering conclusions with respect to the above.

Keywords: Australia, EU Member States, European Union, immigration, refugee

Introduction

Today one of the most challenging issues faced by both the European Union (EU) and its Member States is the massive influx of refugees and
(often ‘economic’) immigrants seeking to reach Europe. This process, however, is taking place not only in Europe, but also in other parts of the world. For example Australia has also been facing massive immigration problems for the decade of more. Being a state with colonial origins, Australia is on the one hand developing its migration policy\(^1\) by remaining open to newcomers, while on the other hand it is trying to restrict the number of refugees and immigrants by applying solutions that are considered controversial by some in the international community. Thus at one and the same time Australia’s migration policy has caused debate and controversy in Australia itself, as well as beyond. European leaders and policy-makers have made explicit reference to Australia’s case, sometimes indicating its path toward restricting immigration as one of the possible ways to deal with the issue in the EU Member States.

The topic of the paper thus concerns the history and background of Australia’s migration and refugee policies and the potential to apply these solutions in the EU. It has often been assumed that the specific history and background of Australia’s migration and refugee policies render it not relevant for the European Union (although they are sufficient, albeit controversial, in the case of Australia). To verify this assumption, first the origin and the rules of Australia’s migration policy are described, and next the determinants of Australia’s migration policy are indicated. Subsequently, the overall state of the relations between the EU, its Member States and Australia in immigration matters is explored. The main research questions posed in this text concern the key points and determinants of Australia’s immigration, as well as the current state of the EU’s and its Member States’ relationship with Australia with respect to the refugee crisis and immigration. The paper ends by offering conclusions.

1. The origins and determinants of immigration to Australia

In the case of Australia, it is first of all necessary to briefly outline the origins of its migration policy. A brief analysis of this issue will help the reader to better understand the specificity of the solutions currently applied in Australia.

To begin with, Australia is a state built on a massive influx of European immigrants, originally from the United Kingdom (it should be borne in mind that Australia was a British colony), who were sentenced to be sent to Australia for violating British law. In the majority of cases these were

\(^1\) For the purposes of this paper, with regard to Australia the term ‘migration policy’ has been applied consistently – for instance see: Australian Government, http://www.australia.gov.au (last visited 18.12.2016).
petty crimes, such as burglaries, etc. The British historian Niall Ferguson even claims that ‘Australia literally emerged as a country of thieves’.\(^2\) This process dates back to the beginning of the 18\(^{\text{th}}\) century. The main reasons that this forced emigration to Australia rapidly changed into a voluntary immigration concerned the possibilities for newcomers from the UK to quickly increase their wealth. In the first place, the original emigrants were given land after completing their sentences, which in fact transformed their punishment into a kind of prize and began to attracting people voluntarily to Australia. The second major attraction was the first gold rush, which began in the mid-19\(^{\text{th}}\) century when the gold digger Edward Hammond Hargraves discovered rich gold mines in New South Wales in 1851.\(^3\) This event prompted a rapid and massive inflow of gold diggers from other parts of the world (such as China), who were hoping to find gold in Australia. Australia thus ceased to be a ‘huge prison’ for British criminals and became a desirable place to live, where one could quickly become rich.

The black pages of Australia’s history include the events of 1861, when Australian diggers, jealous of the results of and competition posed by their Chinese counterparts, attacked the Chinese gold diggers’ camp in Lambing Flat. This event eventually led to the implementation of the so-called ‘white Australia’ policy, which is usually described as an ‘anti-Asian immigration policy initiated by the new Commonwealth of Australia in 1901. It reflected a long-standing and unifying sentiment of the various Australian colonies and remained a fundamental government policy into the mid-20\(^{\text{th}}\) century’.\(^4\)

The legal act that formed the basis for the new immigration policy was the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901 – one of the first acts introduced by the new Commonwealth of Australia, which was formed earlier that year. Its full title read as follows: ‘To place certain restrictions on Immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of prohibited Immigrants’. Its basic premise concerned the prohibition of immigration to Australia of those the Act referred to as ‘prohibited immigrants’.\(^5\) The potential immigrants were asked first of all to write a dic-

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\(^5\) According to the Act, a ‘prohibited immigrant’ was: ‘(a) Any person who when asked to do so by an officer fails to write out at dictation and sign in the presence of the
tation in a European language, which at that time shattered the hopes of most non-Europeans of being accepted in Australian territory. The adoption of this law had a significant impact on the Australian migration policy during the following years by stopping virtually all non-European immigration (mainly from Asia), thus leading to the formation of a racially insulated society.

Despite the restrictions on immigration contained in the Immigration Restriction Act of 1901, Australia was still receiving new immigrants searching for a better life. During the following years, Australian authorities remained eager to accept newcomers (mainly from Europe) to build the country and enhance its growing economy. This statement is supported by following numbers: at the end of the 17th century the Aboriginal population in Australia was about 400,000,6 while nowadays there are approximately 23,000,000 people – not only descendants of former immigrants but also new ones (see Chart 1). Obviously, the most numerous ethnic group is the English (25.9 per cent), while the Chinese account for about 3 per cent of today’s Australian population.7

While the nature of immigration to Australia changed over time, it is still possible to distinguish the main determinants of the process that encouraged immigrants to come to Australia (pull factors).

The first of these determinants is intrinsically connected to the historical background of Australia, its geographical location, and poor living conditions (dry, red soil, natural hazards, etc.). Being a colony of the United Kingdom, a continent far away from Europe, and not being suitable for agriculture, Australia was recognised as an good place to send

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K.P. Marczuk, *Australia’s History and Background of Migration…*

**Chart 1. Ethnic groups in Australia (2011)**


All the ‘redundant’ citizens of the UK, namely criminals. The second determinant is linked to Australia’s natural resources: Australia is rich in, among other things, gold. During the gold rush of the mid-19th century, which began after the discovery of the gold mines in New South Wales, thousands of people from different parts of the world, including China, decided to come to Australia to improve their living standard.

The third determinant is related to the previous one, as well as to the current political and economic situation in Australia. Despite the fact that the ‘white Australia’ policy remained in place until the beginning of the 1970s, today approximately two-fifths of all new immigrants to Australia are of Asian origin. Furthermore, Australia’s migration policy changed considerably after World War II, when the Australian authorities came to understand that if they wanted their state to develop, they needed to accept more immigrants to boost the economy (for example, many Italians decided to immigrate to Australia following World War II⁸).

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⁸ On a side note, it seems relevant to mention the results of the censuses of the Italian population conducted in Australia in 1933, 1947 and 1991. For comparison purposes the number of Poles is included as well:
China seems to be Australia’s main partner – in 2012 the Australian government adopted a White Paper with the telling title: ‘Australia in the Asian Century’, which emphasized the political and strategic implications of cooperation between Australia and Asia. As regards social ties, Australia tries hard to attract thousands of Chinese students to Australian universities. At the same time, programmes in Australian Studies are run in China (for instance, at the Australian Studies Centre at Peiking University), which may attract Chinese immigrants to Australia in the future.

Obviously, the list of the determinants of immigration to Australia presented above is not exhaustive. Our aim was only to point out those determinants which have had considerable influence on Australia’s migration policy.

2. The cornerstones of Australia’s current migration policy

The recent developments in the international political situation, the massive influx of refugees to other states and, also, the flow of not only authorized, but also unauthorized immigrants, have prompted actions of the Australian government that have been widely criticized. A recent and well-known example of a strict migration policy is the so-called Pacific Solution programme, implemented in 2001 by the government of Prime Minister John Howard. Since the number of unauthorized boats arriving to Australia had been increasing rapidly, Howard’s government decided to transfer them to offshore centres established on the Nauru and Manus Island (Australia signed an Administrative Agreement with Nauru in 2001 in order to attain this aim). In 2008 the government of Prime Minister Kevin Rudd dismantled the Pacific

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Nationality of immigrants</th>
<th>Number of Italians / Poles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1933</td>
<td>Italian/Polish</td>
<td>17,658 / 1,757</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Italian/Polish</td>
<td>7,172 / 1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991*</td>
<td>Italian/Polish</td>
<td>409,464 / 64,899</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*) Data according to the language spoken at home


Solution, but in 2012 it was recommended to re-establish the offshore processing facilities.\textsuperscript{11}

In 2013 Kevin Rudd announced: ‘As of today, asylum seekers who come here by boat without a visa will never be settled in Australia’.\textsuperscript{12} This, among other things, led to the flagship social campaign of 2014 aimed at discouraging newcomers coming to Australia illegally by boat. Its famous slogan is: ‘No way – you will not make Australia home.’ One of the best-known elements of the campaign is a short video in which the current Chief of Army, Lieutenant General Angus Campbell, presented against the background of the campaign’s poster featuring a turbulent sea, informs all potential immigrants that they will not be given entry into the country if they come there by boat without a visa.\textsuperscript{13} This is only one example of a variety of actions the government has undertaken in the last couple of years in order to restrict illegal immigration. In addition, in 2013 the Australian government launched the military-led border security operation known as Operation Sovereign Borders (OSB), which involves the military controlling asylum operations. According to the official Internet website of the Australian government devoted to the OSB, ‘Australia remains committed to ending the criminal activity of people smuggling. Anyone who tries to come to Australia by boat without a visa will be turned back to their country of departure’.\textsuperscript{14}

Recently, Australia’s policy of restricting immigration has been applied by the government led by current Prime Minister Malcolm Turnbull, who announced in November 2016 that a law prohibiting refugees and asylum seekers on Manus Island and Nauru from coming to Australia would (soon) be passed. The solution used by the government of Australia, namely keeping unauthorised arrivals out of Australian territory, was made possible by the Migration Act, which was adopted in 1958 and later amended several times, most recently in 2016. The long title of the law is ‘An Act relating to the entry into, and presence in, Australia of aliens, and


the departure or deportation from Australia of aliens and certain other persons’, a title which accurately reflects its nature. This law replaced the above-mentioned 1901 Immigration Restriction Act.

Particular attention should be drawn to the catalogue of objectives included in the Migration Act, namely ‘[…] to regulate, in the national interest, the coming into, and presence in, Australia of non citizens. […] visas permitting non citizens to enter or remain in Australia and the Parliament intends that this Act be the only source of the right of non citizens to so enter or remain. […] This Act provides for non citizens and citizens to be required to provide personal identifiers for the purposes of this Act or the regulations. […] This Act provides for the removal or deportation from Australia of non citizens whose presence in Australia is not permitted by this Act. (5) To advance its object, this Act provides for the taking of unauthorised maritime arrivals from Australia to a regional processing country’.15

It is thus safe to say that in the Australian authorities’ view, a restrictive migration policy is a part of Australia’s national interest. It might be noted, however, that the act was significantly amended in 1966 by the cabinet of Prime Minister Harold Holt: the restrictions were relaxed, and more immigrants were able to come to Australia easier.16

As mentioned above, Australia has adopted the policy of preventing unauthorized arrivals from coming to the country by relocating them to extraordinary camps outside its territory (on Manus Island in Papua New Guinea and on Nauru Island). In 2016 the government of Australia and the US administration agreed that some asylum seekers – a total of 1,200 people, mainly representatives of the most vulnerable groups – would be resettled to the United States.17 The future will show if the administration of the new US President will support this solution.

3. The European Union, its Member States and Australia’s migration and refugee experiences

As mentioned above, in the mid-1970s Australia became more open to newcomers, including asylum seekers. One of the main factors that prompted


this change was the Vietnam War and, in consequence, the infl ow of Vietnamese refugees to Australia. This phenomenon forced Australia’s authorities to adopt refugee policy rules in 1977. Following slight modifications, these rules still underpin Australia’s refugee policy (Table 2).

Table 2. The principles of Australia’s refugee policy (1977)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1. Australia fully recognises its humanitarian commitment and responsibility to admit refugees for resettlement</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2. The decision to accept refugees must always remain with the Government of Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Special assistance will often need to be provided for the movement of refugees in designated situations or for their resettlement in Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. It may not be in the interest of some refugees to settle in Australia. Their interests may be better served by resettlement elsewhere. The Australian Government makes an annual contribution to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which is the main body associated with such resettlement</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


As a result, since the mid-1970s Australia has received more refugees and immigrants. Not everybody is accepted, however, and boats with unauthorised immigrants are turned back. This is the reason why Australia’s government is criticized by the international community, institutions such as UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees), and the media. For instance, in 2015 “The New York Times” published an editorial under the telling title: ‘Australia’s Brutal Treatment of Migrants’, where Australia’s policy was called inhumane. Moreover, the article emphasized that some European states could be attracted by the tough solution towards illegal immigration adopted by Australia.18

In recent years, European Union Member States have experienced a massive infl ow of refugees and immigrants, some of whom were not authorized to come to the EU. While the refugees are coming mainly from Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and the ‘economic’ immigrants from sub-Saharan Africa and the Balkans, both groups are trying to reach Europe either by boat or using inland pathways.19 Obviously the political leaders

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of European states, mostly of those states that have already faced a ‘maritime’ influx of refugees or immigrants, have been searching for the most workable solution to implement it into their own immigration policies. Some of the EU Member States, namely those of the Mediterranean Basin, which have received refugees and immigrants coming mainly by boat (as happens in the case of Australia), were even advised by Australian politicians to follow Australia’s example.

In 2015, the former Foreign Minister of Australia, Alexander Downer, claimed: ‘You have, in the Mediterranean, three choices’, by which he meant three possible options that might be applied in Europe in order to deal with the refugee crisis. The first is to continue the present policy, but in Downer’s view it would mean that newcomers, who come mainly by boat, will still drown. The second choice is to become more open to those who are coming to Europe, but this means that Europe would need to provide better and safer shipping for them. Finally, the third option is to turn back unauthorized boats in order to stop the drowning. Moreover, Downer claimed that Europe could establish refugee processing centres in northern Africa, and there decide who could be resettled to Europe.

However, despite the obvious similarity that in both cases asylum seekers are coming (to Australia and the Mediterranean region) by boat, there are numerous differences between the situation of Australia and the EU Member States. In the first place the political situation and the scale of influx of refugees and immigrants are different. Australia is a single state, while the EU consists of 28 sovereign states. Second, the geographical conditions should be taken into consideration: Australia has only sea borders, while the EU Member States also have land borders. Third, one should bear in mind that due to factors such as the ‘[…] number of inhabitants, population density, and history, modelling immigration and asylum policy after Australia, even if welcomed, would be hard to fully implement in Europe’. Also, the Stratfor agency noted that while some European politicians have claimed that the European Union should follow Australia’s example and establish offshore centres to process unauthorized arrivals, the differences between the EU’s and Australia’s conditions seem to be too numerous to follow this proposal.

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21 See: ibidem.


23 See: The Refugee Crisis, op.cit.

270
On the other hand, with respect to the relationship between Australia and the European Union, the state of the overall relationship between Australia and the EU appears to be very good, mainly in the economic sphere, since the mid-1990s. In 1995 Australia’s Prime Minister Paul Keating proposed to the European Commission to conclude a framework agreement in order to enhance mutual economic and social ties. Currently, bilateral relations are governed by the 2008 European Union – Australia Partnership Framework. Some provisions of the agreement concern border security matters, migration, and refugee policies. For instance, a Senior Officials’ Dialogue on Migration, Asylum and Diversity Issues is mentioned among the sectors for bilateral talks and closer cooperation in the field of border security, and immigration management is mentioned among security-related objectives.

In recent years a new agreement has been negotiated, which was supposed to be signed in 2016. This process started in 2015 with the conclusion of the Joint Declaration of the EU’s High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy/Vice President of the Commission and Australia’s Foreign Minister. The aim was to get Australia and the EU to enhance their cooperation in areas such as security policy, development, and also in migration and asylum matters. The mutual will to cooperate more closely was then expressed by the President of the European Commission Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Council Donald Tusk, and the Prime Minister of Australia Malcolm Turnbull in their common statement given after the terrorist attacks in Paris in 2015. As regards the refugee crisis, the politicians stated: ‘The displacement and mass movement of refugees and migrants is a global concern. We agreed that international protection must be granted to those entitled to it, in line with international law. Effective management of borders and fighting against migrant smuggling networks remain essential, as well as tackling

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the root causes of the current migration and refugee crisis’. These words mean that both Australia and the EU are aware of the need for bilateral as well as international cooperation in order to manage the refugee and migration crisis.

Conclusions

The refugee and migration crisis has forced both the European and the Australian leaders to search for new solutions for dealing with it. While some European politicians consider the Australian model attractive, they also should be aware of the fact that the situations of Australia and the EU are significantly different in certain critical aspects.

The research conducted for the purpose of this paper led to the following final conclusions:

First, the key points of Australia’s migration and refugee policies and their determinants are strictly linked with the history of this state. Unlike European countries, Australia was founded on immigration, initially from Europe (at the beginning from the UK), and later from other parts of the world, mainly from Asia. Australia’s geographical location, political system, close ties with the UK and with the United States after World War II, growing economy, welfare system – these are only a few factors that have influenced Australia’s migration policy. It is necessary to underscore that Australia has only sea borders, so its immigration solutions are aimed at illegal immigration by boat.

Secondly, with regard to the current state of the EU’s and its Member States’ relationship with Australia concerning the refugee and migration crisis, one should keep in mind that the number of newcomers in Europe is far greater than in Australia (a quantitative dimension). What is more, Europe receives mainly asylum seekers, while Australia also has immigrants from its Asian neighbourhood (a qualitative dimension).

The above differences lead to the conclusion that the history and solutions implemented in Australia’s migration and refugee policies are not fitted to the European Union. Thus, the assumption made at the beginning of this article has been confirmed.

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Bibliography


Book Reviews
The book is composed of five studies concerning various aspects of the cohesion policy. The first two essays, by Adam A. Ambroziak and Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, address general issues, while the next three, by Marzena Weresa, Michał Schwabe and Grażyna Wojtkowska-Łodej, assess the activities under the cohesion policy in Poland in the 2007–2013 programming period. The last text, by Adam A. Ambroziak, focuses on state aid for enterprises between 2007 and 2013.

Essentially, the subject of the study is very relevant and important. As is commonly known, the funds provided by the EU to Poland (under regional policy) create a unique opportunity for economic development. Not only do they considerably increase the possibilities of financing investments in general but they also stimulate investments, which requires determination and effective programming and implementation of the planned activities.

This is particularly important given that the present programming period is the last one under which Poland receives such large transfers. The reasons for this are as follows.

First, some regions will no longer meet the criterion of Objective 1: Convergence (Masovian Voivodeship). Second, there has been a change in the approach to regional policy, which is reflected in the debate on cohesion policy, critical opinions of its effectiveness, drawing attention to the significance and role of well-developed regions and cities, which are particularly predestined to creating innovation and capable of emitting growth impulses to their surroundings. This seems to undermine the view that evening out development opportunities (convergence) is the most important task; supporting the most creative and innovative centres could prove a more effective option. After some time, due to the spread of knowledge (being considered a public good), less developed regions will start benefiting from the growth of the ‘strongest’ ones as well. Third, the
battle for the budget for 2014–2020 shows that we should expect future budget restrictions (this had already been announced), and this seems especially probable given the situation in the euro area and a potential ‘Greek exit’, which could cause considerable turbulences in EU markets.

This means that the way European funds received in this programming period are to be invested should be particularly well-thought out and that the experience gathered in 2007–2013 is especially important. Thus, studies such as these are highly valuable: based on a diligent analysis, they formulate recommendations for policies (policy implications) and politicians, pointing out what should be the focus of attention in the present programming period and how to avoid the mistakes that were made in 2007–2013.

The essays presented in the book address various subjects but all share the central theme of cohesion policy. Adam A. Ambroziak addresses the evolution of the approach to cohesion policy and argues in a highly lucid manner that the current option of this policy could change the rules of division of funds in future programming periods, which – as has already been mentioned – should be a ‘warning signal’ for Poland.

The second study, by Elżebieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska, focuses on the issue of compliance of Polish strategic documents with the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy. I believe that it is very important to address this issue; the key element of successful implementation and execution of projects is the elimination of potential contradictions in the fundamental national and EU documents.

The next three essays, by Marzenna Weresa, Michał Schwabe and Grażyna Wojtkowska-Łodej, assess the execution of projects implemented in the programming period 2007–2013 in three areas: innovation and competitiveness of enterprises, human capital, and environmental protection. I believe that the choice of these particular areas is fully justified. In light of the achievements of new economic geography and new theories of growth, increasing competitiveness and innovation levels as well as the quality of human capital are the most important factors of growth, while environmental policy is one of the most restrictive policies and can even limit growth (in the mid-term perspective).

The book ends with another study by Adam A. Ambroziak, titled State Aid to Enterprises in Polish regions in the Period 2007–2013, which analyses state aid for development and for raising the competitiveness of Polish enterprises in the regional perspective, which – in my opinion – perfectly complements the entire content of the book.

In light of the specificities of the issues addressed in this book, the authors of the studies apply different methodologies, depending on the
issue in question. Apart from a qualitative analysis, some essays examine statistical data, illustrating the degree and structure of the absorption of funds, present certain regularities and trends, which often reveal considerable asymmetry in the use of funds by Polish regions.

The first essay, written by Adam A. Ambroziak and titled *Theoretical aspects of regional intervention*, provides a very good introduction to the discussion. It conducts a diligent and comprehensive overview of the literature on the subject, outlining briefly (as determined by the limited length of the study) the entire complexity of the problems concerning regional policy and the difficulties in choosing the right variant of the policy. The author evaluates the policy (just as it is the case in the other studies) from various angles: political interests, socioethical issues and economics. He does not ignore any voices that may be important for the debate, he quotes the arguments found in the Barca report and in the World Bank report, which – beside some contradicting views – have considerably influenced the present change in the approach to regional policy. Furthermore, it should be emphasised that the author remains neutral in his analysis of the various options of cohesion policy and objectively presents the arguments of the authors of other studies, those of key significance to the course of the debate. Ambroziak’s literature review shows clearly the evolution of the approach to regional policy.

In the context of the debate, it is also worth noting that regional policy for many years ‘resisted’ any changes in the philosophical approach to economy. This is especially true of the 1980s, when the advantages of the free market and economic freedom were once again appreciated and when there were calls for reducing the role of the state to the bare minimum. This trend was especially strong in the economy of the United Kingdom under Margaret Thatcher (1979–1990) and the United States under Ronald Reagan (1981–1989), and the approach was also supported by international institutions (the Washington Consensus).

Those changes in economic policy were accompanied by a debate on its role and the extent of interference. It was pointed out that the flaws of governmental interventions were more harmful than the flaws of the market. Still, in the same period, European regional policy (the ERDF began its operations in 1975, but in the beginning it mainly reimbursed national spending) not only supported the SME sector, business environment institutions, intangible investments, R&D, transfer of technologies, or human resources but was also aimed at areas undergoing a structural crisis, which was clearly at variance with the increasingly popular ‘dogma’ of the effectiveness of horizontal actions.
In the next period (1989–1993), this trend became even more spectacular. Objective 2 of regional policy was formulated: ‘Converting the regions, frontier regions or parts of regions (including employment areas and urban communities) seriously affected by industrial decline (where both the percentage share of industrial activity and the average rate of unemployment exceed the Community average)’. The objective was accompanied by the following initiatives: RECHAR (support for areas dependent on coal-mining), RETEX (conversion of areas with a dominant role of the textiles industry), KONVER (conversion of areas with a dominant role of the arms industry).

Paradoxically, today, after the crisis has undermined the extremely neoliberal approach to economy, after huge assistance provided to the financial sector has challenged the dogma that the market will deal with the slump on its own, exactly opposite trends seems to be emerging in cohesion policy; equalisation is considered ineffective, and – while it is still applied – its rank and significance are considerably decreasing.

Leaving aside these remarks, the review of academic literature performed by Adam A. Ambroziak shows – as previously mentioned – the evolution of the approach to intervention. The author describes the principles of the new approach, with one of the most important of them being the adjustment of the type of intervention to the characteristics of the region, taking into account all of the local determinants (p. 24).

The author also quotes an OECD report according to which the general results of the cohesion policy are rather disappointing, which should be considered a further warning and an indication that the money that is now still guaranteed to Poland should be spent on well-considered, justified investments, suiting the endogenous potential of the region.

The second text, by Elżbieta Kawecka-Wyrzykowska and titled *Alignment of the Cohesion Policy in Poland to objectives and principles of EU economic strategies (the Lisbon and Europe 2020 Strategies)*, presents whether and to what extent the objectives of regional policy in Poland are coordinated with the EU’s economic strategies (the Lisbon Strategy and the Europe 2020 strategy). As promised in the introduction, the author conducted a thorough analysis of the provisions concerning cohesion policy in the Lisbon Strategy and examined whether and to what extent they have been reflected in the objectives set in Polish strategic documents. As regards Europe 2020, the focus is on how cohesion policy implements the objectives of this strategy. Furthermore, the author addresses the renewed strategy, aptly pointing out that the modified version already takes into account the new approach to this policy in the 2007–2013 programming period. Next, she discusses the provisions of Polish strategic documents
(DSRK, Strategia 2020, NSR 2020) and shows nine strategies integrated with them, whose very names (titles) indicate correlation with the objectives of cohesion policy.

The general conclusion from this intellectually disciplined disquisition is that changes that have taken place based on accumulated experience will force the Member States and regions to focus their efforts on a limited number of investments in order to maximise their effects. The new approach is also manifested in the capacity for adjustment due to coordinated activities under the European semester.

Indeed, all the arguments presented by the author indicate that all the present Polish and EU strategic documents are characterised by a high degree of coherence, which in itself provides a good basis for the implementation of the goals of cohesion policy on the EU, national and regional levels. It is worth adding that the author notices the problems related to the procedures in cohesion policy, referring to them as extremely bureaucratic, time-consuming and requiring dozens of officials.

The study by Marzenna Weresa titled Instruments of Regional Innovation Policy Supporting Improvements in the Competitive Position of Polish Enterprises in 2007–2013 focuses on identifying of the instruments of innovation policy supporting the competitiveness of Polish enterprises that have been activated in the previous financial perspective (in Polish regions). Despite the rather modest size of the study, the author provides a synthetic discussion of all the important subjects required for a comprehensive analysis. A brief theoretical introduction reminds the reader that competitiveness is a highly complex category, that the approach to it is not unambiguous (as indicated by Ecorys studies, the structure of the Regional Competitiveness Index, etc.). Next, the author considers whether the Regional Innovation Strategy has properly addressed the issue of innovation and competitiveness on the enterprise level. She takes note of the differences between regional innovation strategies and, divides them into three groups (using the division proposed by Gorzelak, taking into account specific criteria). Then follows a presentation of the instruments for supporting innovation and competitiveness of enterprises in Poland (divided into three groups of regions) and of the allocation of funds from Regional Operational Programmes supporting innovation and competitiveness. The data presented in the study points to the existence of considerable regional differences but many projects could still be implemented by the end of 2015, which might change the scale of disproportion. The second argument for exercising some caution in the interpretation of the available data is the fact that the actual effects of the allocation can be seen only in the long-term perspective. I would encourage the author to con-
continue with these interesting studies because the conclusions could prove very important. The analysis conducted by Weresa suggests that despite considerable efforts and the application of many instruments, there was insufficient coordination to maintain balance between supporting competitiveness and cohesion. It is an important conclusion and a valuable advice for decision-makers.

The study by Michał Schwabe is titled *Effectiveness of support instruments for Polish entrepreneurs within the EU human capital development policy in the years 2007–2013*. The issue addressed therein is extremely important because, as previously mentioned, human capital is now considered the key factor of economic development. The author presents the objectives and priorities of the Regional Operational Programme Human Capital (pointing out those that were implemented on the regional level and those implemented on the national level). The overview of the undertakings conducted under this Operational Programme seems to suggest a considerable success. On the other hand, Poland fares very poorly compared to other EU countries and in GCR rankings. Can we therefore assess investments in human capital only on the basis of the spending on various measures aimed at improving it? Are the good reviews of courses (raising qualifications, improving education, vocational training) issued by people who benefit from them truly objective? The author points out, in a very detailed manner, that these opinions might be false. Finally, the gravest argument seems to be that the curricula of the proposed courses do not reflect the needs of enterprises while the trainers not always have sufficient qualifications.

The study by Grażyna Wojtkowska-Łodej, titled *Aid Instruments for Entrepreneurs in Regions in Poland under the EU Environmental Policy in the years 2007–2013*, addresses another very important and sensitive subject related to environmental policy. The author presents the objectives and instruments of environmental protection, the Polish documents regulating environmental protection issues, showing how they comply with European regulations. The study further presents the data concerning the spending on environmental protection according to national and regional operational programmes as well as the data concerning the implementation of the Operational Programme Infrastructure and Environment. Through a comprehensive analysis of indicators she shows that projects co-financed from EU funds have contributed considerably to the improvement of the environmental situation in many regions of Poland. In the future, the author could also try to conduct a comprehensive overview of the implementation of these projects after 2015.

These three studies evaluating the measured implemented under EU regional policy in the 2007–2013 programming period leads to a rath-
er surprising conclusion: the most notable and unchallenged effects achieved in relatively short time were those of environmental protection programmes. Indeed, they have led to an improvement of living conditions, but they also have economic implications. For the Polish economy, which is energy-intensive and largely based on coal, this economic dimension is not that positive.

The last essay, authored by Adam A. Ambroziak, is titled State Aid to Enterprises in Polish Regions in the Period 2007–2013. As we know, state aid is hedged with special restrictions (it is allowed in order to mitigate the imperfections of the market). The analysis conducted by the author suggests that only 30 per cent of the total amount spent on state aid was allocated to improving the competitiveness of enterprises (assistance regarding R&D&I, support for SMEs, for various forms of trainings and regional aid). Ambroziak’s study leads to very important conclusions, which – in my opinion – provide the basis for deep reflection on the changes in state aid allocation.

The studies discussed above are of very high academic quality. Together, the essays constitute a coherent whole and provide much important and relevant information on the cohesion policy. They present the policy’s evolution and the theoretical debate that led to this evolution. It has been shown that Polish strategic documents are consistent with EU strategies, which – given the additional agreements under the European semester – provides a good foundation for the implementation of the intended actions. Furthermore, on the basis of a thorough analysis of statistical data, the studies present the conclusions drawn from the previous programming period in the following spheres: innovation and competition, human capital, environmental protection and state aid for enterprises. These conclusions are particularly valuable and should be made public and used in the implementation of projects in the present programming period. They are of great significance for better and more effective use of the funds and should be taken into account to avoid the mistakes made in 2007–2013.

Krystyna Gawlikowska-Hueckel
Faculty of Economics
University of Gdansk
Poland’s membership in the European Union has been and will undoubtedly continue to be the subject of many political, legal, social and economic analyses. Especially important among these are those conducted by scientists and combining multiple disciplines of science as this by definition eliminates the main flaw that plagues some studies: a one-sided view on the consequences of Poland’s accession to the European Union. This book is an excellent example of a multidirectional approach to the analysis of the complex effects of membership in the EU, not only in the purely economical dimension but also from the legal, political and social point of view. For obvious reasons, it does not cover all aspects of Poland’s participation in European integration, but it skilfully and logically combines eight multifaceted analyses of the experience from membership in the European Union. The book titled *The European Union and Poland – Problems and Achievements* has been compiled and published by researchers from the Centre for Europe, University of Warsaw, all of them having many years of documented achievements in this field.

The analysis of the socioeconomic consequences of Poland’s accession to the EU begins with the chapter ‘Poland’s Membership in the EU and Global Challenges. Selected Issues’ by Kamil Zajączkowski and Marta Pachocka. The purpose of this study was to identify selected global challenges facing the European Union, and thus Poland as well, and to identify the main consequences for integration and the EU’s position in the world. The authors aptly point out that by joining the European Union Poland has also become a constituent of a ‘global actor’, with all the positive and negative consequences of that fact. For the purpose of a detailed analysis, they identified the three key global challenges, on which the EU and Poland have to take positions: (a): wars, conflicts and the related EU crisis management operations, (b) poverty and the related EU develop-
ment assistance, as well as (c) migrations and the related EU migration policy; the subsequent parts of the chapter follow this division.

As regards the issues related to the European Union’s crisis management missions in the world, the authors aptly point out the changes in the approach to the interrelated policies: the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy, as immanent components of the EU’s comprehensive strategy for global activity. They emphasise that the CSDP should constitute added value with regard to NATO and that supporting CSDP should thus by no means be construed as creating competition for NATO. Furthermore, they perform a very precise and diligent review of the main missions in which Poland has participated and identify the key objectives it sought to achieve. They also note that the new global challenges require Poland’s involvement on both the political and military levels throughout the world, not solely in the immediate geographical neighbourhood. This part is probably best summed up by an observation that in the present international situation economic power alone is not enough to effectively secure the EU’s and its Member States’ fundamental geopolitical interests.

In the next part of the first chapter, the authors try to answer the question of whether global development problems concern Poland as well. To this end, they present the outline of the EU’s development policy as well as Poland’s contribution to its formulation and implementation. They observe that the gradual increase in the amounts contributed by Poland to the EU budget is not accompanied by a dynamic growth of allocations to bilateral aid, with multilateral aid still prevailing. This situation is, however, not specific to Poland alone; it is true of all the new Member States. The authors, seeking to assess the development policy, point out that Poland’s use of the available development assistance instruments has not been sufficient to improve its political and economic position, and they also suggest that Poland should place greater emphasis on projects related to the energy industry, the environment, or those that combine business and development. Without questioning the political value of Poland’s involvement in international aspects, we need not forget about the economic consequences, about the traditional relations of some countries with certain regions, for example Africa, as well as about the potential costs and prospects of becoming a full participant in development policy.

International migration has been rightly identified as the third challenge faced by the European Unions. This is a particularly sensitive subject in the present situation, in mid-2015, and it seems that it should be addressed using different instruments than the ones applied so far. In this context, the analysis of the evolution of the European migration policy
towards movements of non-EU citizens is very well done. Furthermore, the authors describe the common elements of the Polish migration policy, its adjustments and ‘Europeanisation’ towards the actions of the EU in response to global challenges. It seems, however, that apart from traditional European values, which suggest a migration policy based on solidarity, it should also take into account economic and cultural elements as well as the traditional historical ties between some EU Member States and the migrants’ countries of origin.

In the second chapter of the book Dariusz Milczarek analyses the evolution of Poland’s influence on the development of the EU’s eastern policy. The author wonders about the effectiveness of EU’s policy towards the East in the context of the situation in Ukraine. It seems that the main difficulty lies in setting common goals that would be accepted by all the EU Member States. The author analyses in detail various concepts concerning the territory to be covered, and finally chooses the best one, as it seems: the ‘policy towards Eastern Europe’. Next, he presents the genesis of the EU’s eastern policy, highlighting key dates, logical links between events and global reactions to crucial and historic phenomena taking place in the region in question. It should also be noted and commended that the author presents a multifaceted approach to the aforementioned events, showing the degree of significance from the point of view of various actors, including the European Union, NATO, Russia.

What seems particularly interesting and innovative is the concept of division of the EU’s eastern policy into the Eastern Partnership and the strategic partnership with Russia. Based on the research objectives described in the introduction, the author focuses mainly on the first pillar; this highlights the need to conduct further studies on the relations between the EU and Russia. He examines the principles, institutions and mechanisms of the Eastern Partnership. The article suggests that from the economic point of view association agreements and the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area are very important constituents of the Eastern Partnership. Even though this chapter does not focus on economic aspects, the author has outlined the principal elements of liberalisation of trade, which has proved to be the main contentious issue between the EU and Russia, and has also addressed visa issues as a subject of key importance for ordinary people and their perception of the everyday effects of rapprochement between Eastern European countries and the EU.

Of particular note is the exceptionally clear presentation of Poland’s role as an initiator and executor of the EU’s eastern policy. The author discusses Poland’s involvement in the development and promotion of this policy, which seems by all means justified, but also, which is worth
noting, presents a specific interpretation of the concept of ‘executor of the EU’s eastern policy’. It would seem that it is the European Union as a whole, as an international organisation, that should be the only executor of its own foreign policy. However, the author managed to superbly identify the ‘executor’ – Poland as well as the ‘means of execution’ and the instruments used. This is one of few attempts at implementing the concept of Poland as a country that initiates and Europeanises this policy, in the form of EU policy, and then almost independently implements its instruments. The chapter concludes in a review of the main achievements and failures. The author objectively identifies and analyses their consequences. It is noteworthy, however, that he managed to excellently link the difficulties in implementing the eastern policy to their causes, both those encountered by Poland alone and those faced by the EU as a whole. In the conclusions, the author identifies and evaluates both the positive and the negative opinions on the effectiveness of the EU’s eastern policy. Towards the end of the chapter, he very aptly notes that given the current political configuration in Europe, Poland has a historic opportunity to become a bridge between the western and northern part of the continent (to which it already formally belongs) and a number of Eastern European countries.

When analysing Poland’s situation in the EU and in the international arena, it is difficult not to mention the regional dimension. In this context, the choice of the excellent chapter by Artur Adamczyk for this book (‘Cooperation of the Visegrad Group Member Countries within the European Union: Experiences and Challenges for Poland’) should be highly praised. The author of the chapter briefly presents the genesis of the Visegrad Group (or the Visegrad Four – V4) and then moves on to identify the main subjects and forms of the V4’s cooperation in the European Union. He observes that even though the V4 was established for both economic and political reasons, after the accession to the EU it soon turned out that it was hard to find common areas for joint action and common long-term goals that would cement the cooperation between the four countries within in the European Union. Unfortunately, however, the more the V4 countries analysed the intricacies of EU policies and the details of the decisions contained in EU legislation, the more their national interests differed. Moreover, concerned about the possible dominance of Poland as the largest partner in the grouping, the other three countries of the Visegrad Group (Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary) have been looking at many Polish initiatives with great reserve.

Despite those difficulties, the author has managed to identify some common areas of cooperation between the Visegrad Group countries: ne-
negotiations of the 2007–2013 financial perspective, the eastern dimension of EU policy, elements of the European energy policy and of the climate & energy package. In this context, the author has identified the key national interests of the V4 countries and the extent of their possible and actual cooperation and has precisely analysed the actions of the Polish diplomacy, specifying their scope, nature and targets – not only among the Visegrad Group but among all the EU Member States – and highlighting the possible areas where success has been achieved as well as the final results. What is particularly important is that the text is not limited to a mere analysis of the situation and positions of the V4 countries towards the problems, especially within the framework of the Eastern Partnership, but it also presents the broader international context, taking into account the opinions and actions of the other interested EU and non-EU countries.

A particularly noteworthy aspect of the text it that the analysis takes into account the concepts that could negatively impact the coherence of the Visegrad Group, for example the Danube cooperation project between Romania and Austria. Furthermore, the author presents in a detailed and precise manner the potential challenges to further cooperation of the Visegrad Group within the European Union: the conflict in Ukraine and the attempt to develop a coherent common EU position on that issue. Another aspect of particular note is the carefully weighed presentation of the position of Poland and the other V4 countries towards the European Union’s sanctions against Russia. This was especially difficult because of the multitude of positions, many changes and modifications introduced and the new emerging concepts, but the author managed to tackle the problem with great success, skilfully positioning the highly divergent positions of the V4 countries on the timeline of the European Union’s key decisions in this field. At the end of the chapter, the author very aptly observes that his analysis of the functioning of the Visegrad Group has shown that it is most certainly visible in the EU but not necessarily very effective.

The next text, ‘Poland in the European Union: a decade of successes or problems? From the perspective of the use of EU funds’ by Przemysław Dubel, is the start of a slightly different research approach. It has been devoted to the impact of European funds in Poland. It highlights both the positive and the negative effects of supporting social projects financed from EU funds in Poland, and to this aim it places the measures implemented in Poland in the broadly defined context of the EU’s regional policy. The author points out the significance of regional policy as a platform for cooperation between government administration and local authorities. It should be noted, however, that the concepts of spending European funds on the regional level should be consulted at least with their
ultimate beneficiaries: entrepreneurs, whose resourcefulness determines economic growth, socioeconomic development, creation of new jobs and the implementation of innovative solutions.

Furthermore, the author aptly observes that the objectives of regional policy defined at the EU level include both promoting competition and eliminating inequalities between regions. Indeed, this concept seems to be right, albeit very difficult to implement; because it is still being debated in the field of economics what relation there actually is between increasing entrepreneurs’ capability of competing in international markets and an increase in economic growth that facilitates the ‘catching up’ with the better developed regions of the EU (convergence). The next parts of the chapter have been devoted to presenting the available and already spent amounts from European funds under the 2004–2006 and 2007–2013 perspectives.

Finally, the chapter discusses the main barriers to the use of European funds. The research conducted by the author has revealed the main factors that restrict the freedom of operation of companies receiving EU funds. It is worth noting, however, that the considerable administrative and financial requirements concerning the potential beneficiaries of European funds as public funds should ensure proper and effective use of the taxpayer’s money. At the end of the chapter the author points out that the barriers generate additional costs for both the beneficiaries and the institutions that hold the competitions and implement the projects; so far, however, no institution has attempted to estimate them. This observation is by all means an invitation to conduct further interesting studies on the issue.

The next chapter, titled ‘Convergence and competitiveness problems for the Polish economy in the European Union’, continues the discussion on the influence of Poland’s accession to the European Union on its economy. Kazimierz Ryć, puts forward theses about EU membership having considerable influence on the competitiveness of the Polish economy and the need to join the euro area. Evidence supporting these observations is provided in subsequent parts of the chapter, in which the author points out, among others, that price competitiveness is no longer a clear incentive for investment in Poland.

The author’s definitive statement about the invisible hand of the free market that has improperly guided investments and – more broadly – capital flows is at least dubious; instead of convergence there was in fact divergence. It is rather obvious that capital moves to more profitable locations, which leads to an increase in overall prosperity but at the cost of growing disproportions on the regional level.
In the following part of the chapter, the author discusses the consequences of the uneven development levels and the lack of real convergence. He further presents a rather controversial opinion about the negative impact on the South, leading to the loss of some sales markets and to deindustrialisation, as well as that open economy benefits only the North. However, he also very aptly observes that the economic crisis in fact exposed the weakness of the economies of many countries.

The next part of this chapter has been devoted to the description and analysis of Polish opinions on the euro area and Poland’s participation in this undertaking. In order to ensure that the disquisition is as clear as possible, the author has performed a thorough analysis of a report of the National Bank of Poland, taking into account GDP levels, production costs and prices of the factors of production, flexibility of the labour market, and the consequences of giving up on the national competences in monetary policy. One very interesting part of the study focuses the question: if not the euro, then what?, and the author should be commended for presenting a broad overview of the main theses and proposals concerning Poland’s participation in the euro area.

Finally, the author aptly observes that we should support the integration of the European Union around the common currency because, first, it already exists, and second, the global economy needs the euro.

The next chapter of the book has been dedicated to Polish trade within the EU. The chapter, authored by G. Tchorek and J. Czaja, is an analysis of the trade flows from Poland to the European Union against the background of the trade exchange of the Visegrad Group. The approach adopted by the authors seems to be just right and very relevant. Poland’s cooperation with the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary, which began in the early period of the system transformation, has led to many positive joint actions in the international arena, including in Europe. However, despite political consent to close cooperation, we are still more often than not dealing with negative competition rather than examples of positive actions. And in this light the analysis of Poland’s trade compared with the other members of the Visegrad Group provides very valuable insight.

In the first part of the chapter, the authors present a thorough review of the theoretical literature on trade openness and diversification and specialisation in production and export. They address the issue of the relation between trade and GDP, highlighting two approaches focusing on either specialisation or diversification of production and trade. Furthermore, they show how the application of gravity models of international trade reveals the factors that affect bilateral trade exchange: the size of the economies and the distance between them.
The second part of this chapter has been devoted to the main currents in studies of the movement of goods and investments in the Visegrad Group countries. The analysis covered a total of 27 studies, including 19 peer-reviewed; the selection is very broad and highly relevant and includes studies by Polish and foreign researchers, using various methods and models and focusing on various timeframes. Based on the review, the authors formulated three main conclusions concerning the post-accession period: (a) there has been distinct increase of the trade exchange between the V4 countries and the other members of the EU, (b) the significance of intra-industry trade has increased, stimulated mainly by the influx of foreign direct investment, and (c) the diversity of goods has grown and price competition is becoming less important.

In the next part the authors conduct an analysis of Poland’s position in the intra-EU trade. Finally, they formulate very good conclusions concerning both global trade and the trade within the Visegrad Group. They observe that the significance of Polish trade in the international arena has been growing in a relatively quick and constant pace (despite the crisis). According to them, this results from the still existing price competition, Poland’s strong ties to EU countries and the relatively high share of industry in its GDP. The study ends in a meticulous presentation of the data concerning the influx of foreign direct investment (FDI) to Poland as compared to the other countries of the Visegrad Group, where the authors also stress the relationship between FDI and the share of economies and entrepreneurs in the value chain. It would seem, however, that these preliminary conclusions should encourage further analyses in this field.

The next chapter is devoted to Poland’s energy security. Bartłomiej Nowak clearly counts energy security among the fundamental elements constituting general security, including economic security of the state. The author begins his analysis with the presentation of the legal basis, moving on to the main socioeconomic problems: ensuring the security of supply and maintaining reasonable prices for recipients and users. Furthermore, the author emphasises the political nature of the concept of energy security and the international dimension of the activities in this area.

The main part of the chapter is, however, devoted to the economic impact of energy security in Poland and stresses the direct connection with economic development. The author thus performs an analysis of the past and present demand for gas and on this basis formulates conclusions regarding the future demand for this resource. But the analysis covers demand as well, as a vital element of the market; in this context the author discusses the position of operators in Poland and identifies the potential
outcome of the attempts to extract shale gas. The past and present regulations as well as the preliminary steps taken by private investors could suggest potential influence of the availability of shale gas on Poland’s energy security.

In the next part, the author analyses the concept of energy security, its practical implementation and the past and present implications for the leading economies of the world (the US, Germany, France, the UK). It is noteworthy that the author linked the policy of diversification of resources with the shale gas deposits and the concepts of shale gas extraction, but he also highlighted other instruments and measures that should get rid of the monoculture of supply of energy resources and boost energy security: (a) introduction of innovative technologies, (b) establishment of mandatory reserves, (c) development of energy infrastructure, (d) conclusion of international agreements. With the above guidelines, the author performs a very thorough and critical analysis of the concept of energy security as presented in Polish government documents, including in *Poland’s Energy Policy until 2030*. On this basis he formulates the conclusion about the need for close cooperation between state authorities and entrepreneurs to ensure the country’s energy security.

The economic deliberations on the consequences of Poland’s membership in the European Union end with the very interesting chapter by Małgorzata Winter on managing public finance. This is a particularly important issue given Poland’s accession to the European Union because as a Member State Poland must fulfil a number of requirements concerning public finance: from the obligation to contribute to European funds, through the prohibition of state aid that would distort competition, to financial stability requirements related to the membership in the economic and monetary union. In this context, the author stresses the need to move from spending to managing public finance in Poland, which requires innovative implementation of the classic management functions: planning, decision-making, organisation, leadership and control.

The author performs a detailed review of the legislative developments concerning budgetary control, starting with the first regulations of 1989, to the solutions from the period of the financial and economic crisis – 2008–2010. On this basis, she aptly observes that there was no radical change in public finance control on the macro level following Poland’s accession to the EU, but new solutions were indeed introduced on the micro level (individual institutions) because of EU requirements, primarily regarding internal audit. These changes opened the way to the introduction of modern solutions applied in international institutions, also in accordance with the European Commission’s requirements.
Furthermore, the author has performed a detailed analysis of the notion of internal audit, explaining the concept and execution of verification of the internal assessment of financial management in various bodies. She has not only examined the Polish Public Finance Law and its amendments but also presented internal audit practice in Poland.

To sum up, I can say with full conviction that the book *The European Union and Poland – Problems and Achievements*, edited by Artur Adamczyk and Przemysław Dubel, contains many topics interesting for both academic discussion and economic practice. Many publications analysing the consequences of European integration for Poland have appeared on the occasion of the 10th anniversary of accession to the European Union; this book, however, stands out for a number of reasons. First of all, it is interdisciplinary and allows the readers to discover the political, legal, social, and economic impact of Poland’s accession to the EU. Second, the book presents the results of studies and assesses the effects of deeper European integration in areas such as institutional and economic cooperation with the Visegrad Group. It also describes the effects of Polish initiatives in areas of particular importance for the country: the Eastern partnership and energy security. With this, the publication fills a considerable gap in the academic literature on Poland’s membership of the EU, and despite the diversity of approaches, research methods and the subjects analysed, the authors managed to ensure that the layout is coherent and logical and the message conveyed to the readers is clear.

Another particularly noteworthy aspect of the publication is that the conclusions and recommendations contained in it are original and unconventional, based on a solid analysis of the available theoretical literature, reviews of the papers published on these issues so far and on the authors’ own research. Consequently, the book is not just a guide to selected aspects of Poland’s membership of the EU; it presents an intellectual challenge sparking further debates and research on the proposed topics. As a result, every reader of this publication will receive precise and reliable knowledge as well as suggestions for further research in the complex subject matter of European integration.

*Adam A. Ambroziak*

*Warsaw School of Economics*
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“Textbooks and Manuals” series

- Practicioners’ advice on EU project management, ed. Agata Dziewulska, Warsaw 2012.
As it is already visible, the European Union (EU) and the whole European Integration vision, concept or idea seems to be at the crossroads. On the one hand we had proud celebrations of the 60 anniversary of the Treaties of Rome, on the other, the future of the process is uncertain, emerging as a big interrogation point. In response to previous crisis situations, like rejection of the common Constitution proposal by the French and the Dutch public opinion in spring 2005, aftermath of deep economic crisis of 2008, or recently external security crisis in 2014 (Ukraine, Crimea, creation of so called Islamic State) and refugee-migrant crises of 2015, frequently combined with terrorist threat, the EU looks now like an entity which lost its azimuth, direction and blueprint. What more, we can observe some new phenomena on the continent like rise of the populist or nationalistic forces, growing so fast that one has the impression of a new ‘non liberal revolution’ undergoing. Simultaneously former federalist and supranational approaches are more and more frequently being replaced intergovernmental
solution, sometimes even going to the extreme, being both ethnocentric and nationalist, and frequently populist (against the current elites and political agendas of liberal or neoliberal nature).

Two factors, or major events from 2016, the BREXIT vote in the United Kingdom, and also presidential triumph of Donald Trump in the US elections, combined with visible growing assertiveness of Russian Federation (not only Ukraine and Donbas, but also Syria) and new strategic games of China (which has started to implement One Belt, One Road geostrategic vision, supported by some other new institutional frameworks, like AIIB or RECP) create also a completely new external situation for the EU, supplementing, so to speak, internal challenges by different categories of them, external by their nature.

In this respect we have on the agenda post-BREXIT scenarios and ideas, when former concepts of ‘hard core’, ‘multispeed Europe’, or ‘concentric circles’ of European integration re-emerged. Simultaneously one can observe new concepts of global order coming to the fore, probably more complicated and once again multipolar, after bipolar (1945–1991) and ‘unipolar moment’ of absolute US domination (1992–2008). In this circumstances there is a growing danger of diminished role by the EU on the global scene if it continue to stay in its current disarray and deep crises of so different nature.

However, for academics, experts and social science and international relations pundits, it is a kind of golden era of speculation, calculation and especially creativeness and new ideas coming to the fore, as a response to the world of policy and politics where we continuously observe a new game of interests, after BREXIT and ‘Trump phenomenon’ ever stronger. This way, it seems to be a fruitful times both for politicians and academics. In the era when we can detect so many inconsistent, erratic and destructive policies – both on domestic and international agenda – the time has come for new concepts, for invention, creativeness and new bold ideas, or even fresh theories, strategies and blueprints. All of them are kindly welcomed now.

So, in this era of multiple crisis and challenges in the EU and around it we are calling, for example, for texts examining:
Challenges if front of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) of the EU
Migrant and refugee crisis
The Eurozone crisis
Post-BREXIT scenarios of European integration
A role of the EU in the emerging new global order
The EU versus ‘Trump phenomenon’ and the future of Euro-Atlantic
relationship (including the future of TTIP)
The axiological crisis of the EU
The populist and nationalist challenge in the EU, including case studies of Euroskeptic and populist political parties or movements
The future of the European social model
‘Democratic deficit’ in the EU – how to tackle the problem
Vision of the EU and European Integration in front of illiberal challenges.

In this extraordinary wide array of issues a proposals can, of course, explore some other issues, close to the ‘directives’, or guidance, as indicated above. However, in all cases we strongly encourage our Contributors to offer especially comparative analyses – and explain the relevant conceptual, theoretical and methodological aspects of theirs proposed papers.

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The Authors are requested to follow the Guidelines for Contributors and submitted texts should meet the YPES style sheet as provide on our website: http://www.ce.uw.edu.pl/program-wydawniczy/rocznik/. In particular, the maximum word limits is 8000 words, including footnotes and bibliography.